

SEPARATION IS NO SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL IMBALANCE IN DEVELOPMENT

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The States Reorganisation Commission completed the task of reorganisation of the states in India on the basis of language. But, two other tasks remained: the problem of very large states, and the related problem of "one language, one state", instead of "one state, one language", which was what that Commission had created. Over time, discontent developed in many states about unequal regional development. The Fact Finding Committee on Regional Imbalance in Maharashtra identified imbalance on individual aspects of development, mainly with the district as a unit, and formulated a step-by-step approach to its eradication by identifying the physical quantum of imbalance and successively bringing the lagging districts to the state average level. Unfortunately, this approach does not appear to have been properly followed in the last two and half decades. The lack of development of inter-regional social empathy, as reflected in the attitudes and concerns of the political entities, appears to have led to the persistence of the feeling of neglect. That can be a basis of separation. But, creation of one or two separate states by itself can not solve the problem of regional imbalance and neglect, unless persistent effort is made in that direction. Proper decentralisation of power and resources to the Zilla Parishads and lower levels alone can atone for this.

Two decades after the movement for the bringing together of all adjacent areas where the bulk of the population were speaker of a particular language started in Orissa towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Indian National Congress, in its Nagpur session in 1920, passed a resolution constituting its provinces for its provincial committees on linguistic basis. The British government followed this up in 1936 by constituting three separate provinces, Orissa, Bihar and Sindh, on the basis of the languages spoken, namely, Odia, Hindi and Sindhi, respectively. In independent India, Andhra and Madras (Tamilnadu) were formed as two separate linguistic states in 1952. The acceptance of the States Reorganisation Commission's report by the Government of India in 1956 led to the formation of a number of separate states, most on the basis of language. The basic approach appeared to be: 'one language, one state', except for Hindi that had multiple states. There was another exception: the bilingual Bombay state. This was undone in 1960, when two separate unilingual states of Maharashtra and Gujarat were constituted. But for irritants of pockets of areas inhabited by people speaking one

language being left in some other adjoining state, the reorganisation of Indian states on linguistic lines appeared almost completed.

But, two other problems appeared to remain: the problem of very large states and the necessity of 'one state, one language' instead of 'one language, one state', the two being essentially related. Professor K.M. Panikkar, a member of the States Reorganisation Commission (SRC), had, in a minute of dissent [Government of India, 1955], strongly pleaded for the breaking up of the state of Uttar Pradesh into at least two states, on the ground that such a large state, in terms of population, with very heavy representation in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, would be counter to the health of the democratic federation of India. The matter was taken up by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (who, due to ill health, had not been able to make his presentation before the Commission or publicly at that time) in a book-let written in December 1955. While supporting Prof. Panikkar's proposition, Dr. Ambedkar went forward and advocated the splitting up of large states like Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Maharashtra into smaller and more manageable

homogenous unilingual states. He proposed three separate states of western, central and eastern Uttar Pradesh, two separate states of north and south Bihar, two separate states of northern and southern Madhya Pradesh and three separate states of western, central and eastern Maharashtra, besides a city state of Bombay. Ambedkar argued that while 'one state, one language' was a proper approach, there is no justification in insisting on 'one language, one state', as the SRC appeared to have done. Besides avoiding the very great weight of a single very large state in the central Parliament, a point forcefully made by Prof Panikkar, such small states will lead to better organisation of administration and provide better training ground for politicians in the government and legislature. Regional differences, often of differing historical origins, often tend to be overlooked in a unified large single state.

Like always in such matters in our country, these suggestions were then ignored, but taken up later, piece meal, at long intervals. Thus, Punjab was split into three smaller states in 1980 and Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh were divided into two separate states each, at the turn into the present century: Chhattisgarh was separated from Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand was separated from Bihar and Uttarakhand, a small part of Uttar Pradesh, from that state (remember Ambedkar). Now, there is a renewed demand for Telangana in Andhra Pradesh, for Vidarbha in Maharashtra and one or two others in other regions. The present Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh has advocated splitting the present state of Uttar Pradesh in to five separate states. There are strong advocacies for the constitution of a separate state of Bundelkhand, consisting of parts of Uttar Pradesh and adjoining Madhya Pradesh.

The reason for such renewed demand for separation of part of a single unilingual state and of a very large state is that there is a strong feeling in the region demanding separation that it has been neglected by the state government in matters

of socio-economic development which even today is the primary responsibility of the state government. The contents of this socio-economic development are not always clearly specified and often they appear to differ, depending on the groups of the discontented that advocate separation.

A little over two and half decades after the formation of a separate state of Maharashtra, such discontent in large parts of the state led to the strong advocacy for the setting up of regional development boards, which had been written into the Constitution, to advise the governor of the state who will make allocation of resources for remedying the imbalances. As a result, the state government constituted a fact-finding Committee on Regional Imbalances in Development in the State, under the chairmanship of Prof. V.M. Dandekar and consisting of a number of independent academics and some senior officers of the state government. I was one of the members.

The first two tasks before the Committee were to define development and to identify regions. After considerable discussion, the Committee came to the conclusion that only such socio-economic provisions which were the responsibility of the state will have to be examined for the purpose. In matters that were dependent on private investment and enterprise, the role of the state is largely negative - to suggest what shall not be permitted where. As for regions, the Committee realised that in the matter of provision of every socio-economic facility by the state in all habitations, rural and urban, looking at the aggregative two or three or four regions will not be helpful for the state to address itself in regard to resource allocation for its provision. The question will remain: how are the resources to be allocated to the individual habitations that lack such provisions. Therefore, it was decided that, by and large, the district shall be the unit for identification of deficit in each provision. In matters where the provision at the state level was

very poor, it would be more appropriate to take the taluka or the block as the unit for identification. From such district level data, aggregation for broad regions can be presented; but the unit of identification and action has to be the district.

The next question tackled was one of measurement of imbalance in matters of development of the districts. Since there was a large number of matters of development action by the state, beginning with provision of all-weather roads to villages and towns, of primary and secondary schools, of primary and district health centres to provision of flow irrigation and agricultural development programmes, it became clear that imbalance in regional development has to be measured separately for each such provision and remedial action provided for each separately. Aggregating all these into a single measure of imbalance of development of the district would be a meaningless exercise from the point of view of the state's action in remedying the imbalance.

The basic provisions had to be provided in every village. Flow irrigation had to be provided to all the land in the district that could be potentially irrigated by such projects. The data collected by the Committee showed how many villages/towns had the facility in complete measure and the extent of shortfall. One approach to remedying the shortfall would have been to start with the district with the largest percentage of villages without the facility in the state, and suggest that the district be brought to the next lowest level first. The same approach could then be followed for the next round. But it was realised that this ran the risk of most districts with no financial provision for the facility until the lowest district had come up to the next lowest level. This would be politically and socially untenable. So it was decided that the districts that were below the state average for the particular facility in the villages should first be identified and then the extent of shortfall in each such district be calculated. The state should provide resources to bring

the villages in each such district to the level of the state average. Each such district would receive funds in proportion to its shortfall from the state average. The years taken to bring the districts to the level of the state average would depend on the budgetary provision made by the state legislature for the purpose every year. Once the necessary number of villages without the facility are provided with it to bring the district position to the level of the state average, the state average should be calculated again. This will naturally be higher. And the same approach to allocation of resources for the purpose to bring the districts below the new state average will naturally cover a larger number of districts than earlier. In this manner the successive state averages would increase, until all districts are covered fully by the facility.

This manner of calculating shortfalls from the state average successively, for each item of socio-economic facility, has the advantage that no district will be without some financial provision for some or other facility in any year. For, it was most unlikely that the same set of districts were below the state average in regard to all facilities. The chances of unhappiness at the district level with such approach would therefore be eliminated.

The Committee's report showed the physical shortfall for the first round in case of every facility. The Committee also made a calculation of the cost of the first round of action for every facility, on the basis of the average cost for creation of such facility estimated by the concerned state department, on the basis of prices prevalent in 1983. These could be aggregated to show the amount of expenditure in the first round that would be involved, for the state government and the legislature to judge and make provision for. It is obvious that the proper shortfall was physical; the monetary expenditure will change from year to year due to changing prices. The real shortfall, in physical terms has to be seen and shown every year for every facility.

And finally, the Committee said that if this approach is accepted by the state government and the state legislature, there will be no need for the regional boards, since there will be no further work for them in this matter.

But this report and the recommendations were not fully accepted by the state government. The Regional Boards were created. They followed their own lines of measurement and recommendation. The Governor had the unenviable task of reconciling their recommendations and suggesting allocations to the state government. There was always a reference by the government to a financial backlog for the regions. It is difficult to understand how this figure came to be calculated, certainly not in terms of the Committee's first round estimates at 1983 prices!

The result is, the problem of regional imbalance persists in Maharashtra. When recently the State's Home Minister was appointed the guardian minister of Gadchiroli district, his first reaction on visiting the district was the inadequacy in development work in the district. This inadequacy is in regard to the very same basic provisions about which the 1983 Committee had made its suggestions. This is symptomatic of the inadequate provision of these facilities two and half decades after that Committee's recommendations, fifty years after the creation of Maharashtra and sixty years after the creation of the Republic of India.

It is no surprise, therefore, that there is a renewed demand for the creation of Vidarbha. No one has taken the trouble to present up-to-date data on the lines of the Report of the Committee on Regional Imbalance to show how Vidarbha or any other region in the State has suffered from negligence. This is because perceptions of negligence continue to be unclear, sometimes different. There is an overall lack of trust in the political leadership of the successive governments of the state. The ministers of the

state government coming from one region have little knowledge of the problems in other region and do not appear to show interest in these and sympathise with the regional people and their problems. Most of them have no social contact or relation with these regions. One is reminded of what Ambedkar wrote in 1955: 'It is a vast area and it is impossible to have efficient administration by a single state... Even from the point of view of the Marathas why should there be this consolidation? What affiliation has a Maratha of Satara got with the Maratha of Aurangabad? What affiliation has a Maratha of Nasik got with Maratha of Ratnagiri? What care and interest a Maratha of Satara is going to bestow upon the problems of the Maratha of Aurangabad? What care and interest a Maratha of Nasik is going to bestow upon the problems of the Maratha of Ratnagiri? The consolidation has no meaning and can serve no purpose'. Ambedkar does not refer to Vidarbha. But, today one can add: what relation do people from western Maharashtra have with the people of Bhandara and Chandrapur? The people from Ratnagiri possibly at best know that Bhandara grows rice; but nothing else, including how and when. It is a vast state with highly regionalised societies, with little connection between one another. It is no wonder that at the level of cabinet responsibilities and political organisation, there is little real understanding of the people and their problems from other regions. Even half a century after the formation of united Maharashtra this remains the situation. And, this appears to be at the root of the renewed demand for separation.

A separate state will greatly minimise these problems of lack of understanding, social cohesion and sympathy. In fact, one wonders if with the separation of Vidarbha, there will not be a demand, at some interval, for separation of Marathwada. It was this that led Ambedkar to suggest three states, not two.

Another useful result of multiple Marathi speaking states is also possible. With 'one language, one state', the fear of regional chauvinism, so detrimental to the Indian Union, was expressed by people like Ambedkar. While Marathi has not become the sole official language of the state and the courts, manifestations of such chauvinism are already visible. More than one Marathi speaking states is likely to be a check on such tendencies: There is little possibility that both the people and their leaders in all Marathi speaking states will speak the same language and raise the same slogans.

However, whether there are two Maharashtras or three, the problem of regional imbalance will remain, if it is not properly understood and systematic action taken to eradicate it. The mere formation of a separate state is no solution to this problem. Moreover, even after the solution to the problem of imbalance in development is taken care of by adoption of the approach suggested in the Report of the Committee on Regional Imbalance, there will be new emerging problems. The best way to handle these is decentralisation

of responsibilities and resources at the district level, as was very well tried out under the Zilla Parishad Act of 1961. Unfortunately, the party in power destroyed it after ten years of very encouraging operation, because the Ministers and MLAs felt neglected in their constituencies. This arises out of lack of understanding of the responsibilities of the elected representatives of the three tier system. The surest way of avoiding emergence of regional imbalance in development due to poor understanding of local problems and possibilities is to empower the elected local bodies with powers and financial resources to take decisions on local problems and handle these in their best considered ways. We must learn from our past mistakes and take steps early enough for their redress.

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REGIONAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES AND THE ISSUE OF STATES RE-ORGANISATION IN INDIA; A REVISIT

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The paper contends that demands for state reorganization and creation of new states have to be viewed basically as issues arising out of regional injustice. It is argued that a full-fledged theory of regional justice is yet to emerge in the literature. Most of the initiatives for conceptualization of issues of justice including Rawl's Theory of Justice mainly focus on 'individual' justice issues rather than the issues of 'regional' justice. Amartya Sen's contributions on justice provide opportunities for 'extension' of his approaches to analysis of regional justice. After a brief examination of the concept of 'regional justice' and also whether the rulers of the past in India had adopted regional justice perspectives the paper focuses on the recent initiatives to tackle the problem of regional injustice in the case of Karnataka, particularly through a High Powered Committee on Redressal of Regional Imbalances under the chairmanship of Dr DM Nanjundappa. After a brief critical analysis of the report of this Committee and subsequent developments in the state the paper concludes that creation of new states may not necessarily serve as a permanent solution of the problem of regional injustice.

Demands for creation of new states, inclusion of some territories of one state into another, treatment of some states as special category states, etc have been springing up with intensity in recent times necessitating revisit to the entire issue of states re organisation in India. Added to such developments relating to the states as a whole, there have also been demands to reorganise the sub regions of each state as well; the taluks are found to clamour for district-hood, bigger villages are found putting claims for a taluk status, etc. These demands for restructuring of states and the administrative units within particular states are not without any rationale-administrative, political, economic etc. Such demands and agitations voicing them essentially highlight that the region is not justly treated from all such points of view and hence the concerned region should get an opportunity to manage its own affairs. Though claims for separate statehood and agitations drawing public attention and the attention of the decision makers do provide an opportunity in a way for searching a way out for the on-going

problems it must be emphasised that the problems and challenges involved particularly in the context of reorganisation of states are too formidable to be resolved in a short period. The present paper tries to raise some of these issues, develop conceptual insights about 'regional justice' in general and briefly analyze the issues of regional justice in the context of the state of Karnataka examining the feasibility of demands for a separate state voiced in some of the sub regions of the state. Demands for new administrative units within a given state or restructuring of the existing administrative units within the states are also important issues, which do deserve some attention when we are examining the issues of regional justice. However, our focus in this paper is mainly on the larger issue of reorganisation of states within the country and its implications for regional justice. Such issues need to be examined objectively without being engulfed by emotions that are common in public debates on them. It should also be recognised that generally the powerful interest groups demanding separate

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This paper presents personal views of its author. The author expresses his thanks to the participants of a national seminar on States Reorganisation organised by the Indian School of Political Economy, Pune, on August 27-28, 2010, for the suggestions on the ideas presented in this paper. An earlier shorter version of this paper was presented as one of the background papers facilitating discussion in this seminar. The author's special thanks are due to Vikas Chitre, Honorary Director, Indian School of Political Economy, for evincing interest in the paper and also for his comments and suggestions. The author's thanks are also due to Nayanatara Nayak, In-Charge Director, CMDR for her comments on an earlier draft of the paper. The author benefited from his discussions with Sundara and Srinivasa Ritti, Professors of Ancient Indian History (retd.), about some historical aspects of regional justice issues presented in a section of this paper. The author expresses his grateful thanks to them. Usual disclaimers apply. His thanks are also due to Arun Kulkarni and B.P. Bagalkot for research assistance and secretarial support.

state status for some regions get strengthened by such debates and these interest groups also make efforts to organise such debates for mobilising public opinion in their favour. Our purpose in this paper is to examine the issue of state reorganisation in a conceptual framework of regional justice outlining at the same time historical experiences of the country in this connection.

Following is the plan of discussion in the paper:

First, in **Section I** we try to draw the attention of the readers to the challenges involved in the reorganisation of states in India in general terms by way of developing a setting for discussion of the conceptual aspects of the issue.

Then, in **Section II** we present, in brief, some of the conceptual aspects of regional disparities and regional justice, which should receive some attention in any theory of regional justice, which according to our view, is yet to develop fully.

In the above background, in **Section III** an attempt is made to briefly examine the views of eminent thinkers of our times, viz. John Rawls, author of *Theory of Justice*, a monumental work of our times on the subject, first published in 1972 and Amartya Sen, author of a number of insightful contributions on such themes climaxing in *The Idea of Justice*, first published in 2009, particularly their relevance to the development of a theory of regional justice.

We then present briefly in **Section IV** our views about whether in India the issue of regional justice was historically a less focused issue and the reasons for this relatively less attention.

Section V is devoted to an extended discussion of the problem of regional justice in the context of Karnataka and the recent attempts to handle this problem.

In the **Concluding Section**, a brief summary of the discussion in the paper is presented with our own view about whether the problems of regional injustice can be completely overcome and the lessons that we have to draw from the historical experiences in this connection.

I. HARSH REALITIES

State reorganisation in India has not been a one-time affair of 1956 only. It has been continuing since then. In 1960, 1963, 1966, 1971, 1972, 1975, 1987, and in 2000 newer states have come into existence in the country. Occasional eruption of emotions and public agitations seem to remind us about the problem being live with simmering discontent in the minds of people, which sometimes get capitalised by the political interests. The Government of India has recently admitted¹ that demands have been received by certain interests for creation of new states though the affected 'state governments' have not expressed their views on this subject. The hard facts about states reorganisation bring out the following;

* Linguistic States - a Boon or a Bane?

Linguistic state re organisation has proved to be both a boon and a bane in the country. Though the regional language is a powerful unifying force amongst people, which was recognised by the well meaning leaders, this has also given a handle -the easiest one at that- for the self interest seeking politicians to work on the emotions of the people to create disruptive forces. Anti Hindi agitations, anti out of the state language protests, antagonism not just for language but also for the speakers of the languages, etc are the too well known negative externalities experienced by the country. Resource costs of these negative externalities in terms of loss of life and property are a source of worry and concern. These losses run into several thousands of crores of rupees apart from the invaluable human losses.

* **Subtleties of Languages as the Basis for Reorganisation; Recent Developments**

Now the country has graduated into a stage of considering 'subtleties' of the same language and seeking some identity for each of these subtleties, rather than comparing one's language with altogether a different language. Thus, the language of Kannada spoken in Kodagu or Coorg (a district of south Karnataka adjoining Kerala borders) - the language kodava thakk, with influences of Malayalam, the spoken language of Kerala and of Tamil, the language of Tamilnadu) has tended to unify people of that sub-region of the state for claiming a separate state of Kodagu itself. Similarly, the language of Kannada spoken in Bombay Karnataka with influences of Marathi, the spoken language of adjoining Maharashtra, has led to demand for a separate state for that region. There are distinct features in the vocabulary, accent, slangs, etc in the language of Kannada spoken in the districts of North Karnataka itself. In the same way, the erstwhile Hyderabad-Karnataka has also been inspired to present demands for a separate state for that region. Similar demands are made, as clarified by the minister of Government of India, in the case of different sub-regions of Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, etc. Socio-economic factors such as job opportunities, investment opportunities, infrastructural facilities, trade outlets, etc. are the major forces giving a kick to 'separatist' demands based upon these subtleties of languages themselves providing additional strength to the linguistic basis. In actual practice, most often, the non language factors consisting of socio economic compulsions dominate the scene and the linguistic factors become only the *alibi* for the separate-state agitations. In all such agitations the underlying factor seems to be the feeling that there is lack of

fairness and justice to the region and people therein as at present and the hope that these problems get resolved with re organisation of the states.

* **Challenges Involved in Reorganisation of States**

While revisiting the issue of reorganising of the states, the following challenges are worthy of consideration.

a. Should Linguistic Principles be Given up while Reorganising the States?

The basic principle behind formation of a state is that there must be unified feeling among the citizens of the state so that no externally imposed irritants disturb the administrative convenience and peace in the region. Wherever major socio-economic, cultural and administrative aspects pertaining to a specific region can be more or less internalized, states can be formed subject to the fulfilment of viability conditions. This seems to be the spirit of the approach of the States Reorganisation Commission of 1955. Language was considered as such a unifying force cutting across all ethnic, gender, class, etc lines. However, our experience during the past more than half a century has raised a major question before us in this connection, viz., **should linguistic considerations be the only or even the prime considerations in state reorganisation in our times?**

Alternatively, can linguistic considerations be totally ignored while considering the basis of fresh reorganisation? Simple geographical contiguity and administrative convenience seem to be the alternative bases if linguistic factors are totally given up. It would be helpful

if the pros and cons of different alternative bases are carefully analysed. Ethnic and language considerations have always been powerful unifying forces for people and even for rulers historically. Historians provide evidences to show that even during Emperor Ashoka's period single official language and script were prescribed by him for his kingdom. Hence, it may be difficult to totally give up the language as a basis for states reorganisation. Ethnic or religious considerations as the basis for states reorganisation would be fraught with the catastrophe of breaking of the nation itself hence cannot be considered acceptable.

b. What Is the Optimum Size for New States?

Should the new states, when created after reorganisation, be smaller in size? Should all the states be of the same or similar sizes? Is it possible to determine the 'optimum' size of a state?

What should be the basis for determining the size - geographical area, population, etc. of the newly reorganised states? In India there are states with only two districts (Goa, for example) and states with more than 20-25 districts. Karnataka for example, has as many as 28 districts as at present. Every now and then demands are made and conceded for creating new districts through redefining the boundaries of districts.

c. Governance Costs in the Post Reorganisation Stage

Costs of administering districts of varying personal circumstances would obviously vary in a big way and no uniform approaches for the governance

of the states would be proper. Thus, varying proportions of Scheduled Castes (S.C.) and Scheduled Tribes (S.T.) population would be another factor that can play an important role in governance. There are states in the country which consist of a large percentage of Tribal population (e.g. Orissa). This adds a new dimension to the method and costs of governance. Such dimensions cannot be overlooked. States reorganisation brings with it the need for large amounts of resources to meet large capital and recurring costs from another point of view also, for the regions that have been designated as new states. New capital city, new administrative set up consisting of departmental secretaries, their staff, etc need to be created. Office accommodation, buildings of legislature, quarters, transport system etc need to be provided, which impose a huge charge on the resources of these new states or of the federal government, which is supposed to ensure smooth transition.

d. Challenges of Viability of New States

Will the new states be viable in themselves? Since resource endowments of different regions are different in the country, it may be difficult to visualise states with equal resources position. Under such circumstances, how would the **states of unequal resources position be treated in actual developmental policy making? Are states with greatly unequal resources likely to lead to the poorly endowed states being dominated economically and politically by the resource rich states? Also, would states which become excessively and perennially dependent on the Centre because they are not viable likely to suffer possible loss of autonomy?**

Though **unequal treatment of unequals** can be considered as a philosophical basis for handling this issue, the concrete translation of this philosophy is extremely tricky. In a federal set up assistance from the federal government to the new states is a generally recommended method of equalisation. That this may not work out perfectly is brought out from the Indian experience even in the case of existing states. This is illustrated below under section V with a simple statistical analysis in the case of Karnataka state.

The way the federal financial system has worked in India during the past several years raises some doubts in our mind about how the new states are likely to be treated if the newly formed states happen to be resource poor. Since no state can be considered as self sufficient on the basis of its own resources in view of growing functional responsibilities and hence resource needs, dependence of the new states on the centre appears to be unavoidable. Most of the resource transfers from the centre to the states under non plan and plan accounts are based upon the method of reassessment of the resources position of the concerned state/s by the agencies like the quinquennial Finance Commission and the ongoing Planning Commission. Though transfers are mostly formula based, discretion also has a significant role to play and the resource poor states and states of smaller sizes are generally less vocal and less assertive in negotiations in the course of resource reassessments and determination of quantum of resource transfers. As a result, such states are likely to suffer in federal financial flows. This is likely to lead to more dependence

on the centre for resource flows and hence greater loss of autonomy of the new states.

e. Equity Issues in the Post Reorganisation Stage?

As stated earlier, the demands for new states or new administrative units arise primarily on account of a 'feeling' about unfairness and injustice in the present framework. Some of the questions that become relevant here are- **Would not the issues of justice and fairness continue to be confronted in a post reorganisation situation also in the new states in the comity of states and also within each of these states?** Since a state of perfect justice and fairness is hard to achieve once and for all can we visualise a mechanism for an 'ongoing' tackling of such issues in the post reorganisation phase? The available literature in this connection provides some insights about such issues of inter regional and intra regional inequities. There seems to be some consensus among main stream economists that 'economic growth and economic integration will, in the long run, reduce income disparities between regions' [Polese, 2008]. Some five decades ago a model was presented [Williamson, 1965, Pp. 3-54] to depict initially rising and then falling regional disparities. However, as has been rightly said, 'spatial income inequalities never totally disappear, if only because of the friction of space and the costs of migration. Some disparities are more stubborn than others, with Italy, a classical example in Europe' [Polese, *op cit*, p. 3]. Income and economic product inequality or equality is only one of several issues in connection with inequality. Regional inequalities encompass hosts of other

aspects like, gender equality, social equality, equality in nutrition and health care status, literacy and educational status, etc; and everything cannot be converted into economic terms. Thus, even after the reorganisation stage, inequalities might continue to exist or might even grow. Some theories posit regional inequalities to be a function of geographical proximity to the metropolitan centres, capital city, trading centres, ports, etc. All these are the givens and hence geographical inequalities might not be eliminated even after state reorganisation. Therefore, **the issues of regional equity and regional justice seem to be perennial themes for researchers for investigation and policy makers for action.** The problems of intra state disparities open up additional challenges before analysis and policy making.

f. Challenges before a Federal Set-up

What should be the nature of the linkages of these new states with the Union Government in the Indian Federation? Even after the states have been reorganised according to one or the other criteria, intra-regional disparities may continue to exist within the newly created states. **Hence, it is sometimes argued that fresh reorganisation may itself not be a panacea for the problems of inter regional disparities and injustice. The question is, can there at all be an enduring solution to such problems in a federal framework? Can the union government mobilize enough resources and work out acceptable criteria of resource transfers to these new states?** In case the new states are expected to mobilize their own resources for meeting the demands for

infrastructure development (building of new capital city, assembly building, secretariat, legal institutions, etc, which are the minimum wherewithal for a new state to function), then are all the new states adequately endowed for the purpose? In the present paper we have attempted below to briefly examine this issue only in the context of Karnataka state by way of an example.

g. Implications of Globalisation

Forces of globalisation are the unavoidable developments of our times that are likely to come in the way of the process of internalization of socio economic, cultural and administration related variables, which are the unifying forces at sub national and regional levels. Globalisation essentially connotes opening up where political borders are expected to lose their significance and the entire world has to be treated as a global village wherein countries are looked upon only as localities or wards of such a village. **At the present juncture when globalisation view is emphasised everywhere, is it possible to achieve such internalization at sub regional levels within a country?** Or, are we convinced that national and sub regional affiliations are more dominant and natural than global affiliations and hence various types of challenges associated with the affiliations of the former type need to be managed? On the other hand, since opening up with communication and information revolution, (internet, spread of T.V. etc. to rural areas and distant hinterland) is likely to arouse the aspirations of the people even in least developed and remote rural areas of the country, globalisation is likely to strengthen the forces for reduction of

socio economic disparities among regions within a country and also promote forces of development, autonomy and self, etc. Which forces are stronger in the case of India? How to manage such forces is indeed a big challenge. Just as it normally happens in a town or a city, the developed localities or wards, get more facilities and hence develop much faster than the less developed ones.

Consideration of the facts as above about states reorganisation and challenges arising from regional disparities would raise certain basic issues about the conceptual aspects relating to why state re organisation demands originate and how issues of regional justice are the underlying forces in this connection. **Apart from the question of injustice to people in general and certain communities in particular, there is also a basic question of injustice to a 'region' as a whole.** India, having suffered the problem of over exploitation of her natural resources, inadequate initiatives to develop her potentials, systematic efforts to alienate her from her own rich heritage and misemployment and underutilisation of her manpower resources, etc. over several centuries under colonial rule, can appreciate what it means if separate status is not accorded for a region. It is significant that India was personified as Bharata Mata, implying a separate identity for the country as a whole. Sub regions within a country also have identities of their own and it is proper to recognise this.

II CONCEPTUAL INSIGHTS ABOUT 'REGIONAL JUSTICE':

* **Region as a reference point in discourses on justice and fairness**

In discussions relating to what should be

considered as just and fair generally the reference point is the individuals, and naturally so, since the goal of all socio economic activity is considered to be the satisfaction for the human being. Incidentally, a lesser attention is given in these discussions to the non human beings also - animals, birds and in the end plant life also, in that order. This also is done primarily to ensure higher well being for the humans. Plants need to be protected because they preserve cleanliness in air, ensure timely rainfall providing water to living beings;² animals and birds need to be preserved for they help maintaining ecological balance, pollination, germination, preservation of plants, etc, all of which are needed for 'human well being'. The question of recognising each one of them with a separate identity of its own is conveniently sidelined. **In the same way, the fact that each geographical region has its own individual status does not receive the same attention as assigning a separate identity for each individual or group of individuals or communities.** We have policies to safeguard specific categories of people such as SC, ST communities, minorities, etc. But, the special features and challenges of different geographical regions of a country do not receive an equal focus and attention.³ However, **this raises an important question; can justice and fairness for human beings be achieved without considering justice and fairness for regions?** In other words, in a comity of regions of unequal and hence unfair and unjust levels and rates of socio economic development, do people, though equally endowed and developed, experience the feeling of fairness and justice? Thus, a rich person from a poor state like Bihar though having the same amount of income like a rich person from

a well developed state like Maharashtra or Punjab, would have a feeling of deprivation merely on account of the fact that he lives in a poor state of Bihar. Such feelings of deprivation become more conspicuous and acute if the regions happen to be geographically contiguous and people keep moving from one region to another of unequal socio economic progress. Duesenbery's demonstration effect in triggering interpersonal comparisons of socio economic status amongst persons and implications therefrom work more forcefully if these persons live *in the same region or in geographically contiguous regions and also in situations where contacts and interactions among people are relatively easy and frequent. Such inter personal comparisons* of socio economic status and difficulty in emulation of higher status due to lack of the necessary wherewithal, would be irksome irritants and they become a source of discomfort and feeling of deprivation. It is a factual experience that people from some of the border regions of North Karnataka, for example, feel deprived and uncomfortable as soon as they enter the neighbouring Sangli and Kolhapur districts of Maharashtra as the latter have a significantly higher level of development, in terms of good roads, better electricity supply and water supply, etc., infrastructure, better developed education and health care institutions, more disciplined transport system, etc. Higher developmental status shows itself! Though these people may be speaking the same language (as these border areas are bilingual areas) discrepancy in the status of development within a cross-over of few kilo meters of distance would only cause envy and irritation about backwardness of the region where they live.

Thus, there is a comparative perspective in the minds of people when they feel the sense of deprivation and 'injustice'. Such feelings of discomfort and deprivation arise to start with, more by observing the region specific parameters of development than individual specific parameters. Feelings of 'regional' injustice and unfairness are therefore a real phenomenon, which need to be distinctly treated as compared to feelings of injustice and unfairness for 'persons and communities'.

*** What is meant by justice and fairness in the context of different regions in a given nation?**

Justice, however, is a very elusive concept, not easy to define or easy to perfectly operationalise even in the context of human beings. That a particular situation is just or unjust or a particular action is just or unjust needs to be explained in several sentences, outlining why it is so, and it is difficult to describe the phenomenon just by a single term. Sanskrit language, which has rich vocabulary and which is considered as mother of many languages, may help to some extent in this connection. The Sanskrit equivalents of the term justice are many, such as *dharma*, i.e., righteousness, *nyaaya*, i.e., reasonableness, *yogya*, i.e., proper, *sarvasamata*, i.e., equitable, *apaksha-paata*, i.e., impartiality, *saamya*,⁴ i.e., being equal; etc. It is clear that these terms indicate implicitly (with the help of *yogavrutti*, i.e., etymology) why a particular state or action is one of justice. Though these terms in Sanskrit connote different shades of meanings, it should be emphasized that all of them are essentially related to the concept of justice. This would be clear by understanding the

meaning of the constituents of these Sanskrit terms. According to Indian epistemology things like justice, injustice, goodness or badness, being proper or improper, happiness and sorrow, etc, are perceivable only by conscience (and not just the mind)- *sakshi*, i.e., conscience, which is considered as the *sva-roopendriya*, i.e., deep inner sense of the self, and not one of the five senses of perception. It is also worth noting that generally the absence of justice rather than its presence is more quickly perceived by this deep rooted organ-instrument of perception. Hence, the feelings of injustice are deep rooted and reactions arising out of such feelings would be quite strong and they last long. Also, cases of injustice rather than cases of justice are articulated by the society more quickly and more emphatically, probably because **generally the society is more intolerant of injustice than being appreciative of justice.**

Ancient philosophers, particularly Greek philosophers were in search of the meaning of justice. Socrates, for example, presented four definitions of justice- viz. justice as 'telling the truth rendering up what we have received; rendering to his due; complying with the interest of the stronger, that is of then ruling class as it is expressed in law and minding one's own business both in external relations with others and in the internal ordering of the soul'. [Bird, 1968, p. 10] Justice is thus considered as a relational concept and a social norm. Classical economists of the West also had conceptualized justice and injustice in their analysis of human behaviour. For example, out of the six springs of human conduct as enunciated by Adam Smith in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*,⁵ [Smith, 1993, p. 129]

such as self love, desire to be free, propensity to truck barter and exchange, habit of labour, sense of propriety and sympathy, the spring- 'the sense of propriety' seems to come closest to the various Sanskrit equivalents of the term justice. Regional dimension of justice, however, does not seem to explicitly appear in Adam Smith's perception of justice and propriety though his framework of springs of human conduct surely provides an opportunity for its extension to regions.

The term justice and their Sanskrit equivalents essentially connote that justice is a 'relational concept' and a matter involving more than one entity affected by the subject matter (since at least two entities are compared and one more entity to stand in judgment about justice or injustice involved in actions affecting the two entities) and that it is linked to an action from another party or mutual action. For example, non-availability of minimum housing facility to an individual connotes injustice since implicitly a comparison is involved of the one without housing facility with the one having housing. In a situation where there is no housing facility for anyone -as in the case of a hypothetical situation of nomads the question of injustice relating to housing does not arise at all. In case the nomads come in contact with the people who also might be erstwhile nomads but who have been settled in a village by the government through the provision of housing facility, etc. and if the nomads feel desirous of such a settled living and also put a claim to the government then they develop a feeling of injustice from the government if this facility is still not provided to them. Hence, while considering justice and injustice, etc. what is

involved is a comparison of one's state with another's state with regard to a matter that is part of one's own preference function and assessment of an action by the third party relating to that matter. If these matters are region specific just as 'housing facility' in tribal areas in forest regions then we are essentially in the domain of regional justice. It is true that individual specific parameters are the starting point also for considering aspects of regional justice. However, these parameters assume a different dimension and bigger proportions when we are considering regional justice issues. In the following paragraphs this distinction is further clarified by way of an illustration.

*** Region specific parameters and individual specific parameters for understanding the aspects of regional justice and individual justice:**

While the parameters relating to the individuals have implications for regions it would be a big lapse in justice discussions if region specific parameters or the regional dimensions of individual specific parameters are totally overlooked. The following chart presented on page 14 brings out the contrasts of individual specific and region specific parameters. Three categories of parameters are mentioned in the chart, viz. **Region specific parameters, individual specific parameters and overlap parameters** that have implications for both the region and individuals. For example, when we are considering health care facilities individuals are not so much concerned with whether adequate number of PHCs is available in the region or not. Their concern is whether when needed the health care facilities are available to them

or not. If they are very well endowed with then they can access these health care facilities available in distant places as well. Some parameters would have implications both for the region and the individual. Only for illustrative purposes globalisation and the related parameters are shown in the Chart as the 'overlap parameters'. The chart is essentially illustrative and not exhaustive. In the case of region specific parameters, by and large, all those cases are included where there is a feature of what Richard Musgrave, a noted Public Finance expert, calls non excludability and non rivalness in consumption [Musgrave, 1958]. In the case of individual specific parameters exclusion is possible and there is also rivalness in consumption. Thus, while discussing the issues of regional justice, by and large, we need to focus on such non rival or non excludable or collective consumption goods, with varying degrees of non excludability, non rivalness in consumption non appropriability, difficulty in attaching a price tag, etc. In the debate relating to public goods, the term non appropriability (used by Head) means difficulty in assigning a price to the good with the help of which the payer of price would appropriate the good and non payers are excluded. Hence, payers and non payers are rivals in consuming the good. But, in the case of those goods that are specific to the region as a whole, what is involved is collective consumption by the region as a whole and there is no rivalness in consumption, nor is there a possibility of appropriating the good by payment of price. Non excludability may depend upon both the nature of the good or service in question and also the size of the region where non excludability is

seen. For example, a police post, providing protection to a locality may become less effective in a very large

locality. Hence, the question of regional justice is very much linked with the size of the region as well.

Chart: An Illustrative Chart of Region Specific and Individual Specific Parameters to Throw Light on Issues of Regional Justice.

Region Specific Parameters	Nature of Questions for Eliciting Information; Relevant Questions	Individual Specific Parameters	Nature of Questions for Eliciting Information; Relevant Questions	Overlap Parameters	Nature of Questions for Eliciting Information; Relevant Questions
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1 Social Infrastructure parameters					
i. Education	Are there adequate educational facilities within the region? Are there Neighbourhood schools, higher education institutions, etc., in the region? Are there schools with drinking water and toilet facilities in the region? etc., etc.	Access to elementary education, higher education, etc for particular community, gender, etc.	What is the Net enrolment ratio in the community in that region? Net enrolment ratio for male and female categories? Out of school population, transition probabilities, attendance, achievement ratios, etc. for different categories of population, etc.	Influences of liberalization, privatization and globalisation, (LPG) on education.	Has FDI in education affected educational facilities in the region and performance of children of specific communities? What is the effect of LPG on cost of education in the region and for individuals? ...
ii. Health and Medi care.	How many Primary Health Care Centres (PHCs) are provided in the region in relation to population? How many CHCs? Referral Facilities? Population Bed ratios in the regions? Drinking water facilities, Sanitation facilities in the region? Public Toilets, their location, their functional status, working condition.	Access to and utilization of medical care facilities by house holds or individual members of different population groups Access to and utilisation of Public water taps for residents belonging to different population categories, etc etc.	Various access indicators about various medical services in the region for different population groups; Various utilization indicators.	Influences of LPG on health and medical care facilities, costs of these facilities, etc.	Has FDI in particular and LPG in general in health and medical care affected availability of health and medical care facilities in the region, their costs to the households, etc. rural urban discrimination and health status of specific communities, etc?
2. Physical Infrastructure Parameters	What is the length of all season roads in the region?	Utilisation of infrastructure by different population groups	Utilisation indicators		

* **Feelings of inter regional injustice with respect to socio economic opportunities seem to be the genuine factors behind the demands for new states or demands for new administrative units within the existing states.** Justice or injustice is both a matter of feeling and also a matter of actual physical facilities being available in the region. Most often the counter argument against the protagonists of a separate state is that inadequacy of facilities and opportunities, deprivation, etc.,

is all within the mind.⁶ A contented soul has no complaints, it is said. While this might be true one cannot deny the importance of basic needs for human existence in a modern civilised society.

* Having appreciated the need for recognising region as a separate unit in discussions relating to issues of justice we may now examine what may be the essential aspects of a theory of regional justice and whether the available litera-

ture throws light on this issue. It is in this background that the questions such as how **genuine** is the demand for a new state and how *feasible* is this demand can be better appreciated.

- * A related matter worthy of consideration is what A K Sen says, 'reasoning' about justice. This reasoning needs to be extended to regional justice as well. Is regional justice a negative function of regional disparities of goods and services available? What are the other determinants of regional justice?
- * **A quick scanning of the literature relating to regional studies in general and regional economics in particular seems to make it clear** [For an excellent literature review see Keshab Das, 2002] **that even while studying the problems** of regional disparities the focus is mainly on particular regions -either rural areas or urban areas, developed regions as a whole or under developed regions as a whole, individual cities⁷ or specific villages, etc. The entire literature in developmental economics also focuses on disparities in development of nations rather than inter regional and intra regional disparities *per se* within a given nation. Even the university syllabi in different countries relating to regional economics and regional studies seem to have only such a focus on 'specific' regions. However, the specific issues of **regional disparities and regional justice** *per se* do not seem to have received adequate attention of conceptual research. In the context of public finance and that too in relation to the issues of federal resource transfers one comes across some serious discussion of inter-state disparities though the issue of intra state disparities with regard to different parameters again appears to have

received less research interest in literature. Thanks to **Dr. D M Nanjundappa High Power Committee Report for Karnataka -2002**, the **Dandekar Committee Report for Maharashtra** a few decades earlier, the studies relating to demands for newer states within the existing states in India (such as a separate state for North Karnataka, Hyderabad Karnataka, Kodagu in Karnataka, Vidarbha and Marathwada in Maharashtra, Telangana in A.P. Koshala in Orissa, etc), etc. in recent times, there have been some serious research initiatives to examine the problems of intra-regional disparities. ***A comprehensive theory of Regional justice is yet to emerge from all these initiatives.*** Obviously such a theory examines two dimensions of distributive equity if only socio economic aspects alone are considered, viz. a) ensuring availability of absolute minimum levels of socio economic services for each entity in a group, (this is ***absolute equity***) and b) if availabilities vary from one entity to the other, then initiatives are needed to ensure *minimum disparity* in the availability. This is *relative equity*. ***Such a theory has to be multi disciplinary in its approach*** and dynamic in its perspective.

The aspects, which deserve focusing while developing a 'theory of regional justice', are the following:

- a. What is the ***optimum size of a region*** so that costs are minimized and benefits are maximized so far as access to and utilization of socio economic opportunities are concerned and the whole issue of governance of the region is concerned?
- b. **Why is it that some regions in a given country are more developed than others?** Is it possible to develop taxonomy of the

determinants of **development and deprivation** arranging them on manoeuvrability scale? Reversing the determinants of deprivation may not necessarily lead to the determinants of development since these factors might not operate in such a simplistic fashion. This question is stated essentially in a static framework. In a dynamic framework the *relevant* question is- **why is it that some regions develop faster than others?** What are these determinants?

- c. Regionalists seem to point out two types of disparities, viz. geographical disparities and man-made disparities while examining the problem of regional disparities. The problems become more complicated when the geographical regions and administrative regions (like state, district, taluk etc) diverge from each other. Economic region and administrative region are not identical.⁸ Under such circumstances what types of countervailing interventions are needed to reduce disparities? In a globalisation framework international resource transfers assume special significance. However, it should also be noted that the international agencies do not seem to take cognizance of inter regional disparities and intra regional disparities while providing developmental assistance to a country and they seem to consider the country as a whole as the unit for their calculations about inter country flows of developmental assistance. Locational identities are not considered important under such an approach. Development of urban centres, metropolis, etc is facilitated through international developmental assistance and people from poorer regions are encouraged to move to such developed centres in their own interest. This can be termed as a **policy of people to jobs**. This is a case of selective migration of people. With regard to a market strategy of spontaneous movements of people for attaining equilibrium in the self balance approach many reservations were

expressed. "Migrants are misinformed and migration is selective, thereby increasing wage differences between regions. Investors, likewise, seem to overvalue already productive regions, respond to agglomerative efficiencies and in other way contribute to disequilibria. Finally, diffusion of information is very slow, national backwaters always lagging behind the centres of intervention and innovation. The upshot; mechanisms for interregional market equilibrium are rusty, and they need both oil and applied force; the standard approach to regional planning..." [Goldsmith, 1978, as quoted in Das, et al. *op. cit.*, p. 8] As against this, the national initiatives, which are likely to be more sensitive to the aspirations of the people wherever they are living, are pressed into service for developing socio economic opportunities for them irrespective of their location in the country. This is the **policy of jobs to people**.⁹ Even in the national context, the policy of central grants to state administration rather than to the decentralized sub regional administrative units (like Zilla Panchayat or Taluk Panchayat or even the Village Panchayat administration) seems to lead to concentration of economic opportunities in selected regions in contrast to the state grants to these units, which are likely to lead to de-concentration of these opportunities.

- d. **Measurement Issues:** In any empirical theory of regional justice and fairness measurement issues assume a special significance. Both types of criticisms of 'measurement without theory and theory without measurement' need to be properly tackled when a theory of regional justice is being developed. How to measure regional justice? How is regional justice a function of regional disparities? **How to measure inter regional and intra regional disparities** both in the static and dynamic settings? Disparities with respect to which parameters, what Sen

mentions as 'evaluative space', [Sen, 1995, ch 3] is an important issue. Different initiatives of the past in this connection seem to develop various types of indicators of development for regions using few or more parameters and using one or the other statistical technique (like using various types of averages, gini coefficient, factor analysis or principal components analysis, etc) for consolidating the region specific data about the chosen parameters. Obviously all such initiatives, though useful to some extent, face a number of practical and technical problems relating to the reliability of data about parameters, even the choice of parameters of development, dependability of the statistical techniques used, etc. All the chosen parameters may not be of equal significance for the region as a unit and also for the people living in these regions. Normally all parameters are treated as of equal weightage in the indicator based approaches for development, which is not realistic.

- e. What are the *costs of disparities*? What is meant by disparity costs and how to measure them? Recognition of short period and long period costs would throw further light on the regional injustice issues. Disparities with regard to which parameters are costlier?
- f. *Are there any benefits* from disparities as has been indicated by the phrase '*opportunity in disparity*', used by Amartya Sen? [Sen, 2006]¹⁰ When speaking about opportunities in disparities are we referring to both the disparities amongst people and disparities amongst regions? Sen has an interesting defence of inequality and injustice, though these insights are presented in the context of personal justice rather regional justice [Sen, 1992, See particularly the section 9.6 Alternative Defences of Inequality Pp. 138-41].
- g. If in reality disparities are inevitable, then is it possible to determine their **tolerable levels** so that human miseries on account of regional disparities are proper and 'feelings of disparities' in general are minimized?
- h. A basic question in this connection is how factual disparities and feelings of 'injustice' are related. **Is justice always a positive function of equality? Also, is injustice always a positive function of disparity?** To both these questions the answer is in the negative. If so, how should the principles of equal treatment of equals leading to horizontal equity and unequal treatment of unequals leading to vertical equity be translated into practice for achieving regional justice?
- i. What role does history play in explaining the levels of and changes in regional disparities? Socio cultural perspectives of regional disparity and justice need to supplement the purely economic perspectives. This seems to be a big lacuna in the regional studies available at present [Das, *op. cit.*]. All the issues of disparities seem to have been linked to resources particularly the financial resources. Approaches for Managing the Regional Disparities and various types of injustices: the roles of public sector, private sector and joint sector and the NGOs. This may be yet another issue of importance for *the proposed* theory of regional *justice to consider*. Since private sector by definition is guided more by profit maximization considerations such approaches need to be carefully managed. This indeed is of topical interest in the context of privatisation and liberalisation.
- j. Social accounting mechanisms and feelings of regional justice: It appears that people's involvement in matters relating to supplies of public services might provide significant insights for efficient governance of the region.
- k. Is it possible to incorporate the issues of regional justice and fairness in the general treatises on Theory of Justice developed in the context of justice for people rather than

justice for regions? If it is not possible to do so, then a specific attempt to develop such a theory is necessary.

Hosts of such and similar questions can be raised for being considered in any attempt to develop a theory of regional justice.

III. ARE THERE REGIONAL JUSTICE ISSUES IN THEORY OF JUSTICE OF RAWLS AND TREATISES OF OTHER EMINENT THEORISTS OF OUR TIMES?

Amartya Sen, bringing out a general feeling about justice, very meaningfully observes in his latest treatise [Sen, 2009] on the subject, dedicated to the memory of John Rawls, another eminent contributor to the theory of justice debate, "The need for a theory of justice relates to the discipline of engagement in reasoning about a subject on which it is, as Burke noted, *very difficult to speak*. (Italics ours). It is sometimes claimed that justice is not a matter of reasoning at all, it is one of being very appropriately sensitive and having the right nose for injustice". When this is the feeling about personal justice one can imagine how difficult it is to speak about regional justice. We briefly examine below whether the contemporary treatises on justice have *something to offer* for developing a comprehensive theory of 'regional justice'. We have particularly focused our attention on the views of John Rawls, the most **influential thinker** of our times on issues of justice, on issues of regional justice. Another noted contributor of our times to justice issues after John Rawls is Amartya Sen, whose *magnum opus- The Idea of Justice* is another path breaking contribution. In one of the sub sections below a very brief appraisal is made of *The Idea of Justice* of Amartya Sen only to highlight that here also no pointed analysis of regional justice issues is available, though one can discern in this some possibilities for extension to matters relating to regional justice.

- i. We notice that even the eminent contemporary theoretician about Justice, the author of path breaking '*the Theory of Justice*' [Rawls, 1973], extensively discusses the **issues of inter-personal justice rather than inter-regional justice**. He says, "I shall not consider the justice of institutions and social practices generally, nor except in passing, the justice of the law of nations and of relations between states..." He adds, "the conditions of the law of nations may require different principles arrived at in somewhat different ways". This, in spite of his non negotiable faith in justice. He says, "**Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of system of thought**. ... A Theory must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise, laws and institutions, no matter how efficient and well arranged, must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust". He emphatically declares, each individual "possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many". For him "an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice".
- ii. In this background it would be clear how Pareto optimality principle of allocative efficiency would be unjust in the context of unequal regions also, as no change in the socio economic status of a poor region with an improvement in that of a rich region, though this may be considered as total welfare improving through 'efficient' resource allocation, can be acceptable on principles of regional justice.

- iii. Rawls' two basic principles, viz. **basic rights principle** and the other about the **distribution of social and economic inequalities** do not explicitly bring in the regional dimensions. Rawls articulates these principles as follows. "Each *person* (italics ours) has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme to all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value". This is termed as the **Rights Principle** by Rawls. The other principle is termed as the **Difference Principle**. To quote him, "Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions; a) they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and b) they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society" [Rawls, *op. cit.*, Pp. 5-6]. The latter obviously is the antyodaya approach in Gandhian framework. *Such issues are referred to also in the context of Wicksell's Qualified Majority Voting Principle in the debates about public choice in democracy.* Under such a principle, certain public decisions need to be taken by considering the views of minority also and not just by considering the views of the majority. Majority view is weighted by the minority view.¹¹
- iv. In both the principles, the word **'persons'** **cannot simply** be substituted by the term **'regions'** **in order to derive the conceptual** insights about the issues relating to regional disparities. This is because though the region consists of persons it is necessary to recognise that **a separate identity exists also for the region apart from individuals living therein.** - Even absolute equity and minimum relative inequity of persons within a region may not ensure fair deal for that region in a comity of regions. In fact in the state of extreme underdevelopment *there are*

glaring 'equalities' and only in the course of *development inequalities* seem to increase, as was highlighted in the famous **Kuznet's Curve**.¹² A poor country with high inequality would not be of the same socio economic status as a rich country with the same degree of inequality. It would not be fair and just to treat equally these two countries on the grounds that they have the same degree of inequality. Hence, it would be highly necessary to treat each region-country as an 'individual' with unique identity of its own. Simple extension of Rawlsian approach to the issues of regional justice might bring out a number of complications, as can be appreciated from a brief explanation below. In order that there is justice, one has to ignore one's own personal circumstances, which Rawls terms as **the 'veil of ignorance'**. **This veil of ignorance is expected to ensure that there is no scope for personal prejudices in determining any action - personal or group action, and hence that action is likely to be just.** This veil of ignorance becomes too thick to be pierced through in the context of regions, since instead of *ignorance about* some individuals in the context of a particular region **analysts have** to assume existence of ignorance about a number of individuals, **a number of regions and a number of individuals in** a number of regions and also ignorance about a number of parameters relating to the personal circumstances of all these entities. Apart from facing a major objection to such an assumption that lots and lots of information is wasted and not used in the process of rational decision making for ensuring justice, there is also a great difficulty even in making an assumption that people are 'ignorant' about all these aspects! **Rawls dreams to reach a goal of creating 'a society where luck plays a minimal role'.** Under the veil of ignorance luck is given a tremendous role to play. This goal

might get further distanced once we move from the context of persons to the context of regions since in the case of the latter, number of imponderables increases tremendously making the approach increasingly complicated.

Regional disparity is, as stated earlier, objectionable obviously for reasons of justice. The issue of justice **cannot be over looked in the context of regional analysis and policy making, particularly when we consider a separate identity for region and justice is interpreted as fairness, a la John Rawls.**

Definition of a region is indeed a tricky issue. Researchers in Regional Studies bring out various parameters that need to be considered while identifying a region. Geographical regions, administrative regions, climatic regions, political regions, etc, may not always converge. However, at an operational level, when we are considering the issue of regional justice and the policies needed to reduce inter regional and intra regional injustice, we are mainly considering administrative regions.

- v. According to Rawls 'the theory of justice as fairness argues for equal rights for all individuals, and denies that injustice toward any particular group of individuals is justifiable unless this injustice is necessary to prevent an even greater injustice.' It is obvious that fairness for people would be meaningless unless there is fairness for the region where they live and *vice versa*. We observe that the status and standing of the region is a function of the status and standing of the people living therein and *vice versa*. The gradation of the region on a value scale confers spill-over effects for the people. Thus, in the case of Karnataka, people living in metros and big cities like Bangaluru, Dharwad Hubli, etc, are looked upon with awe and wonder and respected by the people in small towns and

villages in contrast to people living in backward regions of the state like Yadgir, Sindhanur, etc. This gradation of places and people is in built in people's perceptions and this fact cannot be over looked.¹³ **Rawlsian view that "an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice" is not applicable in the case of regions, since each region has to bother about itself rather than what happens to other regions. This is particularly true when we consider supply of basic goods to regions. Thus, supply of drinking water or subsistence goods and services to all regions adequately is non-negotiable.** For the purpose of providing amenities in the most deprived regions of Hyderabad Karnataka, for example, the lack of amenities in some parts of Bombay Karnataka, which is slightly more developed, cannot be tolerated. While one cannot deny the fact that adequate supply of subsistence goods to Hyderabad Karnataka is also non-negotiable this provision should not be at the cost of adequate supplies to North Karnataka. The point is that in the case of deprived regions, **supplies should be created by special development efforts.** Inadequacies in both the regions need to be concurrently tackled. Hence, when we are considering regional justice issues, Rawlsian prescription for tolerance of injustice is unacceptable.

- vi ***The Idea of Justice*¹⁴ and other relevant works of Amartya Sen;** Amartya Sen, the theoretician-analyst *par excellence* of our times has presented several conceptual insights about such issues in a number of his contributions. Some of his ideas relating to regional justice can be culled out from his works. A notable contribution of Sen in examining justice issues in terms of freedom and capabilities rather than simply income

or capital or even utility based approaches was developed to analyse the issues of justice and fairness in the context of individuals.

A moment's reflection on these ideas would make us feel that this approach is 'amenable' to application in the context of regional justice as well. Though this approach of capabilities has all the essential ingredients of what Rawls called 'primary goods', Sen contrasts it by considering capabilities as *actual opportunities* of living instead of *means* of living.¹⁵ While discussing regional justice issues using capabilities approach we might consider three possibilities, viz., a region where really capable individuals live but who lack the wherewithal or opportunities for making achievements, second a region which has these wherewithal or opportunities but not the capable persons - and third a region which lacks both. Obviously, the regional justice is at the lowest level in the third region, (assuming there live some people in this region- like the remote tribal villages in the midst of forests). Between the first two, the first region suffers from more intense injustice. The example below may clarify. This has been the burden of song of people from North Karnataka Bombay Karnataka and Hyderabad Karnataka regions in the state of Karnataka can be cited as examples of such a region. In such a region proactive intervention is required to provide the wherewithal and opportunities for achievements so that capable individuals are in a position to make achievements possible and also their talents do not get rusted on account of lack of opportunities, helplessness and frustration. In fact, development mandates such an approach. Even though this amounts to unequal attention to regions this passes the test under the norm of unequal treatment of unequals.

IV. UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF REGIONS AND REGIONAL JUSTICE ISSUES IN INDIA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Since regions are not found to be equal with one another at any point in time in the past, it may be interesting to examine how this issue of inequalities of regions was viewed historically in India. This question naturally arises in our mind out of curiosity. **Was the issue of gradation of regions and regional justice a matter of any consideration in the Indian context in the past?**

It is interesting to note that in India not all the regions were considered historically as of equal value. Regional inequality was accepted as a matter given. No eyebrows were raised by anybody about the status of the regions. Such status was conferred to the cities, towns and regions of the country not necessarily on the basis of economic advantages though in most cases the status was aligned to the economic advantages also. For example, the ancient adage in Kannada (which says, one should look forward to living in Kashi and to dying in Prayag)¹⁶ brings out this gradation of regions and places.¹⁷ Traditionally, the vast region called *Aryavarta*- the geographical region spread over in between the **Himalayas** and the Vindhya hills was considered as very high in the regional valuation.¹⁸ It is also worth noting that this region also is generally the most fertile vast tract of the country, being fed by the Himalayan rivers- the Ganges, Jamuna, Brahmaputra, etc. With plenty of water supply, with high fertility of soil and the possibility of highly productive agriculture the region had all the ingredients of high economic prosperity. It is also noteworthy that this **region was chosen by the foreign settlers from ancient times for their occupation and rule.** The density of population of this region was high throughout the historical period. The geographical regions to the South of the Vindhya hills were also categorized mostly according to whether they fall in the river beds, sea shore, rich forest resources, etc. Thus, the natural endowments also seem to be one of the criteria for

determining the placement of a particular region in the hierarchy among the comity of regions of the country, though extra material considerations were the overriding bases.

Most of the centres of pilgrimage in India seem to be located on the river banks and people used to settle down in these places for obvious reasons of plenty of water supply, petty business and trade opportunities, possibilities of social and religious life, etc. However, it is remarkable that some individuals particularly with reformist fervour preferred less developed regions for their living probably out of stoic ideology. This is clearly evident from the selected parts of what is known as Hyderabad Karnataka region. The districts of Bellary, Raichur, Bidar and Gulbarga in Karnataka, for example, which are the parts with hottest climate in the state and some of which are now reckoned as the most backward districts of Karnataka, according to all types of indicators of development and deprivation, were surprisingly the preferred districts for the saints and their followers for several generations. Social reformist cum Devotional movements like the ones under the leadership of Bhakti Bhandari Basavanna and others with highly meaningful Vachana Sahitya, the devotional saints, the inspirers and luminaries of Dasa Sahitya in Kannada, like Purandara Dasa, Vijayadasa, Gopaladasa, Mohanadasa, Jagannathadasa, Praneshadasa, etc, prospered in this most deprived region of Karnataka itself. It must, however, be noted that in this region very important rivers like Krishna, Tungabhadra, etc, have been flowing for ages, though with scanty rainfall within the region itself. It is quite likely that there were periods of some prosperity in this region though large parts of the year were and continue to be the periods of acute poverty for masses and this must be the reason for starting of such reformist and devotional movements in the region. Reformism was probably targeted at the relatively prosperous people and devotionism with an attitude of reconciling with deprivation and exploitation,

must have been targeted at the exploited masses. This region, therefore, has emerged as the region rich with philosophical literature and culture, attracting others, those interested in these values even from distant places as well.

That region was accorded a separate status of importance in the thinking and socio-religious practices in the country is evident also from the dos and don'ts in connection with foreign travel and crossing of seas etc, which are still in currency among some communities and some regions of the country. Even within the country different regions are graded in people's perceptions. Thus, gradation of regions in olden days was done not simply in terms of economic considerations as at present, but in terms of comprehensive considerations of social, cultural and literary values. This was accepted by the people not only from the region itself but also from the other regions of the state. **While rethinking about classification of regions within a state or among the states, such comprehensive indicators deserve serious consideration.**¹⁹

Thus, it appears that regional 'economic' disparities did not receive much explicit attention of the people in general and scholars in particular in the past, though other aspects of the region did get recognised in grading the regions. No attempt seems to have been made in the past to develop a comprehensive numeraire for ranking regions according to economic, cultural, etc, criteria. The present approach of considering primarily economic parameters in lieu of socio cultural parameters is also highly unrealistic. It also is unjust and offensive, for, it terms certain regions 'backward' even though they are likely to be much more advanced than other regions when these other parameters are taken into account. Of course, the policy makers cannot overlook the importance of providing opportunities for economic and human capital development in the region.

Did rulers of the past take note of regional disparities and introduce specific measures to tackle the problem of regional injustice? Some historical evidence throws light on this issue in the case of at least some rulers of the past. Emperor Ashok, for example, had divided his vast empire into four provinces with headquarters at Takshashila, Ujjayini, Tosali, and Suvarnagiri. Through welfare measures in the distant provinces implemented through provincial heads appointed by the Emperor, an attempt was made by the King to integrate all provinces under the fold of the Empire. Prakrit was the official language in all the provinces and Brahmi was adopted as the official script. This seems to hint at the principle of one language one state formula advocated by some for states reorganization. Several welfare measures were introduced even in the distant provinces. The Girinar rock inscription of Rudradaman reveals that a big irrigation lake was constructed by Chandragupta Maurya in the remote region of the empire and that it was got repaired by the local provincial Governor under Ashoka. This lake served the people for nearly 900 years with frequent repairs and reconstruction from time to time with the grant from the king of the empire. This brings out the concern of the rulers for welfare and just treatment of the region. This is brought out by inscriptional evidence. Planting of trees on the road sides for shade for travellers, construction of wells, healing houses for humans and animals in all the provinces, etc, bring out the urge of administration for regional justice. Kautilya's *Arthashastra* shows that the presiding officers for different economic activities and developmental functions were responsible for proper functioning of the various services in all parts of the state. This was organised by constituting *janapadas* or administrative units and appointing heads of the *janapadas*. Pre Gupta and Gupta rule subsequently (about 200 B.C. to 700 A.D.) also strove to ensure availability of public services for the people in different parts of the empire and thus

provide regional justice. Historians quote different Travel Accounts of foreign travellers of those times in order to bring home this point [Government of India, 1981]. During subsequent foreign rules, trends of greater centralisation were witnessed and the concept of regional justice seems to have got sidelined though it cannot be said that it was totally forgotten.

In Karnataka, a number of instances are available to show that historically the rulers had laid a great emphasis on regional justice. In the decentralised administration of the past, the local chieftains or *Mandaleshvaras* were autonomous though they were answerable and subservient to the powerful monarch of the kingdom. In such a system, people also had a big voice about the welfare schemes in the region and thereby they were also instrumental in safeguarding regional justice.. They used to raise voice for irrigation projects, roads, etc, within the region where they lived. In Karnataka an instance is quoted about the revolt of the people, which went right up to the King of Vijayanagara empire, for, taxes levied by a new chieftain in one of the provinces of the kingdom, after the old one was defeated in war, were higher than in the earlier regime and an inscription says that the king was convinced about this regional injustice and the said chieftain was immediately removed and old tax rates were restored.²⁰ In the process of provision of regional justice or more correctly in the process of ameliorating regional injustice in the past the roles played by the rulers, the affected people of the concerned region and people in general have to be appreciated. Old inscriptions amply bring out the effective implementation of what the prevalent jargon of PPP (public private partnership) indicates. Some of the Vijayanagara Inscriptions²¹ [Shrinivas and Gopal, 2008] show how some taxes levied by the autonomous local nayakas, such as oppressive marriage tax, barber tax, etc were withdrawn for some regions initially and for all the regions of the Kingdom subsequently as a result of people's representations to

the Vijayanagara king. In the same way, the king used to pay attention to the water supply schemes in all the provinces of his kingdom and had ensured that at least one water tank is constructed in every village through the funds of the government treasury and/or munificent donations from the rich people from the region. It is interesting to note from inscriptions that, by and large, the maintenance of the tank was the responsibility of the local people for which the king had entrusted the task to some of his officers against a grant of some land. In some cases the king himself used to make a direct grant for the purpose and ensured that there is no violation of *Raja Dharma* of maintaining regional justice. All these inscriptional evidences go to show that regional justice was one of the important considerations in the minds of administration in the past. For want of adequate historical data, however, it may not be proper to make a general statement that all the regions of the state had equally developed with comparable supplies of goods and services. The historical account and inscriptional evidences highlight the faith in *Raja Dharma and faith of the people in the king*. Beyond this, the actual state of affairs might not have been as rosy as the intentions of the king and of the people in maintaining regional justice.

In the above general conceptual background and an account of historical practices in Karnataka in particular, we may now focus on modern day Karnataka case in somewhat greater detail. It might appear from the discussion below that the conceptual aspects of regional justice have not been fully translated into actual practice. It is also not clear how the concept of *Raja Dharma* of ensuring regional justice and justice for all people got sidelined in the context of this state also over the period of time. It is not possible to trace the factors responsible for this development in this article. What we propose to do below therefore is

to examine the 'recent' attempts made in Karnataka to handle regional disparities persisting in the state for several decades and thereby address the issue of regional injustice.

V. FOCUS ON KARNATAKA

- i. In Karnataka in the name of regional justice there are occasional demands for a separate state from Kodagu, as stated earlier, (a single district adjoining Kerala and Tamil Nadu states), from Hyderabad Karnataka region (consisting of five districts after creation of Koppal district) and from Bombay Karnataka region (consisting of seven districts now after creation of new districts from out of the erstwhile four districts of Dharwad, Karwar, Belgaum and Bijapur constituting Bombay Karnataka region).
- ii. The Sri Krishna Committee Report submitted to the Government of India in January 2011, which could surely help the protagonists of Telangana as a separate state, might also help the supporters of setting up of Rayalaseema, Telangana and Karavali regions of the present state of Andhra Pradesh into three separate states. The moot point to be noted is that the acceptance of Sri Krishna Committee Report is also likely to strengthen the demands for creation of other states within the country. Karnataka for example, which is as large as Andhra Pradesh, it is argued, can be divided into three states of smaller sizes under the names of Karavali-Malnad state, Uttara Karnataka state and Dakshina Karnataka state. The demand of Kodagu, as a separate state, also needs to be suitably considered.²² With regard to the issue of creation of smaller states important sections of the Congress Party, the ruling party at the Centre and the BJP seem to be favourably inclined. Rahul Gandhi, the General Secretary of the Congress Party, who must be representing the view points of the youth of the Party, is

reported to have argued out a case for smaller states, particularly keeping in mind the logic of administrative convenience. While supporting the UP Congress Resolution. The BJP has already gone on records of history for taking initiatives in setting up the new state of Jharkhand by bifurcating Bihar, the new state of Chattisgarh severing this region from a very large Madhya Pradesh and creating another state of Uttaranchal after breaking it away from a very large state of Uttar Pradesh. It should be noted that all the six states emerging as a result of this initiative are the Hindi speaking states themselves though the language spoken therein might have subtle variations in intonation, vocabulary, literature, etc. In the same way, conceding the demands for creation of Vidarbha, Marathwada and Western Maharashtra from out of the present large state of Maharashtra, also might not come in the way of promotion of the language of Marathi, it is said. Coming under the administrative control of larger number of states rather than only one state the Kannada language also might get a substantially additional boost, it is said by the protagonists of creation of a few more Kannada speaking states from out of the presently large state of Karnataka.

- iii. The Congress, which is the major opposition party in the State, should take the initiative, it is argued, in placing forth the demand for the setting up of three new states by bifurcating Karnataka. The BJP, which was responsible for the setting up of three new states in the north and is now supporting the formation of Telangana state, may not oppose the division of Karnataka.
- iv. From this discussion, it emerges that there is no need to consider language as the only yardstick for the formation of a state; nor was there such inevitability even in the past. One language one state formula has not been

adopted in India right from the beginning. This is clearly brought out from the fact that though there are several states of Hindi speaking people, this has not created any problem even from the point of view of promoting a language, but has only benefited different Hindi speaking states from the administrative point of view. Not one, but several states are always in the forefront in lobbying for Hindi or Hindi speaking people.

- v. **Three questions are relevant here, viz.**
 - a. **Has there been really regional injustice in the regions of Karnataka so that the demand of the concerned regions for separate statehood can be considered to be genuine?**
 - b. **Is the demand feasible considering the future resource availability for the region in such a way that there is no undue dependence on the Union government for resources?**
 - c. **Would the rest of the state, which largely comprises the South Karnataka region consisting of the remaining 16 out of the present 29 districts (that were largely part of the Mysore region) not turn out to be non viable after reorganisation?**

Except Kodagu and districts of South Karnataka the districts demanding a separate state are largely known as part of North Karnataka. These districts are relatively less developed from many points of view. Kodagu appears to be relatively better endowed and developed (though its infrastructural development is said to be still not very satisfactory), with more than 90 per cent literacy, high family planning achievements, very enviable martial traditions, etc, and with rich coffee plantations. Its claim for a separate state seems to be mainly to preserve the benefits from its endowments within itself. Through formation

of Kodagu as a state there is thus an intention to internalize socio economic advantages of the region.

We may briefly examine each of these three questions below.

a. Do some regions of the state truly experience regional injustice and unfairness?

Imbalances in developmental levels in different sectors and in investments in North Karnataka and South Karnataka are quite glaring. In fact, North Karnataka has been feeling neglected right from the period when it was part of the erstwhile Bombay state before reorganisation or when it was part of the erstwhile Mysore state and even during the period when the state has been renamed as Karnataka. By way of illustration, some of the indicators of disparity are; Employment share of North Karnataka was 26 per cent whereas that of South Karnataka was 78 per cent during early 2000. 72 per cent of Industrial Projects cleared by the Government during the decade 1991-2001 were for South Karnataka whereas it was only 27 per cent for North Karnataka. Even when population differences of the regions are recognised, regional imbalances continue to be noticed as has been pointed out by a number of research studies and even official committees. Disparities are noticed with regard to Irrigation facilities, power supply, educational opportunities, health, housing, drinking water supply, etc. Maximum values for selected socio economic indicators for North Karnataka districts are found to be much lower than the maximum values for South Karnataka districts. Similarly, the minimum values are much lower for North Karnataka districts than the minimum values for the other region.²³ It is these disparities,

which get registered in the minds of the people that cause irritation and agitational forces.

Dr. D M Nanjundappa (DMN) Committee (High Power Committee for Redressal of Regional Imbalances (HPC) - 2002) has made a thorough study of the inter regional disparities within Karnataka largely divided for administrative purposes into 4 divisions viz., Gulbarga Division, Belgaum Division, Bangalore Division and Mysore Division. The former two divisions together comprise North Karnataka and the latter two South Karnataka. The Committee has clearly brought out that there have been glaring disparities between North Karnataka and South Karnataka with respect to several socio economic indicators.²⁴

This Committee made a definite value addition to the understanding of regional disparities in the state by compiling vast micro level data and by adopting a novel approach, some of the salient points of which are outlined below.

On the basis of six selected parameters of deprivation, (1. percentage of families below poverty line; 2. percentage of unsafe deliveries; 3. percentage of severely malnourished children; 4. percentage of habitations not fully covered with drinking water facility; 5. percentage of children out of school in the age group of 6- 14; and 6. gender gap in literacy) deprivation distances are worked out for the districts of the state.²⁵

- i. The Committee adopted *taluka as the unit instead of the district*. For details see the report; a brief explanation is given below
- ii. In order to rank the talukas according to development and present them in a scale, 35 indicators of development were used for constructing an integrated or Comprehensive Composite Development Index (CCDI). The

identified 35 indicators of development cover different sectors viz., agricultural and allied (9 indicators), industry, trade and finance (5 indicators), economic infrastructure (9 indicators), social infrastructure (7 indicators) and population characteristics (5 indicators)

Comparing the value of CCDI of the taluka with that of the state average all the 175 talukas were arranged into four categories as relatively developed, backward, more backward and most backward talukas. All talukas having CCDI less than state average are considered as backward talukas. Thus, out of 175 talukas (currently 176 talukas) 114 talukas were found to be having CCDI less than the state average CCDI, i.e., 65 percent of the talukas were found to be backward under this reckoning as of around the year 2000. Since the talukas might be positioned at varying distance from the state average, they were further classified as most backward ($0.52 < \text{CCDI} < 0.80$), more backward ($0.80 < \text{CCDI} < 0.89$) and backward ($0.89 < \text{CCDI} < 1$). Thus, 39 most backward talukas, 40 more backward talukas and 35 backward talukas emerged on the basis of this calculation. The Committee pointed out that as many as 26 of these 39 most backward talukas are part of North Karnataka showing that it has been the victim of regional injustice over the years.

Though these findings are revealing there can be reservations about the Committee's approach regarding a number of points. Development is essentially a complex multi-faceted phenomenon. In this background, it may be argued as to the extent to which this '*indicator based approach*' adopted by HPC would be proper in ranking talukas. A number of important qualitative dimensions of development remain overlooked in this indicator based approach. As has been so clearly observed in the case of Maharashtra, "Undue pre-occupation of the Boards with computation of disparities in infrastructure has often led them to look for methodological twists that would give their regions a

larger share of the Backlog Fund..." It is quite possible that different authorities at the district / taluka level or even vested interests at the level of the state headquarters present data for indicators in such a way that they can claim a larger share in the funds to be released by the state authorities. The Special Development Plan proposed by the HPC (to be briefly discussed below) does provide tremendous opportunities for manipulation of the data for indicators. Even with regard to the chosen 35 indicators one feels that they do not fully exhaust all the facets of development. Hence, one way of modifying the methodology may consist of considering additional indicators and construct afresh CCDI, on the basis of which the talukas may further be ordered in the development scale. It is quite likely that the ordering of talukas may undergo a change with such a reconstruction of CCDI.

Obviously, the data constraints might have compelled the HPC to consider different numbers of indicators for each of the 5 sectors identified. However, the logic of relevance of the indicators should be a more dominant consideration than the logic of availability of ready data. In fact, a great service would be rendered by these HPCs if the relevant data compilation is initiated by them at the micro level, even at the level of villages. By choosing taluka as the unit of enquiry the Committee has come closer to the Rawlsian approach of examining the issue of justice, as the taluka is nearer to the persons (the unit considered as relevant in the Rawlsian framework) than the state as a whole or the district as the unit. This is particularly advantageous when we consider the individual specific parameters, as outlined above, while examining the issues of justice. This does not preclude the necessity of taking note of the region specific parameters while discussing the issues of regional justice. Obviously, the village/town would be still closer to persons and hence data need to be

compiled for villages/towns of the state in order to suggest measures for tackling the problems of disparities with regard to the individual specific parameters. Within the town, ward wise information would provide a more acceptable basis to tackle the disparity problem as such problems actually existing have been a source of discontent among people living in the same region. It is more likely that the persons residing in the individual wards are a relatively more homogeneous group. This factor of homogeneity may be an important consideration in defining the regional unit for the purpose of analysing regional injustice by extending Rawls' theory of justice.

We may also appreciate the importance of a flexible approach in considering the newer indicators of development depending upon the circumstances. It is not clear whether the important indicators like Net Enrolment Ratio (NER), Stage wise dropout rates, stage wise stagnation rates, indicators of parental interest in education of their wards, etc, were considered for education under the social infrastructure sector. Similarly, for health all the relevant indicators do not seem to have received the due attention in the methodology of calculating CCDI. A fresh look at the indicators of the sectors may therefore be necessary from this point of view. These and other important aspects deserve serious consideration. It is true that data may not be readily available on some of these aspects. However, special research studies need to be initiated for identifying the relevant parameters constituting the indicators. Similarly, serious data collection initiatives also need to be taken to generate useful information base about these parameters on an on going basis.

It is also not clear whether the varying numbers of indicators for each of the chosen sectors would introduce some bias in the

nature and the value of CCDI. Since the recommendations of the Committee heavily depend upon the taluka- wise CCDI, this observation becomes all the more crucial.

In the same way, a fresh look at the construction of the deprivation index is also recommended. As indicated above, the report mentions that six selected parameters of deprivation are considered by the Committee. Should there be additional indicators of deprivation? Or, have some indicators become redundant? The Namoshi Committee²⁶ was expected to look into these aspects. This Committee was asked to look into this issue after intensive investigation of the ground level situation in each district after visiting the districts and their interior places. It seems to suffice here to raise the issue in general terms so that further studies are initiated to look into the matter closely.

Absence of deprivation does not necessarily mean development and also absence of development does not necessarily mean deprivation. In order to examine whether this is a valid proposition it may be useful to see whether the classification - most backward, more backward and backward talukas reckoned on CCDI basis is consistent with the classification according to Composite Deprivation Index (CDI).

In the context of decentralization in governance, the village instead of the taluka emerges as a focal point. This must be true for those functions which have been or which should have been devolved to village panchayats and for funds allocated for those purposes. For functions which impinge upon wider geographical regions (e.g. talukas, districts, groups of districts), for example, major irrigation systems covering larger areas, different units more appropriate for the purpose may be required to be used for

allocation of functions and funds. In this background, the relevant data need to be developed for the village as the unit, as observed earlier.

Despite some of these reservations it should be stated that the Committee has done yeoman service in drawing the attention of all concerned about the dimensions of regional injustice within the state. It has clearly shown with facts and figures that even parts of South Karnataka suffer from regional injustice and hence the policy making has to address this question objectively.

b. How viable would be the regions if they are converted into new states?

This is an extremely tricky question and no simple answer can be given. Viability can be assessed in terms of resource potentials of different types and their dynamics over time. Since different talukas in the specified regions suffer from different degrees of backwardness, viability and sustenance of the regions would not be of uniform levels in the post reorganisation period. Since outlays expended in these regions are intended to develop these regions, some insights can be developed about whether in the post reorganisation stage the tempo of this effort can be maintained. Normally, due to resource constraints, no undue escalation of outlays can be expected from the efforts in the past and hence the trends in outlays in recent past can provide some insights in this connection.

From the data for a long period from 1990 to 2003 about the Panchayat Outlays²⁶ (Detailed data given in Appendix) in the districts of three regions, which demand statehood, viz. Bombay Karnataka, Hyderabad Karnataka and Kodagu, it is clear that neither the state government nor the Union government has been able to make stable outlays year after

year. Sometimes the outlays have also been reduced. This shows that the financial resources position of the specified districts is not at all stable. It should also be noted that the central allocation is invariably smaller than the state government allocation indicating that during the post reorganisation stage there is bound to be increasing pressures on the resources of the Union government for the purpose of maintaining the service levels in the specified regions. When there are demands on the central resources from other regions and newly formed states of other regions as well, there is a likelihood of greater uncertainty about resource availability for the newly formed states- regions of the present state. As it is, the literacy rates, educational facilities, health care facilities and infrastructure in the specified regions are much below the state average and those obtaining in the South Karnataka region. It would therefore be risky to leave these regions to such a position of uncertain resource availability. Added to this, for the same reason, other resources like qualified manpower resources, infrastructure, etc, are inadequately available in these regions in order to support the development of these regions.

In order to see how far the actions of the political interests and bureaucracy after making people aware of the serious problem of regional disparities, have been consistent with the declared goals of their reduction within a reasonably short period of time, we attempt here a further brief analysis of the rationale of the release of funds to different districts.

If we consider per capita district domestic product as an index of development of a district then we find that the per capita district GDPs (for 2003-04 at 1993-94 prices, for which the information was available) vary quite significantly amongst all the 27 districts

of the state as a whole and also amongst districts of different regions within the state of Karnataka. Thus, the per capita GDP for the state as a whole was Rs. 14249 for 2003-04. Interestingly, per capita GDP for seven Bombay Karnataka districts was the lowest compared to even Hyderabad Karnataka. Kodagu district stands distinctly apart from all other districts of all the regions of the state. While for Kodagu the per capita GDP was Rs.15349, for South Karnataka consisting of 14 districts it was Rs. 14240, for Hyderabad Karnataka consisting of five districts it was next highest at Rs 11662 and for Bombay Karnataka it was the lowest at Rs.10698.

The coefficient of variation of selected parameters also brings out interesting facts about the state as a whole and for the specified regions. While for the state as a whole the coefficient of variation of GDP per capita was 22.4 per cent maximum variation is found in South Karnataka with the coefficient at 46 per cent. This is followed by the Hyderabad Karnataka with coefficient of variation at 37.6 per cent. The least variation is found in Bombay Karnataka implying that the level of development is more or less uniformly low in the entire Bombay Karnataka region. That some districts of South Karnataka are quite backward deserving special attention, the point made by DM Nanjundappa Committee, is clearly brought out from the high coefficient of variation for this region. Per capita GDP is as low as Rs 8381 for Chamaraj Nagar district whereas it is more than three times higher for Bangalore Urban (for obvious reasons) than that for Chamaraja Nagar district, being as high as Rs. 29362. And for Dakshina Kannada district it is Rs. 27351.

We raise two questions in this connection;

- i. Were the funds released both by the state government and the union government to the district administrations in clear recognition of the level of their development?
- ii. Were the funds released in clear recognition of inter regional disparities and inter district disparities of development within each region?

Linking per capita district GDP with per capita grant to the district government from different federating units like the state government and the union government should help developing insights about the issues being examined. The correlation coefficient should help in developing insights about the first question while the coefficient of variation should throw light on the second issue under consideration.

It can be seen that the per capita Zilla Panchayat Outlay coming from different layers of federation is not equal over different districts and hence over different regions within the state. Thus, per capita outlay from all sources taken together has been consistently lowest for Bombay Karnataka region during the latest period of 1999-2000 to 2003-04. Maximum outlay is found to be for the Kodagu district. Next in order generally is the outlay for South Karnataka region and then for Hyderabad Karnataka region. No clear cut explanations can be provided for why there are year to year variations in the Zilla Panchayat outlays in different regions. Outlays are mostly decided at the state secretariat level and one cannot confidently assert that the decentralised decision making has taken firm roots so as to reflect perfectly the priorities at the Panchayat level.

Table 1 Zilla Panchayat Per Capita Outlays 1990-91 to 2003-04 according to specific regions of Karnataka (Rs.)

															Per Capita GDP of districts in the speci- fied region (in Rs.)
1999-2000			2000-01			2001-02			2002-03			2003-04			
State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	
Bombay Karnataka															
143.8	143.9	287.6	180.8	144.6	325.4	200.8	145.5	346.2	109.6	115.1	224.7	120.0	112.1	232.1	10698
Hyderabad Karnataka															
155.0	142.7	297.7	191.5	151.6	343.2	210.4	152.7	363.1	116.1	131.4	247.5	125.6	130.7	256.4	11662
Kodagu (Actuals)															
249.2	260.0	509.2	309.9	241.4	551.3	342.4	243.2	585.6	211.5	210.0	421.5	227.7	191.8	419.5	15349
South Karnataka															
155.0	161.9	317.0	189.6	156.8	346.5	210.6	163.2	373.8	120.4	138.8	259.2	131.5	136.6	267.2	14240
Karnataka															
156.5	158.3	314.8	193.5	157.4	350.9	214.4	161.9	376.3	120.5	135.4	255.9	131.5	132.8	263.7	14249

Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Govt. of Karnataka. Also see Annexure I and II.

* Per Capita GDP for the year 2003-04 at 1993-94 prices

Break up of total outlay into that from state government and the union government throws light on whether they have acted rationally in recognition of the per capita district GDP. It can be seen that both the state government and Central government have made maximum outlay for South Karnataka region and minimum outlay for Bombay Karnataka region. Thus, here also there is no evidence of the governmental outlays acting in a conscious way for correction of regional disparities, as ideally they should have been maximum for Bombay Karnataka region and minimum for South Karnataka region. Since a number of schemes being implemented at the district level are likely to be the Central or part of the Centrally sponsored schemes with the requirement of making a matching contribution by the state government to the outlays of the

central government, one tends to point the finger towards the central government for this anomalous situation.

Another point that emerges from this simple statistical exercise is that inter district variation of outlays, which ought to have been higher for Hyderabad Karnataka compared to Bombay Karnataka **in recognition of higher inter district variation of per capita district GDP** in the former, has been the other way round. In other words, there does not seem to be any evidence of conscious effort for correction for the level of backwardness of districts or inter district variation of backwardness with the help of Zilla Panchayat outlays both from the state government and the central government. This is made out from the statistical exercise presented in the following table.

Table 2. Coefficients of Variation of Zilla Panchayat Per Capita Outlays 1990-91 to 2003-04 According to Specific Regions of Karnataka (%)

1999-2000			2000-01			2001-02			2002-03			2003-04			Per Capita GDP of districts in the specified region (in Rs.)
State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Bombay Karnataka															
15.3	18.8	16.0	15.5	20.3	17.4	15.7	20.1	17.4	15.3	19.2	17.1	15.3	18.3	16.2	10698
Hyderabad Karnataka															
8.5	9.2	8.5	7.7	6.4	6.8	8.0	9.9	7.7	10.3	11.5	10.8	10.0	12.2	11.1	11662
South Karnataka															
29.4	30.3	29.3	28.0	26.7	26.6	28.1	28.3	27.2	29.5	32.5	29.6	29.6	30.8	28.9	14240
Karnataka															
25.2	27.6	25.8	24.2	23.8	23.5	24.3	25.0	23.9	27.2	28.6	26.9	27.0	26.9	25.9	14249

Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Govt. of Karnataka.

* Per Capita GDP for the year 2003-04 at 1993-94 prices.

The above observations are more clearly brought out by the coefficients of correlation between per capita GDP and per capita grants made by the state government and central government. These coefficients are presented in Table 3;

Though it is true that higher grants are made to zilla panchayats with smaller GDP per capita, as made out by the negative sign of the coefficients of correlation it is also revealing that the value of the coefficient is different when we consider different regions of the state. Of course,

further study is needed to find out whether this implies violation of the principle of justice. However, it certainly arouses the interest of the researchers in regional justice.

In the same way, outlays should be more for the region with higher 'coefficient of variation' of per capita GDP and vice versa. However, this is not clearly seen in the case of different regions of Karnataka. Per capita outlays have not acted as correctives for high backwardness and wide disparities of development within the regions of the state.

Table 3. Coefficients of Correlation of Zilla Panchayat Per Capital Outlays and Per Capita District Income for 1990-91 to 2003-04

1999-2000			2000-01			2001-02			2002-03			2003-04			Per Capita GDP of districts in the specified region (in Rs.)	
State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	
							Bombay Karnataka									
-0.1063	-0.4066	-0.2894	-0.1432	-0.2190	-0.1845	-0.1715	-0.2665	-0.2198	-0.1525	-0.2905	-0.2343	-0.1794	-0.2248	-0.2097	10698	
							Hyderabad Karnataka									
-0.6054	-0.2047	-0.4231	-0.5210	-0.2212	-0.4210	-0.4667	0.3857	-0.0708	-0.3332	-0.4141	-0.3815	-0.3571	-0.3858	-0.3742	11662	
							South Karnataka									
-0.7191	-0.7082	-0.7256	-0.7564	-0.7041	-0.7566	-0.7498	-0.7112	-0.7601	-0.7049	-0.6405	-0.7023	-0.6992	-0.6593	-0.7014	14240	
							Karnataka									
-0.4699	-0.4152	-0.4501	-0.4924	-0.4242	-0.4732	-0.4876	-0.4042	-0.4650	-0.4022	-0.3861	-0.4087	-0.4058	-0.4010	-0.4163	14249	

Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Govt. of Karnataka. * Per Capita GDP for the year 2003-04 at 1993-94 prices

Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Govt. of Karnataka. * Per Capita GDP for the year 2003-04 at 1993-94 prices

Table 4. Co-efficients of Correlation between SDP Per Capita of ZP and Per Capita Outlay from

GDP Per Capita (in Rs.)	1999-2000			2000-01			2001-02			2002-03			2003-04		
	State	Centre	Total	State	Total	Centre	State	Total	Centre	State	Total	Centre	State	Total	Centre
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
10698	18.9	-0.1063	-0.4066	-0.2894	-0.1432	-0.2190	-0.1845	-0.1715	-0.2665	-0.2198	-0.1525	-0.2905	-0.2343	-0.1794	-0.2248
11662	37.6	-0.6054	-0.2047	-0.4231	-0.5210	-0.2212	-0.4210	-0.4667	0.3857	-0.0708	-0.3332	-0.4141	-0.3815	-0.3571	-0.3858
14240	45.9	-0.7191	-0.7082	-0.7256	-0.7564	-0.7041	-0.7566	-0.7498	-0.7112	-0.7601	-0.7049	-0.6405	-0.7023	-0.6992	-0.6593
14249	22.4	-0.4699	-0.4152	-0.4501	-0.4924	-0.4242	-0.4732	-0.4876	-0.4042	-0.4650	-0.4022	-0.3861	-0.4087	-0.4058	-0.4010

Note: Kodagu district is excluded from the table because it is a single district region.

Table 6. Per cent of Expenditure to Budget Provision -Pertaining to Dharwad Zilla Panchayat

Sl. No.	Major Head of Account	2009-10			2008-09			2007-08			2006-07			2005-06		
		Non Plan	Plan	Total	Non Plan	Plan	Total	Non Plan	Plan	Total	Non Plan	Plan	Total	Non Plan	Plan	Total
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
1	2059 Public Works	99.9	---	99.9	93.3	---	93.3	95.2	---	95.2	87.9	---	87.9	1070.2	---	1070.2
2	2202 General Education	76.2	56.7	70.6	76.7	77.1	76.8	85.8	75.6	82.4	81.4	85.3	82.7	82.4	105.2	90.3
3	2204 Sports and Youth Services	97.5	81.8	85.0	79.1	89.2	87.4	95.0	95.0	95.0	89.8	68.4	75.7	67.7	66.2	66.7
4	2205 Art and Culture	---	100.0	100.0	---	100.0	100.0	---	0.0	0.0	---	77.7	77.7	---	406.5	406.5
5	2210 Medical and Public Health	78.8	78.3	78.7	79.9	53.7	74.6	84.7	53.9	78.3	85.0	68.6	81.3	102.6	74.3	97.6
6	2211 Family Welfare	44.3	91.0	89.4	45.2	81.9	80.9	---	82.9	82.9	---	79.8	79.8	---	83.5	83.5
7	2225 Welfare of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes & Other Backward Classes	98.9	96.7	98.2	98.3	97.1	98.0	95.7	97.4	96.1	99.4	106.0	101.1	109.4	90.6	106.4
8	2235 Social Security and Welfare	85.2	90.2	89.7	81.0	88.8	87.7	84.4	80.0	80.6	88.8	75.5	77.4	120.7	87.3	90.6
9	2401 Crop Husbandry	93.2	98.2	95.7	94.3	72.8	83.4	91.6	89.5	90.5	75.9	91.1	83.9	102.4	97.4	99.3
10	2402 Soil and Water Conservation	78.9	---	78.9	75.3	---	75.3	93.6	---	93.6	80.0	103.3	100.5	100.9	1508.8	571.6
11	2403 Animal Husbandry	99.6	99.2	99.6	94.5	99.4	95.1	94.4	99.0	95.1	97.3	100.1	97.6	101.2	115.6	102.8
12	2405 Fisheries	92.3	94.0	93.1	97.5	82.1	89.2	85.0	92.4	88.8	85.8	78.6	82.1	191.1	47.2	112.2
13	2406 Forestry and Wildlife	95.1	99.0	95.9	93.5	98.0	94.4	95.5	37.1	93.1	---	94.8	94.8	---	88.9	88.9
14	2425 Co-Operation (1)	---	100.0	100.0	---	100.0	100.0	---	85.4	85.4	---	165.7	165.7	---	39.1	39.1
15	2515 Other Rural Development Programmes	63.4	45.8	56.0	68.0	43.6	56.3	70.7	506.2	303.9	66.3	672.1	290.6	85.9	128.8	107.1
16	2702 Minor Irrigation	94.5	---	94.5	92.3	---	92.3	96.5	---	96.5	105.8	---	105.8	125.8	---	125.8
17	2851 Village and Small Industries (1)	88.4	97.4	89.7	68.7	64.3	68.1	76.7	94.8	80.1	81.0	52.8	74.5	85.4	41.1	74.4
18	2852 Industries (1)	0.0	---	0.0	27.1	---	27.1	98.8	---	98.8	95.7	---	95.7	87.0	---	87.0
19	3054 Roads and Bridges	100.9	99.6	100.3	98.7	94.5	96.1	---	94.6	158.8	---	100.1	100.1	---	151.6	197.9
20	3425 Other Scientific Research	---	84.7	84.7	---	100.0	100.0	---	98.4	98.4	---	73.2	73.2	---	50.0	50.0
21	3451 Secretariat Economic Services	98.5	90.9	97.0	96.2	88.5	94.5	92.9	93.0	93.0	102.0	78.5	98.9	104.8	29.2	88.0

It is not enough if allocations of outlays are made keeping in mind the goal of regional justice. What is required is their fuller utilization and translation of the expenditures in terms of goods and services. From the data collected for one of the Zilla Panchayats (Dharwad Zilla Panchayat) for recent period (please see the tables 5 and 6) it was noticed that there is no hundred per cent release of the budgeted funds and hundred percent utilization of outlays in the case of many departments. Even with regard to non plan heads releases are less than budget allocations with regard to some heads in some years. Since non plan head indicates committed liabilities such sliding of releases is somewhat strange! With regard to some departments the utilization percentage was as low as around 40 per cent. On plan account occasionally releases and expenditures are found to be more than the budgeted amounts. All such deviations only go to show that budgeting at the Zilla Panchayat levels is not done with high level of seriousness or at the decentralized levels many unforeseen developments are likely to be faced and they are likely to make financial decisions and actions therefrom very much uncertain. Discussions with officials at these levels reveal that the decisions are taken at the state headquarters and the officials only take actions to implement these decisions.

It is also worth noting that the scaling down of expenditures in relation to budget provisions is prominently seen in the case of soft and less visible sectors like education, health, rural development, etc, though they happen to be important developmental sectors. This is a cause for concern particularly when we are focusing on regional justice issues and the need for concerted and conscious efforts to develop these regions. In a drought prone region, such as Dharwad district, such slides back in the case of crucial sectors like rural development, village and small industries and industries are indeed disturbing. Sporadic increases in release percentages and utilization

percentages in some years only bring out the erratic nature of policy making and implementation initiatives in this connection.

It should be noted that Dharwad Zilla Panchayat is a relatively better administered region and utilisation of funds should be fairly satisfactory in this Zilla Panchayat. However, this cannot be said of all other Zilla Panchayats. For smaller Zilla Panchayats and those in still less developed regions, utilisation percentages are likely to be poorer. Our illustrative exercises thus only go to indicate that regional justice issues have not prominently appeared while implementing different policies in the sub regions of the state and implementation has been by and large mechanical and routine in nature. Our contention is that there is no guarantee that in the post reorganisation stage the things are likely to change significantly. In other words, there is no guarantee that central grants to new states would be adequate, the budgeted amounts would be in accordance with the requirements of the new states and the decentralised levels in the new states, that there would be timely and hundred per cent release of the budgeted amounts and that the released amounts would be fully utilised by the respective developmental departments. In the same way, there is no guarantee that these funds would be efficiently expended, leading to the required production and supply of goods and services to the people in all the regions of the newly formed states.

Thus, since independent statehood for the specified regions faces a number of corridors of uncertainty, the problem of regional injustice has to be tackled in a different way. This is tackled by HPC by providing for a Special Development Plan, which aims at reaching the state average levels of various services in the backward talukas of the region within specified time period and concerted efforts to lift the region from the state of under development and wide disparities. DMN

Committee felt that other things remaining the same, this approach is likely to be more effective in ameliorating regional injustice in Karnataka.

The Special Development Plan and the Approach of Evaluation of Implementation

For promoting the backward area development in Karnataka the Government had set up four Regional Development Boards- Hyderabad Karnataka Area Development Board in 1991, Border Area Development Board also in 1991, Malnad Area Development Board in 1993 and Bayaluseeme Area Development Board in 1995. A thorough evaluation of the functioning of these Boards [CMDR,] brought out that all is not well and these Boards are functioning essentially as power centres and the politicians' handles. It is interesting that a similar observation is made in the case of Regional Boards of Maharashtra also. An evaluation concludes, "Establishment of decentralized institutions, however, is only a necessary condition for accommodating regional needs and aspirations in the planning process, but not a sufficient one". Noticing that these Boards are not functioning properly and also that they are redundant in the background of statutory powers given to Panchayat Raj institutions under 73rd and 74th amendments to the Constitution both CMDR in its study, commissioned by HPC, and HPC itself in its recommendations had suggested their abolition. However, for obvious reasons the State Government has not accepted this recommendation. **This probably shows how if smaller states with homogenous perspectives are not created then there is an interest in perpetuating a large state, having a number of regions of varying development levels in it with such decentralized power hubs.**

In order to bring the identified 114 backward talukas to the developmental level of the state as a whole, the HPC recommended investment of

Rs.31000 crore at 2002-03 prices. This is the allocation for the Special Development Plan. In the case of Maharashtra this type of outlay was meant to cover the 'backlog'. About this type of approach a number of observations can be made.

How far the gap filling is a genuinely useful approach in the process of development? Do the gaps also not go on changing over the period of time? *Pro rata allocations only according to the gaps as recommended by HPC might conceal an important point that filling of larger gaps requires proportionately larger resources-manpower, financial and physical- than smaller gaps.* There is always a need for a *Big Push* in lifting a backward region to the levels comparable to those of the advanced region of the state. Such issues were unfortunately missed out in the DMN approach of Special Development Plan. Another issue in question is whether this recommended sum of Rs 31000 crore is or is not an additionality, over and above the usual budgetary allocation to the backward talukas. Since this is the recommended outlay for a 'special development plan', a general impression is that it is an additionality. However, this has continued to be a disputed point. Some analysts of the recommendations of DMN HPC have opined that in view of deep disparities a big push is required for tackling these disparities and this allocation of Rs 31000 crores must be considered as an additionality.²⁷

The division wise distribution of the allocation might conceal the taluka wise requirements. Also, formula based allocations, though desirable from the point of view of avoiding subjectivity and the 'luck factor' (so emphatically condemned by Rawls) it is worth noting that the process of socio-economic development is not basically a formula driven process. To put it differently, the path of development is not a straight line but a random zigzag, since, even if development may have logic of its own, it is also continuously

impacted by random events and shocks, so that a simple formula may not be in a position to capture this process. If the formula is based upon very complex and sophisticated model building then it is not easily accessible either to the executive agencies in the process of implementation facilitating proper implementation, nor to the evaluating agencies and people for evaluation.

The fact that the Dr. D M Nanjundappa Committee has not covered all the developmental departments in its allocation calculus is itself a moot point for taking a fresh look at the methodology.

The Committee had suggested major sector-wise allocation pattern of Rs. 31000 crore of additional allocation for talukas. It is however not clear how the sectoral allocation pattern was itself decided by the Committee. In other words, how the priorities of sectors were decided by the Committee. One gets an impression from the approach adopted in the evaluation of the implementation of the recommendations till date (being undertaken by the HPC under the then Chairmanship of Sri S. Namoshi) that the priorities were decided by the actual allocations of the previous period by the sectoral departments. However, the priorities need to be decided before the allocations are made and not the other way round. Sectoral allocations need to be decided on the basis of a sound logic rather than a mechanical projection over the past. Under such an approach certain sectors need to be considered as non-negotiable and charged to the exchequer. If simple projections of the past trends are the basis for fresh allocations then the status quo of regional disparities is likely to be maintained, which obviously is not the objective of DMN HPC.

The variations for many sectors in the actual allocation from the recommended allocation, as observed over the years, only go to show (a) either

the methodology for deciding the sectoral allocations was not realistic enough or (b) the actual implementation of the recommendations came under different pressures and stresses so that the deviations resulted. In this background, High Powered Committee appointed by Government of Karnataka to oversee the implementation of DMN HPC recommendations, may have to adopt a different approach in arriving at the priorities of the sectors in order to make fresh recommendations or to evaluate the implementation of the earlier recommendations in a more realistic setting.

A major point for consideration is whether the implementation and evaluation should have a static framework of considering the recommendations made nearly a decade earlier. The delay in implementation of the recommendations should not be taken as a reason for adopting a less relevant basis for evaluation. Since development is essentially a dynamic process, a **rolling approach** seems to be necessary at all stages- of formulation of the developmental plans, their implementation and their evaluation. Also, no adjustments for price changes are made over a decade both in respect of Outlays decided for the Special Development Plan and their sectoral distributions. Recent inflationary trends, particularly food inflation show how any type of price adjustment calculation also is likely to go wrong.

In the entire exercise, the role of the private sector, public-private partnership, etc. which are assuming increasing significance in the developmental policy making have not received any attention. Consideration of these might change the size of the overall allocation - normal and additional and also the sectoral allocations. There is also no recognition of resource availability from various other sources for the developmental programmes like international funds flow.

The approach of evaluation of implementation of the recommendations heavily relies upon **the financial aspects only**. There are a number of stages in the evaluation of the implementation of recommendations. *Firstly*, how much is actually allocated? Have the allocations been decided on the basis of sound unit cost, etc calculations? *Secondly*, How much of the allocations is actually released to the sectoral functionaries in different divisions? How much of released resources actually reach the functional heads at the taluka and village levels? In this entire network, the last stage viz., the village level seems to be the weakest. What measures are taken to strengthen the links till the last level? *Thirdly*, How much of the received resources are actually utilized by the concerned functionaries? Absorption capacity of a particular department and a particular sector in a particular region plays a very important role in this. Whims and fancies of either political leadership or bureaucracy in asking for more like Oliver Twist of Charles Dickens can also be a major cause for the deficits in utilisation of resources. The recent figures for different divisions and sectors in Karnataka in this connection show that asking for more is the easiest step but utilising the asked for funds is the most difficult part of action. And *lastly*, how do these financial resources get transformed into physical achievements? Both in the HPC Report as well as the approach for evaluation, the physical target realisation receives hardly any attention.

On the whole, though one should appreciate the serious efforts made through a Special Development Plan to remove the element of regional injustice, it is not clear whether the approach of this special plan is fool proof.

Having considered the two of the three issues raised earlier we may now briefly examine the third issue of viability of the rest of the state after statehood is granted to some regions.

c. What would happen to the rest of the state if demands for statehood of some regions within Karnataka are at all conceded?

This issue is of course hypothetical. However, it seems to be clear that in view of inherent geographical inequalities the new scenario might not present a totally different picture from the one obtaining at present. In any case the central grants to other regions might not increase, if one considers pressures on central resources. Probably the grants are likely to get reduced, for the claims of the hitherto less developed regions in their new avatar as states for more financial assistance cannot be resisted. Also, the requirements of financial support per unit of outcome might be disproportionately higher in the new situation since the economies of scale of operation would not be experienced in a significant way in the new situation. Under the pre reorganisation stage the relatively backward regions of the state 'could' benefit from cross subsidisation from richer regions. This is particularly relevant in the case of Hyderabad Karnataka, which continues to be backward from many points of view. Even Bombay Karnataka region might experience such gains. With these regions severing their connections from other regions after becoming separate states the cross subsidisation opportunities will disappear, imposing tremendous responsibilities on the administration of these regions.

In the same way, since there is no effective method of regulating manpower flows from one region to another the present trends of flocking of competent manpower in more developed regions might continue, depriving the newly constituted states of availability of such manpower. Congestion in the developed regions-states and scarcity in others are likely

to cause further problems. Thus, reorganisation of states would present many challenges, some of which are old and some new and hence it is not a smooth sailing event at all. For poorer regions getting constituted as states such challenges are likely to be more formidable while rest of the regions would face challenges of different sorts.

VI TO CONCLUDE

We briefly summarize the main conclusions of this paper as below.

1. Region has to be given a separate identity in discussions relating to justice.
2. There is an urgent need to develop conceptual insights about regional justice and injustice. The present method of concentrating only on personal justice may not achieve its purpose unless matters relating to regional justice are properly considered.
3. State reorganisation does not seem to be a panacea for the problem of regional injustice.
4. The decisions in this connection have to be taken on case by case basis.
5. Wherever demands are voiced for a separate state the union government may take the initiative to watch the situation for that region particularly with regard to resource availability and its sustenance for some time, say, for five years and then consider granting the statehood after being convinced of sustenance of the newly formed state.
6. The gap filling approach as adopted by various committees appointed in different states for tackling regional disparities in development and thereby the problems of regional injustice may itself turn out to be a source of irritation strengthening the cries for a separate state from within a newly constituted state. Hence, the entire issue is like a tight rope walk, needing utmost care and tact in its handling.
7. While examining the case of regional injustice made by some regions it is desirable to take a comprehensive view of development and develop indicators incorporating not only economic and social dimensions but also cultural, philosophical and other parameters also.
8. It would be a great service to the nation if opinion makers of the country try to develop an ethos to convince people that some regional disparities that are ingrained in the unequal natural endowments of regions are inevitable. Extreme deprivations need to be honestly tackled by public interventions and involvement of people. No purpose would be served if regional disparities are used for achieving self interest by individuals and political interest groups.

NOTES

1. This is reported in the daijiworld.com and also in the vernacular media on 16th March 2011. The report says, "At this juncture there is no proposal before the central government for setting up of a states reorganisation commission. None of the governments have put forward any demand for separate state," said Gurudas Kamat, the Minister of State for Home, in a statement made in the Lok Sabha... The minister said that from time to time, the union government had received demands for bifurcating Karnataka to set up separate Kodagu state, carve out Telengana out of Andhra Pradesh, Vidarbha from Maharashtra, and for putting together parts of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh states to give birth to a separate state named Bundel Khand. The Minister also said, "These demands have come from individuals and organisations and not from the state governments." He also mentioned that there have been demands for setting up of Bhojpur state by pooling together certain districts of Uttar Pradesh and Chattisgarh, Saurashtra out of Gujarat, Koshalanchal in Western Orissa, Gurkhaland out of West Bengal, Mithilanchal by separating certain regions from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, as well as Poorvanchal, Harit Pradesh, Brij Pradesh, and Avadh Pradesh out of Uttar Pradesh. According to press reports of March end 2011 Karnataka leaders from the Hyderabad Karnataka have demanded a special status for the region even if the region continues to be part of the state of Karnataka in order to make it eligible to receive special assistance particularly from the Union Government for its development.

2. Sanskrit slogans implanted in forest areas (on Tirupati hills, for example) such as - *vrusho rakshati rakshitah*- the tree protects humans if it is protected- are meaningful. People are exhorted through placards of such slogans not to uproot trees, kill wild animals and birds and thus preserve the forests for they help human beings in the long run. The message is 'preserve trees for trees preserve humans'. They bring out how human action is always human centred. That way preservation of the region as a whole is also intended to safeguard the interest of human beings.

3. Of course, in India there are special approaches to recognise the special problems under the term *Special Category States*. Special programmes are introduced from time to time to tackle the regional problems. Thus, there used to be *Drought Prone Area Programmes- DPAP*, Regional Development Boards, etc. However, a moment's reflection reveals that these efforts and policies are not invested with the same amount of seriousness as the programmes directly targeting people, such as employment programmes, poverty eradication programmes, inclusiveness programmes, etc.

4. V.S. Apte, *English Sanskrit Dictionary*, Nag Publishers, 1987, p. 245.

5. Adam Smith presents an extended discussion of the sense of propriety as an important spring of human conduct. Special chapters are devoted to the articulation of Justice under the sense of propriety. There is a very meaningful passage under this extended Section running into several pages reflecting Smith's commitment to justice. He writes, 'As society cannot subsist unless the laws of justice are tolerably observed, as no social intercourse can take place among men who do not generally abstain from injuring one another, the consideration of this necessity, it has been thought, was the ground upon which we approved of the enforcement of the laws of justice by the punishment of those who violated them' [Smith, 1938, p. 72]. For a brief discussion of Adam Smith's contributions in this connection see [Roll, 1993, p. 129].

6. An interesting Sanskrit *Subhashita* is worth quoting here; *sarpaah pibanti pavanam na cha durbalaah te ... santosha eva purushasya param nidaanam*. It is said that serpents subsist only on air and they are still quite strong. The poet in this verse gives a number of examples where the living entities do not depend upon any external factor for their strength and happiness. Thus, the sum and substance of this subhashita is - Happiness is inborn and it does not depend upon external factors.

7. See, for example, a number of socio economic surveys for individual cities sponsored by the Research Programmes Committee of the Planning Commission during the early period of the planning era in India. Thus, we have Bombay Survey, Delhi Survey, etc., having rich socio economic data about the respective cities and people living there.

8. The vast literature that has developed under the title of regional economics brings out such issues. The pioneering contributions of Walter Isard in this connection deserve a special mention.

9. For details regarding such insights see [Kanbur and Venables, 2003]; spatial Inequality and Development, Special Issue of Journal of Economic Geography - Selected papers presented at a Conference held in Helsinki in July 2003, also see [Timmins, 2003], address the 'fundamental issue in econometric studies of agglomeration- the extent to which the observed clusters are due to the natural advantage of the location or due to the presence of some agglomerative force'. Also see the presentation material of a public lecture delivered by Ravi Kanbur at Centre for Multi disciplinary Development Research, Dharwad, on 23rd February 2011, as a part of DM Nanjundappa Chair Visiting Professorship programme.

10. See [Sen, 2006]. This is in line with the spirit of what is the Shakespearean adage- 'Sweet are the uses of adversity, which like a toad ugly and venomous, yet bears a jewel in its head'. One of the papers by Kanbur and Venables [2005] observes, 'The "new economic geography" has emphasised that there are powerful forces of agglomeration that tend to lead to a concentration of economic activity, magnifying natural geographical advantages that a region may enjoy. Thus, spatial agglomeration brings the benefits of returns to scale, and helps efficiency and growth.' This is indeed in line with the statement of Amartya Sen regarding the 'Opportunity in Disparity'.

11. For details, reference may be made to [Musgrave, 1958] particularly the discussion on budget determination through voting.

12. [http://en. Wikipedia.org/wiki/image:Kuznets-curve.png](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/image:Kuznets-curve.png)

13. This can be clarified from an example from an academic profession. Thus, even a mediocre performer from a noted university is respected more than an outstanding performer from a non metropolitan university. Brands have a role to play everywhere. Perfect comparisons are of course difficult, but the experiences of members in the selection committee meetings bring out this point. The brand names also play a role as screening devices. Similarly, regions are placed in a hierarchy in the perceptions of the people conferring certain spill-over benefits or losses to the residents.

14. For a detailed review of this work of A.K. Sen in a comparative perspective of the work of John Rawls, see [Nadkarni, 2010]

15. Sen, 2010 (first published by Allen Lane 2009), p. 233. The Section entitled Why Go Beyond Achievement To Opportunity on p. 235 of this book presents arguments about why capabilities approach provides an analytically superior basis for understanding issues of justice and injustice.

16. A saintly person is expected to pray before God as '*Kashi vasa kodu, Prayaga marana kodu*', 'Oh! God, grant me an opportunity to live in Kashi and also an opportunity to die in Prayag'. This aspect of the gradation of places is explained in detail in *Padma Purana*, one of 18 important *puranas* written by sage Vedavyasa. There is in this an implicit purpose-wise gradation of regions and towns. This hierarchy of regions was universally accepted. Different *sthala puranas* bring out the importance of ancient cities or ancient regions, which was universally accepted.

17. Also see the oft quoted verse eulogizing selected cities of the country-

*Ayodhya Mathura Maya Kashee Kanchee Avantika /
Puree Dvaravatee chaiva saptaitaa mokshadaayikaah||*
This verse means- *Ayodhya, Mathura, Maya, Kashee, Kanchee, Avantika, Puri and Dvaravatee (Dwaraka), visit to and stay in these seven cities would help man to be liberated from the bondage of samsara.*

18. *Aryavartah punyabhoomih madhyam Vindhya Himalayoh-* This verse from *Amarakosha* implies that the region between the Himalayas and Vindhya mountains is a highly auspicious region.

19. This point is worth the attention of the recent Karnataka Government Committee on implementation of the recommendations of Dr DM Nanjundappa Committee in Karnataka, as, re-thinking about the comprehensive indicators of development and deprivation has been one of the terms of reference before this Committee.

20. The inscription says-
*shatrunaapi kruto dharmah paalaneeyah prayatnatah /
shatruleva hi shatruh syat dharmah shatruh na kasyachit||*
'There may be enmity with the enemy but nobody can consider justice as enemy at any time. Hence, regional injustice has to be necessarily corrected at all times. See for details Keyur R. Karagudari, 'Paragonic Efficiency of a King in Sanskrit Inscriptions' (Mimeo).

21. Reference is invited to [Shrinivas and Gopal (Eds.), 2008, Vol. II, Pp. i-xciv and 1008]. A detailed Introduction to this Volume provides useful information with inscriptional evidence about how conscious efforts were made in the direction of regional justice goals.

22. This is totally in contrast to the spirit of Karnataka Ekeekarana movement (unification of Karnataka) that was spearheaded by eminent leaders, some of whom were even Englishmen like Sir Thomas Eliot, Sir Thomas Munroe, John A Dunlop, Green Hill, R Grant, W A Russell, J F Fleet, etc. From Karnataka R H Deshpande, Rodda Srinivasarao, founder of the illustrious Karnataka College at Dharwad and other organisations, promoting the cause of Karnataka, Karnataka Kulapurohita Alur Venkata Rao, Muduvudu Krishnarao, Andaneppa Meti, etc and the Government officer like Deputy Chennabasappa and subsequently Hukkerikar Ramarao, Ex Speaker of Bombay Legislative Assembly, Dr R R Diwakar, former Governor of Bihar, Vidyaratna R.S. Panchamukhi, known as Bhisma Pitamaha of research in Karnataka (particularly for integrating Bellary into Karnataka on the basis of historical evidences) and others also were involved.

23. [Panchamukhi, J] This study was completed at CMDR much before the setting up of Dr DM Nanjundappa High Powered Committee in Karnataka. This study is based upon the detailed data supplied by Government of Karnataka about district wise socio economic indicators. The author of this study was a member of a two member committee appointed by the Government of Karnataka to analyse regional disparities in the state.

24. [Government of Karnataka, 2002], gives rich data, division wise, district wise and taluka wise about various socio economic indicators to show the extent of regional disparities in the state.

25. For details about the methodology, see [Government of Karnataka, 2002, ch. 5].

26. There is no Report of the Committee under the then chairmanship of Sri Namoshi. The author is given to understand that no report is submitted by the Committee.

27. In a number of seminars held after the submission of the DMN HPC Report, this view was expressed and reported in print media.

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Annexure I-A. Zilla panchayat outlays by district 1990-91 to 2003-04

Sl No	District	1999-2000			2000-01			2001-02			2002-03			2003-04			(Rs. Lakhs)
		State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	
		(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	
1	Belgaum	5277	4669	9946	6425	5010	11435	7218.5	5199	12417.5	3820	4021	7841	4258	4548	8806	
2	Bijapur	2636	2618	5254	3294	2697	5991	3634.5	2828	6462.5	1956	2195	4151	2135	2091	4226	
3	Dharwad	1887	1800	3687	2376	1747	4123	2592.5	1716	4308.5	1458	1375	2833	1573	1315	2888	
4	Uttara Kannada	2521	2406	4927	3150	2697	5847	3513.5	2677	6190.5	1883	2075	3958	2071	2033	4104	
5	Bagalkot	2434	2145	4579	3002	2266	5268	3300.5	2152	5452.5	1825	1748	3573	1972	1674	3646	
6	Gadag	1420	1592	3012	1867	1381	3248	2060.0	1453	3513.0	1164	1188	2352	1259	1078	2337	
7	Haveri	1984	2413	4397	2539	2251	4790	2879.0	2214	5093.0	1557	1752	3309	1743	1675	3418	
8	Gulbarga	4788	4547	9335	5695	4483	10178	6235.5	4026	10261.5	3240	3720	6960	3545	3548	7093	
9	Bellary	2942	2840	5782	3603	2898	6501	3989.5	3222	7211.5	2134	2304	4438	2304	2337	4641	
10	Bidar	2674	2435	5109	3227	2400	5627	3569.5	2437	6006.5	1939	2152	4091	2097	2210	4307	
11	Raichur	2493	2091	4584	3119	2474	5593	3393.0	2462	5855.0	1925	2216	4141	2073	2224	4297	
12	Koppal	1791	1686	3477	2350	1963	4313	2574.0	1987	4561.0	1525	1777	3302	1646	1732	3378	
13	Kodagu	1367	1426	2793	1700	1324	3024	1878.5	1334	3212.5	1160	1152	2312	1249	1052	2301	
14	Bangalore	1967	2022	3989	2518	2122	4640	2706.0	2095	4801.0	1648	1796	3444	1749	1750	3499	
15	Bangalore	3340	2960	6300	4027	3055	7082	4457.0	3472	7929.0	2395	3032	5427	2601	2972	5573	
16	Chitradurga	2588	3304	5892	3177	3197	6374	3487.5	3272	6759.5	2064	3364	5428	2231	2948	4979	
17	Kolar	3987	4234	8221	4831	3723	8554	5346.5	3724	9070.5	2905	3105	6010	3182	3156	6338	
18	Shimoga	2502	2973	5475	3050	2797	5847	3489.0	3004	6493.0	2063	2358	4421	2298	2284	4582	
19	Tumkur	4342	4483	8825	5250	4568	9818	5828.5	5000	10828.5	2975	3757	6732	3265	3556	6821	
20	Davanagere	2738	2975	5713	3353	2821	6174	3792.0	3135	6927.0	2238	2514	4752	2445	2470	4915	
21	Mysore	3458	3267	6725	4300	3485	7785	4690.0	3689	8379.0	2480	2772	5252	2693	2603	5296	
22	Chikmagalur	2699	2791	5490	3100	2239	5339	3475.0	2389	5864.0	2123	2043	4166	2327	2017	4344	
23	Dakshina Kannada	2377	2535	4912	2931	2777	5708	3271.0	2555	5826.0	1841	2150	3991	2027	2178	4205	
24	Hassan	3275	3310	6585	3850	2940	6790	4277.0	2974	7251.0	2356	2619	4975	2589	2696	5285	
25	Mandya	2984	2662	5646	3952	2517	6469	4337.0	2307	6644.0	2459	1866	4325	2668	1993	4661	
26	Chamaraja Nagar	1701	1693	3394	2150	1816	3966	2355.5	1878	4233.5	1425	1718	3143	1534	1782	3316	
27	Udupi	1484	1705	3189	1856	1812	3668	2088.0	1915	4003.0	1293	1651	2944	1425	1664	3089	
	Lumpsum	5544		5544	5544		5544	7882.0		7882.0	5849		5849	7882		7882	
	Total	79200	73582	152782	96236	73460	169696	108320.	75116	183436.5	61700	62420	124120	68841	61386	130227	

Source: Economic Survey 2003-04.

Annexure I-B. Zilla panchayat outlays by district 1990-91 to 2003-04 (% to total)

Sl No	District	1999-2000			2000-01			2001-02			2002-03			2003-04		
		State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total	State	Centre	Total
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
1	Belgaum	6.7	6.3	6.5	6.7	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.9	6.8	6.2	6.4	6.3	6.2	7.4	6.8
2	Bijapur	3.3	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.7	3.5	3.4	3.8	3.5	3.2	3.5	3.3	3.1	3.4	3.2
3	Dharwad	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.2
4	Uttara Kannada	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.7	3.4	3.2	3.6	3.4	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.0	3.3	3.2
5	Bagalkot	3.1	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.8
6	Gadag	1.8	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8
7	Haveri	2.5	3.3	2.9	2.6	3.1	2.8	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.5	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.7	2.6
8	Gulbarga	6.0	6.2	6.1	5.9	6.1	6.0	5.8	5.4	5.6	5.3	6.0	5.6	5.1	5.8	5.4
9	Bellary	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.7	4.3	3.9	3.5	3.7	3.6	3.3	3.8	3.6
10	Bidar	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.4	3.3	3.0	3.6	3.3
11	Raichur	3.1	2.8	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.6	3.3	3.0	3.6	3.3
12	Koppal	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.8	2.7	2.4	2.8	2.6
13	Kodagu	1.7	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.8
14	Bangalore	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.9	2.7	2.5	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.5	2.9	2.7
15	Bangalore	4.2	4.0	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.6	4.3	3.9	4.9	4.4	4.4	4.8	4.3
16	Chitradurga	3.3	4.5	3.9	3.3	4.4	3.8	3.2	4.4	3.7	3.3	5.4	4.4	3.2	4.8	3.8
17	Kolar	5.0	5.8	5.4	5.0	5.1	5.0	4.9	5.0	4.9	4.7	5.0	4.8	4.6	5.1	4.9
18	Shimoga	3.2	4.0	3.6	3.2	3.8	3.4	3.2	4.0	3.5	3.3	3.8	3.6	3.3	3.7	3.5
19	Tumkur	5.5	6.1	5.8	5.5	6.2	5.8	5.4	6.7	5.9	4.8	6.0	5.4	4.7	5.8	5.2
20	Davanagere	3.5	4.0	3.7	3.5	3.8	3.6	3.5	4.2	3.8	3.6	4.0	3.8	3.6	4.0	3.8
21	Mysore	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.3	4.9	4.6	4.0	4.4	4.2	3.9	4.2	4.1
22	Chikmagalur	3.4	3.8	3.6	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.3
23	Dakshina Kannada	3.0	3.4	3.2	3.0	3.8	3.4	3.0	3.4	3.2	3.0	3.4	3.2	2.9	3.5	3.2
24	Hassan	4.1	4.5	4.3	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.9	4.0	4.0	3.8	4.2	4.0	3.8	4.4	4.1
25	Mandya	3.8	3.6	3.7	4.1	3.4	3.8	4.0	3.1	3.6	4.0	3.8	3.5	3.9	3.2	3.6
26	Chamaraja Nagar	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.8	2.5	2.2	2.9	2.5
27	Udupi	1.9	2.3	2.1	1.9	2.5	2.2	1.9	2.5	2.2	2.1	2.6	2.4	2.1	2.7	2.4
	Lumpsum	7.0	0.0	3.6	5.8	0.0	3.3	7.3	0.0	4.3	9.5	0.0	4.7	11.4	--	6.1
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Economic Survey 2003-04.

**Annexure II. District-wise Sectoral Composition of Gross District Income of Karnataka
(At Constant (1993-94) Prices) (2003-2004)**

Sl No	District	Agriculture including Animal Husbandry	Forestry and Logging	Fishing	Mining and Quarrying	Primary sector Total	Manufacturing		Construction	Electricity, Gas and Water Supply	Secondary sector Total	Railways
							Registered	Un-registered				
1	Belgaum	101663	8461	160	403	110687	50039	48246	35848	12420	146553	2469
2	Bijapur	42696	3620	120	18	46454	1376	11023	18130	6264	36793	1418
3	Dharwad	21640	2248	136	22	24046	17379	15943	27391	3653	64366	2302
4	Uttara Kannada	26246	6084	3392	716	36438	9774	10910	17066	2149	39899	1953
5	Bagalkote	43735	3114	18	1234	48101	3672	26607	14234	3744	48257	829
6	Gadag	10232	1692	13	2	11939	104	12268	9610	1674	23656	1222
7	Haveri	27874	2875	127	43	30919	12247	12274	8591	3139	36251	938
8	Gulbarga	72194	5391	305	7981	85871	9961	19422	33713	4597	67693	1167
9	Bellary	43460	3583	488	30318	77849	116134	12988	18328	7646	155096	1418
10	Bidar	32801	2907	61	79	35848	3453	7679	10254	1440	22826	862
11	Raichur	34278	3159	137	11926	49500	6061	6429	10054	5961	28505	556
12	Koppal	31746	2488	110	373	34717	45555	10356	7634	1869	65414	600
13	Kodagu	20182	2353	60	140	22735	803	2275	6665	1197	10940	0
14	Bangalore	38347	5500	243	92	44182	494547	99424	136528	36815	767314	1614
15	Bangalore Rural	54008	3841	82	356	58287	82367	23035	8199	11693	125294	2225
16	Chitradurga	36913	3131	134	2875	43053	1106	13300	12483	3602	30491	1800
17	Kolar	86272	5755	176	54	92257	3327	17199	15995	9672	46193	1494
18	Shimoga	56005	3506	464	182	60157	4757	13481	15344	4927	38509	1429
19	Tumkur	61308	5502	649	777	68236	13718	25998	18836	10398	68950	1102
20	Davanagere	48350	3334	229	61	51974	3099	14743	17212	6194	41248	643
21	Mysore	61350	4562	463	135	66510	57947	21088	33390	6517	118942	1113
22	Chick-magalur	57572	3004	204	6630	67410	1053	5524	8322	4834	19733	1036
23	Dakshina Kannada	53688	3944	11593	610	69835	86915	45655	24613	5402	162585	2476
24	Hassan	74868	4045	234	238	79385	2702	7311	15285	3926	29224	1756
25	Mandya	59132	3776	529	16	63453	5758	9400	17660	3854	36672	1538
26	Chama-rajanager	21737	2191	126	1521	25575	167	9479	5604	2433	17683	218
27	Udupi	36101	2812	7361	130	46404	9128	16254	12113	2593	40088	425
	Karnataka	1254398	102878	27614	66932	1451822	1043149	518311	559102	168613	2289175	34603

(Contd.)

Annexure II. District-wise Sectoral Composition of Gross District Income of Karnataka
(At Constant (1993-94) Prices) (2003-2004)

Sl.No	District	(Rs. in Lakh)														Per capita GDP (in Rs.)
		(1)	(2)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)		
				Transport by other means	Storage	Communication	Trade, Hotels & Restaurants	Banking and Insurance	Real estate, Dwellings & Business Services	Public Administration	Other Services	Tertiary sector Total	Gross Domestic Product (GDP)			
1	Belgaum			11067	47	27384	52499	26768	39514	16100	50573	226421	483661	11115		
2	Bijapur			6789	54	13174	13701	9640	13940	3115	20443	82274	165521	8848		
3	Dharwad			6919	70	8490	30292	32013	22055	20439	25090	147670	236082	14233		
4	Uttara Kannada			5375	28	15345	16793	14677	13814	8606	18975	95566	171903	12282		
5	Bagalkote			2743	23	6697	16473	7024	15529	6864	19052	75234	171592	10042		
6	Gadag			2323	36	9922	6980	6343	9466	15328	11757	63377	98972	9846		
7	Haveri			3429	38	3539	11082	6692	12535	9297	11987	59537	126707	8520		
8	Gulbarga			8320	97	16204	26562	15520	24308	16064	41499	149741	303305	9385		
9	Bellary			17647	118	8577	56493	16709	17821	5636	31518	155937	388882	18566		
10	Bidar			7829	61	3071	9279	6337	12431	6838	19870	66578	125252	8066		
11	Raichur			3691	188	4951	17772	8998	9569	5669	21481	72875	150880	8851		
12	Koppal			2660	66	3784	17118	4090	15093	2380	20026	65817	165948	13444		
13	Kodagu			2506	19	7818	11652	8279	6675	6244	9698	52891	86566	15349		
14	Bangalore			60981	335	114869	427023	239655	156913	33961	134068	1169419	1980915	29362		
15	Bangalore Rural			5340	38	7473	65271	7789	18070	8279	16422	130907	314488	16196		
16	Chitradurga			2358	29	7761	13089	9517	21274	6394	16691	78913	152457	9761		
17	Kolar			6402	52	11705	20522	12341	24092	14138	26630	117376	255826	9802		
18	Shimoga			4934	87	16720	20717	16483	21539	14466	23964	120339	219005	12915		
19	Tumkur			5118	43	1438	23473	7504	28579	14525	25992	107774	244960	9182		
20	Davanagere			4249	56	9601	18005	11822	15688	19293	16603	95960	189182	10221		
21	Mysore			10283	130	21423	55986	34262	32241	6413	33678	195529	380981	14033		
22	Chick-magalur			2734	24	10206	16138	11349	11990	901	14399	68777	155920	13235		
23	Dakshina Kannada			29852	54	26260	120653	42574	26109	10119	45939	304036	536456	27351		
24	Hassan			4358	63	13518	16417	13092	16810	14161	16504	96679	205288	11531		
25	Mandya			2945	66	10129	18794	15644	17330	1496	17006	84948	185073	10157		
26	Chama-rajnagar			1216	36	4422	7489	4609	11314	2409	8613	40326	83584	8381		
27	Udupi			5998	5	8898	22781	27510	13788	9496	22277	111178	197670	17226		
	Karnataka			228066	1863	393379	1133054	617241	628487	278629	720755	4036077	7777074	14249		

Source : Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Karnataka.

Annexure III. Districtwise Demographical Information - Karnataka

State/District/Taluk	Total Population				Rural Population				Urban Population				Decennial population growth rate (1991-2001)	Area (Sq Kms)	Density of population (per sons/sq.kms)
	person	Male		Female	person	Male		Female	person	Male	Female				
		(2)	(3)			(4)	(5)					(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
KARNATAKA	52850562	26898918	25951644	34889033	17648058	17240075	17961529	9249960	8711569	17.5	191791.00	276			
Bagalkot District	1651892	834247	817645	1173372	591400	581972	478520	242847	235673	18.8	6575.00	251			
Mahalingpur* (TMC)	30858	15603	15255	140213	72090	68123	16840	8650	8190	-	9.80	3149			
Jamkhandi	408441	207904	200537	256694	131025	125669	151747	76879	74868	20.4	1168.08	350			
Bilgi	141996	71271	70725	126542	63473	63069	15454	7798	7656	19.3	776.38	183			
Mudhol	244316	123461	120855	201855	101938	99917	42461	21523	20938	25.6	975.72	250			
Badami	291924	146424	145500	214869	107581	107288	77055	38843	38212	13.8	1374.71	212			
Bagalkot	247271	125122	122149	156283	78326	77957	90988	46796	44192	18.1	937.91	264			
Hungund	287086	144462	142624	217129	109057	108072	69957	35405	34552	17.0	1359.04	211			
* Spreads over two taluks namely, Jamkhandi and Mudhol, hence shown separately															
Bidar District	1502373	771022	731351	1157498	591653	565845	344875	179369	165506	19.6	5448.00	276			
Basavakalyan	299910	152998	146912	241125	122427	118698	58785	30571	28214	21.7	1202.97	249			
Bhalki	257042	132016	125026	221949	113353	108596	35093	18663	16430	15.3	1117.20	230			
Aurad	245294	125739	119555	229490	117559	111931	15804	8180	7624	16.8	1227.20	200			
Bidar	405340	209230	196310	231283	118568	112715	174257	90662	83595	22.4	925.19	438			
Humnabad	294587	151039	143548	233651	119746	113905	60936	31293	29643	20.2	987.56	298			
Gadag District	971835	493533	478302	629652	319629	310023	342183	173904	168279	13.1	4656.00	209			
Nargund	92679	47286	45393	60118	30701	29417	32561	16585	15976	6.9	435.67	213			
Ron	247645	124658	122987	181091	91080	90011	66554	33578	32976	12.1	1295.09	191			
Gadag	332011	168887	163124	158931	80906	78025	173080	87981	85099	14.5	1097.53	303			
Shirhatti	183191	93284	89907	133566	68059	65507	49625	25225	24400	14.7	949.34	193			
Mundargi	116309	59418	56891	95946	48883	47063	20363	10535	9828	14.3	885.50	131			
Bellary District	2027140	1029714	997426	1320290	668534	651756	706850	361180	345670	22.4	8450.00	240			
Hadagali	168118	85051	83067	144704	73177	71527	23414	11874	11540	14.1	947.82	177			
Hagarbommanahalli	159886	80770	79116	159886	80770	79116	0	0	0	18.4	973.95	164			
Hospet	374949	189674	185275	153499	77177	76322	121450	112497	108953	19.8	904.17	415			
Siruguppa	235344	117731	117613	168842	84322	84520	66502	33409	33093	24.2	1036.17	227			
Bellary	625494	319008	306486	308728	156309	152419	316766	162699	154067	26.3	1688.59	370			
Sandur	191166	98278	92888	156998	80464	76534	34168	17814	16354	22.2	1152.42	166			
Kudligi	272183	139202	132981	227633	116315	111318	44550	22887	21663	24.0	1618.87	168			
Uttara Kannada District	1353644	686876	666768	965731	489908	475823	387913	196968	190945	10.9	10291.00	132			
Dandeli*	886754	446632	440122	633476	318527	314949	253278	128105	125173	-	8.52	6255			
Karwar	147890	75160	72730	72852	36625	36227	75038	38535	36503	5.4	724.12	204			
Supa	48914	24590	24324	48914	24590	24324	0	0	0	4.5	1910.44	26			
Haliyal	105851	53895	51936	80350	40957	39393	25501	12938	12563	12.2	839.10	126			
Yellapur	73497	37626	35871	55574	28566	27008	17923	9060	8863	11.1	1298.75	57			
Mundgod	90738	48973	41765	74565	40643	33922	16173	8330	7843	20.9	667.44	136			
* Spreads over two taluks namely Supa and Haliyal hence shown separately															

(Contd.)

Annexure III. Districtwise Demographical Information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	Total Population				Rural Population			Urban Population			Decennial population growth rate (1991-2001)	Area (Sq Kms)	Density of population (per sons/sq kms)
	Male		Female		person	Male	Female	person	Male	Female			
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)			
Chitradurga District													
Chitradurga	1517896	776221	741675	1243658	635442	608216	274238	140779	133459	15.6	8440.00	180	
Molakalmuru	126742	65187	61555	112609	57842	54767	14133	7345	6788	22.4	738.45	172	
Challakere	332718	170337	162381	283651	145160	138491	49067	25177	23890	19.1	2016.89	165	
Chitradurga	376506	193371	183135	251336	129259	120777	64112	61058	61058	16.9	1359.87	277	
Holalkere	197766	100809	96957	183192	93218	89974	14574	7591	6983	10.4	1088.48	182	
Hosdurga	219445	111339	108106	196957	99732	97225	22488	11607	10881	9.8	1324.13	166	
Hiriyur	264719	135178	129541	215913	110231	105682	48806	24947	23859	15.7	1692.08	156	
Dharwad District													
Hubli - Dharwad*	1604253	823204	781049	722336	371275	351061	881917	451929	429988	16.7	4260.00	377	
Dharwad	336838	172657	164181	284231	145942	138289	52607	26715	25892	-	213.42	1578	
Navalgund	218961	112239	106722	202671	103941	98730	16290	8298	7992	13.5	999.00	219	
Hubli	176648	90360	86288	128736	65950	62786	47912	24410	23502	9.4	1080.78	163	
Kalghatgi	128380	66000	62380	128380	66000	62380	0	0	0	13.5	620.74	207	
Kundgol	137016	70780	66236	122336	63294	59042	14680	7486	7194	13.0	682.44	201	
	157053	80740	76313	140213	72090	68123	16840	8650	8190	13.8	648.50	242	
*Spreads over two taluks namely Hubli and Dharwad hence shown separately													
Bijapur District													
Bijapur	1806918	926424	880494	1410829	723276	687553	396089	203148	192941	17.5	10494.00	172	
Indi	569348	292687	276661	315457	162271	153186	253891	130416	123475	20.4	2634.32	216	
Sindgi	352987	183615	170372	322505	167363	155142	31482	16252	15230	16.8	2221.40	159	
Basavana Bagevadi	326655	167295	159360	298923	153081	145842	27732	14214	13518	16.3	2176.72	150	
Muddebihal	303290	154766	148524	274730	140207	134523	28560	14559	14001	16.0	1944.61	156	
	253638	128061	125577	199214	100354	98860	54424	27707	26717	15.7	1501.41	169	
Koppal District													
Yelbarga	1196089	603312	592777	997797	502732	495065	198292	100580	97712	25.0	7189.00	166	
Kushnagi	236373	119264	117109	224931	113471	111460	21482	5793	5649	20.5	1489.66	159	
Gangawati	239331	120621	118710	218148	109855	108293	11442	10766	10417	26.0	1370.38	175	
Koppal	406334	204356	201978	304942	153145	151797	101392	51211	50181	26.8	1311.21	310	
	314051	159071	154980	249776	126261	123515	64275	32810	31465	24.8	1364.25	230	
Udupi District													
Kundapur	1112243	522231	590012	905890	421056	484834	206353	101175	105178	7.1	3880.00	287	
Udupi	377420	174455	202965	348829	160536	188293	28591	13919	14672	7.3	1559.72	242	
Karkal	529225	251021	278204	376579	176451	200128	152646	74570	78076	6.7	929.24	570	
	205598	96755	108843	180482	84069	96413	25116	12686	12430	7.8	1072.37	192	
Bangalore Rural District													
Nelamangala	1881514	962183	919331	1474118	752077	722041	407396	210106	197290	12.4	5815.00	324	
Dod Ballapur	174880	89473	85407	149593	76350	73243	25287	13123	12164	21.7	509.93	343	
Devanahalli	268332	137541	130791	190554	97344	93210	77778	40197	37581	19.4	779.87	344	
Hosakote	185326	95288	90038	132380	67946	64434	52946	27342	25604	15.3	448.12	414	
	222430	115187	107243	186107	96325	89782	36323	18862	17461	18.0	546.95	407	
(Contd.)													

(Contd.)

Annexure III. Districtwise Demographical Information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	Total Population			Rural Population			Urban Population			Decennial population growth rate (1991-2001)	Area (Sq Kms)	Density of population (per sons/sq.kms)
	person	Male	Female	person	Male	Female	person	Male	Female			
		(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)		(7)	(8)			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Tumkur District												
Chiknayakanhalli	2584711	1313801	1270910	2077509	1052113	1025396	507202	261688	245514	12.1	10597.00	244
Sira	209622	105559	104063	187233	94350	92883	22389	11209	11180	8.4	1115.23	188
Pavagada	301473	153733	147740	251385	127878	123507	50088	25855	24233	18.1	1558.93	193
Madhugiri	246255	125798	120457	218187	111382	106805	28068	14416	13652	15.7	1357.91	181
Koratagere	265884	135320	130564	239580	121770	117810	26304	13550	12754	8.3	1128.70	236
	160952	81862	79090	147297	74933	72364	13655	6929	6726	10.6	643.35	250
Gulbarga District												
Aland	3130922	1592789	1538133	2278301	1152343	1125958	852621	440446	412175	21.4	16224.00	193
Afzalpur	297136	152233	144903	261891	133962	127929	35245	18271	16974	13.9	1734.07	171
Gulbarga	180071	92538	87533	160736	82447	78289	19335	10091	9244	19.4	1304.74	138
Chincholi	675679	348665	327014	245414	125071	120343	430265	223594	206671	29.0	1734.53	390
Sedam	223646	113309	110337	206502	104267	102235	17144	9042	8102	18.2	1552.20	144
	196154	97709	98445	156026	77208	78818	40128	20501	19627	20.2	1036.17	189
Belgaum District												
Chikodi	4214505	2150090	2064415	3201814	1630756	1571058	1012691	519334	493357	17.7	13415.00	314
Ahni	567601	290943	276658	456495	234597	221898	111106	56346	54760	16.4	1271.70	446
Raybag	461862	236878	224984	420912	216061	204851	40950	20817	20133	20.8	1994.96	232
Gokak	347600	178825	168775	311828	160220	151608	35772	18605	17167	22.8	957.95	363
Hukeri	526092	266630	259462	401006	202991	198015	125086	63639	61447	19.2	1543.27	341
	357193	181579	175614	304765	154704	150061	52428	26875	25553	15.7	991.49	360
Mandya District												
Krishnarajasagara*	1763705	888034	875671	1480990	744276	736714	282715	143758	138957	7.3	4961.00	356
Krishnarajpet	1149681	582859	566822	923908	468141	455767	225773	114718	111055	-	3.47	2448
Nagamangala	248245	123531	124714	225665	111946	113719	22580	11585	10995	12.3	886.04	280
Pandavapura	190770	94186	96584	174718	85969	88749	16052	8217	7835	6.8	1031.14	185
	175009	87458	87551	156699	78220	78479	18310	9238	9072	9.3	542.70	322
*Spreads over two taluks namely Pandavapura and Shrirangapatana, hence shown separately												

*Spreads over two taluks namely Pandavapura and Shrirangapatana, hence shown separately

(Contd.)

Annexure III. Districtwise Demographical Information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	Total Population			Rural Population			Urban Population			Decennial population growth rate (1991-2001)	Area (Sq Kms)	Density of population (per sons/sq.kms)
	person	Male	Female	person	Male	Female	person	Male	Female			
		(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)		(7)	(8)			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Mysore District												
2641027	1344670	1296357	1658899	845379	813520	982128	499291	482837	15.8	6854.00	385	
224254	115849	108405	209330	108257	101073	14924	7592	7332	18.7	785.50	285	
253926	129409	124517	210026	107049	102977	43900	22360	21540	14.3	900.08	282	
239199	120481	118718	208566	104881	103685	30633	15600	15033	10.0	596.76	401	
1038490	529531	508959	239262	123168	116094	799228	406363	392865	21.5	828.31	1254	
245930	124705	121225	233885	118536	115349	12045	6169	5876	13.6	1622.40	152	
360223	182528	177695	153856	75382	78466	48232	24393	23939	11.1	991.08	363	
279005	142167	136838	245839	125353	120486	33166	16814	16352	8.1	598.21	466	
Kodagu District												
548561	274831	273730	473179	236270	236909	75382	38561	36821	12.3	4102.00	134	
142012	70987	71025	109516	54537	54979	32496	16450	16046	11.5	1492.32	95	
205921	102739	103182	185515	92183	93332	20406	10556	9850	12.8	989.67	208	
200628	101105	99523	178148	89550	88598	22480	11555	10925	12.4	1619.84	124	
Davanagere District												
1790952	917705	873247	1247954	637670	610284	542998	280035	262963	14.9	5924.00	302	
245654	126128	119526	157910	81131	76779	87744	44997	42747	13.3	484.62	507	
268793	137608	131185	226886	115720	111166	41907	21888	20019	14.8	1436.72	187	
158883	80954	77929	144139	73239	70900	14744	7715	7029	16.2	963.35	165	
602523	309642	292881	238000	121655	116345	364523	187987	176536	17.2	956.58	630	
222592	113577	109015	207024	105703	101321	15568	7874	7694	11.3	884.74	252	
292507	149796	142711	273995	140222	133773	18512	9574	8938	13.6	1170.86	250	
Chamarajanagar District												
965462	489940	475522	817372	414783	402589	148090	75157	72933	9.3	5101.00	189	
213082	107395	105687	186742	93981	92761	26340	13414	12926	8.9	1392.88	153	
337571	170225	167346	277013	139593	137420	60558	30632	29926	8.4	1226.67	275	
77971	39663	38308	69386	35267	34119	5855	4396	4189	8.7	266.34	293	
336838	172657	164181	284231	145942	138289	52607	26715	25892	10.6	2785.82	121	
Kolar District												
2536069	1286193	1249876	1910546	968253	942293	625523	317940	307583	14.4	8223.00	308	
271119	138328	132791	240582	122756	117826	30537	15572	14965	12.9	889.51	305	
191122	97239	93883	136154	69296	66858	54968	27943	27025	12.9	601.81	318	
51828	26159	25669	43021	21758	21263	8807	4401	4406	13.1	225.43	230	
169689	86053	83636	149570	75618	73952	20119	10435	9684	16.3	927.83	183	
193965	98426	95539	152867	77276	75591	41098	21150	19948	15.3	662.90	293	
271284	138311	132973	205791	104466	101325	65493	33845	31648	15.1	902.72	301	

(Contd.)

Annexure III. Districtwise Demographical Information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	Total Population			Rural Population			Urban Population			Decennial population growth rate (1991-2001)	Area (Sq Kms)	Density of population (per sons/sq.kms)
	person	Male	Female	person	Male	Female	person	Male	Female			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Dakshina Kannada District	1897730	938434	959296	1168428	574657	593771	729302	363777	365525	14.6	4560.00	416
Mangalore	882856	434702	448154	281777	135470	146307	601079	299232	301847	16.2	842.72	1048
Bantval	361554	178664	182890	306734	151394	155340	54820	27270	27550	11.9	735.60	492
Beltangadi	246494	121288	125206	239189	117641	121548	7305	3647	3658	16.6	1375.52	179
Puttur	266072	132786	133286	218002	108527	109475	48070	24259	23811	12.2	995.19	267
Sulya	140754	70994	69760	122726	61625	61101	18028	9369	8659	12.8	827.74	170
Hassan District	1721669	859086	862583	1416996	703957	713039	304673	155129	149544	9.7	6814.00	253
Sakleshpur	134345	66380	67965	111169	54625	56544	23176	11755	11421	7.7	1028.42	131
Belur	183755	91744	92011	163527	81397	82130	20228	10347	9881	7.9	783.13	235
Arsikere	303044	152106	150938	257878	129274	128604	45166	22832	22334	6.6	1257.39	241
Hassan	361147	181057	180090	227885	112815	115070	133262	68242	65020	14.4	940.81	384
Shimoga District	1642545	830559	811986	1071535	540238	531297	571010	290321	280689	13.1	8477.00	194
Sagar	200995	100977	100018	138294	69471	68823	62701	31506	31195	13.5	1926.76	104
Sorab	185572	94267	91305	178145	90456	87689	7427	3811	3616	14.3	1146.67	162
Shikarpur	213590	108344	105246	167573	84985	82588	46017	23359	22658	13.2	908.11	235
Hosangara	115000	57392	57608	109957	54828	55129	5043	2564	2479	12.0	1417.91	81
Tirthalli	143207	70734	72473	128399	63228	65171	14808	7506	7302	9.3	1188.95	120
Shimoga	445192	226928	218264	170840	86704	84136	274352	140224	134128	21.8	1141.70	390
Bhadravati	338989	171917	167072	178327	90566	87761	160662	81351	79311	4.4	673.79	503
Bangalore District	6537124	3426599	3110525	777137	406201	370936	5759987	3020398	2739589	35.1	2190.00	2985
Pattanaigere*	96385	51307	45078	187269	94181	93088	44033	22313	21720	-	33.48	2879
Bangalore (M Corp.)*	4301326	2242835	2058491	187269	94181	93088	44033	22313	21720	-	221.32	19435
Bangalore North	830061	440822	389239	223031	115614	107417	607030	325208	281822	-11.0	563.48	1473
Bangalore South	1009924	532611	477313	312946	163438	149508	696978	369173	327805	-1.5	796.22	1268
Anekal	299428	159024	140404	241160	127149	114011	58268	31875	26393	35.4	530.93	564

(Contd.)

Annexure III. Districtwise Demographical Information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	Total Population				Rural Population				Urban Population				Decennial population growth rate (1991-2001)	Area (Sq Kms)	Density of population (per sons/sq.kms)
	person	Male	Female	person	Male	Female	person	Male	Female						
		(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)		(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)				
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)			
Raichur District	1669762	841840	827922	1248925	626859	622066	420837	214981	205856	23.5	6827.00	245			
Lingsugur	321042	162628	158414	247478	124942	122536	73564	37686	35878	22.5	1948.05	165			
Devadurga	222457	112245	110212	200463	100933	99530	21994	11312	10682	25.8	1507.95	148			
Raichur	435380	220675	214705	208976	105087	103889	226404	115588	110816	21.3	1534.69	284			
Manvi	330719	166063	164656	293106	147002	146104	37613	19061	18552	22.8	1792.91	184			
Sindhur	360164	180229	179935	298902	148895	150007	61262	31334	29928	26.5	1598.74	225			
Chikmagalur District	1140905	574911	565994	918181	461286	456895	222724	113625	109099	12.2	7201.00	158			
Sringeri	36930	18538	18392	32681	16312	16369	4249	2226	2023	11.0	442.83	83			
Koppa	87780	44015	43765	82667	41427	41240	5113	2588	2525	8.9	572.21	153			
Narasimharajapura	65639	32559	33080	58175	28776	29399	7464	3783	3681	16.5	744.14	88			
Tarikere	224170	113537	110633	190104	96234	93870	34066	17303	16763	9.3	1216.18	184			
Kadur	289406	146266	143140	235890	119142	116748	53516	27124	26392	11.3	1414.27	205			
Chikmagalur	295565	149158	146407	194314	97464	96850	101251	51694	49557	16.5	1613.29	183			
Mudigere	141415	70838	70577	124350	61931	62419	17065	8907	8158	10.1	1162.43	122			
Haveri District	1439116	740469	698647	1140096	586935	553161	299020	153534	145486	13.4	4823.00	298			
Shiggaon	166742	86112	80630	122091	62997	59094	44651	23115	21536	13.0	589.23	283			
Savanur	143885	74353	69532	108322	56020	52302	35563	18333	17230	16.3	538.99	267			
Hangal	230750	118161	112589	205741	105360	100381	25009	12801	12208	12.9	767.78	301			
Haveri	252347	130230	122117	196434	101641	94793	55913	28589	27324	14.5	799.54	316			
Byadgi	127944	65765	62179	102281	52641	49640	25663	13124	12539	14.3	436.57	293			
Hirekerur	212458	108829	103629	196586	100725	95861	15872	8104	7768	10.7	806.92	263			
Ranibennur	304990	157019	147971	208641	107551	101090	96349	49468	46881	13.3	904.56	337			

Source: Census of India 2001

Annexure III. District wise Demographical information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	sex ratio (no. of females per 1000 males)	sex ratio (0-6 age- group)	literacy rate (population aged 7 years and above)		percentage of urban population to total population	percentage to total population									
			person			main workers		marginal workers		non - workers					
			male	female		person	male	female	person	male	female	person	male	female	
(1)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)
KARNATAKA	965	946	66.6	76.1	56.9	34.0	36.6	51.7	21.1	7.9	5.0	10.9	55.5	43.4	68.0
Bagalkot District	980	940	57.3	70.9	43.6	29.0	34.0	48.5	19.2	9.6	5.2	14.0	56.4	46.3	66.7
Mahalingpur* (TMC)	978	942	67.1	78.7	55.4	54.6	32.1	51.3	12.5	4.2	3.1	5.3	63.7	45.6	82.2
Jamakhandi	965	931	56.7	67.7	45.3	37.2	34.3	49.3	18.7	6.5	4.7	8.3	59.2	46.0	73.0
BiBi	992	948	50.9	65.0	36.8	10.9	37.4	48.6	26.1	10.6	6.2	15.0	52.0	45.2	58.9
Mudhol	979	952	52.6	64.8	40.2	17.4	36.7	52.0	21.0	10.9	4.5	17.5	52.4	43.5	61.5
Badami	994	953	56.4	71.7	41.1	26.4	32.9	46.3	19.4	12.5	6.9	18.0	54.7	46.8	62.6
Bagalkot	976	923	63.7	77.5	49.7	36.8	32.8	47.7	17.6	8.2	3.8	12.8	59.0	48.6	69.6
Hungund	987	937	59.7	76.1	43.2	24.4	32.0	46.8	17.0	11.1	5.8	16.6	56.9	47.5	66.4
Bidar District	949	941	60.9	72.5	48.8	23.0	28.3	40.9	15.0	8.8	6.6	11.2	62.9	52.5	73.8
Basavakalyan	960	928	59.1	71.6	46.2	19.6	29.9	42.5	16.8	9.9	6.9	13.0	60.2	50.6	70.2
Bhalki	947	942	62.4	75.3	48.8	13.7	29.6	41.7	16.9	9.3	6.3	12.4	61.1	52.0	70.6
Aurad	951	946	57.9	69.9	45.2	6.4	28.7	41.1	15.6	11.0	7.0	15.1	60.4	51.8	69.3
Bidar	938	943	65.0	74.5	54.8	43.0	26.8	40.1	12.7	6.1	5.8	6.4	67.1	54.1	81.0
Humnabad	950	949	58.5	70.2	46.2	20.7	27.1	39.6	14.0	9.4	7.2	11.6	63.5	53.3	74.3
Gadag District	969	952	66.1	79.3	52.5	35.2	40.0	52.7	26.9	7.1	3.5	10.8	52.9	43.8	62.3
Nargund	960	949	64.1	78.4	49.2	35.1	43.2	53.7	32.2	4.3	2.4	6.3	52.5	43.9	61.4
Ron	987	955	63.9	79.4	48.2	26.9	39.3	50.3	28.1	9.1	4.4	13.8	51.7	45.3	58.1
Gadag	966	957	71.4	82.6	59.9	52.1	37.6	52.3	22.4	5.6	3.0	8.2	56.8	44.7	69.4
Shirhatti	964	954	62.9	75.5	50.0	27.1	42.9	56.0	29.3	7.0	3.3	10.9	50.1	40.7	59.8
Mundargi	957	928	62.1	76.3	47.3	17.5	41.3	53.0	29.1	9.7	4.3	15.3	49.0	42.7	55.6
Bellary District	969	947	57.4	69.2	45.3	34.9	39.5	51.2	27.5	5.9	3.4	8.4	54.6	45.4	64.1
Hadagali	977	978	60.3	72.1	48.2	13.9	39.7	50.3	28.8	10.2	5.8	14.6	50.2	43.8	56.6
Hagaribommanahalli	980	926	58.1	70.8	45.2	0.0	36.6	49.0	24.0	8.5	4.5	12.5	54.9	46.6	63.5
Hospet	977	955	60.9	71.6	50.0	59.1	38.4	51.7	24.8	4.1	3.0	5.2	57.6	45.4	70.0
Siruguppa	999	947	43.6	56.9	30.3	28.3	47.8	55.2	40.3	3.6	2.1	5.0	48.7	42.7	54.6
Bellary	961	940	59.7	70.8	48.2	50.6	38.3	51.3	24.8	4.2	3.0	5.4	57.4	45.6	69.8
Sandur	945	948	53.3	65.5	40.4	17.9	35.5	50.4	19.8	9.4	3.9	15.3	55.1	45.7	64.9
Kudligi	955	945	59.5	72.1	46.4	16.4	41.2	49.0	33.0	7.7	3.7	11.8	51.2	47.2	55.2

(Contd.)

Annexure III. District wise Demographical information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	sex ratio (no. of females per 1000 males)	sex ratio (0-6 age- group)	literacy rate (population aged 7 years and above)		percentage of urban population to total population	percentage to total population									
			person			main workers		marginal workers		non - workers					
			person	male		female	person	male	female	person	male	female	person	male	female
(1)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)
Uttara Kannada District															
Dandeli*	971	946	76.6	84.5	68.5	28.7	33.6	51.1	15.7	9.3	6.6	12.1	57.1	42.4	72.2
Karwar	956	963	83.1	90.4	75.5	28.6	25.7	43.1	7.4	4.1	5.9	2.3	70.2	51.1	90.3
Supa	968	938	84.0	91.5	76.3	50.7	30.0	46.5	13.0	8.6	9.4	7.8	61.4	44.1	79.2
Haliyal	989	971	65.4	76.8	54.0	0.0	35.2	51.7	18.5	9.7	6.5	13.0	55.1	41.8	68.5
Yellapur	964	957	63.7	74.5	52.4	24.1	41.7	54.1	28.8	7.8	4.9	10.8	50.6	41.0	60.4
Mundgod	953	939	73.9	81.2	66.3	24.4	36.0	55.4	15.6	5.8	4.2	7.4	58.2	40.3	77.0
	853	958	70.5	79.9	59.3	17.8	35.5	47.5	21.4	10.2	5.6	15.6	54.3	46.9	63.0
Chitradurga District															
Molakalmuru	955	946	64.5	74.7	53.8	18.1	37.9	51.5	23.8	9.6	5.5	13.9	52.4	43.0	62.3
Challakere	944	943	52.6	65.0	39.5	11.2	37.2	47.8	25.9	7.7	4.8	10.9	55.1	47.4	63.3
Chitradurga	953	945	58.9	70.0	47.2	14.7	39.7	50.4	28.4	9.8	5.6	14.2	50.5	43.9	57.4
Holkere	947	947	71.8	80.5	62.6	33.2	34.9	50.3	18.7	7.1	4.5	9.9	57.9	45.2	71.4
Hosdurga	962	935	68.0	78.4	57.4	7.4	38.3	53.0	23.1	15.4	8.4	22.7	46.3	38.6	54.2
Hiriyur	971	969	65.0	75.1	54.7	10.2	39.0	55.9	21.5	10.7	4.5	17.1	50.3	39.6	61.4
	958	940	63.2	73.5	52.5	18.4	39.3	51.5	26.6	8.5	5.9	11.2	52.2	42.6	62.1
Dharwad District															
Hubli - Dharwad*	949	943	71.6	80.8	61.9	55.0	36.6	52.3	20.1	6.1	3.8	8.5	57.3	44.0	71.4
Dharwad	951	941	53.9	61.9	45.5	15.6	37.1	50.7	22.9	11.1	9.1	13.2	51.8	40.2	64.0
Navalgund	951	958	59.2	70.4	47.5	7.4	43.3	56.1	29.7	7.5	3.7	11.5	49.2	40.2	58.7
Hubli	955	951	63.9	77.2	50.0	27.1	44.8	56.1	32.9	11.1	6.0	16.5	44.1	37.9	50.6
Kalghatgi	945	941	63.1	75.5	49.9	0.0	41.9	56.0	27.0	10.3	4.6	16.3	47.8	39.4	56.7
Kundgol	936	920	58.3	69.3	46.6	10.7	43.0	56.6	28.4	12.8	6.3	19.8	44.2	37.1	51.8
	945	948	65.4	78.1	52.0	10.7	43.5	56.0	30.3	7.6	3.8	11.6	48.9	40.2	58.1
*Spreads over two taluks namely Hubli and Dharwad hence shown separately															
Bijapur District															
Bijapur	950	928	57.0	69.9	43.5	21.9	30.5	44.7	15.7	9.2	5.8	12.8	60.3	49.5	71.5
Indi	945	926	62.9	73.6	51.7	44.6	29.4	44.8	13.2	7.3	5.1	9.6	63.3	50.1	77.1
Sindgi	928	920	53.2	65.6	39.8	8.9	33.1	46.5	18.7	8.1	4.6	11.8	58.8	48.9	69.5
Basavana Bagevadi	953	930	52.2	66.4	37.3	8.5	29.1	42.5	15.1	10.8	7.3	14.4	60.1	50.1	70.5
Muddebihal	960	931	54.4	68.5	39.9	9.4	32.9	45.3	20.0	11.0	6.3	15.8	56.1	48.4	64.2
	981	939	58.2	74.1	42.1	21.5	28.5	44.0	12.6	10.9	6.5	15.4	60.6	49.5	72.0

(Contd.)

Annexure III. District wise Demographical information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	sex ratio (no.of females per 1000 males)	sex ratio (0-6 age- group)	literacy rate (population aged 7 years and above)		percentage of urban population to total population	percentage to total population									
			person	male		female	main workers		marginal workers		non - workers				
							person	male	female	person	male	female	person	male	female
(1)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)
Koppal District	983	953	54.1	68.4	39.6	16.6	35.3	47.5	22.8	11.1	6.1	16.1	53.6	46.3	61.1
	982	929	53.7	69.7	37.6	4.8	38.6	48.3	28.7	14.1	7.4	21.0	47.3	44.3	50.3
	984	965	51.3	67.7	34.6	8.9	34.9	46.4	23.1	12.7	5.9	19.7	52.4	47.7	57.2
	988	957	53.1	65.9	40.3	25.0	33.0	47.2	18.7	10.1	6.4	13.8	56.9	46.4	67.5
	974	957	57.8	71.4	44.0	20.5	36.1	48.3	23.6	8.8	5.0	12.7	55.1	46.7	63.7
Udupi District	1130	958	81.2	88.2	75.2	18.6	37.5	50.4	26.1	6.4	4.7	7.8	56.1	44.9	66.1
	1163	957	75.7	84.5	68.2	7.6	32.8	47.2	20.4	8.9	6.1	11.3	58.3	46.7	68.3
	1108	963	85.1	91.2	79.8	28.8	38.7	52.0	26.6	4.9	4.1	5.7	56.4	44.0	67.7
	1125	949	81.3	87.1	76.2	12.2	43.2	52.0	35.4	5.4	4.0	6.7	51.3	43.9	57.9
	955	942	64.7	74.0	55.0	21.7	38.6	54.2	22.3	8.8	5.4	12.4	52.6	40.4	65.3
Bangalore Rural Dis- trict	955	946	72.3	81.4	62.8	14.5	36.9	52.0	21.1	7.8	5.9	9.7	55.4	42.1	69.2
	951	942	69.1	79.0	58.8	29.0	39.5	56.2	21.9	8.1	4.6	11.9	52.4	39.2	66.2
	945	942	68.2	77.6	58.2	28.6	40.5	55.6	24.4	7.3	4.6	10.2	52.2	39.8	65.4
	931	929	69.2	78.2	59.5	16.3	38.7	54.7	21.6	7.0	4.3	9.9	54.3	41.0	68.5
	967	949	67.0	76.8	56.9	19.6	40.6	55.0	25.8	10.3	5.3	15.5	49.0	39.8	58.7
Tumkur District	986	969	70.2	79.5	60.8	10.7	38.3	56.6	19.7	11.7	5.7	17.8	50.0	37.7	62.5
	961	939	62.4	73.1	51.4	16.6	42.7	54.2	30.6	10.9	5.5	16.5	46.4	40.2	52.8
	958	938	56.5	68.6	44.0	11.4	39.7	50.6	28.3	13.3	8.0	18.8	47.0	41.3	53.0
	965	952	61.2	72.7	49.4	9.9	38.9	51.8	25.5	14.4	8.1	20.9	46.7	40.1	53.6
	966	943	62.7	73.3	51.8	8.5	45.3	56.9	33.2	11.1	5.8	16.5	43.7	37.2	50.3
Gulbarga District	966	938	50.0	61.8	37.9	27.2	32.3	44.7	19.4	10.8	6.3	15.5	56.9	48.9	65.1
	952	917	52.9	66.0	39.2	11.9	35.7	46.9	24.0	15.6	9.1	22.4	48.6	43.9	53.6
	946	940	50.9	63.6	37.5	10.7	30.5	44.5	15.7	12.2	7.0	17.7	57.3	48.5	66.6
	938	918	66.5	76.3	56.1	63.7	26.9	40.7	12.2	6.0	4.8	7.3	67.0	54.5	80.5
	974	932	48.6	62.3	34.7	7.7	36.2	47.1	25.1	13.9	6.8	21.2	49.9	46.2	53.8
1008	964	44.8	56.4	33.4	20.5	33.8	46.7	21.0	12.7	6.5	19.0	53.4	46.8	60.0	

(Contd.)

Annexure III. District wise Demographical information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	sex ratio (no. of females per 1000 males)	sex ratio (0-6 age- group)	literacy rate (population aged 7 years and above)		percentage of urban population to total population	percentage to total population									
						main workers			marginal workers			non - workers			
			person	male		female	person	male	female	person	male	female	person	male	female
(1)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)
Belgaum District	960	921	64.2	75.7	52.3	24.0	36.5	52.0	20.4	8.1	3.9	12.4	55.4	44.1	67.3
	951	880	68.3	80.0	56.1	19.6	38.4	54.3	21.6	8.5	3.6	13.6	53.2	42.1	64.8
	950	916	61.2	72.3	49.6	8.9	38.4	53.7	22.2	13.0	5.5	20.9	48.6	40.8	56.9
	944	914	55.6	66.5	44.1	10.3	32.9	50.4	14.3	7.5	2.8	12.4	59.7	46.7	73.4
	973	928	55.7	68.7	42.5	23.8	35.5	50.1	20.5	7.6	3.4	11.9	56.9	46.5	67.5
	967	924	62.1	74.6	49.3	14.7	38.2	52.1	23.8	8.1	4.2	12.2	53.7	43.7	64.0
	986	934	61.0	70.5	51.5	16.0	38.7	56.0	21.2	9.0	5.2	12.7	52.3	38.8	66.1
	972	965	74.8	82.2	67.2	19.6	31.3	50.2	11.9	2.9	3.9	1.8	65.8	45.9	86.3
Mandya District	1010	971	61.6	73.0	50.4	9.1	39.6	56.8	22.5	9.2	4.8	13.6	51.2	38.4	63.9
	1025	954	62.0	74.1	50.4	8.4	42.7	56.2	29.5	8.3	3.3	13.1	49.1	40.5	57.4
	1001	934	56.7	66.8	46.7	10.5	41.4	59.8	23.0	10.2	3.5	16.8	48.4	36.7	60.2
	964	962	63.5	70.9	55.8	37.2	35.1	53.0	16.5	7.0	5.2	8.8	58.0	41.8	74.7
	936	964	59.2	69.7	47.9	6.7	39.3	53.2	24.4	6.3	2.9	9.8	54.5	43.9	65.8
	962	965	58.0	67.5	48.1	17.3	39.6	54.5	24.1	14.2	8.2	20.5	46.2	37.3	55.4
	985	946	59.7	70.3	48.9	12.8	36.7	56.3	16.9	10.2	5.0	15.5	53.0	38.7	67.6
	961	952	76.5	81.6	71.2	77.0	32.7	51.6	13.1	2.9	2.9	2.9	64.4	45.5	84.1
Heggadadevankote	972	984	52.8	62.0	43.4	4.9	42.0	54.6	29.0	9.0	6.0	12.2	49.0	39.5	58.8
	974	986	49.6	57.2	41.7	13.4	34.5	54.8	13.6	8.9	7.3	10.5	56.6	37.9	75.8
	963	950	53.6	60.5	46.4	11.9	29.5	49.8	8.5	9.2	10.3	8.0	61.3	40.0	83.4
	996	977	78.0	83.7	72.3	13.7	45.1	57.9	32.3	3.4	3.0	3.9	51.4	39.1	63.8
	1001	994	83.7	88.2	79.1	22.9	42.4	56.6	28.3	4.7	4.1	5.4	52.8	39.3	66.3
	1004	963	77.8	85.0	70.7	9.9	44.9	57.2	32.7	2.8	2.5	3.1	52.3	40.4	64.2
	984	979	74.1	79.2	69.0	11.2	47.3	59.6	34.7	3.2	2.7	3.6	49.6	37.7	61.7
	952	946	67.4	76.4	58.0	30.3	35.3	50.9	18.9	8.5	5.8	11.3	56.2	43.3	69.9
Davanagere District	948	932	69.2	77.5	60.5	35.7	34.8	51.2	17.5	5.3	4.8	5.8	59.9	44.0	76.7
	953	955	55.9	67.0	44.2	15.6	35.6	47.7	22.9	12.7	7.4	18.3	51.7	44.9	58.8
	963	955	63.3	74.6	51.5	9.3	43.9	53.3	34.2	15.7	9.8	21.9	40.3	36.9	43.9
	946	940	73.8	81.1	66.1	60.5	33.9	50.8	16.0	4.8	4.2	5.5	61.3	45.1	78.6
	960	961	66.5	76.6	56.0	7.0	38.0	54.9	20.3	9.3	5.5	13.3	52.7	39.6	66.4
	953	941	66.1	74.9	56.9	6.3	31.6	49.4	12.8	10.4	6.9	14.0	58.1	43.6	73.2
	952	946	67.4	76.4	58.0	30.3	35.3	50.9	18.9	8.5	5.8	11.3	56.2	43.3	69.9
	948	932	69.2	77.5	60.5	35.7	34.8	51.2	17.5	5.3	4.8	5.8	59.9	44.0	76.7

(Contd.)

Annexure III. District wise Demographical information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	sex ratio (no. of females per 1000 males)	sex ratio (0-6 age- group)	literacy rate (population aged 7 years and above)		percentage of urban population to total population	percentage to total population									
			person			main workers			marginal workers			non - workers			
			male	female		person	male	female	person	male	female	person	male	female	
(1)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)
Chamarajanagar Dis- trict															
Gundlupet	971	964	50.9	59.0	42.5	15.3	34.9	51.4	17.9	11.5	10.0	13.1	53.6	38.6	68.9
	984	958	49.4	59.1	39.5	12.4	37.8	55.7	19.6	11.3	7.9	14.8	50.9	36.4	65.6
Chamarajanagar	983	998	49.2	56.6	41.6	17.9	32.9	51.7	13.8	11.4	10.5	12.2	55.7	37.7	74.0
Yelandur	966	954	49.6	57.0	42.0	11.0	25.8	40.9	10.3	14.8	17.2	12.4	59.3	41.9	77.3
Kollegal	951	941	53.9	61.9	45.5	15.6	37.1	50.7	22.9	11.1	9.1	13.2	51.8	40.2	64.0
Kolar District															
	972	959	62.8	73.2	52.2	24.7	40.0	52.9	26.7	8.7	5.2	12.3	51.3	41.9	61.0
Gauribidanur	960	953	59.3	69.5	48.7	11.3	44.0	54.4	33.1	8.6	5.6	11.9	47.4	40.0	55.0
Chik Ballapur	965	963	64.7	74.3	54.7	28.8	42.9	55.6	29.8	5.4	3.6	7.2	51.7	40.8	63.0
Gudibanda	981	966	54.8	66.0	43.5	17.0	40.1	52.5	27.4	13.5	7.2	19.8	46.5	40.2	52.8
Bagepalli	972	946	50.6	62.2	38.6	11.9	43.0	55.2	30.5	11.2	5.8	16.7	45.8	39.0	52.7
Sidlaghatta	971	937	60.9	71.4	50.1	21.2	44.6	56.3	32.6	10.5	5.9	15.3	44.9	37.8	52.1
Chintamani	961	957	60.5	71.2	49.3	24.1	40.4	54.1	26.2	10.8	5.5	16.4	48.8	40.5	57.4
Dakshina Kannada Dis- trict															
	1022	952	83.4	89.7	77.2	38.4	44.3	53.9	35.0	5.5	4.3	6.7	50.1	41.8	58.3
Mangalore	1031	955	87.3	92.6	82.1	68.1	41.5	52.5	30.8	3.3	3.3	3.3	55.2	44.2	65.9
Bantval	1024	952	80.6	88.3	73.2	15.2	49.8	55.3	44.4	5.3	4.1	6.5	44.8	40.5	49.1
Belangadi	1032	946	77.7	85.1	70.6	3.0	44.9	53.4	36.6	7.0	4.9	9.1	48.1	41.7	54.3
Puttur	1004	960	80.3	87.2	73.5	18.1	46.3	55.8	36.7	10.3	6.8	13.8	43.5	37.4	49.5
Sulya	983	926	81.2	87.4	74.9	12.8	43.8	56.4	31.0	8.2	5.2	11.2	47.9	38.3	57.7
Hassan District															
	1004	958	68.6	78.4	59.0	17.7	40.8	56.5	25.2	9.4	4.3	14.5	49.8	39.2	60.3
Sakleshpur	1024	976	71.2	79.3	63.3	17.3	46.8	58.8	35.1	4.7	2.3	7.1	48.5	38.9	57.9
Belur	1003	951	67.0	75.9	58.2	11.0	43.1	57.6	28.6	7.2	3.6	10.7	49.7	38.8	60.6
Arsikere	992	943	71.5	80.7	62.4	14.9	38.7	57.2	19.9	11.5	5.3	17.8	49.8	37.5	62.2
Hassan	995	943	75.9	84.1	67.8	36.9	39.9	55.4	24.4	8.4	4.2	12.7	51.6	40.5	62.9

(Contd.)

Annexure III. District wise Demographical information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	sex ratio (no. of females per 1000 males)	sex ratio (0-6 age- group)	literacy rate (population aged 7 years and above)			percentage of urban population to total population	percentage to total population									
							main workers			marginal workers			non - workers			
			person	male	female		person	male	female	person	male	female	person	male	female	
(1)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	
Shimoga District	978	956	74.5	82.0	66.9	34.8	35.7	53.7	17.3	7.8	4.9	10.7	56.5	41.3	72.0	
	991	968	77.7	86.0	69.3	31.2	37.9	56.2	19.5	5.8	2.9	8.8	56.3	41.0	71.7	
	969	946	70.7	80.3	60.9	4.0	37.7	54.7	20.1	12.3	6.2	18.6	50.0	39.1	61.3	
	971	961	69.1	77.4	60.5	21.5	36.0	53.7	17.9	10.2	4.9	15.7	53.7	41.4	66.5	
	1004	960	73.1	81.5	64.7	4.4	35.8	53.8	16.3	8.2	6.1	10.3	56.8	40.1	73.5	
	1025	975	78.0	85.5	70.8	10.3	42.3	59.7	25.4	13.7	4.8	22.5	43.9	35.5	52.2	
	962	961	77.3	83.0	71.3	61.6	33.6	52.3	14.2	5.5	5.1	6.0	60.9	42.6	79.8	
	972	936	73.5	80.9	66.0	88.1	33.4	51.2	15.0	5.3	5.0	5.6	61.4	43.8	79.4	
	Bangalore District	908	943	83.0	87.9	77.5	47.4	36.4	54.8	16.1	2.9	3.2	2.6	60.7	42.0	81.3
		879	931	78.9	84.7	72.2	45.7	37.8	54.9	18.2	2.5	2.4	2.5	59.8	42.7	79.3
918		943	85.6	89.7	81.1	1.0	35.7	54.6	15.0	2.0	2.4	1.6	62.3	43.0	83.4	
883		946	79.6	86.2	72.1	73.1	38.0	55.4	18.2	5.0	4.7	5.3	57.1	39.9	76.5	
896		941	78.5	84.8	71.5	69.0	37.9	55.0	18.7	3.8	4.1	3.5	58.3	40.9	77.8	
883		945	70.4	79.0	60.5	19.5	36.7	54.9	16.1	7.0	7.0	6.9	56.4	38.1	77.0	
Raichur District	983	964	48.8	61.5	35.9	25.2	32.6	46.0	19.0	11.3	6.9	15.7	56.1	47.1	65.3	
	974	954	51.0	65.6	36.1	22.9	27.6	43.1	11.7	15.1	7.0	23.4	57.3	49.9	64.9	
	982	970	38.3	50.1	26.3	9.9	24.9	39.4	10.1	15.2	11.8	18.6	60.0	48.8	71.3	
	973	961	55.6	66.9	43.9	52.0	34.2	47.6	20.4	6.8	4.7	9.0	59.0	47.7	70.6	
	992	971	42.3	54.5	30.1	11.4	38.3	49.7	26.9	10.1	6.5	13.7	51.6	43.8	59.4	
	998	969	50.8	64.6	37.1	17.0	34.6	47.4	21.9	12.0	6.8	17.2	53.4	45.8	61.0	
	Chikmagalur District	984	959	72.2	80.3	64.0	19.5	37.6	54.3	20.6	7.7	5.1	10.3	54.7	40.6	69.1
		992	959	80.8	86.7	74.8	11.5	38.3	57.4	19.2	6.0	5.3	6.7	55.7	37.3	74.2
994		940	78.3	83.1	71.2	5.8	37.9	53.4	22.3	7.0	6.1	8.0	55.0	40.5	68.7	
1016		1029	76.8	85.4	70.6	11.4	40.0	55.8	24.4	5.7	4.6	6.8	54.3	39.6	68.8	
974		955	70.1	78.7	61.4	15.2	35.0	52.7	16.8	9.7	6.4	13.1	55.3	41.0	70.0	
979		956	67.8	77.2	58.3	18.5	35.4	54.6	15.8	10.2	5.3	15.3	54.4	40.1	68.9	
Chikmagalur Mudigere	982	956	75.7	83.2	68.2	34.3	36.7	52.8	20.3	6.2	4.7	7.7	57.1	42.5	72.0	
	996	955	68.8	76.9	60.9	12.1	46.5	58.6	34.3	4.3	3.2	5.3	49.3	38.2	60.4	
Haveri District	944	957	67.8	77.6	57.4	20.8	36.9	52.6	20.3	9.4	5.6	13.4	53.7	41.8	66.3	
	936	945	65.3	74.9	54.9	26.8	36.8	53.8	18.5	10.9	6.6	15.6	52.3	39.6	65.9	
	935	956	59.6	69.7	48.8	24.7	38.3	53.9	21.6	9.0	4.3	14.1	52.7	41.8	64.3	
	953	959	67.6	76.6	58.1	10.8	35.2	51.7	15.8	10.6	7.1	14.3	55.2	41.2	69.9	
	938	963	65.3	75.4	54.6	22.2	38.6	53.2	23.1	6.9	4.7	9.2	54.5	42.1	67.7	
	945	952	71.1	81.3	60.3	20.1	35.6	51.0	19.3	12.5	6.9	18.5	51.9	42.1	62.2	
	952	974	73.5	83.4	63.0	7.5	52.3	21.1	9.9	9.9	5.4	14.6	53.0	42.3	64.3	
	942	946	69.8	79.7	59.2	31.6	37.4	52.4	21.4	8.3	5.0	11.8	54.3	42.6	66.7	

Annexure III. Districtwise Demographical Information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	Percentage Among Total Workers				Percentage of Sched- uled Castes Population	Percentage of Sched- uled Tribes Population	Number of Vil- lages	Number of Towns					
	Cultivators		Agricultural Labourers	Household Industries					Other Workers				
	Person	(29)	Person	(30)					Person	(31)	Person	(32)	(33)
(1)													
KARNATAKA		29.2		26.5		4.1		40.2	16.2	6.6	29406	270	
Bagalkot District													
Mahalingpur* (TMC)		27.1		37.9		7.5		27.4	15.2	4.9	627	12	
Jamakhandi		6.0		15.9		19.2		58.8	15.2	0.5	-	1	
Bilgi		29.8		33.5		9.0		27.7	15.3	1.1	71	3	
Mudhol		30.7		46.9		3.2		19.1	17.5	9.8	71	1	
Badami		34.4		43.2		2.9		19.5	17.5	4.1	78	1	
Bagalkot		25.5		42.2		7.5		24.8	12.3	9.2	149	3	
Hungund		21.9		34.9		3.2		40.0	15.2	5.8	96	1	
		22.7		33.8		14.8		28.7	14.8	3.5	162	2	
Bidar District													
Basavakalyan		24.9		37.5		2.5		35.1	19.9	12.1	621	6	
Bhalki		29.7		35.6		2.7		32.0	19.7	16.4	115	1	
Aurad		30.3		42.7		2.0		25.0	21.6	8.7	133	1	
Bidar		34.6		39.4		2.8		23.1	26.2	8.8	152	1	
Humnabad		13.7		30.2		2.1		54.0	15.0	10.5	134	1	
		19.6		42.1		3.1		35.3	20.1	15.7	87	2	
Gadag District													
Nargund		30.4		39.2		3.7		26.7	14.1	5.6	337	9	
Ron		44.5		32.6		3.4		19.5	8.9	4.6	35	1	
Gadag		32.1		44.0		3.5		20.3	13.8	5.5	93	3	
Shirhatti		24.1		29.3		3.7		42.9	12.1	4.5	64	2	
Mundargi		28.1		47.8		4.6		19.5	17.7	6.7	87	2	
		35.6		45.4		2.4		16.6	19.3	8.0	58	1	
Bellary District													
Hadagali		27.3		39.3		2.8		30.7	18.5	18.0	554	11	
Hagaribommanahalli		28.3		52.3		3.0		16.4	22.4	7.8	57	1	
Hospet		30.5		49.3		3.0		17.2	18.7	13.6	56	-	
Siruguppa		16.7		36.1		2.9		44.3	20.2	16.1	74	3	
Bellary		25.7		56.1		1.9		16.4	19.3	17.9	84	2	
Sandur		23.7		30.3		3.0		43.0	16.2	16.3	103	1	
Kudligi		30.6		32.8		1.7		34.9	16.8	27.1	89	2	
		43.9		36.2		3.7		16.3	19.2	27.1	91	2	

(Contd.)

Annexure III. Districtwise Demographical Information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	Percentage Among Total Workers						Percentage of Scheduled Castes Population	Percentage of Scheduled Tribes Population	Number of Villages	Number of Towns		
	Cultivators		Agricultural Labourers	Household Industries	Other Workers							
	Person	(29)	Person	(30)	Person	(31)	Person	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)
(1)												
Uttara Kannada District		24.7		14.5		2.2		58.5	7.5	1.8	1289	13
	Dandeli*	0.1		0.1		1.9		97.9	8.8	2.4	-	1
	Karwar	13.2		8.0		5.7		73.1	3.9	2.7	52	1
	Supa	39.3		17.2		1.8		41.6	6.4	1.7	120	-
	Haliyal	50.3		20.0		2.7		27.0	7.6	1.7	129	2
	Yellapur	27.4		19.9		1.1		51.6	5.7	0.9	127	1
	Mundgod	41.4		30.9		2.4		25.2	15.0	4.0	91	1
Chitradurga District		38.4		33.4		3.3		24.8	22.2	17.5	1059	6
	Molakalmuru	30.5		40.2		7.2		22.1	19.8	35.3	89	1
	Challakere	35.9		38.6		4.5		21.0	21.8	28.5	195	1
	Chitradurga	32.3		29.3		1.7		36.7	22.6	16.3	190	1
	Holalkere	49.2		34.3		1.8		14.7	24.7	11.6	202	1
	Hosdurga	48.1		27.1		2.2		22.6	18.9	7.7	225	1
	Hiriyur	35.5		33.6		4.5		26.4	24.0	9.6	158	1
Dharwad District		25.8		27.3		2.9		44.1	8.2	4.4	379	6
	Hubli - Dharwad*	29.7		38.9		3.5		27.9	27.2	10.3	-	1
	Dharwad	38.6		36.9		3.0		21.5	6.0	6.4	118	1
	Navalgund	39.1		43.1		1.6		16.2	8.2	4.9	58.0	2
	Hubli	37.7		40.1		2.0		20.3	7.1	4.8	58.0	-
	Kalghatgi	44.0		33.8		2.6		19.6	10.8	5.3	87	1
	Kundgol	36.8		48.7		2.0		12.4	8.5	6.5	58	1
*Spreads over two taluks namely Hubli and Dharwad hence shown separately												
Bijapur District		30.2		39.9		2.9		26.9	18.5	1.7	677	6
	Bijapur	25.0		30.4		2.8		41.8	18.6	1.0	118	1
	Indi	36.2		43.2		2.4		18.1	19.2	1.7	133	1
	Sindgi	34.2		45.9		2.6		17.3	17.8	1.6	148	1
	Basavana Bagevadi	30.3		45.9		3.8		20.0	19.1	1.9	125	1
	Muddebihal	27.1		39.3		3.3		30.3	17.5	3.0	153	2

(Contd.)

Annexure III. Districtwise Demographical Information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	Percentage Among Total Workers						Percentage of Scheduled Castes Population	Percentage of Scheduled Tribes Population	Number of Villages	Number of Towns						
	Cultivators		Agricultural Labourers		Household Industries						Other Workers					
	Person	(29)	Person	(30)	Person	(31)					Person	(32)				
(1)		(29)		(30)		(31)		(32)		(33)		(34)		(35)		(36)
Koppal District		30.4		42.4		3.3		24.0		15.5		11.6		629		5
	Yelbarga	35.9		46.3		2.8		14.9		14.7		10.5		144		1
	Kushtagi	41.6		36.9		4.0		17.5		13.4		13.2		177		1
	Gangawati	23.2		45.4		2.3		29.1		16.4		13.8		157		1
	Koppal	25.3		39.6		4.4		30.7		16.5		8.4		151		2
Udupi District		19.9		18.0		12.7		49.4		6.1		3.7		248		6
	Kundapur	25.1		25.5		6.7		42.7		5.4		3.0		99		1
	Udupi	15.6		14.9		12.4		57.1		5.7		3.8		99		4
	Karkal	21.7		13.2		22.7		42.4		8.4		5.0		50		1
Bangalore Rural District		41.4		20.4		4.8		33.5		20.1		3.3		1873		10
	Nelamangala	41.0		18.0		5.2		35.8		22.8		3.6		243		1
	Dod Ballapur	38.0		18.7		8.9		34.4		20.4		4.3		297		2
	Devanahalli	35.3		27.3		2.1		35.3		23.4		9.8		214		2
	Hosakote	35.5		22.2		3.7		38.6		21.9		3.4		296		1
Tumkur District		45.7		23.8		4.6		25.8		18.3		7.5		2708		11
	Chiknayakanhalli	47.1		21.1		5.8		25.9		17.2		7.9		234		1
	Sira	42.9		25.7		8.3		23.2		21.6		9.1		249		1
	Pavagada	37.6		40.1		4.4		18.0		27.1		16.5		147		1
	Madhugiri	40.8		38.0		3.5		17.8		23.0		11.6		320		1
Koratagere	52.8		26.8		3.2		17.2		22.0		10.2		251		1	
Gulbarga District		27.1		40.0		2.5		30.4		22.9		4.9		1437		17
	Aland	31.3		50.4		2.5		15.8		22.8		2.1		136		1
	Atzalpur	29.4		48.3		2.8		19.5		17.8		2.1		93		1
	Gulbarga	15.3		22.9		2.0		59.8		20.4		1.5		140		1
	Chincholi	29.9		47.5		2.8		19.8		33.2		2.3		148		1
Sedam	25.7		40.4		2.3		31.6		25.8		2.6		117		2	
(Contd.)																

(Contd.)

Annexure III. Districtwise Demographical Information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	Percentage Among Total Workers						Percentage of Scheduled Castes Population	Percentage of Scheduled Tribes Population	Number of Villages	Number of Towns		
	Cultivators		Agricultural Labourers	Household Industries	Other Workers							
	Person	(29)	Person	(30)	Person	(31)	Person	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)
Belgaum District												
		37.6		31.3		3.5		27.6	11.0	5.8	1270	22
	Chikodi	40.5		31.1		3.6		24.8	15.5	0.9	131	3
	Ahni	47.1		35.3		2.0		15.7	14.7	2.5	108	1
	Raybag	45.2		38.5		2.3		14.0	17.6	1.9	59	2
	Gokak	38.6		33.9		3.2		24.3	9.2	9.7	131	4
Hukeri	41.7		31.8		3.7		22.9	13.1	10.9	123	2	
Mandya District												
		48.9		24.5		2.1		24.4	14.0	1.0	1479	8
	Krishnarajasagara*	2.0		1.5		2.5		94.0	13.6	5.3	-	1
	Krishnarajpet	63.6		20.2		2.1		14.1	12.3	2.1	316	1
	Nagamangala	67.3		10.9		1.7		20.1	11.7	0.9	367	1
	Pandavapura	59.6		20.9		1.6		17.9	11.9	1.0	171	1
Mysore District												
		35.8		22.5		1.9		39.7	17.7	10.3	1340	11
	Priyapatna	63.4		18.2		1.1		17.3	16.2	7.7	203	1
	Hunsur	56.8		23.9		1.5		17.9	18.2	15.5	213	1
	Krishnarajanagara	53.2		26.1		1.3		19.4	14.6	6.5	178	1
	Mysore	11.4		5.5		3.2		79.8	12.8	6.0	143	4
Heggadevankote												
		50.9		34.9		1.2		13.1	27.0	20.9	281	1
	Nanjangud	33.9		39.0		1.4		25.7	22.5	13.2	190	1
	Trumakudal Narasipur	34.1		41.5		1.3		23.1	25.2	13.4	132	2
Kodagu District												
		7.9		4.3		0.9		86.8	12.3	8.4	296	5
	Madikeri	7.5		3.6		1.3		87.6	10.3	4.9	67	1
	Somvarpet	11.7		5.5		0.9		81.9	15.5	4.5	135	2
	Virajpet	4.5		3.7		0.7		91.1	10.4	15.0	94	2
Davanagere District												
		30.8		34.5		3.9		30.8	18.6	11.7	923	6
	Harihara	23.0		32.1		5.6		39.3	12.7	8.5	84	1
	Harapanahalli	31.6		45.0		5.5		17.9	21.3	16.0	80	1
	Jagalur	48.7		37.0		1.2		13.1	23.8	23.6	171	1
	Davanagere	18.0		23.6		4.4		53.9	15.7	9.3	166	1
Honnali												
		38.4		42.0		2.5		17.1	19.5	7.1	173	1
Channagiri	39.7		37.9		2.8		19.5	23.5	12.5	249	1	

(Contd.)

(Contd.)

Annexure III. Districtwise Demographical Information - Karnataka (Contd.)

State/District/Taluk	Percentage Among Total Workers						Percentage of Scheduled Castes Population	Percentage of Scheduled Tribes Population	Number of Villages	Number of Towns
	Cultivators	Agricultural Labourers	Household Industries	Other Workers						
	Person	Person	Person	Person	Person					
(1)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)		
Chamarajanagar District	27.7	43.0	4.4	24.9	24.6	11.0	509	4		
	33.1	44.1	4.8	18.0	19.1	11.5	158	1		
	24.3	45.3	4.8	25.7	23.3	9.8	184	1		
	16.4	50.1	5.2	28.2	34.0	17.6	28	1		
	29.7	38.9	3.5	27.9	27.2	10.3	139	1		
Kolar District	36.7	27.4	3.2	32.7	26.5	8.1	3311	12		
	42.6	34.3	3.1	20.0	24.1	14.9	239	1		
	34.9	29.5	2.6	33.1	25.3	8.7	251	1		
	39.4	41.6	1.4	17.5	23.4	15.2	105	1		
	48.2	29.7	1.8	20.3	25.8	16.3	229	1		
Chintamani	35.0	25.5	2.9	36.7	21.6	8.5	290	1		
	41.7	25.0	4.0	29.3	23.3	10.5	400	1		
Dakshina Kannada District	5.2	4.5	21.2	69.1	6.9	3.3	354	20		
	4.2	4.0	25.0	66.7	4.7	1.3	88	14		
	6.5	5.9	5.4	82.3	4.7	4.1	79	3		
	10.9	9.4	32.8	46.9	9.0	5.2	80	1		
	3.6	1.6	27.1	67.7	11.7	4.9	67	1		
Hassan District	1.0	0.7	10.8	87.5	13.9	7.7	40	1		
	55.0	14.6	1.6	28.7	18.1	1.5	2559	9		
Shimoga District	16.6	8.6	1.1	73.8	27.5	1.2	227	1		
	52.2	16.0	1.5	30.4	27.6	2.1	383	1		
	55.6	19.1	2.4	22.9	18.4	2.8	369	1		
	53.4	9.0	1.5	36.1	12.2	0.9	391	2		
	30.5	31.4	2.5	35.6	16.4	3.4	1530	9		
Hosanagara District	37.7	20.7	1.9	39.6	9.6	2.0	238	2		
	46.0	37.6	2.4	14.0	18.9	3.7	306	1		
	42.3	37.2	2.3	18.2	22.3	5.6	176	2		
	35.3	34.1	2.6	28.0	9.4	1.7	204	1		
	39.1	37.7	2.8	20.3	9.6	1.6	247	1		
	15.4	22.9	2.7	58.9	16.8	3.9	214	1		
	18.6	35.9	2.8	42.7	20.0	3.4	145	1		

(Contd.)

Annexure III. Districtwise Demographical Information - Karnataka (Concld.)

State/District/Taluk	Percentage Among Total Workers						Percentage of Scheduled Castes Population	Percentage of Scheduled Tribes Population	Number of Villages	Number of Towns						
	Cultivators		Agricultural Labourers	Household Industries	Other Workers											
	Person	(29)	Person	(30)	Person	(31)					Person	(32)	Person	(33)	Person	(34)
Bangalore District																
		3.3	2.6	2.7	91.3	13.0	699	1.3							19	
		0.5	1.5	3.7	94.3	10.9	-	1.7							1	
		0.3	0.2	2.4	97.1	11.1	-	1.1							1	
		8.1	6.3	3.6	82.1	14.1	225.0	2.3							6	
		6.7	5.0	2.6	85.7	16.4	241	1.4							8	
Bangalore South																
Anekal		18.5	14.8	4.3	62.4	26.6	233	1.8						3		
Raichur District																
		28.2	44.8	2.0	25.0	19.0	886	18.1							9	
		32.4	41.7	2.9	23.0	21.3	191	16.0							4	
		31.4	46.7	1.7	20.2	19.9	188	33.7							1	
		19.2	34.5	1.7	44.5	19.0	160	12.0							2	
		27.6	56.4	1.7	14.3	18.8	171	23.6							1	
Sindhur		33.3	46.4	1.8	18.5	16.6	176	13.0						1		
Chikmagalur District																
		28.6	21.1	2.3	47.9	20.4	1117	3.6							9	
		30.8	32.2	2.6	34.4	10.8	49	7.7							1	
		18.7	22.6	2.4	56.2	18.3	80	4.7							1	
		23.5	27.5	3.1	46.0	15.1	58	3.3							1	
		33.3	35.2	3.3	28.3	21.7	249	3.5							1	
Tarikere																
Kadur		46.9	27.1	2.4	23.6	19.4	312	1.8						2		
Chikmagalur		18.8	8.1	1.7	71.4	21.7	229	2.0						1		
Mudigere		13.0	7.3	1.5	78.2	24.3	140	9.1						2		
Haveri District																
		30.5	43.7	4.1	21.6	12.2	698	8.8							9	
		30.8	46.2	4.0	18.9	10.3	92	6.0							2	
		28.3	49.4	6.9	15.4	13.8	65	7.9							1	
		35.9	45.6	2.7	15.7	13.4	151	7.9							1	
		26.9	44.7	2.8	25.6	11.7	89	9.1							1	
Byadgi		35.0	42.3	2.3	20.5	11.3	66	13.4						1		
Hirekerur		39.4	42.7	2.5	15.4	12.7	128	10.5						1		
Ranibennur		22.2	38.5	7.1	32.2	11.9	107	8.2						2		

THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN MAHARASHTRA STATE AND THE ROLE OF THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BOARDS

R.P. Kurulkar

The problem of regional disparities exists at the international, national as well as at the state levels. This paper has made an attempt to study the problem of regional disparities in Maharashtra State, with special reference to the Fact Finding Committee Report [1984] and the Indicators and Backlog Committee Report [1997]. Between 1984 and 1994, the data show that, the regional disparities, instead of reducing, have actually increased. To solve this problem, "accelerated development" of identified backward districts is suggested.

In the second part the paper discusses the role of the Regional Development Boards in Maharashtra, under Article 371(2) of the Constitution of India. Their functions and achievements during the period 1995-2010, are critically examined. To ensure minimum or equitable funds (as per cent of population) to backward areas in larger states (like Rajasthan, U.P., M.P., Orissa, etc.) the establishment of such regional boards, is suggested. This step may reduce regional disparities in these states to some extent.

1. INTRODUCTION

The problem of regional disparities exists at the international, national as well as at the state levels. North-South dialogue on development is basically the problem of rich versus poor regions. The controversy relating to the trade-off between national objective of high growth rate and the regional objective of equity or social justice is also well-known in economic literature. It has to be noted that regional disparities cannot be altogether eliminated; but they can be certainly reduced to the minimum by adopting appropriate policies. i) In the light of these conditions it is proposed to discuss in this article the problem of regional disparities in the State of Maharashtra since its inception in May 1960, up to 2010. ii) In the second part, an attempt is made to discuss the role and achievements of the Statutory Regional Development Boards in Maharashtra, as a mechanism to reduce such regional disparities in the State during the period, 1995 to 2010.

In recent years, there has been a demand for the appointment of a "Second States Commis-

sion" from certain neglected areas in India, for example, Telangana agitation in Andhra Pradesh; Vidarbha agitation in Maharashtra; or demand for the creation of Harit Pradesh in Uttar Pradesh, etc. It may be suggested here that creation of Statutory Regional Development Boards, in such neglected and larger states, may prove useful to solve this problem to some extent.

PART I

2. THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN MAHARASHTRA

a) Maharashtra State was created on the 1st of May 1960 with the merger of two Marathi speaking areas of Marathwada (which formed part of the former Hyderabad State) and Vidarbha (which formed part of the former Madhya Pradesh State). Thus, the present state of Maharashtra comprises three regions, viz., (i) Rest of Maharashtra (which includes Western Maharashtra, Konkan and Mumbai City. ii) Vidarbha, and iii) Marathwada. Hence, we shall be making a com-

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Views expressed are personal.

parison of the relative socio-economic progress made by these three regions during the last 50 years or between 1960 and 2010.

3. MAJOR STUDIES ON REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN MAHARASHTRA

The Third Five Year Plan (1961-1966) of Maharashtra State discussed, for the first time, by using certain indicators of development, the relative levels of development of the four regions of the State. In 1975, the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics Pune, published a study on, "Regional Planning For Marathwada", [Brahme et al., 1975] in which it also discussed the relative levels of development of Greater Mumbai, Pune region, Marathwada and Vidarbha regions. In 1980 Narottam Shah, a Member of the State Planning Board, published a report on the "Levels of Development of Districts in Maharashtra".

In [1992], Seeta Prabhu and P. C. Sarker published their research paper on "Identification of Levels of Development of the Districts in Maharashtra", using the data for 1985-86. The following important conclusions emerged from this study: (i) of the 29 districts in Maharashtra 11 districts had attained a "high level" of development; while 3 districts could attain "medium level", and the remaining 15 districts were identified as "backward" or at lower level of development". Most of these 15 districts belonged to the Marathwada and Vidarbha regions.

In 1983, the Government of Maharashtra appointed a "Fact Finding Committee on Regional Imbalance in Maharashtra", under the Chairmanship of the eminent economist the Late Prof. V.M. Dandekar [Henceforth, FFC or Dandekar Committee]. The report of this committee was published by the Government in 1984. Again in 1992, the State Planning Board of the Government of Maharashtra appointed a Study Group under the Chairmanship of B.A. Kulkarni to identify the "Backward Areas in Maharashtra

State". This Study Group identified, by using 12 indicators of development, 17 districts in the state as "backward". Of these 17 backward districts, six districts belonged to Marathwada, 8 districts to Vidarbha and 3 districts to the Rest of Maharashtra region. In 1995, the Governor of Maharashtra, appointed, the "Indicators and Backlog Committee" to study the impact of the expenditure incurred by the Government for the removal backlog, estimated by the Dandekar Committee, between 1984-1994, on the three regions of the state. We shall discuss the reports of the Dandekar Committee (1984) and Indicators and Backlog Committee (1995) in greater details in the next section.

Recently, in 1997, the Government of India had appointed a Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. E.A.S. Sarma to identify "100 Poorest Districts" in India. Surprisingly, this Committee identified 10 districts in a highly developed State like Maharashtra. The entire Marathwada Region (8 districts) was identified as "Poorest". Vidarbha region included 3 districts, viz. Gadchiroli, Buldhana and Yavatmal.

In July [2007], the Government of India had appointed a Committee on Indebtedness of farmers in India. This Committee, chaired by Prof. R. Radhakrishna, identified "100 agriculturally distressed and backward districts", in India. Of them, 11 were identified in Maharashtra mostly from suicides affected regions of Vidarbha and two districts from Marathwada, i.e., Osmanabad and Nanded.

Recently (in 2009), M. H. Suryanarayana, has published a paper on "Intra-State Economic Disparities: Karnataka and Maharashtra", which has concluded that, "The four urban districts of Mumbai, Thane, Pune and Nashik account for half of the state income; the other half is shared by the remaining 31 districts." And, "Almost half of the rural population was deprived in the Inland central and Eastern regions", "Needless to say,

this calls for concerted efforts at balanced regional development in Maharashtra" [Suryanarayana, 2009, p. 223].

We may conclude from all these studies that over the last five decades the Marathwada and Vidarbha regions and a small part of Rest of Maharashtra (namely, Dhule, Nandurbar, Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg) have been found to be relatively under-developed.

4. A CRITIQUE OF THE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL IMBALANCE IN MAHARASHTRA STATE (1984)

The Government of Maharashtra had appointed this Committee in 1983 under the Chairmanship of the eminent economist, the Late Prof. V.M. Dandekar. The Committee submitted its report to the Government in 1984. There was extensive discussion on this report in various parts of the State, especially in backward regions like Marathwada and Vidarbha. **The State Government has not accepted this report, but surprisingly, the Government has been making annual provisions in its Annual Budget since 1985-86 for the removal of backlog on the basis of this report.** Moreover, the methodology followed by this Committee was again followed by the other Committee, that is, "the Indicators and Backlog Committee", appointed by the Governor of Maharashtra in 1995. Hence, it is proposed in this section to make a critical evaluation of this FFC report (1984), very briefly. It may be noted here that for the purposes of liquidating the regional backlog, the State Government has not followed the recommendation of the Dandekar Committee, i.e., 85 per cent of the plan funds scheme by scheme for removal of backlog and 15 per cent for ongoing projects and natural growth in all districts. **Actually only 15 per cent of the plan funds were spent for removal of backlog resulting into time and cost overruns.** The FFC had recommended removal of all backlog in seven

years, while the time taken into account by the Government for this purpose was 16 years, (due to meager allocation).

Between 1985-86 and 2003-04, (i.e., 19 years) the State Government had made a total budgetary provision of Rs. 14050.93 crore, in its annual budgets, for the removal of backlog, but in actual practice, the Government could make a total expenditure of Rs. 10,745.81 crore only or 76.47 per cent of budget allocation. In recent years, i.e., in 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05, the proportion of expenditure to annual allocations, was only, 25.23 per cent 22.66 per cent and 8.40 per cent, respectively! The big difference between allocation and actual expenditure in removal of backlog clearly indicates the apathy of the Government towards removal of backlog. (Memorandum submitted to the Meeting of the state cabinet held on 18th 19th September 2006 at Aurangabad, by the Marathwada Statutory Development Board.)

There was huge diversion of irrigation funds to the Rest of Maharashtra (ROM) Region at the cost of the Vidarbha and Marathwada Regions. This had led to huge irrigation backlog in both Vidarbha and Marathwada Regions. The diversion of funds from one region to another is against the Article 371(2) clause 8 of the Constitution of India. However, this excess of funds diverted to the ROM region, were rectified by the Hon. Governor, in later period. Although, there are number of instances of such diversion of funds in irrigation sector, we are presenting one case below:

During the year 2004-05, the allocation made to the ROM region was Rs. 396.85 crore; while the actual expenditure incurred during this year in ROM was Rs. 1,245.85 crore or an excess expenditure of Rs. 849 crore. On the other hand, there were short falls in expenditures in irrigation in Marathwada and Vidarbha regions.

5. THE APPROACH OF THE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE (1984)

A) *The important terms of reference of the Committee were as follows:*

1. To decide on indicators for assessing imbalance in development
2. On the basis of 1) above, and relation to the average development in Maharashtra, to determine district-wise imbalance in 1960 and in the latest year for which information is available.
3. To determine what action the Government could take in relation to which of the indicators and the limits thereof.
4. To suggest remedial action to remove the existing imbalance as determined and long-term measures to prevent recurrence of such imbalance [FFC, 1984, p. 1].

B) *Sector Approach:* In Chapter III, the Fact Finding Committee (FFC) has discussed the methodology it adopted for estimation of regional backlog of development of the three regions of the state. After discussing drawbacks in the methods of identification of backwardness, followed by various Committees, that is, ranking method, Index method and the principal component analysis method, the Committee chose to adopt the sectoral method for estimation of regional backlog, with district as the unit of measurement (except irrigation, for which, "taluka" level information was used for drought-prone talukas).

Although the Committee also discussed taluka level industrial development, with various incentives, **the Committee did not estimate regional backlog of industrial sector.**

The Committee has clearly stated that, "In fact, our central purpose is not so much to identify backward areas classifying the districts into two classes called Backward and Not Backward" [FFC, 1984, p. 18]. Hence, the committee adopted

what is called the sectoral approach. The following sectors were considered for the estimation of backlog.

1) Roads Development, 2) Irrigation from surface water resources, 3) Rural Electrification, 4) General Education, 5) Technical Education, 6) Health Services, 7) Water supply, 8) Land Development, and 9) Veterinary services.

6. THE CONCEPT OF BACKLOG ESTIMATION

As stated earlier, the FFC [1984] adopted the sectoral approach while estimating the backlog of a district/taluka in 9 sectors of the economy. The State average in each sector was considered as the basis for estimation of backlog. All those districts which were below the state average were only considered for the estimation of backlog in each of the nine sectors mentioned above. Those districts which were above the state average in each sector were not considered for the estimation of backlog. The backlog was defined as the difference between the district average and the State average for each sector. Appropriate indicators were adopted in each sector for estimation of backlog. First, the backlog was estimated in physical terms, (e.g., hectares of irrigated area etc.) and then it was converted into financial terms by estimating the cost at current prices (1983 prices) of bringing the development of the physical infrastructure of the sector in the district up to the level indicated by the average for the State. To arrive at the total district backlog, the financial backlogs of all nine sectors were added together. The financial backlog of a region was estimated by adding the district backlogs of a given region, namely Vidarbha, Marathwada and Rest of Maharashtra.

The total developmental backlog, estimated (at 1983 prices) by the committee, was as follows:

i)	Vidarbha	Rs. 1,246.55 crore (or 39.12 per cent)
ii)	Marathwada	Rs. 750.85 crore (or 23.56 per cent)
iii)	Rest of Maharashtra	Rs. 1,189.38 crore (or 37.32 per cent)
	Total backlog	Rs. 3,186.77 crore (or 100 per cent)

7. SOME CRITICAL ISSUES

(i) Unit of measurement:-

The Fact Finding Committee decided to adopt "district" as a unit of measurement of backlog with reference to state average. But, in case of irrigation sector it decided to adopt "taluka" as unit of measurement for "drought-prone" areas because of availability of taluka level data. We do not agree with this argument on the following grounds:

1) In all other eight sectors, the Committee adopted "district" as a unit, while in only one sector it adopted "taluka" losing uniformity of measurement. Secondly, the Vidarbha region had only 2 drought prone talukas in Buldhana district, while 67 talukas were in Rest of Maharashtra Region, and only 19 in Marathwada. Hence, this indicator was not common to all regions; in fact, it was injustice to Vidarbha region. Consider the following case.

Table 7.5 of the report shows district-wise irrigation potential created as on June 30, 1982. It shows the backlog in irrigation in Konkan region as 105.58 (thousand ha); while in Western Maharashtra only Nashik (0.77) and Dhule district (29.96) (thousand hectares), had a total of 30.73 (thousand ha) of backlog. Or, in other words, in Rest of Maharashtra, the total backlog in irrigation sector, with district as a unit, was only 136.31 thousand hectares, or only Rs. 136.31 crore at the rate of Rs. 10,000 per hectare! Because, all other districts were found to be above the State average.

By changing the unit of measurement from "district" to "taluka", the Rest of Maharashtra could get huge amount of backlog under irrigation sector, i.e. Rs. 541.90 crores! That is Rs. 541.90 crore - 136.31 crore = Rs. 405.59 crores as additional amount. Marathwada could receive Rs. 316.71 crore - Rs. 260.67 crore = Rs. 56.04 crore while Vidarbha could get nothing by way of

additional irrigation potential for meeting the requirements of drought-prone taluka! This was sheer injustice.

If the Committee had adopted uniformly "district" as the unit of measurement of backlog for all 9 sectors including irrigation, the backlog of Rest of Maharashtra would have come down from Rs. 1189.38 crore to Rs. 783.79 crore; and the total backlog of the whole State would have been reduced from Rs. 3,186.77 crore to Rs. 2,725.14 crore!

2) The Committee instead of changing the unit of measurement from district to taluka, could have recommended the appointment of a separate committee to study the problems of these 88 drought-prone talukas. In fact, recently, such a committee was appointed by the State Government to study, the problems of 148 drought prone talukas in the state. This committee chaired by Rangnathan has recently (2010), submitted its report to the Government. Its findings are not yet published.

3) One may add one more point that, to reduce inter-taluka disparities is the responsibility of the District Planning Committees (DPCs) under the 73rd & 74th Amendment to the constitution. The Marathwada Development Board had prepared Comprehensive District Plans (Tenth Plan) for Jalna and Beed districts, with the objective of reducing inter-taluka disparities.

(ii) Considering only the public expenditure, ignoring private sector in Health and Education:

During the 1980s, the public sector was dominant and played an important role in the Indian economy in almost all economic activities, including industry and social sectors. Hence, the FFC considered only public expenditure (included only the government aided institutions) while measuring the backlog of each district. But,

this approach of the committee resulted in very paradoxical situations, especially, in sectors like health and education.

In developed regions, especially Western Maharashtra region, the private sector was playing a major role in education and industry. That was not the condition at least in Marathwada. Private educational institutions, health services, and industrial entrepreneurship were almost non-existence. One must consider this major difference between developed and backward regions.

We present two cases to stress this point.

A) In case of Number of PHUs and PHCs per million of population (1981) Dhule, Beed, Chandrapur, Osmanabad, etc, have been identified as districts" above the state average, or developed!

While Nagpur, Thane, Nashik, Satara, etc, have been identified as districts, below the "state average" (or backward) (see page 145 of the report of FFC).

B) In technical education, Mumbai City has been identified as below state average or backward. The backlog for Industrial training Institutes in Mumbai was estimated at Rs. 970.55 lakhs [see FFC, 1984, p. 294].

This has happened mainly because; the committee completely ignored the health and education services in the private sector. Had the committee estimated averages of public plus private sectors services in education and health sectors together, this average would have given us a very realistic picture of these services. The data on private sector could have been obtained from the Government.

(iii) State Averages:

1. The Fact Finding Committee, while estimating the sectoral backlog district wise, adopted the method of the distance between district average and state average in nine sectors mentioned above. All districts below the State average in each sector were given backlog funds; those districts above the state average were not given backlog funds. The method has a major drawback, that is, those districts below the State average (for example in irrigation) may reach the state average over a period of about 15 years; but during these 15 years, the State average itself moves upwards, and backward districts in irrigation again remain below the state average! The committee itself has agreed that, "reducing disparities is a continuous process" (page 289). That means, backward districts can reach up to state average but cannot cross it. This indeed has been the experience of the last 25 years of backlog removal.

Let us consider one example to prove this point. In 1994, the percentage of irrigation for the state was 35.11 per cent, (Rabi equivalent) which increased to 54.42 per cent in 2008. Therefore, all the districts which were below the state average of 35.11 per cent have to catch up the new state average of 54.42 per cent in 2008, creating a new backlog in Irrigation as shown below

Table 1. New Backlog in Irrigation in 2008 (000ha)

Region	Physical Backlog (000 ha)	Financial (Rs. In crore)
(1)	(2)	(3)
1) Vidarbha	1076.79 (57.3)	10767.90
2) Marathwada	500.97 (26.7)	5009.70
3) Rest of Maharashtra	301.15 (16.0)	3011.50
Total	1878.91 (100)	18789.10

Note: To create one hectare of irrigation potential the cost norm assumed is Rs. One lakh.

Hence, the total backlog in irrigation sector alone amounted to Rs. 18,789.10 crore or in physical terms a backlog 1,878.91 (000) hectares. The minimum new backlog is in Rest of Maharashtra region, while the maximum is in Vidarbha region. (Figures are obtained from Irrigation Department, Government of Maharashtra.)

(iv) Impact of the Removal of Backlog on Regional Balance:

The major objective of the Fact Finding Committee (1984) **was to remove the existing imbalance as determined and to suggest long-term measures to prevent recurrence of such imbalance.** To what extent, have we been able to achieve this objective? To answer this question, we need to refer to the Report of the Indicators and Backlog Committee, appointed in 1995 by the Hon'ble Governor of Maharashtra. This committee submitted its report in 1997. We shall discuss some of the major findings of this committee.

* At the outset it should be mentioned that the Indicators and Backlog Committee (or I. B. Committee), adopted the same methodology which was adopted by the Dandekar Committee, except for one change, that, this committee adopted "district" as the unit of measurement of backlog for all nine sectors of the economy, including irrigation sector.

* The total backlog estimated by this committee (at 1994 prices) was found to be Rs. 14006.77 crore! Or, almost 4 1/2 times larger than what was estimated by the Dandekar Committee! The IB Committee (1997) has also estimated that in real terms the total backlog of the state had increased by 88 per cent between 1984 and 1994. (The committee had actually estimated the total backlog at Rs. 15355.77 crore but later on the same was adjusted to Rs. 14006.77 crore.) The impact of the removal of backlog over the period, 1984-1994, is shown in the following table-2.

Table 2. Impact of Government Expenditure (Backlog) on three Regions of the State

Sr. no.	Region	Proportion of Backlog per cent (1984)	Proportion of Backlog (1994)	Change in Proportion per cent	Index of Per Capita Backlog		
					1984	1994	Change
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1	Rest of Maharashtra	37.32	24.54	-(12.78)	61	39	-22
2.	Marathwada	23.56	30.13	+(6.57)	143	186	+43
3.	Vidarbha	39.12	45.33	+(6.21)	161	206	+47
	Total	100.00	100.00				

Source: *Indicators & Backlog Committee Report* (1997) GoM Mumbai Pp. 242 and 243.

Table 3. The Region - wise Backlog Estimated by the I & B. Committee was as follows:

1	Rest of Maharashtra	3738.32 crore	24.54 per cent
2	Marathwada	4626.55 crore	30.43 per cent
3	Vidarbha	6961.02 crore	45.33 per cent
	Total Rs.	15355.77	100.00

Source: *Indicators & Backlog Committee Report* [1997] GoM Mumbai Pp. 242 and 243.

8. NEW-ECONOMIC POLICY AND BACKWARD REGION

The impact of liberalisation, privatisation and Globalisation on backward areas like Vidarbha and especially Marathwada has been quite adverse. This is explained in terms of the development of the industrial sector as well as in terms of the Special Economic Zones proposed in the three regions of the State (see table-4).

Table 4. Information Relating to the Development of Tiny, Small and Medium and Large Scale Industries in Maharashtra (up to 30th Nov. 2009)

Sr. no.	Region	No. of Tiny, Small, Medium Establishments	Employment (no)	Large Scale Units (no)	Employment (no.)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1	Rest of Maharashtra	116478 (76.9)	894458 (75.3)	2231 (83.6)	506223 (79.6)
2	Marathwada	11672 (7.7)	102076 (8.6)	142 (5.3)	41936 (6.6)
3	Vidarbha	23345 (15.4)	191647 (16.1)	297 (11.1)	87478 (13.8)
	Total	151495 (100.00)	1188181 (100.0)	2670 (100.0)	635637 (100.0)

Note: Figures in brackets are percentages to total.

Source: Prepared from the table no. 8.11 'Economic Survey of Maharashtra 2009-10, Government of Maharashtra Mumbai p. 101.

This table clearly shows that between 1991 and 2009, (i.e., post-liberalisation period, the Rest of Maharashtra region has made phenomenal industrial progress, due to its location advantage, and better infrastructure facilities in this region. About three fourth of the total industrial units are located in this region while, of the total industrial employment about 80 per cent is created in this region. The position of the Marathwada is extremely poor, both in terms of proportion of industrial units (7 per cent to 8 per cent) and employment created (5 per cent to 6 per cent),

during this period.

The position of Vidarbha is a little better than Marathwada in terms of industrial units (15 per cent) and employment (13 per cent to 16 per cent) This clearly shows a very lopsided industrial development of the state, which may be considered as a major factor leading to rising regional disparities in the State. Let us examine the position of the Special Economic Zones in Maharashtra.

Table 5. Progress of Special Economic Zones in Maharashtra (up to 2009)

Region	No. of SEZ	Proposed Investment (Rs. Cr.)	Employment in lakhs
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rest of Maharashtra	119 (82.6)	171608 (90.7)	57.91 (88.8)
Maharashtra	15 (10.4)	4962 (6.6)	1.53 (2.3)
Vidarbha	10 (7.0)	12578 (2.7)	5.81 (8.9)
Total	144 (100.00)	189148 (100.00)	65.25 (100.00)

Source: *Economic Survey of Maharashtra 2009-10*, p. 108.

The establishment of Special Economic Zones in Maharashtra up to Nov. 2009 again shows that more than 80 per cent SEZs are located in ROM. Of the total proposed investment, 90 per cent is to be made in ROM creating about 90 per cent of total employment. Again due to poor infrastructure facilities in the other two regions, the proposed investment as well as employment created in extremely poor. If the present trend of such investment continues (which is very likely to continue), the regional disparities are bound to increase in the years to come.

9. PRESENT POSITION OF REGIONAL IMBALANCE

- i) Table - 3 indicates that, between 1984 and 1994, the regional disparities, instead of reducing, have increased by about 4 1/2 times. Disparities in Marathwada, as indicated by the proportion of backlog; increased from 23.56 per cent to 30.13 per cent. Similarly, the proportion of backlog in backward Vidarbha also increased from 39.12 per cent to 45.33 per cent during the same period.
- ii) Surprisingly, the proportion of backlog in a highly developed Rest of Maharashtra region has reduced from 37.32 per cent to 24.54 per cent between 1984 and 1994.
- iii) In terms of per capita backlog index also the backward regions of Marathwada and Vidarbha stand to lose as their changes are +43 per cent and +47 per cent, respectively. On the other hand, the change of per capita backlog Index for the Rest of Maharashtra is (-) 22 per cent, indicating an improved position.
- iv) Present position of the backward region:

In 1978-79 (FFC report) the per capita income of Marathwada was Rs. 1036 which formed 66 per cent of the State per capita income (Rs. 1570) at current prices. In 2008-09, the per capita

income of Marathwada region was Rs. 34538 or 63 per cent of the state average or Rs. 54867; this shows a decline from 66 per cent to 63 per cent.

- * In 1997, the Sarma Committee appointed by the Government of India, identified 100 backward and poorest in India. This Committee identified the entire Marathwada Region (8 districts) as "poorest".
- * The Human Development Report 2002 of Maharashtra State, states that, all the 8 districts of Marathwada region have HDI values below the State average of 0.58. The same is the case with Vidarbha region (except Nagpur)
- * Of the 10 high HDI districts in the state 9 districts are located in Rest of Maharashtra region, indicating a high level of disparities not only in per capita income also the quality of life of the common people in backward regions (see Appendix-3).
- * According to the Economic Survey of Maharashtra 2009-10; out of 8 districts in Marathwada, four districts have shown a negative growth rate in their per capita incomes between 2007-08 and 2008-09. These districts are: (i) Latur (-2.19 per cent); Osmanabad (-2.56); Jalna (-17.8 per cent); and Hingoli (-3.3 per cent). Please see Appendix- 1.

The State per capita income during 2008-09 was Rs. 47473 Mumbai district topped the table with per capita income of Rs. 89343 (which was 63 per cent above the state average); while Jalna district had the lowest per capita income of Rs. 23635 (or only 43.08 per cent of state average).

1. The distance between Jalna and Mumbai was nearly 4 times. In Marathwada region, except Aurangabad all 7 districts had per capita incomes ranging between 43.08 per cent (Jalna) to 65.91 per cent (Parbhani).

There were only 7 districts in the state, which had per capita income above the state average. The remaining 27 districts had lower per capita income than the state average. This clearly indicates not only inter-regional but inter-district disparities in development.

2. Division wise data show that Konkan (143.91) and Pune division (110.02) had per capita incomes above the state average, while, Nashik (84.55) Marathwada (62.95), Nagpur (86.52) and Amravati (60.51) divisions had per capita incomes well below the state average.

10. HOW TO REDUCE REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN MAHARASHTRA?

We have concluded that during the period, 1985-86 to 1994-95, the regional disparities, instead of reducing have actually increased. This has been proved by factual data and no-body can deny this fact. Similarly, the developed ROM region is the most beneficiary region in whole process of backlog removal. This has mainly happened due to inappropriate Government policies. What is way out? Hence, we have to search for an alternative solution, which is briefly stated below.

11. CLASSIFICATION OF DISTRICTS INTO, "BACKWARD" AND "DEVELOPED"

i) We have stated earlier that both FFC and I&B Committees have avoided the classification of districts into "backward" and "developed". But, we feel that to reduce inter-district disparities such a classification is important and is the first step. There are a number of committees at the National and State levels which have adopted such a classification for identification of backward areas; for example, Chakravarty Committee Report (All India); Committee for Identification of Backward Areas in Maharashtra [1992]. Secondly, the reasons given by the FFC, that there are drawbacks in the methods of identification of

backward regions, (i.e., Ranking method, Index method and Principal Component Analysis) are not convincing on the following grounds:

- a) By identifying 'backward' and developed regions/district, we could design policies for the accelerated development of backward districts by providing additional funds to these districts. Unless, backward districts are provided higher level of investment than the "developed" districts, the objective of reducing regional disparities cannot be achieved. We have suggested this approach in this paper.
- b) These additional funds should be utilised in each of the identified backward districts through SWOT analysis and "Vision Documents" of each district, so that full potential of each district is exploited. In fact, the 14th chapter of the I. B. Committee report specifically discusses long range planning and balanced development of these districts.

ii) Methods of Identification: There are well known methods of identification of backward areas, which were followed by the above mentioned committees or researchers. They are, (a) Ranking Method (b) Index Method (c) Principal Component Analysis. The Chakravarty Committee had followed all these three methods and those districts which were common to all the three methods were identified as "Core Backward" districts. Seeta Prabhu and Sarker as well as the Study Group appointed by the Maharashtra State Planning Board [1992] also identified backward districts in Maharashtra by following the above three methods, using indicators representing, agriculture, industries and social sectors. Therefore, we feel that to reduce regional disparities in Maharashtra during the next decade (2010-20), we have to follow the same methodology as stated above, with suitable indicators.

iii) Accelerated Development of Backward

District: The State Planning Board had appointed a Committee in 1992, to identify backward areas in Maharashtra State, under the Chairmanship of B.A. Kulkarni.

This Committee had identified 17 districts in Maharashtra as, "backward" on the basis of 12 socio-economic indicators and by using the above mentioned three methods of identification. This report was in Marathi language and was not published by the State Government. But the recommendations of this Committee were very pragmatic and important. Had the State Government accepted and implemented these recommendations, in 1992 the problem of regional disparities in Maharashtra would have been solved to a great extent.

At a later stage in 1995, the Indicators and Backlog Committee again reconsidered the recommendations of this committee (chapters 12 and 13 of the I & B Committee Report) and advocated implementation of those recommendations. Therefore, we shall briefly mention the major recommendations of this committee.

- 1) The committee identified 17 districts in Maharashtra as backward by using 12 socio-economic indicators. These districts were as follows:
 - i) Gadchiroli, ii) Buldhana, iii) Amaravati, iv) Chandrapur, V) Yavatmal, vi) Akola, vii) Bhandara, viii) Wardha (Vidarbha 8 districts) ix) Jalna, x) Parbhani, xi) Osmanabad, xii) Latur, xiii) Beed, and Nanded (Marathwada 6 districts) xv) Dhule, xvii) Ratnagiri, xvii) Sindhudurg (Rest of Maharashtra 3 district)
- 2) The Committee recommended 15 per cent of the Plan Funds for accelerated development of these 17 districts; the distribution of these 15 per cent funds was made on the basis of population and area of these 17 districts, as follows:

i) Vidarbha 7.5 per cent; ii) Marathwada 5.0 per cent, and iii) Rest of Maharashtra 2.5 per cent.

- 3) Assuming that the Annual Plan of the Government of Maharashtra for the year 2010 - 11 is Rs. 33934.53 cr. Then the 15 per cent of this amount would be about Rs. 5090 crore.

Then the division of this amount (Rs. 5090 cr) among the three regions of the State would be

i) Vidarbha Rs. 2545 crore, ii) Marathwada Rs. 1695 crore; and iii) Rest of Maharashtra Rs. 850 crore.

These special Funds are to be considered as additional funds for the accelerated development of these 17 districts.

- 4) Although the FF Committee Report (1984) was not accepted by the Government, the report of the Indicators to Backlog Committee (1997) was accepted by the State Government. Hence, one may suggest that to reduce regional imbalance in Maharashtra State, the proposal discussed above may be accepted and implemented by the state Government from the year 2011-12.
- 5) We have suggested this proposal mainly because, even today, the relative developmental stage of the backward regions is not much better.

PART - II

12. ROLE OF THE STATUTORY REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BOARDS

After the publication of the Fact Finding Committee Report in 1984, there was the demand from the backward regions like Marathwada, Vidarbha and Konkan for the creation of the Statutory Regional Development Boards under

Article 371 (2) of the Constitution of India. Shri B.A. Kulkarni one of the members of this committee in his Note of Dissent to this report, has expressed the necessity of invoking provisions of Article 371 (2) of the Constitution of India (see page 341). Secondly, the Fact Finding Committee has also accepted the fact that the historic Nagpur Agreement of Sept. 1953, which was signed by the political leaders of these three regions, was not implemented by the State Government between 1960 and 1984. The Committee States, "in our opinion, the failure to report to the State Assembly every year in terms of the Nagpur Agreement has been a serious lapse on the part of the State Government". **The demand for invoking the provisions of Article 371 (2) of the Constitution is mainly an expression of this feeling of hurt and distrust" (Report page 10).** For details of the Nagpur Agreement, Please see Appendix - 2.

Therefore in 1984, both the Houses of Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council of Maharashtra, recommended unanimously to the Central Government for the creation of the Statutory Regional Development Boards for (i) Vidarbha, (ii) Marathwada and (iii) the Rest of Maharashtra.

13. CREATION OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BOARDS: (1994)

The President of India issued an order under Article 371 (2) of the Constitution of India, on 9th March 1994, for the establishment of three separate Development Boards, namely, for Vidarbha, Marathwada and the Rest of Maharashtra. This order states that, "the Governor of Maharashtra shall have a special responsibility for the establishment of separate Development Boards for Vidarbha, Marathwada and Rest of Maharashtra and for matter specified in the sub-clause (b) and (c) of clause (2) of Article 371 of the Constitution in respect of the area of each such Development Board".

Accordingly, the Governor of Maharashtra issued an order on 30th April 1994, and created three regional Development Boards.

- * The Vidarbha Development Board, Nagpur.
- * The Marathwada Development Board, Aurangabad, and,
- * The Development Board for the Rest of Maharashtra, Mumbai.

14. COMPOSITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT BOARDS:

- * Each Development Board shall consist of 10 Members including the Chairman, all of whom shall be appointed by the Governor.
- * Two members of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly from the area of the respective Development Board.
- * One member from the local Authority from the area of the respective Development Board.
- * Four members from amongst the persons who,
 - * have special knowledge of the planning process, finances and accounts of the Government, or,
 - * have had a wide experience in financial matters and administration, or,
 - * have special knowledge in different fields like, irrigation, public health, public works, industries, agriculture, education or employment.
- * A Commissioner of Revenue Division from the area of the respective Development Board.
- * An officer of the State Government not below the rank of Additional Commissioner of a Revenue Division from the area of the respective Development Board. He shall be the Member Secretary of the respective Development Board.

15. FUNCTIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT BOARDS

The main functions of the Development Boards are as follows;

- * To ascertain relative levels of development in different sectors in relation to its area on the basis of appropriate indicators having regard to the levels of development in the state as a whole;
- * To assess the impact of various development efforts in removing backlog and in achieving an overall development within its area.

16. DIRECTIONS BY THE GOVERNOR

The Governor may by order, from time to time, give directions to a Development Board in the matter of its functioning. The Directives of the Hon. Governor, with reference to equitable distribution of Plan Funds, among the three regions of the state are binding on the state Government, under Article 371 2) of the Constitution of India. How would these ensure a minimum flow of funds to backward regions? We consider this question in the following section.

17. SUITABLE ARRANGEMENT FOR EDUCATION, TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT

The Governor shall ensure equitable arrangement providing adequate facilities for technical education and vocational training and for adequate opportunities for employment in services under the control of the State Government.

It may be noted here that almost all the provisions made in the "Nagpur Agreement" of 1953, are incorporated in the provisions made in the Article 371 (2) of the Constitution.

18. ALLOCATION OF FUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE

- * The Governor of Maharashtra shall ensure equitable allocation of funds for development expenditure over the areas of Development Boards, subject to the requirement of the State as a whole.

- * In ensuring equitable allocation of funds the Governor may (i) take into account the recommendations, if any, made by the Development Board, and,
- * Where he considers it necessary and appropriate to seek advice from any person or body of persons in matter of allocation of funds.

19. ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO BE REFLECTED IN ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENT

The allocation of funds made by the Governor shall be reflected in the Annual Financial Statements to be placed before the State Legislature and the development activities with regard to the outlays as aforesaid shall be carried out by the State Government **and funds so allocated shall be non-divertible from one area of the Board to that of another Board, provided that.**

- * Re-appropriation may be made in conformity with the budgetary rules and procedures on the developmental activities undertaken within the area of the Board.
- * In the implementation of the development activities the prevailing norms shall be adhered to.
- * The respective administrative departments shall continue to implement and exercise administrative and technical supervision and control over the developmental activities.

20. ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT BOARDS

A Critical evaluation: The Statutory Regional Development Boards in Maharashtra have been functioning for the last 15 years, (i.e., 1995-2010); Therefore, it would be quite useful to make a critical evaluation of their progress and achievements during this period.

At the outset, it should be made clear that these Boards are merely a recommendatory body and not an implementing agency. The Boards pass resolutions on various aspects of the problems of

the region, like removal of backlog, relative levels of development, etc., as mentioned earlier. These resolutions are submitted to the Hon'ble Governor's Office for consideration. Those resolutions, if found suitable by the Governor's Office, are sent to the State Government for consideration and implementation by the Line Departments. We are stating below some of the major achievements of these Boards during the last 15 years.

i) The Boards have made constant efforts to increase the allocation of funds for the removal of backlog in the Annual Budgets of the State Government. For example, in the initial years 1985-86, the State Government allocated only Rs. 200 crore for the removal backlog which was hardly 12 per cent of the total Plan Outlay. Later on this amount was increased to Rs. 500 crore in 1994 - 95; then to Rs. 1100 crore, and to Rs. 1720 crore in 2002-03. Even then, the percentage plan funds allocated for removal of backlog has been about 15 per cent over these years.

ii) The Boards have constantly pointed out to the Government that **there is a big difference between the allocation of funds for the removal of backlog and actual expenditure incurred year-wise.** For example, the total approved outlay for the Marathwada Region for the period 1985-86 to 2007-08, was Rs. 4971.08 crore; but, the actual expenditure incurred during this period was Rs. 3234.09 crore or about 65 per cent of the approved outlay. As 35 per cent of the approved amount was unspent, it resulted into lower level of physical achievements as well as cost-overruns of various projects. It is alarming that, in the years 2002-03; 2003-04 and 2004-05, the percentages of expenditure incurred were, 31.1 per cent 31.2 per cent and 10.7 per cent respectively! This was brought to the notice of the Government. The Hon. Governor has taken a serious note of these lapses.

iii) The problem of Divisible and Non-divisible Funds was also examined by the Boards and was solved satisfactorily in consultation with the Planning Department. The Non-Divisible expenditures are those which cannot be considered for region-wise division among the 3 regions. These are expenditures which are made for "the State as a whole", while those expenditures which can be divided region-wise are known as "Divisible Funds". As the percentage of Non-divisible funds to total Plan Funds increased to about 59 per cent, the proportion of Divisible Fund declined sharply to 41 per cent. Hence, the Marathwada and Vidarbha Development Boards raised this issue with the Government. The Planning Department, on making a closer examination of these expenditures found that many of the Non-divisible expenditures were actually "divisible". Hence, the percentage of Non-divisible expenditures was brought down from 59 per cent to about 30 per cent.

iv) Another important achievement of the Boards is the issue of the Directives by the Hon'ble Governor on 15th December 2001, relating to allocation of funds for irrigation sector, among three regions of the state. To ensure that the irrigation sector in backward Marathwada and Vidarbha get adequate funds for completion of various irrigation projects, he directed the State Government to adopt following formula for allocating plan funds for irrigation sector.

- * 50 per cent on the basis of backlog,
- * 25 per cent on the basis of net sown area of the region
- * 25 per cent on the basis of population (excluding Mumbai) of the region

The above formula was made operative from the year 2001-02 onwards, and was made applicable to i) Budgeted allocations (for irrigation) and ii) Non-budgeted allocations, (i.e., Bonds or market borrowings to finance irrigation projects, especially the Krishna Valley Irrigation Project).

The distinction between backlog funds and non-backlog funds was abolished (for irrigation sector only). Due to implementation of this formula, the flow of funds to irrigation sector in backward regions was increased to a great extent. Earlier the allocation to irrigation sector was included in the total amount of backlog budgeted for all 9 sectors. For example, in 1985-86, only Rs. 200 crore was allocated for all 9 sectors, for removal of backlog. Hence, irrigation could get very small amount. Now the entire budget allocated for irrigation sector (over Rs. 5000 crore) is distributed among the 3 regions on the basis of the formula mentioned above. **Hence the funds for irrigation sector have increased many times.**

This step taken by the Hon'ble Governor was highly appreciated by the political leadership and common people from backward areas like Vidarbha and Marathwada as it augmented the allocation of resources for irrigation sector in these areas

v) With the publication of the "Human Development Report-2002" by Government of Maharashtra, it was found that majority of the districts in Marathwada and Vidarbha were below the state average of 0.58. As mentioned earlier, in Marathwada all 8 districts were below this average, while in Vidarbha also, except Nagpur, all districts were below average. Of the 10 high HDI districts, 9 were located in Rest of Maharashtra while only one (Nagpur) was in Vidarbha. These data clearly indicate that even today, there is a big developmental gap between developed and backward regions of the state.

To remove this gap the Marathwada Development Board made a proposal to the Hon'ble Governor to allocate "Special Fund" of Rs. 2000 crore, in the Annual Budget of the Government for the improvement of HDI values in low HDI districts of the State (19 districts). It is gratifying to note that the Government of Maharashtra has provided Rs. 500 crore for the purpose, in its Annual Budget 2010-11. But, unfortunately the Government could not spend a single rupee under this Head during the fiscal year 2010-11. The Government has now decided to identify 172

backward talukas in the state on the basis of a few socio-economic indicators. The Marathwada Statutory Development Board has opposed this move on the following theoretical grounds:

- a) HDI values cannot be estimated at the taluka level mainly because taluka income cannot be estimated at the taluka level, which has a weightage of 1.0 and
- b) Hence, progress of the taluka cannot be estimated at taluka level in terms of HDI, over a period of time. Also, how does the Government come to the figure of 172 backward talukas, without going into the procedure of selecting these talukas on the basis of some 25 socio-economic indicators? Because, if you follow (i) Ranking Method or (ii) Index Method or (iii) Principal Component Analysis, you will get different number of backward talukas. Without going into this exercise, the Government has decided these 172 talukas, without any sound basis. This is something very serious indeed.

21. RESEARCH STUDIES

The Marathwada Development Board had financed a few research studies relating to the problems of this region.

- i) The Board had financed a study titled, "Comprehensive District Development Plans", of Jalna and Beed districts, in 1998-98. The major thrust of these plans was to reduce inter-taluka disparities in development; secondly, the "Growth Centre" approach was adopted in these plans.
- ii) The Board also financed "A Report on the Farmers' Suicides in Marathwada Region" in 2006. The findings of this report were presented before the "Committee on Farmers' Indebtedness" appointed by the Finance Ministry Government of India (2007). The report was also submitted to concerned authorities, at state and central Government level.

- iii) Recently, on the advice of the Hon'ble Governor, this Board has undertaken a research study relating to the socio-economic problems of tribal population in Marathwada region. The results are to be published shortly.

22. CRITICAL EVALUATION

There are a few criticisms against the structure and working of these Boards:

- a) The Chairman of the Board is generally an MLA or a person from the ruling party. Hence, it is a kind of political appointment. The Late Shri Govindbhai Shroff a prominent Freedom Fighter of the Hyderabad State Liberation Movement had expressed his opinion that the Chairman of the Development Board should be a visionary or a retired Judge of the High Court.
- b) It is also opined that the Boards work in isolation without any public contact. Many people do not know about even the objectives and the working of these Boards.
- c) There is a demand from other parts of Maharashtra for the creation of such Boards, on the ground that they are also not getting benefits of development, e.g., (Konkan, North Maharashtra). But, personally I feel that such Boards are to be set up for backward areas only that is, Marathwada, Vidarbha and Konkan. In fact, there was never any demand from developed Western Maharashtra for the creation of such Board. Hence, there was no need for the creation of the Development Board for the Rest of Maharashtra Region. It was purely a political decision.

23. REPLICATION OF SUCH BOARDS IN OTHER STATES:

Finally, one may explore the possibility of creating such Boards in larger States like, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, etc, because there are areas in these States which were neglected by the dominant regions of the State. Creation of Boards on statutory basis

would at least ensure these regions an equitable allocation of funds for their development, i.e., in proportion to their population.

But this kind of a proposal is likely to be opposed by the "elected representatives" or MLAs on the ground that the financial powers of the state legislatures are being transferred to the Governor while preparing the Annual State Budgets. If the experience of Maharashtra is any guide, these Boards are functioning fairly well and effectively ensuring at least the minimum funds for their development.

The Evaluation Team of the Planning Commission [2003], has also expressed satisfaction about the working of these Boards in Maharashtra. The Team has suggested that these Boards should expand their activities like preparation of Regional plans; Annual plans; creating awareness among the masses etc. (See Appendix - 4).

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APPENDIX - 1

Per Capita District Incomes at Current Prices for 2007-08 and 2008-09

Sr. no.	Region/Dist	2007-08 Rs.*	2008-09 Rs. *	Growth Rate (per cent)	Percentage to State Average *
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1	Mumbai	77145	89343	15.8	162.84
2	Thane	69265	78531	13.4	143.13
3	Raigad	55935	57074	2.0	104.02
4	Ratnagiri	39527	45060	14.0	82.13
5	Sindhudurg	40738	47183	15.8	86.00
	Konkan Region	69199	78961	14.1	143.91
6	Nashik	51711	55841	7.8	101.78
7	Dhule	31194	33869	8.6	61.73
8	Nandurbar	33240	30516	-8.2	55.62
9	Jalgaon	37651	43184	14.7	78.71
10	Ahmednagar	41584	47856	15.0	87.22
	Nashik Region	42127	46391	10.1	84.55
11	Pune	71073	79968	12.5	145.75
12	Satara	43531	47009	7.9	85.68
13	Sangli	41321	46699	13.0	85.11
14	Solapur	40899	45055	10.2	82.12
15	Kolhapur	50445	55931	10.9	101.94
	Pune Region	54126	60365	11.5	110.02
16	Aurangabad	42927	49465	15.2	90.15
17	Jalna	28754	23635	-17.8	43.08
18	Parbhani	32102	36161	1.6	65.91
19	Hingoli	30257	29150	-3.7	53.13
20	Beed	31562	33672	6.7	61.37
21	Nanded	25581	28853	12.8	52.59
22	Osmanabad	29924	29155	-2.6	53.14
23	Latur	29410	28764	-2.2	52.42
	Aurangabad Region	31840	34538	8.5	62.95
24	Buldhana	27326	30165	10.4	54.98
25	Akola	33834	36750	8.6	66.98
26	Washim	27469	23628	-13.9	43.06
27	Amaravati	31317	33710	7.6	61.44
28	Yavatmal	32349	36979	14.3	67.40
	Amravati Region	30706	33202	8.1	60.51
29	Wardha	38434	41757	8.6	76.11
30	Nagpur	52884	60592	14.6	110.43
31	Bhandara	38439	42037	9.4	76.62
32	Gondia	33807	36986	9.4	67.41
33	Chandrapur	40379	43456	7.6	79.20
34	Gadchiroli	24115	24370	1.0	44.42
	Nagpur Region	42699	47473	11.2	86.52
	Maharashtra State	49058	54867	11.8	100.00

Source: *Economic Survey of Maharashtra 2009-10*, GOM, Mumbai (Table 3.8) Growth rate estimated.

Appendix - 2 Nagpur Agreement:

The problem goes back to the reorganisation of the States. The States Reorganisation Commission was appointed by the Government of India on December 29, 1953. In anticipation, informal deliberations began among eminent social and political workers of Maharashtra on the formation of a Marathi-speaking State out of contiguous Marathi-speaking areas of the then Bombay, Madhya Pradesh and Hyderabad States, and they signed an agreement which would constitute the basis for bringing together the three-Marathi-speaking areas in one single State. The agreement is known as the Nagpur Agreement (September 1953). Its salient features are as under:

(1) For the purpose of all types of development and administration, the three units, namely, Vidarbha, Marathwada and the rest of Maharashtra will be retained as such.

(2) Subject to the requirements of a single Government, the allocation of funds for expenditure over the different units will be in proportion to their population but, in view of the undeveloped conditions of Marathwada, special attention will be given to promote all-sided development of that area. A report in this behalf will be placed before the State Assembly every year.

(3) The three units will be given representation in proportion to population in (a) the composition of the Government, (b) the admission

to all educational institutions having training facilities in vocational and scientific professions or other specialised training, and (c) the services, of all grades, under Government or Government-controlled enterprises.

(4) The High Court of the new State will have its principal seat at Bombay and a second seat at Nagpur. The Bench at Nagpur will ordinarily function for Vidarbha area. While making recommendations of High Court Judges it shall be seen that Vidarbha and Marathwada areas get adequate representation in respect of appointments from, the services and the bar.

(5) Subject to the efficient conduct of administration of a single State, the advantages derived by the people of Vidarbha from Nagpur as the capital of their State shall be preserved to the extent possible. The Government shall officially shift to Nagpur for a definite period and at least one session of the State Legislature shall be held every year in Nagpur.

(6) The administration will be decentralised as an effective means of better associating the people of different units with the administration.

Appendix 3 Human Development Index: Maharashtra State - 2000

District	HDI	Region	Backward District
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. Mumbai	1.00 H	Rest of Maharashtra	-
2. Gr. Mumbai	1.00 H	-do-	-
3. Thane	0.82 H	-do-	-
4. Raigad	0.70 H	-do-	-
5. Ratnagiri	0.44 L	-do-	B
6. Sindhudurg	0.60 H	-do-	B
7. Nashik	0.51 M	-do-	-
8. Dhule	0.36 L	-do-	B
9. Nandurbar	0.28 L	-do-	-
10. Jalgaon	0.50 M	-do-	-
11. Ahmednagar	0.57 M	-do-	-
12. Pune	0.76 H	-do-	-
13. Satara	0.59 H	-do-	-
14. Sangli	0.68 H	-do-	-
15. Solapur	0.48 L	-do-	-
16. Kolhapur	0.64 H	-do-	-
17. Aurangabad	0.57 M	Marathwada	-
18. Jalna	0.27 L	-do-	B
19. Parbhani	0.43 L	-do-	B
20. Hingoli	0.43 L	-do-	New District
21. Beed	0.47 L	-do-	B
22. Nanded	0.37 L	-do-	B
23. Osmanabad	0.38 L	-do-	B
24. Latur	0.47 L	-do-	B
25. Buldhana	0.41 L	Vidarbha	B
26. Akola	0.44 L	-do-	B
27. Washim	0.36 L	-do-	New District
28. Amravati	0.50 M	-do-	B
29. Yavatmal	0.22 L	-do-	B
30. Wardha	0.49 M	-do-	B
31. Nagpur	0.71 H	Vidarbha	-
32. Bhandara	0.46 L	-do-	B
33. Gondia	0.46 L	-do-	New District
34. Chandrapur	0.41 L	-do-	B
35. Gadchiroli	0.21 L	-do-	B
State	0.58		17

H = High, M = Medium, L = Low, B = Backward districts identified by Government of Maharashtra.

Source: Government of Maharashtra, [2002], p. 274.

Appendix - 4

The following suggestions have been made by the Programme Evaluation Organisation of the Planning Commission, New Delhi in its Study No. 186, dated April 2003, pp X, XI.

The Development Boards were constituted to address certain specific areas of development concern. As per the Governor's order, the Boards are required to function till 2004. The Governor has also desired that all backlogs referred to in the IBC report be removed by 2006.

The performance evaluation brings out both **positive and negative** aspects of their functioning. While the Boards activities have generally brought about important changes in the planning process, their approaches and recommendations were not always in keeping with the objectives of **efficient use of public** resources and developing a strategy for **balanced regional development**.

Should the **term** of the Boards be then **extended**? For two reasons, it may not be fair to conclude that the services of the Boards will no longer be required. First, the activities of the Boards have helped in bringing about several modifications in the planning process for removal of existing backlogs and the impacts of the changes introduced need to be **monitored and evaluated** and perhaps, more **corrective actions** may be required to ensure balanced regional development in the State. Second, being decentralised units, the Boards are better aware of **the local resources, needs, development potentials and areas of socio-economic concern**. Their experience in articulating the issues of regional development in the planning process can be very useful inputs to the planners and policy makers.

The Boards, however, will not be required to carry on with the special functions that were assigned to them by the Governor for backlog monitoring and updating beyond 2006. It is also felt that some of the routine functions of the Boards need not be carried out by them. In view of these, the **role and functions** of the Development Boards must be **redefined**. The following suggestions are made towards this end:-

- * The Boards should be given the **responsibility of preparing the regional development reports** and periodically updating the same. The reports should contain:
 - * an analysis of the assessment of local resource base (human, natural and socio-economic) and development potentials;
 - * the development status of important **population groups and spatial units** in terms of **development indicators** of the various areas of socio-economic concern;
 - * computation of development gaps (not disparity in infrastructure) between the regions and "the State averages in the broad areas of social concern (material well-being, health, education, etc. as in the Human Development Reports brought out by Planning Commission, different State Governments and the UNDP); and
 - * an outline of the regional development plan for consideration of the Planning Department, based on resources and potentials of regions.
- * Based on the regional development reports prepared by the Boards, appropriate **locative principles** for allocation of development resources across regions may be worked out. An **Expert Committee** may be constituted to study the reports and recommend appropriate allocation principles.
- * The Planning Department must regularly give feedback to the Development Boards on the status of proposals and suggestions made by the Boards with explanations wherever needed.
- * The services of the Boards should be used for **monitoring and evaluation** (M&E) of plan programmes and overall regional development. They can monitor the physical and financial performance of plan schemes more effectively than being done at present by the line departments. They can also undertake evaluation of development interventions in collaboration with the research institutions. Results of the **independent** M&E exercises can be forwarded to the concerned line Departments through the office of the Governor for follow-up actions. Perhaps, some capacity **development** of the Boards may be necessary for the purpose.

- * Spending the large part of the **Special** Fund on various development schemes, as is being done at present, is not advisable as many such development schemes can be taken up under the normal State Plan and M.P./M.L.A. Local Area Development Schemes. Instead, they should carry on with the compliance of Governor's directives of using some proportion of this fund for adopting the most backward talukas in the region for intensive development.
- * The Boards should carry on with the task of conducting generation programmes and supporting capacity building of the grassroots level institutions and other such schemes which cannot be adequately funded under the normal plan activities.

WHY VIDARBHA STATE?

FAILURE OF ARTICLE 371(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION: VIDARBHA STATE IS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE

R.L. Pitale

Marathi speaking eight districts of former Madhya Pradesh known as Vidarbha became integral part of Maharashtra State under "one language one state" formula in new linguistic reorganisation of States in November 1956. As the States Reorganisation Commission recommended the creation of Vidarbha State, the demand for Vidarbha State is raised from time to time. The leaders of newly created State of Maharashtra started with great fervour to develop all the regions but in the process Vidarbha lagged behind. This regional imbalance was studied by the Fact Finding Team of the Planning Commission in March-May 2006. The paper reviews the findings of the Report of this team to consider the future course of action. The paper makes a case for developing Vidarbha within Maharashtra and suggests that a time bound Development Plan for Vidarbha in the next three years should remove the feeling of economic injustice done to Vidarbha. Much will depend on changing governance pattern of Maharashtra in favour of Vidarbha Region. In this interim period, the development efforts of Maharashtra will be tested and if economic backlog and imbalance continue then there will be justification for the creation of Vidarbha State.

INTRODUCTION

The Vidarbha's Marathi speaking area which was always with Hindi speaking area of Central Provinces (CP) and Berar and Madhya Pradesh got attached to Maharashtra under the linguistic rearrangement of the States in November 1956 in Bilingual State of Bombay and in Maharashtra State in May 1960 due to political exigencies then and in good faith that interest of economic well being of Vidarbha will be protected. Vidarbha got merged in Maharashtra (erstwhile Bombay State) as per the decision of Government of India in reconstituting the States based on one language one state formula though States Reorganisation Commission recommended creation of a separate Vidarbha State. The historical background of long standing demand of Vidarbha State is well known and hence not repeated for the sake of brevity.

It was hoped that people speaking the same language will form cohesive units for rapid and

balanced development. But the history of economic development of Maharashtra during the last 50 years has proved otherwise. Some areas, especially Vidarbha, have been systematically neglected as corroborated by the Planning Commission's Fact Finding Team Report while its resources are used for the benefit of the rest of Maharashtra. The Planning Commission was aware of the economic injustice done to Vidarbha. Planning Commission has been raising the issue of backlog in development of the backward regions from time to time with the State of Maharashtra as evident from the Planning Commission's Fact Finding Team Report May 2006 (p.1) But the Government of Maharashtra did not pay much attention to this advice.

The economic disparities were quantified by Expert Committee headed by Prof. V.M. Dandekar in 1983. It took Maharashtra Government almost 10 years to consider the findings of Dandekar Report In view of the imbalance in regional development of Maharashtra, at the

behest of Government of Maharashtra the arrangement under Article 371(2) of the Constitution was invoked. Vidarbha Statutory Development Board, *inter alia*, was put in place in April 1994 by the President of India. *The extended tenure of 15 years of the Board ended in April 2010. Now the tenure of Development of Boards has been extended by five years, i.e. up to April 2015.*

The protests of political leaders of Vidarbha against injustice to Vidarbha inside and outside the Assembly were ignored by the state government. The Rajya Sabha took up this issue for detailed discussion in March 2006 in pursuance of Private Members' Resolution of two Rajya Sabha MPs from Vidarbha (Shri Datta Meghe and Shri Vijay Darda) about regional disparities and economic distress in Vidarbha. This Resolution sensitised the Parliament about the economic woes created by Government of Maharashtra that finally clinched the issue with the Government of India (GOI). The basis of this conclusion is the direction given by the Prime Minister to the Planning Commission to set up a Fact Finding Team to Report in the matter. Reacting to the acute economic distress and reports of suicides of farmers even under the arrangement of Article 371(2) and the Prime Minister's package of Rs. 3750 crore, the Prime Minister desired that Planning Commission should study the facts of the matter and report to him accordingly. Planning Commission set up a Fact Finding Team on

March 2nd 2006 under the Chairmanship of Mrs Adarsh Misra, Principal Adviser, Planning Commission, to study the acute economic distress in Vidarbha and report to him in this regard.

I. FACT FINDING COMMITTEE'S REPORT MAY 2006

The Planning Commission impartially conducted the investigation and submitted the Report to the Prime Minister in May 2006. It has found the deliberate neglect of Vidarbha by Western Maharashtra politicians irrespective of political parties to which they belong and also by the administration. The 244-page Fact Finding Report specially studied, *inter alia*, the working of the Article 371(2) of the Constitution and one can safely conclude that that Article 371 (2) has virtually failed to give economic justice to Vidarbha.

Failure of Article 371(2) of the Constitution: Undisputed case for Separate Vidarbha State

The observations of the Planning Commission's Fact Finding Team are extracted below in their wording which conclusively proves the failure of Article 371(2) of the Constitution of India. The Planning Commission referred to this in its Report as "Historical disregard of the Constitutional Provision for appropriate investment" [Government of India, 2006, p. 23].

Summary Points from the Report of the Planning Commission's Fact Finding Team on Vidarbha (2006):

1. The Team found astounding evidence of years of continued neglect of a region and its people.
 2. It would not be incorrect to state that the lack of implementation in some of the major areas of development is possibly one of the major causes of the present acute distress faced in this region.
 3. That the system is not geared up towards implementation and that annual surrender of the amounts allocated leading to supplementary budgets, which are then spent in the rest of Maharashtra.
 4. Information received from the Government of Maharashtra, Office of the Governor and the Vidarbha Statutory Development Board indicate that the implementation of the directives issued by the Governor of Maharashtra has not been satisfactory.
 5. Their [Government of Maharashtra's] response to the need to provide integrated watershed development and rainwater harvesting for cost effective water conservation was lukewarm.
 6. Other regions of the State which were behind Vidarbha in irrigation development at the time of Independence have now marched ahead of it in the post-Independence period
 7. There is an obvious lack of commitment in implementing any schemes under irrigation in Vidarbha.
 8. The acute and continued neglect of the area is well evidenced even by the Human Development Index (HDI) of the State which shows that out of the 35 districts 4 of the six highly distressed districts are uniformly among the lowest in the State.
 9. The history of implementation of the allocations since 2000, when the first allocations were indicated, shows that the State has traditionally surrendered the provisions for Vidarbha, while, paradoxically, bulk of the State's power requirements are drawn from this region.
 10. Actual expenditure against allocation is likely to stay questionable as evidenced from previous track record of lack of effective monitoring and implementation systems; and lack of monitoring of implementation in identified sectors [and subsequent orders of President of India of 9th March 1994]
 11. While the irrigation backlog in Vidarbha has increased from 38.05% in 1982 to 62.20% in 2002, the irrigation backlog in rest of Maharashtra has progressively declined from 39% in 1982 to 4.73% as on 1.4.2002. (For the rest of Maharashtra, it is now zero).
 12. Even the need to provide energy for energisation of pump sets has not led to a system of prioritisation.
 13. The common refrain is that though majority of electric power is produced in Vidarbha area, the energy requirements of Vidarbha, in particular for the energisation of agriculture pumps, is not fulfilled compared to the Western Maharashtra.
 14. About Rs. 9,250/- crore annual subsidy is given by the State Government on these agriculture pumps. This is perceived as not only a loss of irrigation potential which could have been made available to this region (Vidarbha), but also as a denial of financial assistance in the form of subsidy to the farmers of this area.
 15. Final Conclusion of the Report (Page 91): Lack of political will is still evidenced for implementation.
- From the above, it is clear that Arrangements under Article 371(2) of the President of India had completely failed as Maharashtra Government has not shown any political will to develop Vidarbha. Hence it can be deduced from the Report that there is no other alternative for the people of Vidarbha but to get a separate Vidarbha State as the Report has clearly stated that the Government has no political will to implement the development of this area. The process for creating Vidarbha State needs to be initiated urgently.

**II. COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL
(CAG) REPORT 2006-07 ON MAHARASHTRA:
ARTICLE 371(2) SIDELINED**

Besides the Planning Commission's above mentioned detailed report, findings of the CAG Report 2006-07 reported in the press brings out that "Western Maharashtra (WM) benefited as the Vidarbha's backlog piled up. The diversion of funds to the influential WM and northern parts of state, ducking Governor's directives has led to irreversible regional balance. Vidarbha has been robbed of 70 per cent of its funds". Provision for irrigation made by the Governor was Rs. 3119.79 crore but government allotted only Rs. 1391.58 crore that resulted in a backlog of Rs. 2528 crore.

Government subsidies have also been monopolised by the State's powerful sugar lobby. Subsidies amounting to Rs. 800 crore have been given to sugar factories and a benefit of zero interest has also been extended to them. In addition, purchase tax of \$ 63 million was waived for sugar factories and \$ 212 million provided for buffer stock transport subsidies. (In the Report, the figures have been given in dollars.)

As per CAG Report 2006 "3.2 million Vidarbha farmers consume 11 per cent of total electricity while sugarcane belt of Maharashtra accounts for 65.5 per cent. Six sugar growing districts of Pune Division had 3.57 lakh pump sets in excess of the quota of 2004, while Vidarbha had deficit of 2.15 lakh pumps (now it is 2.38 lakh in 2009). 60 per cent of State's electricity is generated in Vidarbha. It has power but is politically powerless" [CAG Report, 2006-07].

"Pune Division is entitled to consume 512 million units (MU) of power. Agriculture pumps in the Division consumed 1079 MU with a subsidy to the pump set of Rs. 250 per unit. Pune got excess subsidy of Rs. 144 crores in 2007 and Western Maharashtra got Rs. 560 crores. Against this, Vidarbha out of its share of 2668 MU

consumed only 985 MU due to backlog of 2.15 lakh pumps resulting in a loss of subsidy of Rs. 420 crores" [CAG Report, 2006-07].

The above brief observations show the sidelining of Presidential Constitutional Arrangements under Article 371(2). What worst commentary there be on governance pattern of Maharashtra Government which itself approached the President of India to set up Vidarbha Development Board. Article 371(2) arrangement has been completely sidelined during the last 15 years (1994-2010). Maharashtra Government has thus forfeited its right to keep Vidarbha in Maharashtra.

**III. GOVERNOR'S DIRECTIVES 2009-10
UNDER ARTICLE 371(2): HIGHLIGHT ON THE
GOVERNANCE PATTERN OF MAHARASHTRA
IN NOT CARRYING OUT GOVERNOR'S
DIRECTIVES IN LETTER AND SPIRIT**

The following observations are those of Governor of Maharashtra as per the Directives issued by him and placed on the Table of Vidhan Sabha Session (Budget Session) 2009-10.

How the Government of Maharashtra has tried to change tracks and adopted ways to circumvent the directives can be seen from the Directives issued by the Governors since 2000. This has happened under four Governors during the last 15 years during the term of P.C. Alexander (Jan 1993 - Oct 2002), Mohd Fazal (Oct 2002 - Dec 2004), S.M. Krishna (Dec 2004 - Mar 2008) and S.C. Jamir (Dec 2008 - Jan 2010).

A few illustrations should suffice to show how difficult it is for the Governors to implement the provisions of Article 371(2) of the constitution. The Directives of 2009-10 state the following:

1. The Governor has noted that these trends of excess expenditures in rest of Maharashtra region have continued even in the FY 2007-08 and FY 2008-09 with significant

shortfalls in Vidarbha region during this period. Similar trends are also observed within the other regions as well.

2. There have been significant continued deviations from the Governor's directives over the years. The Governor has noted with serious concern that in spite of the well-settled principles of allocation of funds to the regions, the actual expenditure does not comply with these directives. The Governor has, therefore, directed that the Planning Department should investigate into this to fix responsibility for the same.
3. The Governor ---therefore, observed that similar to the requirements of Krishna valley projects, other river basins, viz., Godavari and Tapi which are governed by inter-state Awards or bilateral Agreements also require due consideration. In case of Godavari river basin, the total water available for the state is yet to be fully planned especially in Vidarbha region.
4. The state government should follow up on top priority approvals for diversion of forest lands with the central agencies for projects in Vidarbha particularly major projects in that region for removal of backlog. It is also necessary for the state government to take up the issue of minor irrigation projects having culturable command area up to 2000 ha. for exemption from environmental clearances and clearance for medium projects having culturable command area less than 10000 ha. at state level Environmental Impact Assessment Authority. This would help in many minor and medium projects to take off expeditiously in Amravati division.
5. The Governor has directed that the Planning Department shall commission a detailed study of the cost and time overrun of the

ongoing irrigation projects in the state and submit the report within 6 months to the Governor.

6. There shall be no diversion of funds from backlog districts to non-backlog districts and from the area of one Development Board to another without prior approval of the Governor.
7. Should the State Government resort to market borrowings, outside the budget, for the irrigation sector, money so raised should be for the State Government as a whole and distributed amongst the three Development Boards equitably.

In view of non-compliance of earlier directives, Governor asked for the Quarterly and Six Monthly Reports on compliance of Directives of 2009-10. Concerned authorities can verify the same from the government and Governor's office.

In order to get the Governor's Directives implemented as per requirement of Article 371(2) of the constitution, seven persons including MLAs and MLCs filed a Writ Petition (No. 2751 of 2006) against the Government of Maharashtra in High Court Judicate at Bombay. The court after hearing both parties gave a Judgment that "It should be noted that Article 371 is not the 'usual executive power' of the State available to the Governor under Article 154. Under Article 371, there is a 'special responsibility' imposed on the Governor to ensure that there is no backwardness in Vidarbha and Marathwada regions and the same is a constitutional obligation imposed on the Governor, which can not be frustrated. ---The Directives of the Governor are binding on the State".

Even after clear judgment on Article 371(2) by the High Court, the Government of Maharashtra is nowhere serious about implementing the

Constitutional provisions made by the President of India. What is the way out except to create a separate Vidarbha State?

IV. MOCKERY OF NAGPUR AGREEMENT OF 28TH SEPTEMBER 1953

Before the States Reorganisation Commission was set up in December 1953, the leaders of Western Maharashtra took initiative to bring all Marathi speaking areas in one State. Besides agreement on other operational arrangements for proper cohesiveness amongst the two regions, it was specifically agreed by seven senior leaders of Western Maharashtra and four from Vidarbha that the seat of government shall officially shift to Nagpur for a definite period and at least one session of the State Legislature shall be held every year in Nagpur. This Nagpur Agreement was further vetted by the Joint Committee of Parliament in clause 17 of its Report on the subject. Leaders from Western Maharashtra and Vidarbha supported the Committee and urged that Nagpur should, to the extent practicable, be given constitutional recognition.

Accordingly, a new clause has been added to the Article 371 of the constitution with the consent of the members of Maharashtra. The Nagpur Agreement which has a constitutional validity and commitment of the leaders of Western Maharashtra is observed more in breach than faithful compliance. The Assembly Session in Nagpur is held reluctantly as is evident from the time spent on winter session at Nagpur and as a ritual as is evident from the number of days for which the Session is held at Nagpur. In the beginning there was some semblance of holding the Session but off late and this year it was held just for 11 days. The Shortest session was held just for 5 days in 1989. The Mockery of Nagpur Agreement is rubbing salt to the wounds caused by economic injustice to Vidarbha. This shows lack of earnestness for Vidarbha.

V. LOSS OF RESOURCES AND ITS CUMULATIVE NEGATIVE MULTIPLIER EFFECT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In addition to what has been stated above that the Government of Maharashtra has totally derailed the functioning of Article 371 (2) of the Constitution, it will be appropriate to highlight here the loss of resources for Vidarbha which may be seen in Box (A).

Separate Vidarbha will contribute to Prime Minister's Objective of achieving of Growth Rate of 10 per cent and above.

It may be pointed out that States separated from their Mother States are growing faster than the Mother State as per the study of Central Statistical Organisation, Government of India (Business India 26th Jan 2010) The Pre-Division (1993-2001) and post-Division (post 2001) economic performance of the States shows that Chattisgarh's pre-division growth rate was 1.6 per cent and has increased to 7.9 per cent after it was separated from Madhya Pradesh. In case of Jharkhand, for the same period it was 4.8 during pre-division and now 8.6 per cent in post-division period. The higher growth rates may be due to low growth base in the States but it can not be denied that the higher growth rates were achieved as the States could chart higher growth profile in separate State.

Vidarbha State would not lag behind to contribute its share of growth.

The above conclusively shows that once Vidarbha becomes State it will grow faster and contribute substantially to the rate of growth of GDP of the economy. Why then there should be any opposition to separate Vidarbha State that contributes to PM's objective of higher rate of growth of 10 per cent and above. Why wait for agitations, fast-unto-death, and martyrs?

A. Loss of Resources of Vidarbha: 2010 At A Glance

Irrigation

1. There has been a huge loss of cultivation on proposed 31 lakh hectares in Vidarbha since 1978 when the Inter-State Water Tribunal allocated [to Vidarbha?] 822 TMC out of total allocation of 1207 TMC from Godavari Basin. Virtually no investment was made in irrigation schemes in Godavari Basin while all investment through budgetary and non-budgetary resources (borrowing) was made in the Krishna Basin which completed all the irrigation projects in Western Maharashtra. Vidarbha Suffered loss of production and employment in agriculture sector during the last nearly 40 years.

The Krishna Basin projects have created potential to mop up 818 TMC over and above allotted amount of 599 TMC by the Tribunal in 1978. As per Vidarbha Development Report it has brought under irrigation an area of 14.69 lakh hectares by completed projects and 7.78 lakh hectares through on going projects. Western Maharashtra farmers became well- to-do while Vidarbha farmers faced poverty and suicides.

2. The percentage of created potential in June 2008 to ultimate potential for Vidarbha is 40% while for Nasik and Pune is 78.8% and 74% respectively. The cumulative production loss runs into cores of rupees and a consequent employment loss to farmers and farm labour.
3. Out of total 50 lakh hectares of cultivated land in Vidarbha, only 10 lakh hectares land is under Rabi crop. 40 lakh hectares of cultivable land remains unused during Rabi

season resulting in loss in production and employment of farmers and farm labour year after year.

4. Non completion of Gosikhurd irrigation project is a monumental example of how to delay a project. It is a Silver Jubilee for its non completion. In the first place, the resources were not made available, and later it has been quietly put as a national project, thus minimising the state's responsibility for it. In the new arrangement Central assistance of 90 per cent of funds become available with 10% contribution from Maharashtra. Since there is no provision for the same in the State budget and also in Governor's directive separately, the implementation of the project will get delayed further.
5. There has been considerable loss as a result of backlog of electricity connections of 2.38 lakh water pumps of farmers of Vidarbha, **by not taking steps to provide pumps for Vidarbha farmers while excess pumps were given in sugar belt of Maharashtra. Though most of the villages of Vidarbha are electrified but sanction for pump sets has not been given which has been clearly pointed by Fact Finding Team of Planning Commission.** Even available ground water is denied to Vidarbha farmers for agricultural production as also loss of subsidy of Rs. 420 crore to farmers every year, as pointed out by CAG Report 2006-07.

Forest and mineral resources

1. Vidarbha is rich in forest and mineral resources. These resources remain unutilised due to political and administrative neglect of Vidarbha. More than 90% of dense forests and 50% of moderately dense forests are in Vidarbha. In spite of the richness of the forests of Vidarbha and its contribution of revenue, the allotment of outlays under the

annual plan for Vidarbha districts is disproportionately small. The total expenditure For Vidarbha districts is Rs. 1178.83 lakh and the same for rest of the districts of Western Maharashtra is Rs. 3974.25 lakh. A similar step-motherly treatment is seen in the allotment of the outlays for the year 2008-09 allotted to different statutory boards.

Thermal power

The gift to Vidarbha of 47 thermal projects to be set up all over Vidarbha to increase electricity generation for the benefit of Western Maharashtra is the next step to further damage the life of Vidarbha people. Vidarbha wants more irrigation but Maharashtra says generate more electricity as Western Maharashtra needs it. Maharashtra has money to set up thermal power projects in Vidarbha but not for irrigation. What is the use of Vidarbha irrigation for Maharashtra? 47 Thermal power projects will generate 54,509 MW. It will burn 11.68 lakh tonnes of coal resulting in 4.47 lakh tones of ash and 17.52 lakh tones of carbon dioxide per day for Vidarbha. It will also give 20.49 lakh calories of heat. What more Vidarbha wants for its economic development?

Industry

1. The Butibori Industrial area is languishing during the last 25 years and there are almost no big industries there. If more financial incentives are given and more attention is paid, it can generate more income and employment. Without special efforts, industrial growth would not have taken place in Basmat Industrial Estate and Mumbai-Pune and Mumbai-Nasik industrial belt. When Maharashtra Chief Minister goes to foreign countries to get investment and resources, his shopping list does not have Butibori. That has resulted in wastage of

industrial infrastructure, loss of production and employment. It is not the loss of Vidarbha but, in fact, of the whole of Maharashtra. If Vidarbha develops, Maharashtra will develop faster.

2. Same is the case with MIHAN. The delay in its implementation is proverbial. No attention is paid to generate passenger traffic and cargo load. How this should be done is given in Feasibility Report of Larson and Tubro sponsored by MSRTC. It will not be out of place to mention here that the Nagpur airport was not handed over to MIHAN for one reason or the other till Pune International airport became functional. From Pune airport, lakhs of rupees worth of flowers and vegetables are exported to Europe and other countries. If MIHAN had been completed as scheduled, industrial growth would have accelerated significantly.

Budgetary allocations

1. The budgetary allocation to Vidarbha also shows the financial resource loss of thousands of crores. The figures of the Department of Finance, Government of Maharashtra, show that allocation to Vidarbha in 2008-09 was Rs. 20,792 crore which decreased to Rs. 18,274 crore in 2009-10 budget thereby depriving Vidarbha of Rs. 2518 crore at the allocation stage itself. In addition to this, the actual expenditure is around 65% of the allotted funds which shows the diversion of funds to other areas, as conclusively pointed by the Planning Commission's Fact Finding Report (2006). All the above instances show the huge loss caused to production and employment in Vidarbha.

B. Ultimate Economic Loss of Vidarbha:

The final index of economic loss is the difference in per capita income.

Table: Per Capita Income 2007-08
(At current Prices)

Pune Division	Rs. 52,075
Pune	Rs 68,177
Nagpur Division	Rs 40,539
Nagpur	Rs 49,770
Amaravati Division	Rs. 29,503
Amaravati	Rs. 30,017

Source: *Economic Survey 2008-09*, Government of Maharashtra

The above Table shows the ultimate result of loss of economic resources of Vidarbha. Per capita income of Nagpur Division is only 77 per cent of Pune Division and that for Nagpur is 73 per cent of Pune. What more proof is required about the economic loss of resources and income to Vidarbha?

Creation of Vidarbha State may be the only way out for achieving economic well being of the people of Vidarbha.

VI. NEW ECONOMIC STRATEGY AND POLICY: FROM EAST AND WEST TO CENTRAL VIDARBHA

A new economic strategy for Vidarbha is to have a thrust of development from the least developed to the more developed. The development process will have to commence from East Vidarbha (Gadchiroli-Chandrapur) to Central Vidarbha (Nagpur) and from West Vidarbha (Yavatmal-Buldhana) to Amaravati. The resources and programmes of development will have to be earmarked from the east to the west in Vidarbha. This strategy will correct intra-regional imbalance in a systematic manner and will contribute to correct overall economic imbalance between Vidarbha and the rest of Maharashtra. Three year period is adequate to put on hold the creation of Vidarbha State so that in this interim period the development efforts of Maharashtra

will be tested and if economic backlog and imbalance will continue then there will be justification for the creation of Vidarbha State. The success of this interim strategy will entirely depend on government of Maharashtra. A brief outline of this strategy is spelt out below.

A. Vidarbha in Maharashtra: Blue Print of Development

Some of the development policy initiatives for Vidarbha have waited too long. The main reasons for this are the delay in and the lack of strong implementation by the government. The blame equally lies on the political leadership of Vidarbha who should have corrected the development path of Vidarbha well in time so that backlog would not have accumulated.

The priority areas of development are agriculture such as strengthening the mixed cropping tradition of Vidarbha, developing its irrigation potential, including energisation of pump sets for well irrigation, repair and maintenance of the *malgujary* tanks in Vidarbha, improved cotton and groundnut cultivation, horticulture (orange economy), forest and tribal development, industrial development by encouraging cotton textiles and manufacture of groundnut oil so as to increase creation of greater local value added and employment, mining and appropriate power sector development suiting Vidarbha needs. These areas did not receive adequate attention as revealed in the Fact Finding Team Report of the Planning Commission.

Vidarbha's development should not be held back till a separate state of Vidarbha is brought into existence. The strategy and policy is possible within the present set up of Maharashtra State as envisaged and detailed below, failing which there is a strong case for creating a separate Vidarbha State.

B. Road Map for Rapid Development of Vidarbha

When Chhastigarh became a State, they got the Master Plan with the help of World Bank for 2020. This is available. The same is envisaged for Vidarbha. Till the 20 year Master Plan for Vidarbha can be prepared, the Road Map for Rapid Development of Vidarbha is spelt out that would include targeting the poor, small and marginal farmers, unemployed youth in rural and urban areas, completing the delayed irrigation and road projects as also MIHAN on top priority. A Sub-Master Plan for Naxal affected area is to be drawn separately to kick-start its implementation.

National Hub of Organic Farming: Low Cost and High Returns to Farmers

Vidarbha mainly falls in dry farming area with traditional crops such as cotton, pulses and coarse grains during Khariff season. There is great potential to tune this to organic cultivation. It has been proved that in organic cultivation productivity is no less than fertiliser and chemical based cultivation. There is a huge demand for such products to the tune of \$90 billion in European countries. Vidarbha can be made export hub of organic food (processed and un-processed). Yuva Rural, an NGO in Nagpur, is already working to provide guidance and training in Organic Farming. This NGO can be made the Centre for Organic Farming with financial assistance from the government. The government should also provide seed capital for such NGOs in other parts of Vidarbha. Cash subsidy of Rs. 3000/5000 may be given per household per year to marginal and small farmers who adopt organic farming. This will add to their cash income. Organic Farming Certifying Authority may be set for this purpose. Till such authority is set up, the work can be farmed out to some other, national or foreign, agency.

Expanding Farm Size: Incentives for Group Farming/Partnership Farming, Adding to Farmers' Cash Income

The main problem of agricultural production is small size of the cultivated land holding. Eighty per cent of farm households are marginal (less than one hectare) and small (1 to 2 hectare). Due to small size, the incomes are low and economies of scale cannot be realised. The farmers who bring their land together to increase the size of cultivation to, say 50 hectare, and adopt organic farming can be given cash incentive of around Rs 5000/6000 per annum per farmer household at the end of cultivating season and also by providing such farmers with group crop insurance.

Nagpur Oranges Worldwide

One lakh hectare of land is under cultivation of oranges in Vidarbha, which produces 11.5 lakh tones of oranges. This constitutes 48 per cent to total production. Eighty per cent of this is produced in Nagpur, Amravati and Wardha. Due to 12 hours of load shedding the existing irrigation is also denied and orange production is on the verge of destruction. There are no new processing plants for oranges. In order to rehabilitate orange to its past glory and take Nagpur Orange to the Lunch and Dinner Tables of consumers in and outside India, Production and Marketing Programme (PMP) should be drawn up in consultation with orange growers and traders. State government initiative and support is lacking.

Cotton to Textile

The "White Gold" of Vidarbha which has been yielding so much income to the farmers that agriculture was rated first employer, industry second and job as the third. Vidarbha cotton was rated so high in production and quality that "Futures" of cotton in London and New York depended on the arrival of cotton in Vidarbha districts. To bring the cotton economy out of the

present distress, comprehensive backward linkage (Cotton) and forward linkages (textile) need to be established. Vidarbha Cotton Council on the pattern of Cotton Council of USA needs to be established to make the cotton farmers rich like the sugarcane growers in Western Maharashtra and Marathwada. **The Cotton Council of USA links cotton farmer to the end users, i.e., up to marketing of textiles and that producers-to consumer strategy benefits the farmers. Cotton Council of Vidarbha will also adopt the same approach. For instance, sugarcane farmers are linked to sugar producers and to marketing and exports. The same is envisaged for Vidarbha farmers in Cotton Council.**

MIHAN and Gosikhurd on Fast Track

The agriculture and rural sector will get further boost once MIHAN (Multi Modal International Hub Airport) and Gosikhurd become operational in the next two years. MIHAN Feasibility Report was prepared for MIHAN Project by a team led by L&T-Ramboll Consulting Engineers Ltd for MSRDC (Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation) in January 2001 with the objective of cost effective integration of road, rail and air transport by taking advantage of central location of Nagpur. It was proposed to develop Vidarbha hinter land and to provide the required cargo and passenger traffic and the corresponding infrastructure so that Vidarbha marches on the road of rapid economic development. This was the MIHAN Project perspective but it could not be achieved due to inordinate delay in implementation. Besides completion of infrastructural facilities, adequate passenger and cargo load also needs to be geared up, which steps have not been taken up so far. This needs to be sorted out with Planning Commission, Civil Aviation Ministry for passenger traffic and the Ministry of Commerce and industry for cargo load.

Gosikhurd project like other irrigation projects was taken up to increase the irrigation facilities to the farmers of Bhandara and Gondia districts. The project can be expeditiously completed now that it has been put in as a Central project as 90 per cent of cost is being financed by Central Government on matching cost of 10 per cent to be provided by the State Government. State government should provide its 10 per cent share to get Central assistance to complete the project at the earliest; that will bring thousands of hectares of land under cultivation.

Infrastructure Development Booking Centre: Public-Private Partnership

Instead of issuing tenders every now and then for small and medium level infrastructure civil and other work, Infrastructure Development Booking Centre for registration of companies and contractors as also organisations of retired technical personnel from agriculture to software discipline is required. This will speed up rural infrastructure quickly.

Tourism Hub for Private Tour Operators

Tourism sector, which is employment generating, has great scope in Vidarbha which has remained neglected in Maharashtra. The package of incentives is to be drawn up for accelerated development of this sector. Tourism sector connects urban sector to transport, hotels and rural hinter land.

Uninterrupted 24 hours Electricity to all parts of Vidarbha to carry out above mentioned programmes and projects is to be ensured to utilise existing irrigation facilities and for setting up of electricity- using small and medium enterprises in rural and urban areas. That will change the very pattern of life of Vidarbha which is presently groping in the dark in spite of availability of surplus electricity.

Students and Youths

This is the generation for which Vidarbha State is being demanded so that their future is provided with respectable income and good family life which has been denied to them in Maharashtra. Merely being literate is not enough. Some asset, qualification and skills are the minimum that will need to be provided to them. This is to be done for the rural sector youth and students by outsourcing many banking, marketing and food delivery services in collaborations with private sector and NGOs. This network of services will absorb unemployed youths and students in rural areas, especially from families of marginal and small farmers as well as landless labourers. Government will play only supportive role and oversee implementation.

In regard to urban students and youths major plan will be "Earn while you Learn" right from primary school level to university level. At the schools, students can be given the work before and after school hours. The work can be in the nature of keeping school premises clean, supervising the home work of junior students for which they can be paid monthly token honorarium to inculcate a sense of social service and to give them some pocket money.

The Piggy Banks can be opened in schools for students to provide interest free loans for purchase of books/uniforms at concessional rates. For the college and university students the same pattern can be operated in expanded form for utilising their services for library services, computer services, training of children in computer literacy, etc. This module can be finalised in consultation with teachers, professors and academicians.

Health and Medical Coverage in Rural Areas: Hospitals on Wheels

A new scheme of Hospitals on Wheels with the help of private doctors and clinics can be taken up for rural population by providing fully equipped Big Vans and Bus like Vehicles. These Hospitals on Wheels can have the necessary equipments to attend to routine and emergency

cases. The Medicine Bank can also be organised through government and private funding to supply medicines on the spot.

Friendship Development Plan for Naxal affected Chandrapur and Gadchiroli

The Naxal menace got its foothold in these two districts mainly due to the total neglect of the economy of Adivasi populated areas by Maharashtra Government during the last 50 years. For the purposes of economic development, each Tehsil can be treated as economic district and local need-based planning model be drawn up for implementation. Local participation is to be the keyword to ward off any fear of imposition from above.

Weekly Banking Services at Farm Gates

On the pattern of Hospital on Wheels, Banking Services be provided in collaboration with Banks by providing them Big Van like vehicles to go round the villages on appointed days to provide loans and other services. Rural youths can be given training by banks in preparing the required papers for bank loans, repayment, opening account, etc. These youths can be made in-charge of accessing a fixed number of rural households to facilitate this work on some fixed honorarium.

Round The Clock Citizens Suggestions Kiosks and Online Action Monitoring

In order to make the blueprint of development effectively operative, Suggestions Kiosks are to be encouraged, manned by students and women in different places with the help of private industries/companies and NGOs. Government is to provide seed capital initially.

This Blueprint of Vidarbha State Development is not a wish list but is the mechanism to fulfill the aspiration of decent living for all the people of Vidarbha. Suicides and poverty will have no place in Vidarbha once this interim development strategy and policy is faithfully implemented by the government of Maharashtra. Implementation and Monitoring Cell will have to be set up to

supervise the Strategy and Policy of "Vidarbha Statehood Demand on Hold" during 2011-12 to 2013-14 and see that regional balance in development is established. Of course, the track record of will to develop Vidarbha is not very encouraging but a fair chance can be given to the government. The Interim Strategy and Policy is manageable to implement.

VII. BUDGETARY RESOURCES REQUIRED

To put into operation the Development Blueprint of Vidarbha, a detailed financial estimates will have to be prepared. This is outside the scope of the present article. The Vidarbha Budget given below has been estimated to project Vidarbha's separate Budget 2010. An attempt is made to project the Budget for Vidarbha *vis-à-vis* Maharashtra for 2010-11. This is an illustrative exercise and actual budget estimates can be worked out. It may be pointed out that this budget exercise does not incorporate financial resources required to put

into operation Blue Print of Vidarbha Development, spelt out earlier. We have also not taken into account the borrowing requirement and the interest liability for infrastructure development in preparing the Budget estimates for Vidarbha. The objective of the Budget Estimates for Vidarbha was to bring home the point that the Budget of Vidarbha need not be deficit budget as is often made out.

In projecting Vidarbha Budget, conservative estimates of revenues have been made so that there is no over-estimate on the revenue side. Wherever separate revenue and expenditure figures are available, the same have been taken. Care has been taken in estimating the expenditure based on the past allocations and additional development requirement of Vidarbha. The point that has been brought home is that Vidarbha is a resource rich State and can manage its own development well.

**Illustrative Summary Budget 2010-11
Vidarbha State: Maharashtra State**

(Rs. Crore)

	Maharashtra 2009-10(BE)	Maharashtra 2010-11(BE)	Vidarbha 2010-11(BE)	Maharashtra Excluding Vidarbha (BE)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
A. Total Revenue	89060.65	93106	26142 (28%)	78362
Receipts(1 to 4)			(1 to 8)	
1. Tax Revenue	50985.28	51899	6325 (10.3%)	45672
2. Non-Tax Rev	13894.12	14866	1932 (12.9%)	12934
3.Share in Central Taxes	8568.87	9168	2292 (25%)	6876
4.Grants-in-aid from Central Govt	15612.38	17173	4293(26%)	12880
5.Other Revenue (Backwardness)		-	2500	
6. Sale of Electricity	--	--	5500	-
7. Other Revenue (Forest, Tourism etc)			300	-
8. Central Grant in lieu of Ready Capital City Infrastructure (Initially for two years)	--	--	3000	-
B. Total Capital Receipts	32677.89	48894	--	28000
Total Revenue (A+B)	121738.54	142000	26142 (18.4%)	106362
C.Revenue Expenditure	96184	110611	24046 (21.7%)	72138
Electricity Purchase	-	5500	-	5500
D. Capital Expenditure	26578	27726	-	28000
Other(New Projects)	--	--	2000	-
Total Expenditure	122762.19	143837	26046 (18%)	105638
Surplus/Deficit	-1023.65	-1837	+96	+724

Note: Figures in brackets show percentages of Maharashtra Budget 2010-11(BE)

Wherever actual figures are available they have been taken and rest have been estimated on reasonable assumptions. In population and area, Vidarbha is about one-fourth of Maharashtra. The share in central taxes and Grants-in-aid for Vidarbha are assumed to be about 25% of the total. In fact, it can be more in a separate State based on its backwardness and in the light of the 13th Finance Commission Report. Hence, the assumption is reasonable. Figures for Vidarbha are conservative so that there are no inflated estimates either on revenue or expenditure side.

In the present Budgetary position, Budget Estimates, Allocation and Monitoring (BEAM) System of the Department of Finance, Government of Maharashtra, shows that the Budget allocation for Vidarbha was 20,792 crore in 2008-09 which further decreased to Rs. 18,274 crore in 2009-10. Actual expenditure is normally about 65% of allocation in case of Vidarbha as revealed in BEAM. In this context, the estimated size of the Vidarbha Budget of Rs. 26046 crore is much more than the present allocations given to Vidarbha and akin to the budgets of States of similar in size and population such as Haryana Budget of Rs. 28,542 crore and Punjab of Rs. 31,634 crore. If these States are ranking high in per capita income, Vidarbha has every potential once it becomes separate State or is given full financial autonomy till it becomes a State. The BEAMS data shows how much less is allotted and spent for Vidarbha *vis-à-vis* the Vidarbha estimated Budget

Since most of the debt of Maharashtra government has been spent in western Maharashtra and other areas of Maharashtra and since Vidarbha has a huge backlog of crores of rupees pending with Government of Maharashtra, Vidarbha will not have any liability in this respect. Vidarbha Budget will start with Zero capital Budget.

On the revenue side, grant has been added initially for a period of two years as a start up for the new State and as a compensation for having physical infrastructure for Raj Bhavan, Assembly, Secretariat building, MLA Hostel, bungalows for Ministers and officers and other amenities, which Vidarbha already has. When new States, Chhatisgarh, Uttarakhand and Jharkhand were created, they had no infrastructure of State Capital. Central government provided crores of rupees to build Capital in Raipur, Dehradun and Ranchi, respectively. Nagpur being the erstwhile Capital of Madhya Pradesh, it has all the above mentioned infrastructure of Capital. In this context, the grant in lieu of ready Capital has been added on the revenue side for two years. These resources will be utilised for urgent infrastructure and development projects in Vidarbha.

Times of India, Nagpur, published the author's above Vidarbha Budget a day before (24th March 2010) the actual Budget of Maharashtra Budget was presented on the 25th March 2010. Our estimated Budget was almost the same as that of actual budget of Maharashtra. As per the projection, Maharashtra Budget 2010-11 came to Rs. 1,28,684 crore against the actual Budget as released on 25th March 2010 is Rs. 1,29,499 crore. When Vidarbha becomes a State, its Budget would be around Rs. 26,000 crore and that of Maharashtra Rs. 1,05,638 crore. This should benefit both. The right of self-determination is at the core of Vidarbha Statehood.

Till the conditions get so bad that creation Vidarbha State is the only alternative, interim economic strategy and policy can be put in place to avoid separation of Vidarbha from Maharashtra.

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THE TELANGANA TRAGEDY -

A Lesson in Integration and Disintegration

Gautam Pingle

The movement for a separate Telangana state begins in 1968 and culminates in the results of the two elections of 2004 and 2009. In 2005, the national political parties supported the Telangana case and in late 2009 almost all state political parties and the Union Government accepted the proposition. Thereafter, as a result of agitation, a Committee was appointed to re-examine the issue and its report was published. This resulted in further controversy. The history of the Telangana movement may be seen as an unsuccessful exercise in integration of regions with different history, disparities in economic development, elites with varying capacities and conflicting goals. The common language has not been able to unite the two regions even after 54 years.

Introduction:

Linguistic States in the Republic

The history of linguistic states in India is somewhat uneven with occasional emphasis placed on it in pre-Independence days by votaries for and against the notion. The movement takes shape politically and practically in the early 1950's. The specific issue that precipitated it was the Andhra regions' demand for a state separate from Madras Province.¹ Nehru was forced to concede this when the agitation became a serious law and order problem which he did so with little grace.² He, however, then extended the process further by appointing the States Reorganisation Commission (SRC). He issued a caveat against disrupting the traditional diversity of the Hyderabad State which he saw as a successful experiment in combining not only Hindus of three different linguistic backgrounds (Telugu, Marathi and Kannada) who lived largely in three different regions but also Muslims - all under the hegemony the Nizam of Hyderabad. [Sherman, 2007, Pp. 489-516; Pingle 2010, Pp. 57-65]

On July 2, 1953, Nehru told Chief Ministers that:

So far as we are concerned, we have declared quite clearly that after the Andhra State is well established; we shall appoint a high-powered Commission to consider the question of reorganisation of states in all its many aspects. We do not propose to consider the question of one

state separately now. Instead, this cannot be considered because in every such instance many states are concerned.

Nor do we propose to consider this matter on the purely linguistic plane, although language and culture are necessarily important.....I am surprised that suddenly some people should have galvanised themselves into activity in regard to Hyderabad State and demanded its disintegrationI am sorry for this because it denotes an outlook with which I have no sympathy whatever and, which, I am sure, if given free play, would bring utter chaos in a great part of India and lead to other disastrous consequences also. [Nehru, 1987, Pp. 320-21]

On the issue of splitting Hyderabad State, Nehru considered it was "injurious to Hyderabad and would upset the whole structure of South India". "It would", he added, "be very unwise to do anything that would destroy the administrative continuity that has been achieved in Hyderabad after so much effort". [Nehru, 1954, p. 60] Finally: "I think it will be extremely undesirable, unfortunate and injurious to Hyderabad". [Nehru, 1987, p. 58,fn] In response to the Communist Party of India (CPI)-Front demand for disintegration, Nehru stated forthrightly to Chief Ministers on 2nd October 1952:

Then there is the cry for a division of Hyderabad on a linguistic basis. For my part, I am entirely opposed to this. If it is accepted, I am sure it would retard progress in Hyderabad for many long years and would create all manner of problems and upset that balance of South India. All our Five Year Plans and the like will have to be put on the shelf till some new equilibrium is reached. [Nehru, 1987, p. 114]

Ambedkar had mixed feelings. However, his position on linguistic states was reasonably consistent with his earlier position:

We, therefore, want linguistic States for two reasons: to make easy the way to democracy and to remove racial and cultural tension. In seeking to create linguistic States, India is treading the right road. It is the road, which all States have followed. In the case of other linguistic States, they have been so from the very beginning. In the case of India, she has to put herself in the reverse gear to reach the goal. But the road she proposes to travel is well-tried road. It is a road, which is followed by other States. [Ambedkar, 1955, Chapter III]

Yet he was afraid of what he saw as a threat to the unity of the country and to the rights of the minorities. More dominant in his mind was apprehension that "....the Union of India is far, far away, from the United States of India. But this consolidation of the North and balkanisation of the South is not the way to reach it". [Ambedkar, 1955, Chapter II] He was also fearful of linguistic chauvinism -in this he was prescient.

On Hyderabad and Telangana, as late as 21st December 1955, Nehru told Parliament:

Some honourable members here may well remember that I delivered some speeches in Hyderabad opposing the disintegration of the State of Hyderabad. That was my view. I would still like the State of Hyderabad not to be disintegrated, but circumstances have been too strong for me. I accept them. I cannot

force the people of Hyderabad or others to fall in line with my thinking. I accept their decision and I adjust myself to the position that Hyderabad will be disintegrated. The Commission has suggested that if Hyderabad was going to be disintegrated, the Telangana area should remain separate for five years and then decide whether it should merge with the other areas of Andhra. We have no particular objection to that, but logically speaking, it seems to me unwise to allow this matter to be left to argument. Let it be taken up now and let us be done with it. [Nehru, 1954, p. 179]

SRC and After

On 16th January 1956, Nehru wrote to Chief Ministers that he had spoken on the radio and Government had issued a communique on the SRC recommendations. In the broadcast, he announced that Bombay city would be centrally administered, Vidarbha would be merged with Maharashtra and Saurashtra; and Kutch merged with Gujarat; and also that Hyderabad would be split. The communique added that the future of Punjab and the Telangana area of Hyderabad would be decided later. On 14th March 1956, he reported, "it is a happy omen that the difficult and ticklish question of the Punjab has been settled more or less satisfactorily". [Nehru, 1987, p. 334] He was wrong as promptly agitation broke out in Punjab, and 220 Members of Parliament opposed the bifurcation of Bombay Province. These issues had to await settlement later.

Summing up the issue of Telangana the SRC had stated that:

It seems to us, therefore, that there is much to be said for the formation of the larger State and nothing should be done to impede the realisation of this goal. At the same time, we have to take note of the important fact that, while opinion in Andhra is overwhelmingly in favour of the larger unit, public opinion in Telangana has still to crystallize itself.

Important leaders of public opinion in Andhra themselves seem to appreciate that the unification of Telangana with Andhra, though desirable, should be based on a voluntary and willing association of the people and that it is primarily for the people of Telangana to take a decision about their future. [Nehru, 1987, p. 334, para 382]

Therefore:

After taking all these factors into consideration we have come to the conclusions that it will be in the interests of Andhra as well as Telangana, if for the present, the Telangana area is to be constituted into a separate State, which may be known as the Hyderabad State with provision for its unification with Andhra after the general elections likely to be held in or about 1961 if by a two thirds majority the legislature of the residual Hyderabad State expresses itself in favour of such unification. [Nehru, 1987, p. 334, para 386]

Many of the forebodings of the SRC, which dissuaded it from recommending merger, continued to exist and form the basis of continued unsatisfied demands.

Economic and Political Issues

Despite the linguistic similarities, there were economic, cultural and legacy arguments against merger as stated by the SRC. Throughout recent history, the Telugu people have been divided: the Telangana Telugus had lived for nearly 400 years under Muslim rule while the Andhra Telugus had been ruled for 150 years by the British. Fiscal imbalances between the regions, fears of the Telangana educated class at loss of employment opportunities and the general uncertainty of the Telangana people who had lived under invasion/liberation of the Nizam's State by the Union and consequent military rule for four years (1948-52) - all contributed to a general unease. Even the differences in vocabulary and accents

divided and identified the two Telugu populations, as did also their social and other everyday practices.³ All these issues needed sagacious statesmen to sort out and smooth over.

The age-old Muslim aristocracy and the generally hereditary bureaucracy either fled to Pakistan or were very wary of expressing their views or defending their interests. There had been violence against and massacres of Muslims especially in the Marathwada districts of Hyderabad State in the wake of the Indian Army's takeover.⁴ [Sundarayya, 1972, Pp. 88-89] There was on-going insurrection led by Communist Party, funded and directed from the Andhra, and large parts of Telangana were not under full state control as a result. To blunt the Communist thrust and simultaneously to diminish the power of the feudal class that had supported the Nizam's rule for centuries, the most drastic land reform in the country till date was enacted under military rule. [Reddy, 1989, p. 293]

Not only were the *paigahs*, *deshmukhs*, *desais*, *zamindars*, *jagirdars* and *samasthans* - the entire feudal structure - abolished but the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950, gave all tenants property rights and thus undermined the base of the landed class.⁵ This meant the old elite in Telangana was virtually extinguished as an economic and political class undermined but the new elites had very little time to develop before merger overtook them in 1956. Besides, the Congress Party and Communist Party had been banned in Hyderabad State and political activity was heavily restricted - though elections to the State Assembly were conducted in 1946 under the model of the limited franchise of Government of India Act, 1935. In Telangana, despite the institution of representative assemblies in the Nizam's Dominions, democracy was not as developed as in Andhra and had only a few years' experience. There had also been minimal activity in the All-India Independence movement

This resulted in a political elite, which was very small, weak and inexperienced lacking in contacts with the All-India networks.

In Andhra, on the other hand, democratic participation under the Government of India Act, 1935, in the Assemblies and the District Boards had empowered the elites there. This was apart from the fact that they had the experience of living under British rule of law, courts and a relatively progressive polity for a hundred years. The Andhra people had participated actively in the Independence movement and their leaders had extensive national experience in Congress Party politics - contributing even a President to it.

With 30 per cent of the vote in Andhra (1955) and 31 per cent in Telangana (1952) in Communist hands was the Congress concerned of the outcome in the coming general election in 1957? [Windermiller, 1955, Pp. 57-64; Selig Harrison, 1956, Pp. 378-404] After Avadi meeting where the Congress adopted socialism as a credo, Moscow's new friendliness and the experience of defeating the Andhra Communists in 1955, did the Congress think merger would eliminate the Communist threat once and for all from both the states? [Ram, 1973, Pp. 281-321] So, did the party political argument eventually tip the balance?

Merger Announced

When the merger announcement came from Nehru, it was unexpected and was made in Nizamabad in a public meeting held on March 5, 1956. He also said that there would be two Regional Councils to take care that there was no discrimination. He indicated that the decision had been arrived at with consent of all parties concerned.⁶

The Congress High Command had agreed to bilingual states in Bombay and Punjab. It had not touched United Provinces (later Uttar Pradesh)

and Bihar - though Madhya Bharat was merged with Central Provinces and Berar to make Madhya Pradesh. In Bengal, it refused the Gorkhas a separate state.

How did the merger take place - with no sentiment, no logical reason, no recommendation by SRC, and with no apparent interest shown by Nehru? It seems fairly obvious from the historical and political context of Andhra State and Telangana region that several issues played a role in the merger decision:

1. Andhra State was virtually bankrupt as predicted⁷ before its formation and needed resources to carry on government and take up public investment.⁸
2. The Telangana region had annual surpluses in government revenue despite being a poorer area and had substantial negotiable investments accumulated and inherited from the Nizam's Government. Its industrialisation was more advanced than that in Andhra, with nearly 26 major industrial undertakings - many of them state owned or controlled. [Pavier, 1981, Pp. 52-58] However, agriculture was backward partly due to tenurial conditions (now corrected by the dissolution of the feudal order and the tenancy reform but needing more time and recourse to develop).
3. While the agriculture of the Delta districts was advanced (based on the British built *annicuts* across the Godavari and Krishna rivers), industrialisation was poor with only a few industrial units - AP Paper, Andhra Sugars and two or three jute mills. This was in the Coastal area - Rayalaseema had much less of an economic base and all its districts had annual revenue deficits which needed the help of the surplus generated in the Coastal districts.

4. Selecting an already built-up major city of Hyderabad as a third neutral choice could eliminate the rivalry between Kurnool and Guntur/Vijayawada and give an easy access to the capital for both Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra if merger came about.

The merger of the regions would also merge their two Congress Parties and present an effective defence against the CPI (which also would have one unit).⁹ Moreover, the Congress felt that after the 1955 success in Andhra, it could repeat the same in Telangana in the 1957 General Election. The Communist Party of India (CPI) with a sizeable share of the vote in both Andhra and in Telangana was equally confident. [Ram, 1973, p. 303, 308] While the most of the Congress Party and as also the CPI were in favour of Vishalandhra, N.G. Ranga and his group were in doubt:

"It is indeed a matter of serious thought whether acquisition (sic) of Telangana would be a source of strength or embarrassment, whether it would pave the way more easily for the emergence of a Communist State in India."¹⁰

After the merger, the Congress Party was enormously strengthened. By making a strategic decision not to hold the Assembly election in the Andhra region in the 1957 General Election (because they had held a mid-term election in 1955), it allowed the Party machine to concentrate on the Telangana region. With the revived Party, alliance building with the other minor parties and caste groups, the Congress romped home with 68 of the 107 seats contested by polling 47 per cent of the popular vote. The CPI was reduced to 23 seats with 26 per cent of the popular vote.

With the consolidation of the two Congress Parties and the infusion of revenues and industrial resources from the Telangana, the ready-made

capital and the prestige of Hyderabad city, the surplus food of the Coastal region - the new state of Andhra Pradesh was ready to move forward.

Party and Caste Effects in Andhra Pradesh (AP)

The Congress became a Reddy-dominated party -with the Reddy community holding 25 per cent of the Legislature seats on average over the period 1957 to 1985 [Reddy, 1989, Table 13, p. 305] - with its bases largely in Rayalaseema and Telangana and maintaining its power by forming alliance with the other dominant castes in their strongholds and trying to cater to the interest of the scheduled castes.

However, in 1968, the Telangana youth rose in protest at the lack of opportunities, the unfair treatment to their region and the whole series of broken promises and guarantees. The blame is equally distributed between the Andhra Congress leadership and also its Telangana politicians. There was an extreme need to harmonise the interests of the Andhra and Telangana regions, which were dissimilar in almost every aspect except language (and even that too with significant differences in spoken Telugu). Moreover, there were significant differences between Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra regions, which needed to be managed. In this task, it seems obvious that successive governments failed despite the shock of the 1968-72 agitations for restoration of the status quo ante of 1956. [Gray, 1970, 1971, Pp. 463:474; 1974, Pp. 338-349; Bernstroof, 1973, Pp. 959-979]

Yet, despite its successes at diffusing the crisis of 1968-72, the Congress Party was perceived to have ignored important interests with a regional base - of the powerful and rich Kamma community in the Coastal districts and the development needs (especially irrigation) in Telangana. It paid

the price for the former when the Kamma-dominated Telugu Desam Party (TDP) challenged its power in 1983 on a slogan of appeal to Telugu self-respect.

The TDP launched by N.T. Rama Rao swept into power in 1983 with a strong showing even in Telangana¹¹ when the Congress won only 60 of the 294 seats in the Assembly. The TDP did surprisingly well in Telangana where there was hardly any Kamma caste dominance. [Reddy, 1989, p. 291] It seemed that the Telangana people hoped from a fairer treatment from the TDP. Again they were to be disappointed.

The TDP was ejected from power by its breakaway faction encouraged by the Congress Party [Reddy, 1989, p. 287-289] but returned in 1985 with thumping majority of 202 seats out of 294 (winning 46 per cent of the vote) with the Congress getting only 50 seats (with 37 per cent of the vote). In Telangana, the Congress won only 13 of the 106 seats.¹²

In the Legislative Assemblies and Cabinets - which were crucial to both the Reddy-dominated leadership of the Congress and the Kamma-dominated leadership of the TDP - the party leaders had managed to handle the caste equations well. In terms of representation of castes, the Assemblies from 1982 to 1985 did not show any change in the numbers of Assembly members elected from each dominant caste except a drop of 9 seats for Reddys. In the four cabinets between 1982 and 1985, the representation of Brahmins fell by 2 per cent, of Reddys by 6 per cent but that of the Backward Caste-Kapus fell from 58 per cent to 30 per cent. The Kamma representation in the Cabinet doubled to 6 per cent in 1983 but fell back to 4 per cent in 1985. [Reddy, 1989, Table 12 & 13, Pp. 305-306]

However, by 1999, caste-based voting had become the fact of AP politics: survey data showed that 87 per cent of Kammass and 62 per

cent of the "Peasant Other Backward Castes" in AP voted for the TDP while 77 per cent of the Reddys, 64 per cent of the Scheduled Castes and 60 per cent of Muslims for the Congress. [Suri, 2002, Table 6] This meant that the overall election result rested with the other communities such as Kapus, "Service OBC's" and Scheduled Tribes who voted almost equally for the two major parties [Suri, 2002, Table 6] and could swing the very fine division of the floating vote (10 per cent) which decided which party will get the majority of seats in the Assembly.

Emergence of other caste groups such as the Kapu-dominated Praja Rajyaam Party (PRP) or issues such as separate Telangana has upset the caste balance which first came into being in 1956 and the new balance re-established in 1983. [Srinivasulu, 2002] It is not clear what this 2009 balance represents, as it was overtaken by events. These events are still to crystallise but one thing is sure, separation of Telangana will change everything including the caste equations within all three regions - Coastal Andhra, Rayalaseema and Telangana.

Telangana Resurgence: A Summary Analysis

In 1956, when the merger was forced on the Telangana, its people were just coming out of feudal dependency and the traumatic invasion/liberation by the Indian Army. Soon after, they faced the most serious Communist revolution in the history of the country, which was crushed by the Army. [Sundarayya, 1972; Sherman, 2007; Ram, 1973; Pavier, 1981]

The people had trusted their sovereign, the Nizam, and he failed them. They went along with their natural leaders - their feudal aristocracy and the urban intelligentsia who had been frightened by the sudden transition and the Communist threat. Even after Nehru reversed his position for retention of a united Hyderabad state, then again on an independent Telangana, the merger with

Andhra was accepted with some reluctance as is illustrated by the Gentleman's Agreement. [Rao, 1973, Pp. 301-303] Nehru assured them on 5th March 1956, at Nizamabad: "*We are marrying off an innocent girl to a naughty boy - they may get on; if they do not, they can divorce.*"¹³ Nehru envisaged problems for the very start but consoled himself (and Telengana) that separation was possible if the merger did not result in a fair outcome.

The Gentleman's Agreement. [Rao, 1973, Pp. 301-303] involved all the possible guarantees and assurances¹⁴ and political formations¹⁵ that were possible within the Constitutional framework. For those that were not, the Constitution was amended giving the President of India powers to issue orders to ensure equity and fairness. The details were extensively reported on and accepted by successive state governments but nonetheless led to unrest in Telangana in the 1968-69 largely due to the perception that the guarantees had become ineffective over time.

With the steady decline of the Communist Party of India (CPI) - accelerated by a split in 1962 and formation of the Communist Party of India -Marxist (CPM) - the ruling Congress Party was now predominant. This dominance of the Congress Party seemingly ensured that its Telangana section offered no political counter pressure.¹⁶

The penny dropped late in 1968. By this time - 12 years after merger- the middle classes in Telangana had grown in number and confidence, they had got themselves educated and demanded their fair share of government jobs. Their revolt was combined with the agitation of Telangana irrigation engineers who exposed the scandals of Telangana's Nagarjuna Left Bank canal being deprived of water, the delay in taking up Pochampad project and the diversion of Telangana "surpluses" to Andhra.

All this drove the movement for separation forward. Politicians jumped on the band wagon but despite their electoral success in 1971, when the Congress High Command issued a *dictate* they meekly folded and accepted the idea that a Telangana man (P. V. Narasimha Rao) as Chief Minister (CM) would make the difference.

Now it was the turn of "Jai Andhra" movement of 1972 - ostensibly over the re-introduction of Mulki Rules for protection of employment in the Telangana region for its residents.¹⁷ The reluctance to allow reservation of Telangana jobs for Telangana residents, the refusal to accept a Telangana CM, the drastic land ceiling laws that threatened to dispossess the kulaks and big farmers of Andhra, all this combined to fuel the Andhra separatist movement. [Gray, 1974]

At that point, bifurcation would have met with the greatest approval in both regions. However, Mrs. Indira Gandhi decided against it. Why, no one knows! So, once again a Nehru gave assurances¹⁸ to keep the State and the state Congress Party united.

A Constitutional Amendment¹⁹ and a Presidential Order on Public Services, 1975, [Government of India, 1975] were issued to protect Telangana's legitimate employment opportunities. Employment guarantees renewed in 1969-75 again proved as useless as the earlier ones and successive government committees revealed this. [Girglani, 2002] A detailed report was issued by the State Government on the implementation of the Presidential Order and the consequent G.O.Ms. 610. [Girglani, 2002] The successive TDP and Congress Governments accepted the recommendations of this Report and a Legislature Committee was set up to monitor and ensure their effective implementation. A study of these reports indicates that the will to be fair was simply not there which was acknowledged by the Legislature in its attempt to correct the distortions of the past and ensure justice.

The estimated number of students killed in police firing in 1968-71 varies between 30-40 (official estimates) and 200-300 (unofficial estimates). [Bernstroff and Gray 1998, p. 169] Many thousands are reported to have defected to Naxalism and tens of thousands went to America - a land that gave them a brighter future than their own.

After thirty years, the current movement began. The massive expansion of Hyderabad city itself revealed the enormous wealth acquisition by the non-Telangana people with political connections. The growth of tertiary education increased the demand for white-collar jobs. With sluggish growth in general employment, the attention turned to the government jobs that had been assured for Telangana since 1956, lost in 1971 with the abolishment of Mulki Rules and renewed in 1975 by the Presidential Order but not implemented.

Current Movement and Promises Made

This time the movement was driven by a revolt of the children of working class and peasant families - families that had invested their money and their future in the education of the children in the hope of employment. But liberalisation also led to a dearth of government jobs. It now meant that every village in Telangana was now on the warpath - quietly, firmly and steadfastly - for a separate Telangana. They hoped that when it came, their children's future would be better.²⁰

The rapid growth of the post liberalisation business, the rise in land prices, the scams in allocation of land in and around Hyderabad, the influx of settlers from Andhra all made a potent brew. It had to explode and it did - in the Telangana fashion - quietly and mostly at their own cost - 600 students have committed suicide in protest till date.²¹ (The Sri Krishna Committee (SKC) Report refers to 313 suicides by students over a three-month period). [SKC, 2010, p. 387]

In 1999 General Election, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), with the TDP as one of its members, gained victory. One of its electoral promises was the creation of four new states including Telangana. But when in power, the NDA created only three new States and left Telangana out. Why? L. K. Advani writes:

"A peculiar situation has arisen in the case of the demand for a separate Telangana, a demand which is as old as the formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1956. The BJP has backed this demand. However, we could not do anything in this regard since Telugu Desam, which supported the Vajpayee government between 1998 and 2004, was opposed to it". [Advani, 2008, p. 740 and 742]

By 2004, the Congress, in alliance in AP with the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) which was established for achievement of a Telangana state, and United Progressive Alliance (UPA) capitalised on the Telangana sentiment to drive the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and its ally the BJP out of power in the State and the Centre respectively. It promised that: "The U.P.A. Government will consider the demand for formation of Telangana State at an appropriate time after due consultations and consensus."²²

After the election, both State and Central Governments were now committed to Telangana statehood. The TDP, which opposed separate Telangana, was thrown out of power in Andhra Pradesh - so it must be assumed that the AP electorate voted for bifurcation in 2004. The parties that promised a separate Telangana state - Congress, TRS, BJP and Communist Party of India (CPI) won 51 per cent of the votes cast all over the state while the TDP and CPM, which opposed the break up, got 39 per cent of the votes.²³ (By 2009, however, all political parties except CPM and All-India Majlis-e-Ittehadul

Muslimeen (AIMIM), which promised statehood for Telangana polled altogether 89 per cent of the votes cast²⁴).

The President in his Address to the Joint Session of Parliament in 2004 stated "The UPA Government will consider the demand for the formation of a Telangana state at an appropriate time after due consultations."²⁵ The UPA set up the Pranab Mukherjee Committee to establish national consensus and come to a decision. Most national parties stated their views in writing to this Committee in 2005.

Chandrasekhar, the former Prime Minister (PM) said "The demand for Telangana state is a genuine demand emanating from the aspirations of the people. Telangana has all the qualities that a self-sustaining state needs: economic viability, public support, unique cultural traditions, optimum geographical size and relevant historical context".²⁶

Another former PM, V. P. Singh stated: "Any delay in clinching the issue will not only cause erosion of credibility of the present Government but will also force the people of Telangana to go back to the agitation mode".²⁷

A third former PM, Inder Gujral recalled history: "Over the years - ever since the Indira Gandhi era - I have felt that formation of this state would go a long way to end many agonies and sufferances of the people in this region and provide opportunities for their socio-economic development".²⁸

Sharad Pawar, Leader of the Nationalist Congress Party, added: "The demand of the people of Telangana for a separate state is not a new or sudden development. It has been there for more than five decades. The grievances of the people of the region are real and their demand for a Telangana State is genuine."²⁹

Lalu Yadav of the Rastriya Janata Dal understood what was driving the movement - "The people of the region have been fighting for it for more than a half-a-century. It is a people's movement in real sense. This movement has always been solidly backed by every section of the people of the region. Intellectuals, government employees, students remained all through, as the backbone of the movement. And now, it has percolated down to the agrarian sector and the working classes.... The people of this region strongly feel and they have every reason to feel so - that they can no longer live in the integrated state of Andhra Pradesh with self-respect and dignity".³⁰

Bahujan Samaj Party's Mayawati played it even more boldly. She said, "The demand of the people of Telangana for a separate state is not a new or sudden development. It has been there for the last five to six decades.... Any further delay in forming the State of Telangana will send wrong signals to the people."³¹ To add, as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, she wanted her own state divided into four separate ones to help development and to devolve power to closer to the people.

Since, by 2005, the national political parties were for a separate Telangana, why did it not happen? While earlier, the BJP could do nothing due to the opposition of TDP, now the Congress High Command could do nothing due to the opposition of Y S Rajasehkar Reddy, the AP Chief Minister who became a major power in the Congress Party. The Congress dodged the issue throughout 2004-09; it repeated its promise for separate Telangana in the General Election of 2009; won the election again even though TDP now chastened, supported a separate Telangana in its manifesto and allied itself with the TRS! But once again the Congress was busy dodging the issue when suddenly the leadership in AP changed when the CM died in a helicopter crash.

The whole situation became fluid and, after further agitations, the AP political parties agreed for Telangana statehood and the Congress Legislature Party passed the decision to their Party President, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi. She decided in favour, the Union Cabinet resolved to do the same and the historic announcement of Mr. P. Chidambaram, Home Minister, on December 9, 2009 followed: "The process of forming the state of Telangana will be initiated. An appropriate resolution will be moved in the State Assembly".³² On the next day, he announced this to the Lok Sabha³³ and the Rajya Sabha.³⁴ He made a full statement to the Press.³⁵

Some Andhra political leaders and vested interests holding land in and around Hyderabad then sparked off an agitation and this time it was not "Jai Andhra" as in 1971 but it was fuelled by real estate developers who feared a loss in values if the State is bifurcated with Hyderabad as its capital.³⁶ The leading advocates of unified state or at least Hyderabad as a Union Territory³⁷ had major investments in land in and around Hyderabad. [SKC, 2010, Pp. 316-319, 404 and 442]

Government of India Backtracks: Committee Appointed

However, the agitation by the Andhra region began; it resulted in a stay of execution; and status quo was ordered; and the Sri Krishna Committee (SKC) (formally the "Committee for Consultations On the Situation in Andhra Pradesh") was then set up. This distracted the Telangana movement for 11 months while the SKC carried on its work, field visits and public consultations.³⁸ The SKC did engage all the concerned interests, and was provided with an enormous volume of data and tens of thousands of submissions.³⁹

Its Report of 505 pages of the main Volume with another 183 pages of Appendix Volume was submitted and made public. A thorough analysis and critique of it is given below. [SKC, 2010]

Status Quo Opposed- Telangana Deprived

The SKC came out with incontrovertible points, which had fuelled the separatist movement for so long: These were:

1. "Overall, in spite of 50 plus years of policy protected planning and execution, one finds regional variations in the economic development of AP." [SKC, 2010, p. 118]
2. The SKC noted that the Planning Commission notified as backward nine of the ten Telangana districts - with the exception of Hyderabad and resources have been allocated under its Backward Region Grant Fund (BRGF). These districts contain, as the SKC says, 87 per cent of the population of Telangana. [SKC, 2010, p. 81]
3. Considering the allegation that: "Telangana has low per capita income, lower access to employment, lower business opportunities and low access to education and so on", SKC said, "At the outset, some or all such allegations appear true when absolute amounts, numbers and percentages are reviewed." [SKC, 2010, p. 117]
4. In Telangana, the "net irrigation by canals has increased only slightly from about 1 lakh hectare to around 2.5 lakh hectares. Tank irrigation has reduced from 4 lakh hectares in 1955-56 to around 2 lakh hectares at present." [SKC, 2010, p. 189]
5. "The implementation of G.O. 610 during 1985 to 2005 was, at best, tardy, which remains a grievance of Telangana employees. This issue continues to be highly contentious even today." [SKC, 2010, p. 48]
6. "However, the data received from the State Government shows (Appendix 3.16) that the combined amount released to government and aided colleges together is Rs. 93 crores in Telangana while it is Rs. 224 crores in coastal Andhra (with college-going population similar to that in Telan-

gana) and Rs. 91 crores in Rayalaseema (with population share being less than half that in Telangana)." [SKC, 2010, p. 153]

7. "The real income of the agricultural wage labourers has declined considerably in Telangana whereas it has increased considerably in coastal Andhra region. Similarly, the SCs, STs and minorities in Telangana region have suffered a decline in income during the past about decade or more, whereas these communities have gained substantially in Coastal Andhra." [SKC, 2010, p. 119]

The Movement

8. "The present agitation, however, shows that the demand only lay dormant and could get re-ignited under specific circumstances. While the issue of rightful shares in public employment remains the key point of discord even in the current agitation, a new turn has been given to the demand by Telangana region asserting that it has a separate cultural identity which is distinct from that of Andhra and Rayalaseema regions." [SKC, 2010, p. 342]
9. "The movement has also successfully performed the function of educating the people about Telangana's grievances to the extent that even school children have now been made conversant with issues around the demand for a separate state. Equally helpful to this cause have been NRI Telanganites (NRIs from the opposite side have participated by opposing formation of Telangana) who are known to be supporting the movement in several ways and who have also represented to the Committee. The present movement is considered to be much more extensive than the one in 1969 (which was mostly confined to urban locations), a process in which modern

technologies of communication and modern ways of conducting politics have surely helped." [SKC, 2010, p. 352]

10. "While the JACs⁴⁰ have sprung up in all the three regions, the most vibrant and numerous are in Telangana region with their reach going down to mandal and even village level. The JACs have successfully mobilized the common people who have articulated their particular interests through the movement." [SKC, 2010, p. 359]

Power Groups

11. "The dominant upper castes, the Reddys, Kammas, Velamas and Kapus, continue to hold the reins of power in the state. The Brahmins are much less influential politically due to smaller numbers; however, Coastal Andhra Brahmins played a historic role in forging a Telugu identity through their writings, eventually leading to the birth of Andhra state. They were equally important in intellectual articulation of the cause of economically oppressed social groups and contributed to the extreme left movement to which major support was provided by coastal Kammas." [SKC, 2010, p. 380]
12. "The upper castes in Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra are vehemently against the idea of dividing the state; their greatest fear being the loss of Hyderabad. The accommodation between these two regions has been in terms of political domination by Rayalaseema and economic domination by Coastal Andhra. Together the two regions have ruled the state through Congress and TDP political formations. Telangana feels dominated by the upper castes of these regions and its struggle is primarily to shake off their yoke." [SKC, 2010, p. 390]

13. *"Large scale involvement of students including those from Dalits and Backward Castes in the current movement for Telangana seems to testify to this. A large proportion of student leaders of the movement located in Osmania and Kakatiya Universities is known to be from Dalit/BC background. According to many sources, purported student suicides during the course of the agitation are also largely by Dalit and Backward Caste students."* [SKC, 2010, p. 163]
 14. *"The Madiga caste, which is predominant in Telangana and more numerous on the whole, has had less access to reservation benefits than the Malas who predominate in Coastal Andhra. The former would certainly benefit from a separate Telangana but then their brethren in the coastal state would lose out without sub-categorisation. The economic disaffection of SCs in Telangana versus their rapid strides in education form a potent mixture for agitation politics as is seen from the extensive participation of Dalit youth in the student movement. This is the very same constituency which may feel attracted towards and become co-opted by extreme left ideologies."* [SKC, 2010, p. 415]
 15. *"The Muslims in Telangana, contrary to common belief, are doing well on consumption (improvement by 76 per cent) and poverty reduction levels (33 points)".* [SKC, 2010, p. 363]
 16. *"In 2007, literacy rates for the youth population aged 8-24 for SCs and Muslims in Telangana are ahead of or at par with those in the other two regions."* [SKC, 2010, p. 131]
 17. *"For example, it is possible that the ST community and the Muslims in AP may get a relatively better say in governance on separation in the state of Telangana."* [SKC, 2010, p. 122]
- Logic of the Movement*
18. *"Although as a sub-regional movement, the Telangana movement does not pose a threat to national unity."* [SKC, 2010, p. 344]
 19. *"The Telangana movement can be interpreted as a desire for greater democracy and empowerment within a political unit. As stated earlier, sub-regionalism is a movement, which is not necessarily primordial but is essentially modern - in the direction of a balanced and equitable modernization. Our analysis shows that cutting across caste, religion, gender and other divisions, the Telangana movement brings a focus on the development of the region as a whole, a focus on rights and access to regional resources and further, it pitches for a rights-based development perspective whereby groups and communities put forth their agendas within a larger vision of equitable development."* [SKC, 2010, p. 415]
 20. *"However, given the long-standing history of the demand for a separate state, the deep penetration of the sense of grievance and the widespread emotion around the issue, unless genuine steps are taken to address both real and perceived disparities, the demand is unlikely to go away permanently even if it is subdued temporarily."* [SKC, 2010, p. 417]
 21. *"Thus, from the point of view of sheer size of economy, Telangana as a new state can sustain itself both with and without Hyderabad. The other combination of regions - Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema together can also sustain themselves as a state; in fact they can also sustain themselves separately."* [SKC, 2010, p. 121; Pingle, 2010a]

SKC Summing Up

22. "In view of the complex background of the situation and the rather serious and sensitive emotional aspects involved, *the Committee is of the unanimous view that it would not be practical to simply maintain the status quo in respect of the situation.*" [Pingle, 2010a, p. 442]
23. "Given the above first hand observations of the Committee during its tours of the regions, *the Committee feels that the issue of sentiment has to be considered only as one among several factors to be evaluated.* While not discounting people's wishes or sentiments, the overall implications of bifurcation (or trifurcation as the case may be) have to be carefully delineated to arrive at a responsible recommendation." [Pingle, 2010a, Pp. 352-353]
24. "The Committee is of the view that given the long history of the demand for a separate Telangana, *the highly charged emotions at present and the likelihood of the agitation continuing in case the demand is not met (unless handled deftly, tactfully and firmly as discussed under Option Six), consideration has to be given to this option.* The grievances of the people of Telangana, such as non-implementation of some of the key decisions included in the Gentleman's Agreement (1956), certain amount of neglect in implementation of water and irrigation schemes, inadequate provision for education infrastructure (excluding Hyderabad), and the undue delay in the implementation of the Presidential Order on Public Employment etc., have contributed to the felt psyche of discrimination and domination, with the issue attaining an emotional pitch. *The continuing demand, therefore, for a separate Telangana, the Committee felt, has some merit and is not entirely unjustified.*" [Pingle, 2010a, p. 453]

25. "Therefore, after taking into account all the pros and cons, the Committee did not think it to be the most preferred, but the second best option. *Separation is recommended only in case it is unavoidable* and if this decision can be reached amicably amongst all the three regions." [Pingle, 2010a, p. 453]

SKC tried to do a difficult enough job but failed to defuse the Telangana movement.

It admitted that the united state would not work as usual (Option 1). It toyed with Options 2 to 4 and rejected them itself.⁴¹ It preferred Option 6 - a united state with a Telangana Regional Committee (TRC), a River Water Development Board and Constitutional Amendment. This history of trying to deal with Telangana rights was seemingly to be repeated without much change. Trying to repeat history could hardly find support from those who feel ill served by it in the past. The TRC had been set up along with a similar one for Punjab by amending the Constitution. When the Punjab model did not work the state was divided. When the TRC was abolished the same lesson was not drawn as was for Punjab. What was good for Punjab was not to be applied to Telangana.

The SKC labelled Option 5 - what had been accepted by all parties in December 2009 - separate state for Telangana - as a 'second best' one. It only felt that the Telangana state should be conceded only if it was 'unavoidable'. This was the whole point of the agitation and decision of 9th December 2009!

The SKC Report's semi-secret Chapter 8 - 'Law and Order and Internal Security Implications' (in the published Report containing only 152 words) was challenged in the High Court. The last 52 words of Chapter 8 said: 'A note on the above covering all aspects has been prepared and is being submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs in a separate cover along with this Report.

The Committee has *kept these dimensions in view while discussing various options included in Chapter 9 of the Report, i.e., "The Way Forward"*.⁴¹ (Emphasis added) [Pingle, 2010a, p. 423] The Court felt that these critical 52 words damned the Report's painstakingly constructed edifice of a 1,46,071-word text. [Reddy, 2011, para. 65-71]

The judgment of the High Court stated that:

"The manoeuvre suggested by the Committee in its secret supplementary note poses an open challenge, if not threat, to the very system of democracy. If the source of inputs that gave rise to this is the Government, it (the Government) owes an explanation to the citizens. If, on the other hand, the origin of inputs is elsewhere, the Government must move in the right earnest to pluck and eradicate such foul source and thereby prove its respect for, and confidence in, the democracy." [Reddy, 2011, para. 103]

Thus the Court revealed what amounts to a conspiracy involving many personalities, in an attempt to fool 40 million people of Telangana. [Reddy, 2011, para. 103] It did not take much - only a fair and independent judiciary - to cast light on the dark places that the Sri Krishna Committee has hidden its secret "notes".⁴² The Court revealed that the whole chapter/note outlined the steps to be taken to defeat the Telangana separatist movement. It led the High Court to state: "If one has any doubt about the hidden opposition of the Committee for formation of Telangana, that stands removed with this note." [Reddy, 2011, para. 81] This rang the death knell to the Report and cast doubt over the reputations of its five members.⁴³

Even before the judgement by the AP High Court, some distinguished Andhra intellectuals issued an open letter pleading for bifurcation. It is written with great balance and grace and wisdom and it is worth quoting extensively. They said

that the inclusion of Telangana to create Andhra Pradesh in 1956 had been against the wishes of the majority of leaders from the region.

The separation between the Telangana and the Seemandhra areas since 1800 CE had created unbridgeable gulf between social, educational, economic milieu and political and cultural consciousness of the two regions. The last five-and-a-half decades of togetherness had failed to bring about equitable development in different regions and harmonize the relations between the peoples.⁴⁴

They also said:

The presence of about 30 lakh people from Coastal and Rayalaseema in Hyderabad for the last 56 years should not be a factor in deciding the future of the state. They will continue to remain an integral part of the Hyderabad the same way as the Maratha, Kannadiga, Gujarati and Punjabi people. Claiming special rights by these or any other group is irrational and unjustified.⁴⁵

They added:

The apprehensions of these people have to be removed by discussions with the leaders of Telangana and Central government. The need of the hour is the emotional oneness, which is severely lacking, rather than an enforced administrative and political togetherness of the regions as a single integrated state.⁴⁶

Even as far ago as 2003, the present Home Minister Chidambaram stated: "Someone - or something has to break this logjam". He went on, "the answer does not lie in police action. Perhaps there may be an answer if the people of the region are empowered in a different way, and new opportunities are created for the disaffected sections to gain political power and a say in the governance of the region". Chidambaram concluded: "Strange as it seems, the option of a new state of Telangana may turn out to be the answer to deal with the menace of Naxalite terrorism". [Chidambaram, 2003]

Conclusion

The election of 2009 was decisive for Andhra Pradesh. This time all major political parties - the Congress, TDP, PRP, CPI, TRS and BJP - supported and promised bifurcation of the state and the creation of Telangana. Opposed to this were the All-AIMIM and the CPM though these two parties were formally allied to Congress and TDP respectively - making strange bedfellows. As indicated earlier, the share of the vote for the parties promising a Telangana state in 2009 was nearly 90 per cent.⁴⁷

However, much of the usual delay and obfuscation resulted from the inaction of the ruling Congress Party in the State in implementation of this electoral promise (as they had in 2004) provoked the agitation with students among whom many committed ritual suicide for the Telangana cause. With the death of Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy in September, the agitation accelerated and culminated on 9th December 2009 when the Centre accepted the recommendations of the AP All-Party Meeting and the Congress High Command, that of the AP Congress Legislative Party.

However, with the stay of this decision and the constitution of the SKC, the movement shifted from agitation and electoral politics to an argumentative and propagandist phase. While the JAC refused to engage with the SKC dialogue process, all groups in Andhra Pradesh - both for Telangana, Coastal Andhra, and Rayalaseema - as well as caste groups, NRI's and civil society groups vied at making submissions to SKC. The SKC field visits took the issue to almost every district of Telangana as also many in Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema. This also had the effect of convincing elements in Coastal Andhra that bifurcation would be the best solution.⁴⁸ By now the Kamma dominant caste in the Coastal Andhra

had begun to feel that they were getting a raw deal under the Reddy-dominated Congress government.⁴⁹

The year 2010 saw a virtual split in the main parties - Congress, TDP and PRP - neither of which were in apposition to make a single submission and, therefore, allowed each regional grouping within their party, take its own stand. As a result, this hardened into a real division within these parties with PRP even quietly abandoning its position as its Telangana elements defected to other parties (the PRP was anyway to merge with the Congress in 2011). The division on regional basis affected not just the political parties but also the legal profession, Non-Gazetted Government officers, irrigation and power employees, students, academics, journalists, and finally the police.⁵⁰ Even the State Cabinet was divided with 16 ministers from the Andhra region stating in a written submission to the SKC that the whole Telangana movement was "seditious" and anti-national.⁵¹

The polity is currently fractured and divided de facto and the consequences were clear especially in view of the challenge to the national leadership by Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy's son Y.S. Jaganmohan Reddy. He led his father's faction into opposition when the Congress High Command would not agree to his succeeding his father as Chief Minister - something which 122 Congress legislators are reputed to have signed up for.

The caste alignment brought the division between Malas (dominant in Andhra) and Madigas (dominant in Telangana) into the regional issue - each supporting their regional base and preferring bifurcation as a way of avoiding intra-Scheduled Caste conflict that had been brewing for a decade.⁵² The Kammars and Kapus (dominant in Coastal Andhra) seemed to

back bifurcation and even trifurcation with a separate Coastal Andhra just as the Reddys were demanding a Rayalaseema State.

The Rayalaseema Reddys preferred a Rayala-Telangana option preferring to deal with Telengana Reddys rather than Coastal Andhras if the state was to be divided. When this option was seen unacceptable to Telangana,⁵³ the Greater Rayalaseema option was touted with the coastal districts of Nellore and Ongole (with Reddy dominance) proposed to be added to the four Rayalaseema districts⁵⁴ as a last resort.

As for the Muslims,⁵⁵ the AIMIM preferences were first, for a united State; then, for a Rayala-Telangana and, finally, for a separate Telangana with Hyderabad as its capital. This revealed a remarkably negotiating position, which showed how open it had kept its final option. [SKC, 2010, p. 300] The only option it opposed was that of Hyderabad as a Union Territory.⁵⁶

All in all, apart from the real estate vested interests and to some degree the fear of Andhras' settled in Hyderabad, the SKC's exercise seemed to have consolidated public opinion in favour of division of the State despite its ambiguous Report.

The Telangana Tragedy seems to be coming to a close and the long sought for political self-assertion of the region seems imminent. The SKC has rejected the continuation of the status quo (Option 1) and it has dismissed Options 2, 3 and 4 as unworkable. Its choice was for a united state with constitutional guarantees and regional councils - that had been either neglected (constitutional guarantees) or abandoned (regional councils). By having confessed that the status quo was not maintainable this particular logic of the SKC seemed somewhat obscure. Finally, all other logical reasoning leads towards the division of the State and the state polity is again coming around

to accepting the inevitable as it did in December 9, 2009, as illustrated by the public statement by Andhra intellectuals cited above.

For this eventuality, the only other political issue is that of bifurcation or trifurcation of the State. In any event, all units will do well with some stability and hard work and with less attention to party and caste politics with which the AP political elite has been engaged for the last 55 years.

NOTES

1. For a definitive work on the subject see Rao, 1973.
2. As early as 16 December 1952, three days before he announced the Andhra formation, Nehru wrote to Rajagopalachari, Chief Minister of Madras State saying of the people of Andhra: 'Their state will be a backward one in many ways and financially hard up. They cannot expect much help from the centre. However, that is their look out. If they want the state, they can have it on conditions that we have stated'. (i.e., without Madras city) [Gopal, 1979, p 258].
3. Even Gray [1971, Pp. 463, 474] noted the social tensions between the two Telugu populations.
4. See Noorani for a succinct summary of the documentation. Also [Sundarayya, 1972, Pp. 88-89]
5. Even the Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) acknowledged: 'Telangana movement is the precursor to land reforms initiative in Andhra Pradesh. The Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act enacted in 1950 with its subsequent amendments resulted in the Conferment of Protection to nearly 6 lakh tenants with over 75 lakh acres in their possession. This constituted 33 per cent of the total cultivated area'. http://www.cpmi.org/liberation/year_2005/september/report5.htm (Accessed on 6th May 2011). The success was ensured by the best-framed and most comprehensive census in the country conducted in 1949 [Thorner and Thorner, 1962, Pp. 170-171].
6. The Hindu, March 7, 1956
7. As early as 16 December 1952, three days before he announced the Andhra formation, Nehru wrote to Rajagopalachari, Chief Minister of Madras State saying of the people of Andhra: "Their state will be a backward one in many ways and financially hard up. They cannot expect much help from the centre." [Gopal, 1979, p. 258].
8. The SRC stated 'The existing Andhra state has faced a financial problem of some magnitude ever since it was created and in comparison with Telangana the existing Andhra state has a low per capita revenue. Telangana, on the other hand, is much less likely to be faced with financial embarrassment. The much higher incidence of land revenue in Telangana and excise revenue of the order of Rs 5 crore per annum principally explain this difference. Whatever the explanation may be, some Telangana leaders seem to fear that the result of

unification will be to exchange some settled sources of revenue, out of which development schemes may be financed, for financial uncertainty similar to that which Andhra is now faced. Telangana claims to be progressive and from an administrative point of view, unification, it is contended, is not likely to confer any benefits on this area' [SRC, 1955, para 376].

9. The then Hyderabad Chief Minister, B Ramakrishna Rao, from his sickbed issued an appeal to the Andhras to vote Congress otherwise: "...the people of Telangana, who have had bitter experience of the Communist atrocities, would be loath to accept a Vishalandhra in case a non-Congress government is formed in Andhra. If there is a Government favourable to the Congress ideas in Andhra, the way for the formation of Vishalandhra will be clear.A non-Congress Government in Andhra would be against the early execution of the Nandikonda (Nagarjunasagar) project, which would do good to people in Hyderabad and Andhra States. (Quoted in The Hindu, 10 February 1950).

10. Quoted in Indian Express, 7th July 1953.

11. http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/statisticalreports/SE_1983/Statistical%20Report%20Andhra%20Pradesh%201983.pdf (Accessed on 5th May 2011)

12. (http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/statisticalreports/SE_1985/StatisticalReport%201985%20andhra%20pradesh.pdf) (Accessed on 5th May 2011)

13. '*Ek masoom bholi bhali ladki ko ek natkat ladke ke saath shaadi kiya jaa raha hai, chahe toh woh milke reh sakte hai ya bichad sakte hai*'. Nehru, 1956

14. The Nizam's Mulki Rules safeguarding jobs for Telangana residents was re-issued as a Government Order (G.O. Ms. GAD 813 dated 18.5.1957) with retrospective effect from 1.1.1956- date of merger. These Rules were repealed in 1959 with the Public Employment Act and Rules which came into force on 21.2.1959.

15. Such as a Regional Council for Telangana [see Rao, 1973, Pp. 301-303 for details as in the Gentleman's Agreement]

16. The Gentleman's Agreement accepted that the Hyderabad Pradesh Congress Committee would be kept separate from the Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee. This would ensure that Congress candidates for elected office would be selected separately by each regional party. This arrangement was terminated in 1960 leaving little time for the Telangana party elite to find its feet.

17. The Mulki Rules Bill in the Parliament was enacted in October 1972.

18. These were the Six Point Program of 1971 and the Five Point Formula of 1972 [Gray 1974, Pp. 338 and 341-342]. All parties agreed another Six Point Formula in 1973, which formed the basis of the Presidential Order of 1975. The G.O.Ms. 610 to give effect to the Order was issued only in 1985!! It took ten years for the State Government to formally issue its orders to implement the Presidential Order and even that GO was ignored or violated [see Girglani, 2002].

19. Constitution of India (Thirty-two Amendment) Act, 1973

20. See Kannabiran et. al, 2010, Pp. 69-82 for a vivid picture of the grass roots attitudes.

21. (<http://www.gr8telangana.com/2011/03/students%E2%80%99solidarity-committee-march-to-parliament-for-separate-telangana/>) (Accessed on 5th May 2011).

22. U.P.A. Common Minimum Programme was adopted in 2004.

23. http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/statisticalreports/SE_2004/StatisticalReports_AP_2004.pdf (Accessed on 4th May 2011)

24. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Andhra_Pradesh_state_assembly_elections_results,_2009" (Accessed on 4th May 2011)

25. President of India, 'Address to the Joint Session of Parliament', New Delhi, 7th June, 2004

26. Chandrasekhar, Ex PM, letter to Pranab Mukherjee 21st May 2005.

27. V.P. Singh Ex PM, Letter to Sonia Gandhi, 25th May 2005

28. I.K. Gujral, Ex PM, Letter to Pranab Mukherjee, 24th May 2005.

29. Sharad Pawar, President, NCP, Letter to Pranab Mukherjee 2nd May 2005.

30. Lalu Prasad, President, Rastriya Janata Dal, Letter to Pranab Mukherjee, 20th May 2005.

31. Km. Mayawati President, Bahujan Samaj Party, Letter to Pranab Mukherjee, 8th May 2005

32. Press Statement, Home Ministry, 9th December 2009, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/process-of-forming-telangana-state-to-be-initiated-chidambaram_100286938.html (Accessed on 5th May 2011).

33. http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/waiting-for-information-on-new-state-from-andhra-pranab-lead_100287209.html (Accessed on 6th May 2011).

34. http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/chidambaram-defends-telangana-announcement-second-lead_100287141.html (Accessed on 6th May 2011).

35. http://www.ndtv.com/news/india/full_text_of_chidambarams_telangana_statement.php (Accessed on 6th May 2011).

36. Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar writes: 'Vast amounts of land around Hyderabad have been grabbed in questionable ways. In a new Telengana, many existing landowners-including major industrialists-may lose enormous tracts of land worth thousands of crores. Illegal land grabbing has till now been very lucrative, but may become the kiss of death after Telangana's creation'. (Emphasis added). <http://swaminomics.org/?p=256> (Accessed 4th May 2011).

37. This idea of Hyderabad as a Union Territory is a hoary one, which repeats itself. Mrs. Indira Gandhi writing to Mr M. Naryana Reddy, MP said: 'I have heard of the suggestion to make the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad a Union Territory as a means to solve the present Andhra Pradesh crisis. It seems that its full implications have not been considered by those who have made this suggestion' (Letter dated February, 1973).

38. The signal exception was the Joint Action Committee

(JAC), which was responsible for leading the movement. It rejected the SKC, refused to appear before it, held that making submissions was a waste of time as a political decision had been taken and all that was required was to implement it. The SKC recognised the importance of the JAC thus: 'During this period, numerous Joint Action Committees (JACs) have been formed, the most prominent among them being the one at Osmania University led by Prof. Kodandaram. Initially, all political parties were members of this JAC but subsequently most parties including the TRS left the fold. However, JACs have spread to the district, mandal and village level in Telangana resulting in a groundswell of demand for a separate state'. [SKC, 2010, p. 349].

39. http://www.ndtv.com/news/india/full_text_of_chidambaram_telangana_statement.php (Accessed on 5th May 2011).

40. Joint Action Committees, which have become the driving forces of the movement.

41. However, Chidambaram speaking to the press on the day of the release of the Report stated that the SKC had itself rejected the first three options. (<http://ibnlive.in.com/news/read-telangana-report-with-an-open-mind-pc/139630-37-64.html>) (Accessed 6th May 2011) A careful reading of Chapter 9 (pp. 440-458) would indicate that the SKC ruled out the first four options are impracticable. Besides its Terms of Reference confined it to only two options - united AP or bifurcation and creation of Telengana: 'To examine the situation in the State of Andhra Pradesh with reference to the demand for a separate State of Telangana as well as the demand for maintaining the present status of a united Andhra Pradesh'. [SKC, 2010, p.v.].

42. It turned out that there was not a secret chapter but two secret "notes" - one on the issue itself and the other on how to manage the politicians, press and electronic media, police etc. in order to ensure a atmosphere conducive for a united state. [Reddy, 2011].

43. In early May 2011, the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court has directed police to book case against all five members of the Sri Krishna Committee under Indian Penal Code (IPC), sections 153A (Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc.), 418 (Cheating with knowledge that wrongful loss may ensue to person whose interest offender is bound to protect), 504 (insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace) and 505 (publishing or circulating statements of rumours). (<http://www.siasat.com/english/news/fir-against-srikrishna-committee>) Accessed on 1st June 2011.

44. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-12/hyderabad/28683658_1_telangana-seemandhra-royalaseema (Accessed 6th May 2011)

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Andhra_Pradesh_state_assembly_elections_results_2009 (Accessed on 4th May 2011)

48. <http://expressbuzz.com/states/andhra-pradesh/splittville-the-only-option-says-ajac/176188.html>

49. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/Kammas-getting-raw-deal-in-Cong-Rayapati/articleshow/5908657.cms> (Accessed on 6th May 2011)

50. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-19/hyderabad/29146024_1_separate-state-police-force-police-action (Accessed on 6th May 2011)

51. <http://expressbuzz.com/topic/read-your-memo/196935.html> (Accessed on 6th May 2011).

52. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Anti-Telangana-group-develops-caste-cracks/articleshow/5341968.cms> (Accessed on 6th May 2011).

53. <http://expressbuzz.com/states/andhrapradesh/telangana-congress-mps-favour-trifurcation/239474.html> (Accessed on 6th May 2011).

54. <http://www.hindu.com/2009/12/09/stories/2009120957630400.htm> (Accessed on 6th May 2011)

55. Muslims were divided with the AIMIM taking a complex and flexible position. Other Muslim bodies favoured separation. http://www.twocircles.net/2009dec20/muslim_forum_telangana_demands_immediate_formation_state.html (Accessed on 6th May 2011).

56. <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/mim-opposes-ut-status-for-hyderabad/113533-3.html> (Accessed on 6th May 2011).

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ON THINKING ABOUT SCALE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN INDIA

Yogendra Yadav

Is there a case for reorganisation of states?" This apparently straightforward, practical and uniquely Indian question invites us to reflect upon a complex, theoretical and general problem in the study of politics. In this note I would limit myself to some preliminary remarks about clarifying the terms of debate, a comment on why academic disciplines offer little help in answering this question and some observations on how to go about answering this question. In the end I would indicate my tentative position, subject to revision during the discussions in the seminar.

I

In the Indian context, the question of 'reorganisation' is a euphemism for downsizing the states, and specifically a short hand for carving out smaller states from some of the bigger states of the union, without altering the existing federal balance. Much of the debate takes place on the assumption that we know what is small and big, or how small is too small and how big is too big. Rarely do we open up these assumptions for critical scrutiny and ask a general question: *what is the appropriate scale of representative government?* I see this seminar as one of the few opportunities for discussing this question in its generality, without getting bogged down entirely in the specificities of any one instance. The merit of discussing this question in its generality is that it can yield some coherent set of criteria that can be applied in any specific and politically charged context.

Appropriateness is a relational idea. It assumes an *object* and a relevant *context* (as in 'appropriate dress for an *occasion*') which need to be commensurate to each other, and it requires a subject whose demands, interests of needs supply the

criterion of appropriateness. Thus thinking about appropriate scale of representative government requires specifying the object, the relevant context and the subject.

1. The object here is clearly the scale of representative government. But this idea can be understood differently. The idea of scale could be understood in terms of the population size or in terms of the geographical area (Thinking about Arunachal Pradesh or, less dramatically, Uttarakhand, helps us keep the area dimension in mind). The expression representative government can be interpreted to mean:
 - a. The scale (population or area) that we expect a representative to represent: this translates into the area or the size of the electorate in a constituency.
 - b. The scale (population or area) of that level of government which is responsible for public service delivery for ordinary citizens. In the Indian context this level is the state government, therefore it translates into the size of the state government.
2. It is much harder to specify the context most relevant to the scale of representative government, for this is partly what the dispute is all about. Broadly speaking three considerations here compete with one another to be the most relevant context against which the scale of representative government should be measured:
 - a. Efficiency of government: at what level do we obtain the equilibrium of economies of scale (which go up with mar-

ginal increase in scale) with the information and accessibility advantage (which go down with marginal increase in scale)? How do we combine economic viability with efficient distribution?

- b. Responsiveness and accountability of representation: which scale allows the citizen to hold their representatives accountable and the representatives to receive popular signals and respond to these?
 - c. Fit between a sense of we-ness and political boundaries: irrespective of the arguments about merits or otherwise of different scales, which of the options fits better with citizens own sense of who they are and what is the primary location of their political identity?
3. Finally, specifying the *subject* is more slippery than we think it is. One would assume that here the subject, for whom a scale is appropriate or otherwise, is the citizenry of the concerned area. But a little reflect shows that this idea is contested and lends itself to more than one meaning. The various candidates here are:
- a. The larger unit, the Indian state: what would re-scaling of Indian union do to India as a whole?
 - b. The 'parent' unit of the union: what would carving out of the state do to the state from which the new state would be carved out?
 - c. The smaller unit that awaits its birth: what would a new state mean for its inhabitants? The 'inhabitants' could be seen in terms of citizens as an aggregate or one section of citizens, say, the least advantaged.
 - d. Minority communities in the affected areas: a special category of subjects whose viewpoint could be very different from that of citizens as an undifferentiated subject.

II

The theme of this seminar invites us to think about a subject that is at once politically salient and intellectually challenging. It is not hard to see why Telangana is not a one-off case. We are sitting on the edge of and postponing an encounter with the second reorganisation of state boundaries. The government admits as much. Everyone in power realizes that this is a political bomb waiting to explode and keeps hoping that it won't when they are in power. So far, since the first SRC, the Indian state has handled this question on a case to case basis without even bothering to spell out a coherent set of general considerations that are relevant for the formation of a new state. The preliminary note for this seminar may be one of the few attempts to spell out such considerations.

Political expediency and unwillingness to take risk is however not the only reason for our inability to take up this question with seriousness and rigour. I suspect that thinking about this 'practical' question poses an intellectual challenge, for we hit an 'air pocket' in the open sky of the professional study of politics. The discipline of political science, or any other discipline for that matter, does not prepare us to ask and answer the question about the appropriate scale of representative government in the Indian context. This intellectual silence can be explained in three steps:

1. The question of scale has not invited much reflection in the professional study of politics. Except for the *Federalist Papers* at the founding moment of the American republic, it is hard to think of any body of systematic thought and reflections on what is the appropriate scale of political institutions.
2. This is so because much of the study of representative and governmental institutions originated in relatively small scale European nation-states. Their boundaries did undergo major changes in the course of the last century, but these changes were

hardly an outcome of rational deliberations; these were largely brought about by wars or secession. The US brought in a different scale of representative governments, but given the 'coming together' nature of its federalism, the boundaries of the states were determined and largely frozen by history. This was not a matter of choice, at least not in the way it is in the Indian constitution, and therefore it does not require much thinking and research.

3. The limitation of European and North American context of politics has become a limit to imagining political institutions in the rest of the world, for the centre of gravity of systematic study of politics is still located in societies whose politics is utterly unrepresentative of the rest. So the real-life problem of drawing and redrawing of the boundaries of federal states in India are not subjects of academic reflection in the discipline of Political Science in our country. Even a cursory look at our neighbours would show that this is not confined to India. This is a live issue in Nepal's Constitution making, Sri Lanka's peace process, Pakistan's ethnic problems or Myanmar's transition to democracy.

III

As far as I can see, there are four different ways in which we can go about answering this question. Indian discussions about this question tend to rely exclusively on the first approach. The burden of argument shifts significantly if we allow the other three approaches to influence our reasoning.

1. **Case specific argument:** this approach involves asking if there is a 'case' for a separate state in one or more specific instances. The best of this approach involves assessing all the relevant considerations (economic backwardness and discrimination in the existing state;

feasibility and desirability of the proposed state) by examining all the relevant evidence (legal, economic, political, cultural etc.). The preliminary note for this conference does so admirably in the case of Vidarbha and Telangana. While this is essential in taking any such decision, I think this approach needs to be supplemented by other forms of reasoning. The limit of this 'merits of the case' approach is that it does not provide enough general guidelines; it must go by our prior understanding of how small is too small and how big is too big. In particular this reasoning does not help us beyond a point in thinking about a wholesome reorganisation of states, which would involve changing the presumption. The onus of proof in this reasoning is still on the claimants for a new state.

2. **Comparative evidence:** one of the easiest ways to balance the existing approach would be think of the scale of representative government in the rest of the world. Such a comparison would bring into sharp relief how big is what we call small in India. If the Indian states were to be ranked by their population size in the global ranking of 222 UN member states (excluding India), Uttar Pradesh would rank 6th largest country in the world, a medium size state like Karnataka would take the 24th place in the world, the smallest of the major states, Chhattisgarh, occupies the 55th rung (ahead of Sri Lanka, Cameroon and Chile). Even a 'small state' like Himachal Pradesh ranks 106 and would be among the upper half of the UN member states and 'tiny' state like Meghalaya would rank 141st, ahead of Namibia, Slovenia, Mauritius and Fiji etc. And we are not even looking at the scale of sub-national political units within these states. Clearly something is wonky about our shared sense of what is big and what is small. Our

collective sense of shock at 'small' units like Bundelkhand, Gorkhaland and Coorg demanding a separate state could do with some comparative reflection.

3. **Historical approach:** we have simply not made enough of the historical evidence already available in the country on the record of the last fifty years of state reorganisation. What has been the effect of linguistic reorganisation of the 1950s and the reorganisation of the North East in the 1970s on the newer states, parent states and the country as a whole? I suspect that this is on balance a very positive story and hence it is not academically respectable to recount it. My own sense is that the newer states have done better than before, the parent states have not been devastated (even Bihar appears to have become more manageable after the separation of Jharkhand) and most of the threats to India's unity and integrity have proven to be unfounded.

4. **Counterfactuals and projections:** Unfortunately much of the activist and academic research focuses on a misplaced question: have the new states lived up to their promise? The more analytical question should be a serious counter-factual: have the areas under the new states done better than they would have done if they remained with the older ones? This is a difficult question, but not impossible to

answer within some parameters. That would help us project this reasoning in future and ask similar questions of the proposed states: would they be better off than they are in the existing states?

IV

As would be clear by now, I think there is a strong case for state reorganisation. Once we ask the general question (what is the appropriate scale of representative government) and allow comparative reasoning and historical evidence to influence our judgment, the case for substantial reduction in the scale of representative government is self-evident. But it is important to remember that this is not just a case for redrawing the boundaries of states so as to carve out smaller states from the existing big ones. This would help, but state reorganisation has to be much more than redrawing the boundaries. The real point is to bring the locus of decision making closer to the people and within their control. This requires effective devolution of power along with redrawing the boundaries. While there is something to choose from relatively bigger and relatively smaller states within the existing frame of division of power and resources, the really exciting choice is smaller states with greater resources to the states and greater functions, finances and functionaries to the local bodies. Reorganisation of States must also be linked to the reorganisation of the state.

FORMATION OF STATES/REORGANISATION OF STATES

Suhas Palshikar

Political science in India has not paid adequate attention to institutional design generally and therefore, to issues of federal structure and formation of states. While linguistic states have been taken for granted, it is rarely commented upon that many states in the North East are not based on language but a combination of ethnicity and traditional identities.

Another issue that has not received adequate attention is the size of states. On the one hand, there has been a vast asymmetry of size as resulted from the reorganisation of states in 1956. Following that, and following creation of smaller states like Goa, HP, Haryana, and most of the states in NE, the asymmetry became more glaring. Most of the smaller states are characterised by bouts of political instability, frequent defections and above all, a party system in flux. This is not to say that these characteristics do not obtain in larger states; however smaller states seem to have that tendency more. Except this, size does not seem to make difference in terms of governance and law and order situation.

With the creation of Chhatisgarh and Uttarakhand, we have entered into the post-linguistic state phase of state reorganisation: perhaps, as Ambedkar argued, we might be now turning to the one state-one language formula rather than one language-one state formula. This allows a more rational reorganisation as far as size is concerned. But the issue of size also involves the issue of financial viability and federal structure. Two possibilities can be posed here: one is to rework the federal system in terms of financial distribution of powers and ask states to raise their own resources. The other is to consider forming more asymmetrical federal system wherein the larger states can have internal federal arrangement and smaller states can have possibilities of forming groups for purposes of development

projects. In other words, demands of statehood pose challenges to our institutional ingenuity and constitutional as well as administrative practices. However, the moment we turn to small states formula, two questions emerge: a) is a small state always a better option for democratic governance? and b) what should be the basis or set of principles in forming states?

On the first question, there seems to be an implicit belief that small states could usher in more democratic governance practices. This belief flows from the idea that as governments are small and more accessible to population, they can be made more democratic. Similarly, this belief also flows from a democratic conviction that smaller units can practice democracy better and more effectively. Thirdly, those who believe in local control over local resources too, support the small states. Fourthly, those who celebrate community over modern civil society find small states more amenable to consolidation of community within modern national state system. Of course, each of these assumptions is subject to debate and empirical verification both from our own domestic experience and experiences of other societies. This seminar could therefore, profitably take up these matters for discussion - both theoretically and empirically.

While India may continue to privilege language as one factor in formation of states, we need to consider other factors that are invoked in demands for state formation. One of the most politically sensitive factors is that of backwardness. While it is true that most of the states witness skewed patterns of development, it is not clear if formation of a separate state can guarantee more rapid development. It is more relevant to ask when backwardness becomes a politically viable and salient factor. Secondly, almost each claim to backwardness also resorts to a claim to difference:

that we are different from the state where we are put. Gorkhaland, Telangana, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand, Jharkhand, Vidarbha, are all instances of combination of backwardness argument and difference argument. This takes us to a larger and more serious set of issues: What is the historical process of evolution of difference? During the nationalist movement the principle of difference was underplayed and larger or mega identities such as language, religion and caste blocs could sustain the onslaught of nationalism. In the initial phase of post-independence politics, hope and expectation of development managed to keep the difference principle under control. However, inability to resolve issues of material deprivations and social inequalities contributed to the rising consciousness of difference. At the same time, logic of democracy works-and did work-in two opposite directions. It facilitates coalition building and thus coming together of different sections and at the same time it allows for formation of separate politics located in the difference rather than aggregation. The puzzle which our political analysis has not resolved so far is this: what makes it possible for some differences to be politically salient and some dormant? It might be hypothesised that while backwardness certainly plays an important role in this process, nature of political competition and the domination of locally dominant sections determines to a great extent whether difference will surface as a competing political claim.

While both democratic arguments and difference arguments in favour of smaller and more states can be attractive, we cannot run away from one nagging issue: does the size and composition

of the unit contribute to local patterns of domination? This issue can be tackled from two standpoints. Firstly, we can consider the dominant caste as a factor. Most states post-reorganisation witnessed rise of locally dominant peasant proprietary caste. What will be the effect of small states on this phenomenon? Will local domination become more visible, stronger and better organised as result of small size and a little more homogeneity? Secondly, would small states be more amenable to moneyed interests-local, national and global? Smaller states can be easy prey to the manipulations of the business and industrial interests and if so, one can understand such demands becoming politically viable in times of more assertive march of capitalism in contemporary times.

Equally importantly, smaller states will pose problems related to issue of diversity. Smaller states are likely to be more homogenous. In fact, invocation of difference principle for formation of a state means that a smaller and more homogenous socio-cultural unit is projecting itself as deserving to be an autonomous political unit. Uttarakhand was created in the backdrop of Mandal and OBC reservations. The outcome is that it is a state devoid of much diversity as in its older and 'parent' state of UP. If Gorkhaland is created, it will be devoid of diversity and literally a Gorkhaland, and so on. Already, the states of North East have not only become ethnically less diverse, but also less tolerant. This poses a tricky dilemma of balancing between or privileging between difference as exclusionary separateness and difference as co-existing diversity.

BRIEF NOTE FOR THE SEMINAR IS THERE A CASE FOR RE-ORGANISATION OF STATES?

Amit Prakash

The question of optimum number and size of States in India, along with a search for a set of 'rational' and 'secular' criteria for their creation, has been a perennial one. Ever since independence, claims and counter claims about the necessity of creating new states has been a live issue in the political process of the country, which has not surpassed any part of India - from the Northeast to Western India; and from Jammu and Kashmir to the southern tip of the sub-continent. Further, this is one issue that has seen all manner of political articulations - from mass movements to violent protests and the whole spectrum in between. Even if one were to limit the analysis to contemporary movements, the list is long one and includes demands for new/ separate States of Telangana, Coorg, Belgaum, Vidarbha, Gondwana, Purvanchal, Harit Pradesh, Bundelkhand, Kamtapur State, Gorkhaland, Bodoland, among others. And this list does not exhaust various demands for autonomous structures/ arrangements across the country such as those in Ladakh and various articulations of autonomy across the State of Jammu and Kashmir and a variety of such articulations in the Northeast, as also in parts of Gujarat and central India.

The moot point in all these demands is that they all claim some form of autonomy based on politics of identity, which in turn seems to have emerged as the leitmotif of political contestation in contemporary India. The premises, boundaries, self-definitions, mode of articulation, etc. of such politics of identity may vary from region to region and case to case but the basic argument stands that there seems to be almost no serious contestation of the political space (with the state as well as with other similarly politically-articulate groups) that is not rooted in (and often articulated through) the lens of politics of identity.¹

Articulations of visions of autonomy are as varied as the groups and political actors demanding it. Many groups in Nagaland view autonomy as a sovereign state, while many of the other articulations would be happy with a State within the Indian Union. Still others wish to see the creation of a substate 'development' council while yet others have a vision of a regional, multi-state structure.²

Therefore, the central question that the seminar proposes to address - is there a case for reorganisation of States - cannot be coherently addressed without dwelling on this issue of autonomy that animates and invigorates much of the political process in India. This issue is of further importance on account of the fact that liberal states the world over have not yet been able to find a suitable conceptual, institutional or structural solution to this fundamental problem that it is faced with - that of combining claims of recognition from highly mobilised identities with the premises of individual rights offered by the liberal state. The Indian State is no different. Owing to this central tension between the basic premises of liberal Indian state (individual rights) and those of identity based group claim, the Indian state's response vacillates between coercion and repression on the one hand; and reification of these group demands into a development-deficit definition, on the other. In this sense, the articulate identity groups, premised as they are on some notion of a socio-cultural identity, and the Indian state often talk past each other, further compounding the problem.

It is therefore suggested that the issue of reorganisation of Indian states cannot - contrary to the central argument of the States Reorganisation Commission, 1955 - be an exercise based merely on administrative convenience and

development-deficit-oriented policy. This exercise must also take on board the demands of *recognition* that the identity-based political groups have articulated rather vociferously over the past few decades. However, it is simpler to suggest this course of action than is to take this course on account of conceptual contradictions. The rest of this brief note will therefore lay out some of the crucial issues at hand.

The Conceptual Anchors

The fundamental principles of liberal democracies - basic individual civil rights and political rights, "are well-articulated both in the actual functioning of Western liberal democracies and in the tradition of Western political theory" ... However, "it is difficult to define the basic features of a liberal-democratic approach to managing ethnocultural diversity",³ including myth of 'ethnocultural neutrality' of the state. This myth lies in the roots of the inability of the modern rationalist liberal state in dealing with the diverse claims of rights placed before it by highly mobilised identities premised on cultural factors and demanding autonomy. The state has responded in a rather *ad hoc* fashion with responses ranging from conceding minority cultural rights to denial of all such claims.

"The emergence of ethnicity and minority rights on the political theory mainstream agenda can be traced back to John Rawl's writings on pluralism and consensus as the essence of liberal democratic thinking", which created a large literature engaging with the liberalism-communitarian divide. Autonomy of the individual was pitted against the arguments in favour of "a broader communal socialisation in a historically rooted culture" as necessary precondition for such individualism.⁴ This led to debates about the necessity and mechanisms to accommodate communitarian claims into broader liberal political theory.

Amongst other things, attention of scholars has been focussed on the claims that identities lay on the state and the political process, which in turn structures the debates within political theory. These claims may be classified into three sets:

- (a) Claims of special rights from the government: special representation rights, devolution and national self-determination
- (b) Claims of special rights to seek accommodation of a variety of cultural practices: exemption rights and cultural rights leading to special status to disadvantaged communities including affirmative action programmes
- (c) Demands that are not claims to rights but to collective esteem: symbolism of flags, names, public holidays, national anthems, public funds for cultural activities, educational curricula, etc.⁵

While debates continues about the appropriateness of granting the rights being claimed by the articulated ethnic identities, distinction is also made between rights that may be granted to 'national identities' and ethnic identities. Theorists have argued that while 'national' identities may be granted special status, smaller ethnic identities can only be granted rights that enable them to integrate with the mainstream on fair terms. This global debate is founded on the central premise of liberal state wherein political process should be founded on interests, free association and ideology and all groups claiming rights on any other basis are somehow less 'legitimate'.

However, what is of interest to the politics of ethnic identity articulation is the fact most modern states operate a diverse set of equalising policies such as "affirmative action" or "protective discrimination", located in the global discourse on development and modernisation, especially when these policies have failed to prevent ethnic identity articulation.⁶ Further, most of these articulated identities demand 'autonomy' - a term

whose meaning is as fluid in the academic literature as in the popular political discourse. Being subject to the 'affirmative action' of the state, the development argument becomes central to the politics of identity. Thus, there exists a paradox with respect to most identity articulations: almost all ascriptive ethnic identities require a 'rational' argument of socio-economic deprivation as an added premise for their articulation.

It is these conceptual tensions embedded in liberal theory but innovated upon in practice is the central contradiction that must be addressed to understand the transformation underway in the relationship between the demands of identity and development; both of which derive their legitimacy from arguments of rights, justice and equity embedded deep in the notion of a liberal state.

Legitimacy, Democracy and Governance

Liberal democratic states, no matter what the policy compulsion, cannot ignore the issues discussed above on account of the fact that they require legitimacy - "the right to govern... [which] assumes that consent play a major role therein".⁷ This consent is ascertained in electoral contests but is manufactured via the complex process of engagement between the state and various socio-cultural identities. It is this process of manufacturing of 'consent' - in other words generation and sustenance of legitimacy that is at stake in the way in which these claims of recognition of identity via structures of autonomy are addressed.

Political legitimacy can be seen to be comprising of three components: the normative discursive frame; the process of engagement between the state and socio-political groups; and, outcomes. Normative legitimacy deals with the ways in which the issues of equity and justice are reconciled by the state in its political discourse while the process component focuses on the political process through which contested terms

of engagement are negotiated and reconciled. Both these component of legitimacy are linked to state capacity to deliver on the expectations of various socio-political groups without which the first two components become difficult to sustain. Unless the twin goals of recognition and that of socio-economic change is addressed by the governance process, consent for the right to govern will become increasingly difficult to obtain leading to undermining of political legitimacy of the state and creating what Kohli has eloquent called a "crisis of governance".

Some Tentative Steps Forward

The demands levied on the liberal states to deliver *both*, development outcomes as well as identity recognition necessitates that the state finds a procedural balance between the two - legitimacy and state capacity, to avert serious challenges to the liberal order.

The question of reorganisation of Indian states has therefore to grapple with this challenge: to generate institutional and procedural innovations to reconcile claims of recognition from identities seeking autonomy with the phenomenal challenge of striving towards progressive socio-economic change. If for some reason, administrative convenience and socio-economic change remains the only central concerns in any reorganisation of States, as has been the case until now; incessant demands for new States will continue to fester, creating a crisis of legitimacy for the state, severely compromising its capacity of purposeful policy intervention in any sphere.

NOTES

1. While some of the Left movements may not qualify for such a description, their being restricted to certain geographical pockets in the country would indicate that the question of identity is not totally irrelevant.

2. The term 'autonomy' is used here in the limited sense to denote political and administrative autonomy and does not seek to discuss or comment upon the autonomy of individuals and social groups.

3. Will Kymlicka, "Nation-building and Minority Rights: Comparing West and East" in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 26, no. 2, April 2000, p. 183.

4. Stephen May, Tariq Modood & Judith Squires, 'Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Minority Rights: Charting the Disciplinary Debates' in Stephen May, Tariq Modood & Judith Squires, eds., *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority*

Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.4.

5. Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford University Press, 1995 as discussed in *Ibid.*, p. 4.

6. In fact, in some cases, these very policies of affirmative action may be responsible for encouraging a swifter identity articulation.

7. Jean-Marc Coicaud, *Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility*, (Tr. David Ames Curtis), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 10.

FORMATION OF NEW STATES: FEDERALISING THE PROCESS, INSTITUTIONALISING THE MECHANISMS

Sandeep Shastri

This note uses the ‘moment’ provided by the Telangana imbroglio to dialogue on the wider ramifications of the demand for new states on the federalising process and the institutional mechanisms in place.

The ‘flip-flop’ by the UPA government on Telangana has truly stirred a hornet’s nest. At one level, multiple expressions of discontent have erupted in the non Telangana regions of Andhra Pradesh and at yet another level, those in the forefront of the demand for creation of new states in other parts of India see an opportune moment to present their case with even greater intensity. The ‘now-yes’, ‘now - I am not sure’ attitude of the central government has, beyond a shadow of doubt, opened the floodgates for the assertion of demands for autonomy with even greater visibility, across the country.

In the past too, demands for the creation of new states have been accepted by the Centre. The formation of Chattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand (originally called Uttaranchal), in 2000, can be cited as an immediate case in point. It would be useful to recall, that the process of the creation of these states involved a very detailed process of consultation across multiple levels of government and different shades of political opinion. The same was true of the procedure that was adopted by the central government in the earlier cases of formation of new states. Such a detailed procedure facilitates the process in two important ways.

In the first place, among the wide range of demands for autonomy how does a government ‘legitimise’ a demand/one set of demands even while not conceding others? A detailed process of consultation tests the intensity and genuineness of a demand and allows for a meaningful ‘gate

keeping’ operation to channelise demands in an appropriate and acceptable manner. In the past, the formal announcement of the creation of a new state has always been preceded by the preparation of the ‘political ground’ for the making of such an important announcement. More often than not, the formal announcement of the creation of a new state did not come as a surprise, as the subject had been ‘doing the rounds’ within official circles for quite some time. This often made the formal announcement more ‘acceptable’ even though other demands for autonomy continued to be voiced.

Secondly, any conceding/ creation of a new state is bound to invite some disquiet in the state/s it was earlier part of. A detailed process of consultation/ negotiation immensely helps in ironing out differences and reconciling contradictions so vital to the sustainability of the formation of a new state and ensuring long term stability in the political system.

On both these counts, the ‘Telangana case’ appears to have run into trouble. While it must be conceded that the demand for the creation of a separate Telangana state is among the oldest of demands that have been voiced with varying degrees of assertiveness over time, the timing of the government’s initial announcement took many by surprise. While the ‘fast-unto-death’ by the TRS chief may have played on the minds of the political leadership, it may have been politically prudent to build up a consensus which would have placed the Telangana demand in a different league. This would have helped the government respond to the other demands for autonomy more effectively. What has happened is that even as the ‘Breaking News’ on Telangana flashed on news channels, it was quickly followed up by the

statements of those in the forefront of other autonomy demands aggressively advocating their case.

The failure to generate a political consensus within the state is also clearly apparent. It was embarrassing for the Congress to see many of its prominent elected representatives (from the non Telangana part of Andhra Pradesh) submitting their resignations in protest. The manner in which AP Chief Minister Rosaiah dealt with the post-announcement political developments indicates his own reluctance and predicament in this regard. The many camps within the Congress in the state used this 'political moment' to gain a 'vantage position' in the fight for political space. The government's decision to appoint a Commission is clearly a ploy to postpone a solution and douse the emotional fires that the opening of the Telangana issue has raised.

Given the change in the nature and structure of political competition, the question of creation of new states needs to be viewed from an inherently 'federal perspective'. In the first place, the state/s from which the new state is to be carved out need to be actively involved in the process of state formation from the very inception of the political dialogue. Such an arrangement needs to be formally institutionalised in the decision making process involving the creation of new

states. The consultation needs to be not merely with the government/ legislature at the state but with all the significant political actors involved in the process. Secondly, there is a clear need for a 'federal' authority (as different from the central authority) to be at the nucleus of any negotiations and decisions relating to the creation of new states. This federal authority needs to be authentically federal and not a creation of the centre. Two options seem to be available at this stage. Firstly, the Rajya Sabha and/or its sub-committee could be actively involved in whetting any demand for a new state. As a chamber that is supposed to represent the states, it would enjoy greater legitimacy in the process (it is another matter that a review of Rajya Sabha membership and its working does not appear to justify its being called a Chamber of the States). Secondly, the Inter-State Council chaired by the Prime Minister and having all Chief Ministers as members could be assigned the task. Several sub-committees of the Inter-State Council have been functioning now for two decades. Experience has shown that their functioning do not give any indication of display of party politics in its deliberations. Empowering such a 'federal body' to negotiate with demands for new states and examine their legitimacy would strengthen the institutional mechanisms and contribute to federal justice in a more meaningful and democratic way.

ON SMALL STATES

Prakash Ambedkar

I must thank the organisers for holding a conference on the theme: Is there a case for re-organisation of states? This theme may be considered to be equivalent to examining the necessity of smaller states. In fact, there is a clear cut, vertical division on the issue, "large states versus small states". Those in favour of the larger states have not spelt out their position. The creation of the large state is shrouded in mystery. I would not like to dwell on this issue as the question was one of dominance. For, it is an old question. No useful purpose will be served by debating it at present. I do not see any valid arguments for not accepting recommendations of Fa zal Ali Commission (the States Reorganisation Commission) Report (1955).

At present, however, I do feel the need for the smaller states very badly. Without getting into academic debates, I would like to state the reasons.

The reasons are

- i. When the states were created the population of the country was one third of the present population. Today most states have populations of more than one crore, except the north eastern states, Goa and Himachal Pradesh, and Union Territories of Andaman Nicobar, Chandigarh, Daman and Diu, Lakshadweep, Pondicherry. According to the 2011 Census data, 10 states have populations larger than 6 crore, 9 states and 1 Union Territory of Delhi between 1 crore and 5 crore, and the remaining 9 states and 6 Union Territories with populations of less than 1 crore. The fact is that we still do not treat the people of the North Eastern states as our part. Perhaps, some ethnic groups in these states do not see themselves as being a part of the country, and would certainly want to have much greater autonomy. A major question is: How should we grant them (and other states like Jammu and Kashmir) greater autonomy without de-stabilising the Indian federation?
- ii. The main question is, with states with large population, when the number of the Ministers is fixed as a ratio of the elected members in assembly; whether it is possible to manage and administer the welfare concept originally imbedded in Indian Constitution. The answer is no. The increase in population is one of the causes for the failure of the state. It is increasingly difficult for the states to live up to the expectation of the common man. There is a need, to bring a ratio between the population and the area of the state, which can be manageable. Due to largeness, quite often ministers are ignorant about the realities of the area which they do not represent. I know of a learned Minister who was not able to state the value of the salt pan land in Mumbai; nor were the Ministers able to inform, without help, as to the areas allotted to the refugees in India, nor are they able to tell the number of talukas in the state. I do not blame them. The states are not only large in terms of population, but also large and diversified in terms of topography, natural resources and developmental infra structure. Reaching out to the state government or influencing the policies has increasingly become difficult for the people. All of us seem to have forgotten the basic premise on which 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments were made. It was to bring the decision making and administration at the door step of the common man. Is this amendment a wise

amendment or an escape route from reality? [Shall we not need the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments, and even going further than them, even when we create smaller states than the present ones?] The reasons for dividing districts and talukas were the same. These are vital formations for the functioning of the government. The large states have become burdensome. It is time to recast them.

- iii. The natural resources are scarce. The suggestion of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar that ownership of all natural resources should be in the hands of the Union Government was not heeded. The states were formed on the Linguistic principle, and this has opened up a new field to be exploited either by local leaders or international forces. This has led to instigating agitations and demonstrations for the establishment of the right over the scarce natural resources, and blaming the state for non development, viewing it as a rival. As long as the central leadership is convinced, strong and able, there is no danger. If the central leadership is feeble and the parties are also weak, the local satrap will have a field day. It will not stop at that. If Linguistic latent energy is converted into potent energy, then we have not just one Kashmir, but many Kashmirs. What will happen? No body knows.
- iv. With the passage of time, within every state, a part of the state has developed very fast, whereas other parts have remained undeveloped. This is because aggressive leadership from a part of the state is able to utilise the funds of the state for its area. The different nature of aggressiveness in the leadership within the state is now being held responsible for the underdevelopment. This amounts to using resources of one part of the state for the development of another area. Quite often the underdevelopment is blamed on the lack of capacities/aspirations/vision either of the people or of the political leadership of the underdeveloped area. This has again led to the demand for the creation of a separate state in case of Uttarakhnad, Chhattisgad and now Telangana and Vidarbha. With passage of time, the developed part and the undeveloped part within the existing states are now visible to the naked eye. This discrepancy which has arisen will have to be addressed. There is a need for the states to undergo the change. This situation is mentioned in the Constitution also. We should be prepared to change as and when time demands.
- v. The creation of the large states has not only burdened the states with population but financially also. A state like Maharashtra which was considered as one of the best financially managed state is on the verge of the financial collapse. The reason for this is that as the awareness increases, the demands for development projects/ welfare also increase. This has led to creation of new offices and along with it comes, the staff. Increase in staff means burdening the exchequer. What was formally a two tier system of administration got converted into three tiers. In the process of decentralisation and restructuring the top heavy state administration was just distributed to the districts. The scarce resources meant for development of the common man are consumed by the administration as pay and perks. As the state does not have adequate resources for development, the state's administration has accepted the concept of build, operate and transfer. Nobody has thought what will happen once the assets are transferred back to the states. In what condition will they be transferred? Once transferred the state will have to spend on

the maintenances of the created asset. This will result in depletion of state resources. Thus, no funds will be left in future for development, leading to unrest. One has to take into consideration that the total burden of the states has already crossed five lakh crore. Each state is now borrowing nearly as much as its revenue. It is not the governments but the officers that are controlling the development processes and the finances.. The result is, a new situation is developing. Just to give the glimpse of the situation, on political scenario, instead of party having a vision for the development of the state and a commitment to the development issues, it is the individual leaders; and therefore, strengthening the party is no more an agenda for the political leadership. The leaders are not depending on parties for their survival, but are concentrating only on their respective constituencies for their survival. This process is turning them inward, in the sense that the leaders are becoming parochial. This, to my mind, is the greatest danger. For, the integrity and unity of the country depend on the survival of the political party system. Already the political parties are labelled on caste line, as to whether it is pro-reservation or not. This has led to the question as whether they represent an ideology or a caste interest. Due to this thinking among the common masses, some political parties have become outcast for some castes. This is not a good sign. For, I consider the existence of the national political parties as the symbol of unity and integrity of India. In my opinion, socially cracks have developed. We should not allow the social mistrust to develop into political mistrust. Instead of allowing this tendency to rise, accept the reality of smaller states and allow the national feeling to grow.

The new environment and the information provided by the media and electronic channel have enlightened and widened the vision of the common man. He is no longer contented in meeting his basic needs. He wants economic change. This interest can best be served by smaller states. The smaller state will be in a better position to exploit the resources, develop entrepreneurship and save the natural resources for the future generation. Even though we are an agrarian economy, agrarian products differ. There is no uniform policy for development of agro-industry. That is why, one agrarian product is developed and the other is neglected. The political economy of the neglect of cotton textile industry in Maharashtra and consequent harm to cotton growers in Vidarbha and attention of policy makers to sugar industry and disproportionate use of irrigation water to the sugarcane crop in Western Maharashtra is an extremely telling example. This leads to deprivation to some and fruit for others. The common man is no longer ready to wait. If results are to be achieved, the alternative is to have smaller states.

- vi. The international geo-political situation needs to be looked into. We are in the developing processes of nation building. We have not even begun with the dismantling or replacing of the sub-nationality that exists in the name of religion, language, caste and sub-caste. The sub-nationality is latent energy. Any one can exploit it. The question is, by not looking at the reality, are we creating a swimming pool? Once having created, others will try to swim. Why cry then? Our duty is to see that no controversial swimming pool is created.

SMALL AND LARGE STATES: COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

R.P. Kurulkar

1. INTRODUCTION

There is a demand for the appointment of a "Second States Reorganisation Commission" in India from various states. The main reason for such a demand is the neglect of certain regions in their socio-economic development over the last 60 years. This problem is chiefly faced by the larger states like, Maharashtra (Vidarbha), Andhra Pradesh (Telengana), West Bengal (Gorkha Land), Uttar Pradesh (Harit Pradesh), etc. Also, there are peaceful as well as violent agitations (Naxalites) over the years in the country for their due share in the process and the fruits of development.

There are two objectives of this paper:

- a) To assess the performance of large and small states, in terms of their socio-economic development and,
- b) To study the progress of those states which have been separated from their larger states in recent years, i.e., Uttarakhand, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh.

2. SMALL AND LARGE STATES

There are at present a total number of 35 states in India including 7 Union Territories. Of these, there are eleven states which have the geographical area of more than 1 lakh sq. kms. Rajasthan State has the largest geographical area of 3.42 lakh sq. kms., followed by Maharashtra (3.08 lakh sq.kms) and Madhya Pradesh (3.08 lakh sq. kms). All the remaining 24 states have geographical area of less than 1 lakh sq.kms.

As regards population of the major states, it would be observed from Table-1, that Uttar Pradesh has the highest population of 1661.98 lakh persons (2001), followed by Maharashtra (968.79

lakh) and Bihar (829.99). Jammu & Kashmir State has the lowest level of population (101.11 lakh) among all major states in India.

Among smaller states, the smallest geographical area is that of Delhi (0.01 lakh sq.km.), while Sikkim has the lowest population (5.41 lakhs).

It is however, difficult to define a large or a small state in terms of its geographical area and population. Such a division is likely to be arbitrary. For example, Bibek Debroy and Laveesh Bhandari in their article on "India's Best and Worst States" [India To-day-special Issues, August 15, 2010] have defined a large State as one with the geographical area of more than 35000 sq kms and a population of more than 50 lakh persons. With this definition, they have classified a total number of 20 states as "Big states" while the remaining 15 states as "small states", of them 5 are Union Territories.

If we apply this definition to Vidarbha and Marathwada regions of Maharashtra States, we observe that, Vidarbha's Geographical area is 97404 sq. kms which is larger than the geographical areas of 24 states in India. Similarly, the geographical area of Marathwada is 64813 sq. kms, which is larger than the geographical areas of 21 states in India. As regards population also, Vidarbha's population was 206 lakhs (2001), which was higher than the population of 12 states in India. The population of Marathwada was 155.87 lakh in 2001, which was again higher than the population of 11 states in India. Although, there is no demand from Marathwada for a separate statehood, but there is a constant demand from the Vidarbha region for a separate statehood. The above information may prove helpful in this debate.

Considering Vidarbha and Marathwada's geographical areas, it would be observed that the geographical areas of Kerala (39000 sq.km) and Himachal Pradesh (56000 sq.kms) are smaller than these two regions. Hence, these states could be categorised as "small states". **Therefore, in this article, we have classified 15 states as large states (or major states) while 14 states as "small states", or a total number of 29 states for which data on various socio-economic indicators are available. (Please see table 1).**

1) Per Capita Income (At Current Prices) 2007-08:

The Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) is a function of various factors like availability of natural resources, capital and technology, entrepreneurship and skilled labour, etc. Apart from these factors, there are other factors, which may attract foreign and domestic capital to the states, i.e., economic infrastructure and social infrastructure and various incentives offered by the Central and the State Governments. Due to the abolition of the "Location Policy", by the Government of India, in 1991, the private entrepreneurs are now free to locate their industries anywhere in India. Therefore, it has become now difficult to attract private enterprises to backward areas. If we study the location of various Foreign Direct Investment Projects during the post reform period (1991 onwards), it would be observed that most of these projects have been located in a few developed states, like, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Delhi, Andhra Pradesh, etc. Similar is the case relating to the location of the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in India. They are also located mostly in developed states of the Indian economy. This policy has resulted in increasing the regional disparities among developed and backward states. Against this background we have to study the indicators of socio-economic development of various states under study. The per capita income of a state is determined by the factors mentioned above.

The per capita income of a state indicates the average standard of living of the people in a given state. In 2007-08, the per capita income of India (at current prices) was Rs. 33283./-. (A) Among the 15 large states, the per capita income of as many as 10 states was lower than the All India average. Bihar State has the lowest per capita income of Rs. 11135; or about one-third of the national average. Uttar Pradesh, which is the largest populated state in India, has the per capita income of Rs. 16060, next higher only to Bihar. Maharashtra State has the highest per capita income (Rs. 47051) among all large states in India, followed by Gujarat (Rs. 45773) and Tamil Nadu (Rs. 40757). Hence, we may conclude from the above data that in terms of per capita income the larger states (majority) have not performed well. (B) Among the 14 smaller states 6 states have lower per capita income than the National average; while the remaining 8 states have higher per capita income than the National average, i.e., Rs. 33283. The State of Goa has topped the list with highest per capita income of Rs. 105582. In fact, Goa's per capita income is highest among all states in India, Delhi (Rs. 78690), Haryana (Rs. 58531), and Punjab (Rs. 44923) are some of the smaller states with very high per capita income. We may conclude from the above discussion that smaller states have performed better than the larger states relating to their per capita incomes.

2) Literacy Rates:

A) This is an important indicator reflecting upon the social development of a state. It is also one of the variables constituting the Human Development Index of a state. In 2001, the literacy rate at the national level, was 64.8 per cent. Among the 15 large states, 9 states had literacy rate below the National average. Among them Bihar state had the lowest literacy rate at 47 per cent only; which was also lowest among all Indian states. States with low literacy rates were as follows; Jammu & Kashmir (55.5 per cent); Uttar Pradesh (56.3 per cent); Rajasthan (60.4 per cent); etc.

There were a total number of 6 states which had higher literacy rates than the National average. Among them Maharashtra topped the list with 76.9 per cent literacy rate, followed by Tamil Nadu (73.4 per cent), and Gujarat (69.1 per cent), etc.

B) As regards 14 smaller states, it was observed that, there were only two states, i.e. Arunachal Pradesh (54.3 per cent) and Meghalaya (62.6 per cent), which had literacy rates below the National average. All the remaining 12 states had literacy rates above the National average of 64.8 per cent. Among them Kerala state topped the table, not only among smaller states, but also among all states of the Indian Union, with a literacy rate of 90.9 per cent. Smaller states like Goa (82 per cent), Mizoram (88.8 per cent), Delhi (81.7 per cent), and Himachal Pradesh (76.5 per cent) had performed well on this indicator. Hence, it may be concluded that the smaller states had performed far better than the larger states in terms of total literacy rates in India.

3) Gross Enrolment Ratio (I-VIII) 2006-07:

A) This is yet another important indicator forming a part of the Human Development Index of a state. The Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, a flagship project of the Central Government has been instrumental in raising the Gross enrolment ratio of students studying in the classes from I to VIII or in the age-group of 6-14 years. At the National level, during the year 2006-07, the Gross enrolment ratio was 97.1 per cent. Among the 15 larger states, this ratio was lower than the National average in seven states, lowest among them being in Assam (85.9 per cent), followed by Jammu & Kashmir (87.7 per cent), etc. There were 8 states in this category which had GER higher than the National average; among them Madhya Pradesh topping the table with a GER of 130.1 per cent followed by Tamil Nadu (114.4); and Chhattisgarh (109.9), etc.

B) Among the 14 smaller states only four states had GER below the National average; among them Punjab State had the lowest GER at 76.4; followed by Nagaland (79.1). The remaining 10 smaller states had GER quite above the National average; among them Meghalaya State topped the list with a GER at 152.8; followed by Manipur (140), Mizoram (130.2), etc.

Hence, in terms of Gross Enrolment Ratio also smaller states have performed much better than the larger states.

4) Infant Mortality Rates: (Per 1000)

This indicator reflects upon the quality of health services provided by the Government to the common people in a state. The Government of Maharashtra has used this indicator (IMR) in place of longevity while constructing the Human Development Index at the district level (in 2002). The data on IMR are available for the year 2008 (see table-1). At the All India level, the IMR was 53 (per 1000). Among the 15 larger states as many as seven states had IMR above the National average; the highest IMR (70) was observed in the state of Madhya Pradesh, followed by Orissa (69) and Uttar Pradesh (67). While the lowest IMR was observed in the State of Tamil Nadu (31) followed by Maharashtra (33) and West Bengal (35).

Interestingly, among the 14 smaller states only two states, Meghalaya (58) and Haryana (54) states had IMR above the All India average (53). All the remaining 12 states had very low IMR in 2008. Among them Goa State had the lowest IMR (10), followed by Kerala (12) Manipur (14) Nagaland (26), etc.

Thus, in the Health sector also, the smaller states have provided better health services to the common masses, than the larger states.

5) Human Development Index: (1991)

A) The UNDP has developed this Index, for various countries of the world since 1990. The HDI is the average value of (i) per capita income, ii) Education and iii) Health. Hence, it is considered as a better indicator of quality of life than the per capita income. The Planning Commission (2001) has also published the HDI values of various states in India. But, no data on HDI values of smaller states are available. Hence, we have used HDI data of (1991) which are available for both large and small states.

The HDI value at the national level in 1991 was 0.381. Of the 15 large states, data for 2 newly created states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh was not available. Of the remaining 13 states, 6 states had HDI values below the national average. Bihar State (0.308) was at the bottom of the table; while Tamil Nadu state (0.466) topped the table. Many of the larger states had very poor HDI values, e.g., Uttar Pradesh (0.314); Madhya Pradesh (0.328), Orissa (0.345), etc., indicating a very poor quality of life, on the average, of the people in these states.

Among the 14 smaller states, data on HDI value was not available for one state, i.e., Uttarakhand. Of the remaining 13 states, only two states had HDI values below the national average, i.e., Arunachal Pradesh (0.328) and, Meghalaya (0.365). The remaining 11 smaller states, had HDI values above the national average of (0.381)

Delhi state (0.624) had the highest HDI value among all states in India followed by Kerala (0.591) at the second place. This analysis clearly indicates the fact that in terms of HDI values, the smaller states have performed much better than the larger states.

6. Financial Position Of States:

Table-2 shows the financial position of large and small states in India for comparison. The following major issues emerge from these data.

- a) Share of own tax revenue to total revenue:
 - i) Among the 15 large states, the share of own tax revenue to total revenue ranges from a minimum of 15.6 per cent in Jammu & Kashmir to a maximum of 67.6 per cent in Karnataka. It may be observed that those states which have highly developed industrial and services sectors, have been able to raise higher level of tax revenue, e.g. Tamil Nadu (66.2 per cent), Gujarat (60.9 per cent); Maharashtra (57.2 per cent) etc. Larger states with very low share of own tax revenue to total revenue are, Assam (17.5 per cent), Bihar (17.5 per cent), Orissa (30.9 per cent) etc. these are all economically backward states.
 - ii) Most (that is 7) of the smaller states belong to the category of "special category states", which are heavily financed by the Central Government, i.e., North-Eastern States. Many of them are agrarian in nature, agriculture being the mainstay of their livelihood. Even then, the percentage of cultivable area to the geographical area of these states is very small, e.g. Manipur (10 per cent), Meghalaya (9.5 per cent), Mizoram (4.4 per cent) Sikkim (15.8 per cent) Tripura (26.7), etc. Similarly, the industrial sector of these states is very under developed. For example, the per capita gross industrial output in some of these states was as follows: Manipur (Rs. 174), Mizoram (Rs. 548), Meghalaya (Rs. 3594), and Tripura (Rs. 1576).

On the other hand, some of the smaller states have high level of own tax revenue as percentage of total revenue. These states are Delhi (71.1 per cent) Goa (45.0 per cent), Kerala (64.7 per cent), Haryana (65.3 per cent), Punjab (58.4 per cent), etc. All these states have some highly developed

economic sectors. For example, in Goa State, Tourism and mining industry fetches large revenue. Kerala State has large number of plantations & cash crops. It receives major share of its state income from workers working in Gulf Countries.

Punjab and Haryana, both are agriculturally developed states; their economy is also dominated by small-scale industries.

7. Per Capita Share In Central Taxes:

i) Generally, the Central Finance Commissions are always in favour of allocating larger funds to relatively backward states in India, and allocating relatively smaller funds to developed states. This is evident from the data shown in table-2. For example, developed larger state like Maharashtra has received Rs. 775 per capita as share in Central Taxes. Other developed states also have received lower amount of per capita share in central taxes, e.g., Gujarat (Rs. 1057), Karnataka (Rs. 1310), Tamil Nadu (Rs. 1353), etc. On the other hand, larger backward states have received larger per capita shares in central taxes: For example, Bihar (Rs. 2465), Jharkhand (Rs. 1881) Chhattisgarh (Rs. 2253), Orissa (Rs. 2183), etc.

ii) Among developed smaller states, Delhi (Rs. 1643), Kerala (Rs. 878), Haryana (Rs. 933), Punjab (Rs. 758), etc, have smaller per capita shares in central taxes. Among the North-Eastern states, most of them have larger per capita shares in central taxes.

8. Per Capita Central Grants:

i) Table - 2 also shows the level of per capita Central Government grants to both large and small states in India, for the year 2009-10. Among the larger states, Jammu & Kashmir state has received a maximum per capita grant of Rs. 10188, followed by Assam (Rs. 3735). All other states have received relatively low level of per capita central grants.

ii) On the other hand, most of the North Eastern states have received huge per capita central grants, e.g., Mizoram (Rs. 23180 or maximum) Arunachal Pradesh (Rs. 18921), etc. Developed smaller states have received lower level of per capita central grants.

Hence, in both, larger and smaller states the central grants are made on the basis of their level of development.

9. Proportion Of State Government Liabilities To State GDP:

i) Among the larger states, this proportion ranges between a minimum of 20.5 per cent (Chhattisgarh) to a maximum of 68.8 per cent in Jammu & Kashmir. Uttar Pradesh (50.3 per cent) and Bihar (46.8 per cent) are other states with a high proportion of debt to state GDP ratio.

ii) Among the smaller states the state of Mizoram has the highest debt-SGDP ratio of 113.1 per cent while Delhi State has the minimum (12.7 per cent) Most of the North Eastern states have a very high debt-SGDP ratio, for example, Manipur (75.8 per cent), Sikkim (77 per cent), Arunachal Pradesh (73.1 per cent) etc. (Please see table-2.)

10. Poverty Ratio (1999-2000):

Poverty ratios for the year 1999-2000 (Head Count Ratio) for the 29 states are shown in the table 3. The All India poverty ratio was 26.10 per cent during the period 1999-2000. Poverty ratio data are available for 13 states.

Among the 13 large states, the poverty ratio was highest in Orissa (47.15 per cent) followed by Bihar (42.60 per cent). There were a total number of 6 large states which had poverty ratios higher than the national average; while the remaining states had poverty ratios below the national average.

Among the large states, Jammu & Kashmir state had the lowest poverty ratio (3.48 per cent) followed by Gujarat (14.7) and Rajasthan (15.28 per cent).

Among the 14 small states, data on poverty ratio are available for 13 states (except Uttarakhand); of them, 6 states had poverty ratios higher than the national average. The highest poverty ratio was observed in the state of Sikkim (34.44 per cent) Most of the North-Eastern states had very high poverty ratios, e.g., Tripura (34.44 per cent) Arunachal Pradesh (33.47 per cent); Meghalaya (33.87 per cent), etc.

There were a total number of 7 small states, which had poverty ratios below the national average, i.e., (26.10 per cent). Goa state had the lowest poverty ratio. (4.40 per cent), followed by Punjab (6.12 per cent) and Himachal Pradesh (7.63 per cent); Haryana, Kerala, Delhi, states had also relatively lower poverty ratios (see table-3).

We may conclude from the above discussion that except for the North Eastern states, the poverty ratios in other smaller states are considerably lower than those in the larger states like Orissa, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Assam, etc.

11. Law And Order (2005):

The law and order score is based on factors like, (i) Policemen per lakh of population, (ii) ratio of pending cases to total court cases, (iii) incidence of murder, kidnapping, rape, molestation, in total crime, etc. (India-Today-special Issue, 15/8/2005). The scores are made for both bigger and smaller states separately and have been ranked separately (see table-2). A higher score means that the law and order in the state is better.

Among the bigger states, Tamil Nadu (1.82) scored the highest rank, 2nd rank among large and small states taken together, followed by Rajasthan

(1.38) in the 3rd place among all states. Bihar state (0.29) is at the bottom (19th rank) preceded by Assam (0.30) 18th rank.

Similarly, among smaller states Kerala State (4.16) has scored 1st rank among all states, followed by Mizoram (2.43) or 2nd rank among all states. Uttarakhand (score 0.37) has scored 15th or last rank; preceded by Panjab (0.58) with 12th rank. It would be observed that most of the North Eastern states have scored well despite insurgency activities in those states.

12. Inequality:

This is an important indicator of development. The Gini coefficients based on 55th Round of National Sample Survey are available for both rural and urban areas of major states in India. (see table-3). Data on Gini coefficient was available for 12 states. At the All India level, the Gini coefficient was 26.3 per cent for rural areas; among the larger states. Of them, only 2 states, namely, Bihar (28.4 per cent) and Maharashtra (26.4 per cent) had Gini coefficient higher than the All India average. While, the remaining 10 states had lower values; indicating that in most of these states the problem of inequalities in rural areas is less serious compared to All India average.

The Gini coefficient for urban areas appears to be serious, because at the All India Level the value of Gini coefficient was 34.8 per cent indicating higher level of inequalities, compared to the rural areas. Among the 12 major states for which data are available, the maximum value of Gini coefficient was observed to be in the state of Tamil Nadu (39.1 per cent) followed by Maharashtra (35.5). In the remaining 10 states, the value of Gini coefficient is lower than the All India Average. We also note the fact that in all bigger states there is big difference between the levels of Gini coefficients for rural and urban areas of the state.

Among the smaller states, the data on Gini coefficient is available for only three states, namely, Kerala, Haryana and Punjab. For rural areas, while for Kerala state the value of Gini coefficient is higher than the All India average of 26.3 per cent, the values of Gini coefficient for Haryana (25.0) and Punjab (25.3) are lower than the All India average. As regards urban areas also, all the three small states have Gini coefficients below the national average of 34.8 per cent. Another important point which may be noted here is that, in all these three states, the differences between the values of rural and urban Gini coefficients are not much big, as we find in the case of bigger states.

13. Experiences of The Newly Created States:

It would be quite interesting and useful to study the experiences of the recently created three states, which were carved out of the big states, namely, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand. Let us briefly study their present position. All these three states came into existence in November 2000.

i) Chhattisgarh: Many of these new states got meagre allocations when they formed an insignificant part of the bigger states. Now they are having several times bigger budgetary allocations as separate states. For example, Chhattisgarh region formed a part of the bigger Madhya Pradesh state before year 2000, and received only around Rs. 800 crore for development in years just before its separation from Madhya Pradesh. Now, its plan outlay for 2005-06, is Rs. 4250 crore. Its sales tax receipts alone net in Rs. 1900 crore; while it gets Rs. 800 crore from mining and Rs. 500 crore from forests & excise.

Although, Chhattisgarh gets investments mostly in steel and power sectors, even then the state has a good irrigation network. Hence, the state is investing Rs. 850 crore to construct 30 big and small dams bringing more area under irrigation. The state now has changed from a single

crop to double, triple crop system, offering employment for 265 days for its rural population, compared to 100 days a year earlier. According to the Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh, "As part of Madhya Pradesh, we had only Rs. 80-90 crore for the maintenance and construction of roads. Now, we pump in Rs. 800 crore for the same purpose." According to the data available for the year 2007-08, the per capita income of Chhattisgarh was much higher at Rs. 32884 compared to the per capita income of Madhya Pradesh, i.e., Rs. 18051/-

ii) Jharkhand: The State of Jharkhand was carved out of the bigger State of Bihar in 2000. Now the pace of industrialisation in the state has picked up. Investments both in existing and proposed projects now exceed Rs. 1 lakh crore. Companies like Tata Steel, Bokaro steel, Jindals, Hindalco, Essar steel, Usha Martin Acc, Birla Group, Bihar caustic, Bihar sponge Iron, are making expansion. The Chief Minister of the State Mr. Arjun Munda has remarked, "This is a kind of industrial revolution that no other state has seen in recent years".

The per capita income of Jharkhand in 2007-08 was found to be Rs. 19928, which was much higher than the per capita income of Bihar, i.e., Rs. 11135. Hence, there is much improvement in the State due to its separation from Bihar.

iii) Uttarakhand: It was carved out of the State of Uttar Pradesh in the year 2000. Uttarakhand's main source of revenue has been religious tourism, with holiest Hindu Shrines like Haridwar, Badrinath, Kedarnath, etc. This tourist industry earns Rs. 850 crore annually for the state. To augment its revenue the state Government is tapping its vast hydroelectric potential, by attracting companies like Reliance and L & T, etc. Now, the investment in this sector exceeds Rs. 60,000 crore. It is also reported that by 2007 every village in the state is to be electrified, while by 2009 Uttarakhand would be exporting power to Delhi. After the separation of Uttarakhand from

Uttar Pradesh, in 2000, the new state doubled its per capita income when compared to the per capita income of Uttar Pradesh. For example, in 2007-08, the per capita income of Uttarakhand was observed to be Rs. 32884, compared to the per capita income of Uttar Pradesh, i.e., Rs. 16060.

It may be concluded from the above data and discussion that, by separating from their larger mother states, all the three newly created states have done much better than their mother states. Hence, there is a strong case for creation of new and relatively smaller states in India, with a view to improving the quantitative and qualitative life of the common people.

3. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have made an attempt to make a comparison between 15 bigger and 14 smaller states in terms of well known socio-economic indicators. We may now draw a few major conclusions from this analysis.

- 1) In terms of most of the social sector indicators like, literacy rates, Gross Enrolment ratios, Human Development Index, IMR, etc, the smaller states have performed much better than the most of the larger states.
- 2) In terms of per capita income also, the smaller state of Goa has topped the list, including all large states.
- 3) Inequality in both rural & urban areas is more serious in larger states like Maharashtra and Gujarat. The inequalities are less severe in rural and urban areas of smaller states.
- 4) The law and order situation also is much better in smaller states, which is evident from the high scores in law and order situation they have achieved compared to larger states.
- 5) The major drawback of the smaller states, (especially North-Eastern States) is their heavy dependence on Central Government financial assistance in the form of grants, tax-sharing and heavy borrowings. In a

federal form of Government, this kind of financial imbalance is bound to occur, due to un-even or underdeveloped stage of a state. Even a prosperous state like Maharashtra has raised only 57.2 per cent of its total revenue as own tax revenue. Assam's own tax revenue is also very meagre at 17.5 per cent (or Bihar 17.5 per cent).

Hence, there is a difference of degree among both large and small states, relating to the financial dependence on Central Government, and borrowings. I feel, much importance need not be given to the "financial viability" of a state, while creating new states.

- 6) Considering the performance of the newly created three states in Nov. 2000, i.e., Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, one may draw the conclusion that after separating from their larger mother states, all the three states have performed well in terms of their per capita incomes, industrial development and agricultural progress.

Hence, there appears to be a strong case for the creation of smaller states, especially, in cases like unwieldy larger states like, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, etc.

The data and information used in this section are based on article by Neeraj Mishra, Farzand Ahmed and Subhash Mishra, "Predicament of the Young" India Today-special Issue dated 15/08/2005.

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Table 1. Socio-Economic Indicators of Large and Small States in India

Sr.No.	Large States	Geo. Area (lakh. Sqkm)	Population (Lakh)2001	Per capita income (2007-08) Rs.	Literacy Rate (2001)	Gr. Enrol. I-VIII (2006-07)	IMR (2008)	Human Dev. Index (1991)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1	Rajasthan	3.42	565.07	23933	60.4	106.4	63	0.347
2	Maharashtra	3.08	968.79	47051	76.9	109	33	0.452
3	Andhra Pradesh	2.75	762.10	35864	60.5	88.1	52	0.377
4	Uttar Pradesh	2.41	1661.98	16060	56.3	90.9	67	0.314
5	Jammu & Kashmir	2.22	101.44	24214	55.5	87.8	49	0.402
6	Madhya Pradesh	3.08	603.48	18051	63.1	130.1	70	0.328
7	Gujarat	1.96	506.71	45773	69.1	103.1	50	0.431
8	Orissa	1.56	368.05	23403	63	98.9	69	0.345
9	Karnataka	1.92	528.50	36266	66.6	99.9	45	0.412
10	Chattisgarh	1.35	208.34	29776	64.7	109.9	57	n.a.
11	Tamil Nadu	1.3	624.06	40757	73.4	114.4	31	0.466
12	Bihar	0.94	829.99	11135	47	74.1	56	0.308
13	West Bengal	0.89	801.76	31722	68.6	90.5	35	0.404
14	Jharkhand	0.8	249.46	19928	69.8	89.4	46	n.a.
15	Assam	0.78	266.56	21991	63.3	85.9	64	0.348
Small States:								
16	Delhi	0.01	138.50	78690	81.7	101.1	35	0.624
17	Goa	0.04	13.48	105582	82.0	108.3	10	0.575
18	Manipur	0.22	21.67	19780	70.5	140	14	0.536
19	Meghalaya	0.22	23.19	29811	62.6	152.8	58	0.365
20	Mezoram	0.21	8.89	27501	88.8	130.2	37	0.548
21	Nagaland	0.17	19.90	n.a.	66.6	79.1	26	0.486
22	Sikkim	0.07	5.41	33349	68.8	114.4	33	0.425
23	Tripura	1.1	31.99	28806	73.2	119.9	34	0.389
24	Arunachal Pradesh	0.84	10.98	28945	54.3	118.6	32	0.328
25	Kerala	0.39	318.41	43104	90.9	95.5	12	0.591
26	Haryana	0.44	211.45	58531	67.9	85.2	54	0.443
27	Punjab	0.5	243.59	44923	69.7	76.4	41	0.475
28	Uttarakhand	0.53	84.89	32884	71.6	110.6	44	n.a.
29	Himachal Pradesh	0.56	60.78	40134	76.5	111.1	44	n.a.
Total Average India								
(Including all states)		32.87	10286.10	33283	64.8	97.1	53	0.381

Table 2. Socio-Economic Indicators of Large and Small States in India

Sr. no.		Per capita revenue (Rs.) (2009-10)	Own tax rev. as % of total revenue per cent (2009-10)	Per capita share in central taxes (Rs.)*2009-10	Per capita grants from central Govt. (Rs.) (2009-10)	Proportion of State Govt. liabilities to state GDP% (2009-10)	Law & order score 2005	Rank
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1	Rajasthan	5770	43.7	1450	999	43.1	1.38	3
2	Maharashtra	8061	57.2	775	1413	26.0	0.97	9
3	Andhra Pradesh	9456	51.5	1450	1586	31.3	0.98	8
4	Uttar Pradesh	4809	35.4	2019	799	50.3	0.37	15
5	Jammu & Kashmir	14885	15.6	1445	10188	68.8	0.31	17
6	Madhya Pradesh	5613	40.2	1552	1250	39.0	1.32	5
7	Gujarat	7221	60.9	1057	928	29.7	1.02	7
8	Orissa	6550	30.9	2183	1791	35.9	0.55	13
9	Karnataka	8293	67.6	1310	1010	26.0	1.37	4
10	Chattisgarh	7791	37.2	2253	1508	20.5	0.92	10
11	Tamil Nadu	8667	66.2	1353	1070	24.1	1.82	2
12	Bihar	4353	17.5	2465	1069	46.8	0.29	19
13	West Bengal	4730	46.0	1553	694	42.9	0.47	14
14	Jharkhand	5854	33.7	1881	995	30.1	0.32	16
15	Assam	7528	17.5	1810	3735	29.4	0.30	18
Small States:								
16	Delhi	10660	71.1	n.a.	1643	12.7	1.17	5
17	Goa	24292	45.0	2971	2460	35.8	1.70	4
18	Manipur	14950	4.5	2318	11168	75.8	0.06	9
19	Meghalaya	14723	10.6	2460	9772	41.8	0.04	10
20	Mezoram	30090	3.9	3930	23180	113.0	2.43	2
21	Nagaland	17541	4.0	2427	13674	-50.6	0.21	8
22	Sikkim	49405	5.9	6182	20926	-77.0	1.91	3
23	Tripura	12895	11.8	2051	8876	-37.6	0.28	7
24	Arunachal Pradesh	26631	3.3	4219	18921	-73.1	0.34	6
25	Kerala	8104	64.7	1559	878	-35.0	4.16	1
26	Haryana	9222	65.3	790	933	-18.8	0.83	11
27	Punjab	8898	58.4	934	758	-39.8	0.58	12
28	Uttarakhand	11269	32.2	1591	4574	-39.8	0.37	15
29	Himachal Pradesh	15771	25.8	1558	7718	54.2	1.21	6
Total Average India (Including all states)								

Law and order score is based on factors, (i) Policemen per lakh of population. (ii) ratio of pending cases to total court cases: incidence of murder, kidnapping, rape, molestation, in total crime, India-Today, p. 32)

Source: *Economic Survey of Maharashtra* (2009-10).

Table 3. Socio-Economic Indication

Sr. no.	Large States	Poverty Ratio H&R (1999-2000)	HDI 1991*	Rank	**Gini Coefficient (55 round) NSS	
					(Rural)	(Urban)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1	Rajasthan	15.28	0.347	27	21.3	28.7
2	Maharashtra	25.02	0.452	15	26.4	35.5
3	Andhra Pradesh	15.77	0.377	23	23.8	31.7
4	Uttar Pradesh	31.15	0.314	31	25.0	33.3
5	Jammu & Kashmir	3.48	0.402	21	n.a.	n.a.
6	Madhya Pradesh	37.43	0.328	30	24.2	32.2
7	Gujarat	14.07	0.431	17	23.8	29.1
8	Orissa	47.15	0.345	28	24.7	29.8
9	Karnataka	20.04	0.412	19	24.5	33.0
10	Chattisgarh	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
11	Tamil Nadu	21.12	0.466	14	28.4	39.1
12	Bihar	42.60	0.308	32	20.8	32.3
13	West Bengal	27.02	0.404	20	22.6	34.3
14	Jharkhand	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
15	Assam	36.09	0.348	26	20.3	31.2
Small States:						
16	Delhi	8.23	0.624	2	n.a.	n.a.
17	Goa	4.40	0.575	4	n.a.	n.a.
18	Manipur	28.54	0.536	9	n.a.	n.a.
19	Meghalaya	33.87	0.365	24	n.a.	n.a.
20	Mezoram	19.47	0.548	7	n.a.	n.a.
21	Nagaland	32.67	0.486	11	n.a.	n.a.
22	Sikkim	36.55	0.425	18	n.a.	n.a.
23	Tripura	34.44	0.389	22	n.a.	n.a.
24	Arunachal Pradesh	33.47	0.328	29	n.a.	n.a.
25	Kerala	12.72	0.519	3	29.0	32.7
26	Haryana	8.74	0.443	16	25.0	29.2
27	Punjab	6.12	0.475	12	25.3	29.4
28	Uttarakhand	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
29	Himachal Pradesh	7.63	0.469	13	n.a.	n.a.
Total Average India (Including all states)		26.1	0.381		26.3	34.8

Source: * *India Development Report (2008) Oxford University press. IGIDR. Mumbai*

** Partapratim Pal and Jayati Ghosh [2007].

A NOTE ON THE DEMAND FOR FORMATION OF A SEPARATE VIDARBHA STATE

D.N. Dhanagare

The Demand for formation of Vidarbha as a separate Province under Governor's Council was first made in the Legislative Council of C.P. & Berar in October 1938. The Council had then passed a resolution to that effect unanimously. The demand for 'Mahavidarbha' was later reiterated forcefully by M.S. (Bapuji) Aney in his Memorandum submitted to the State Reorganisation Commission in 1954. However, at that time Aney's focus was more on 'separate history and cultural identity of Vidarbha'. After the formation of the Bilingual State of Bombay a massive protest movement was launched by the Mahavidarbha Sangharsh Samiti. However, the movement eventually petered out though Jambhwantrao Dhote sustained it till the late 1970s.

Today the focus of the agitation for a separate Vidarbha State has shifted from 'cultural identity' to 'development'. The feeling of 'relative deprivation among the people as well as leaders from Vidarbha has further intensified. However, today's leadership of the movement consists of those who have enjoyed power positions too long within the framework of Maharashtra but while in power they never raised the issue of a separate 'Vidarbha State. Now out of power, they have suddenly turned 'protagonists' of Vidarbha'. Their pretentious claims are the least convincing and their political credibility being at the lowest ebb they are less likely to get support from the rank and file in Vidarbha. Contrast can be seen in Telangana that is likely to be a reality soon whereas Vidarbha appears to be a distant dream.

THE STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT BOARDS IN MAHARASHTRA - A REAPPRAISAL*

Ratnakar Mahajan

The basic object of the constituting of Development Boards for Vidarbha, Marathwada and the Rest of Maharashtra was to ensure that these three regions of the state develop in tandem. This obligation was a legacy as much of history as of geography.

Creation of the State of Maharashtra on linguistic basis amalgamating three geographical regions generated great expectations and hope. The shadow that in the subsequent years fell between hope and reality resulted in the genesis of the Constitution of the Statutory Development Boards under article 371(2) of the Constitution. The original article 371 was substituted by the present article 371 by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956 in the wake of the reorganisation of states.

Regional aspirations in Maharashtra thus have a Constitutional sanction; the instrumentality for meeting them was the Statutory Development Boards. In the sphere of balanced regional development, the Governor of state did not only reign, he also ruled. Predictably enough this occasionally brought him into conflict with the ruling dispensation. The dust raised by such intermittent controversies tends to cloud the basic issues; polemics replacing arguments based on cold facts and sound reasoning. In the bargain, the cause suffers at the hands of the very people espousing that cause.

To what extent these Boards have proved an effective tool, assisting the Governor in the discharge of his undoubtedly onerous duties will always be a debatable proposition. What is far more important is to examine whether the present structure of planning continues to be relevant in the changed circumstances of the day.

While the Supreme Court has laid down in the celebrated Keshvanand Bharati case that the basic structure of the Constitution cannot be altered by the Parliament in exercise of its powers of amending the Constitution, today we have a near-free market economy in a socialist state. The commanding heights of economy are no longer the exclusive preserve of the State and while glasnost and perestroika continue to nibble at the state's domain, the volcanic forces of globalisation and its concomitant, liberalisation have drastically altered the landscape, redefining the compulsions inherent in the present situation.

A paradigm shift is therefore no longer a cliché but a necessity. Apart from the fact that the Development Boards could well become fora for accentuating regional loyalties which seek to capitalise on regional disparities, there will inevitably be a conflict between what the Legislature decides and what the Governor considers to be a more equitable distribution of resources. In the event of a difference of opinion, the Governor's will shall prevail; Article 371 (2) of the constitution provides for establishment of development boards as a special responsibility of the Governor in which process the state's legislature has no role. Equitable allocation of funds for development expenditure is again a special responsibility of the Governor according to 371 (2)(b). While in all other matters, including appointment of Vice chancellors of Universities of which he is the Ex-officio Chancellor, as far as the state's administration is concerned, the Governor is bound to act in accordance with the advice tendered to him by the Council of Ministers, (article 163) when it comes to the Development Board his decision is final. The State

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*Revised version of a Speech at the joint meeting of Development Boards convened by H.E. the Governor of Maharashtra, Mumbai, 12th March 2009

Legislature has to be content with a report on the working of each of these Boards, placed before it each year.

This is far from a happy situation. The different regions of the State thus acquire an identity of their own which is no longer conducive to cohesion and compatibility. The concept of "backlog" besides contributing a new word to the English language in the sphere of development economics, has achieved little of consequence. If anything, it has become a handy tool for the disgruntled elements in the polity. This does not augur well for the State's advancement. Addressing the regional imbalance, such as it is, is one thing; encouraging fissiparous tendencies is another. Against this background the question that arises is: what then is the remedy? The concept of backlog was always questionable in terms of sound economic logic. The backlog of a particular district in a specific sector is based on its distance from the state average. However, the state average is derived from the districts. Then, the process of removal of backlog based on the concept of state average becomes a never ending process. On liquidating the existing backlog, the state average increases. In the process some districts are placed below the state average creating a new backlog. So when does backlog vanish? Never! Moreover, the Fact Finding Committee and the Indicators and Backlog Committee both had ignored the activities of private sector from their analysis and for estimating state and district averages. In the present practices resource allocations are made equitably in all sectors and sub-sectors irrespective of specific needs of the region and their capacity or necessity to spend on the particular sector. Thus, there is no scope for harnessing inherent strengths, specific development opportunities and actual needs of the people. It was a product of the then prevailing thinking in the realm of developmental economics. However twenty five years down the line, situation is no longer the same. Now more logical, scientific and practical basis is available in the name of Human

Development Index (HDI). HDI can be calculated district wise to give a strong footing to the district plan.

If the state's role now is that of a facilitator and less of provider, what is it that it must facilitate and what is it that it must provide? Also what is it that it must discourage? In a welfare state, obviously the vulnerable sections of the society must be the state's prime concern. Facilitator in spheres where the entrepreneurial skills of its citizens, now universally acknowledged, can yield their potential without let or hindrance. The state will have to continue to act as provider where succour is desperately needed. That is the mandate of the times.

For decades we have been talking of planning from below. The epoch making 73rd Amendment gave flesh and blood to the village level institutions of self-governance. Article 243b in no uncertain terms invested the Panchayats with both the responsibility as well as the authority in the matter of -

- a. The preparation of plans for economic development and social justice; and,
- b. The implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule.

The 73rd Amendment came into force on 24th April 1993. What is the ground that we have traversed during the preceding fifteen years? Scheme is a part, plan is a whole of which the scheme is a part, which means the totality of the schemes should be such that their successful completion should bring about an unmistakable change.

The scheme of things envisioned and enjoined by the 73rd Amendment admits of no semantics. A village panchayat will not plan as to how many

steel plants the country should have but it can certainly ask where the government unoccupied land is where it can plant trees as a part of its social forestry programme. In the pre 73rd Amendment era, others decided what was good for the village community. Once the 73rd Amendment came into force, it is the village panchayat which will decide what it needs and the process of arriving at this decision is now far more participatory than it ever was. The Gram Sabha is now truly the *Vox Populi* (the voice of people). These provisions are therefore the *sine qua non* of planning from below. These provisions can, however, yield results only when backed by commensurate transfer of funds along with relevant schemes and projects of development which are at present lying with the state government's various departments. The need for such transfer is obvious but hardly practised since the requisite bureaucratic trust in the Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) is lacking. The political leadership has also to reconcile with the reality and show political will to implement the constitutional mandate that they themselves have ushered in.

Now that it has been decided that the regional backlog has to be cleared and some kind of parity established by the year 2010, ensuring in the meantime that the existing disparities do not get accentuated, it becomes necessary to rethink afresh on the necessity of continuing the development boards. The present functioning of the development boards hardly fulfils the expectation that they along with ascertaining relative levels of development in different sectors in their respective areas, having regard to the requirements of the state as a whole, should also suggest and contribute to the formation of annual plan of the state. For all practical purposes they have become another government department to distribute arbitrarily the discretionary special fund kept at their disposal. This distribution has no relation to the backlog in development in various sectors in their respective areas. At least from now on the boards should get rid of such

meaningless exercise and try to function as some sort of Think Tank contributing to preparing regional development report thereby suggesting measures to correct distortions and imbalances in implementation of the state's annual plan. Programme Evaluation Organisation of the Planning Commission has made some useful suggestions in this regard. In the absence of any such reform and streamlining their functioning the boards would lose their relevance and would invite the closure.

The emphasis in the exercise on the anvil is not on the conventional criteria based on achievement in terms of physical targets and financial targets which has turned out to have form without substance but on the Human Development Index. At one end of the spectrum we have needs, at the other resources but the terrains rarely meet because either the plan is flawed or the implementation inadequate. This recurring theme has had its day because the Human Development Index places man at the centre of the universe, his universe - not the Aristotelian abstraction. Once wants and needs are quantified, the exercise will itself yield the plan and when it is matched with resources the road map is complete.

In this process "region" loses, as it ought to, both its identity as well as its relevance. As it is, 'region' is a superfluous entity as against a district, which is much more specific and practical. 'Region' in Maharashtra has assumed political connotation because the state comprises districts taken from adjacent states on linguistic basis. However, that is now history and needs and ways of development are here and now'. Even within regions, some districts remain neglected. For example, in the Vidarbha region people from Chandrapur, Gondia and Gadchiroli frequently complain about Nagpur, Akola and Amravati being specially taken care of. Same is true of other regions of the state. In the pyramidal structure envisaged, the Village Panchayat provides the

basic territorial unit. That is now, under the 73rd Amendment, a constitutional mandate. The district will then regain its rightful place in the scheme of things, providing the apex. Inter district schemes will figure in the state plan. This will be district planning in the true sense of the term. The district planning committee is entrusted with the task of preparing its district plan on the basis of and inclusions from village plans prepared by village panchayats in their gram sabhas. Through this exercise, from the sum total of the parts, the whole will emerge giving shape and form to the hopes and aspirations the people as never before. The Wardha Plan was an attempt in this direction though it lost its steam soon after it was launched for reasons which had little to do with the anatomy of planning. The Wardha plan was given a quiet burial by the state's status quoist bureaucracy citing the notional inclusion of some of its contents in the regular district plan and the state plan. Though originally envisaged by an input from the political leadership it lost its sheen in the course of time as its implementation was left entirely to the bureaucracy devoid of any further monitoring and evaluation from the political leadership.

What is often not realised that this design will itself set in motion a process of administrative reform. The process in the way will come across certain hindrances and obstructions by the vested interests. Reluctance to let go the power from one's own hands is only human. To overcome these hindrances and obstacles is a mandate given by the Constitution. Therefore, it may be long before the goal is achieved. Planning from below, the very bedrock of participatory democracy will also be administrative reform from below. The bottlenecks constantly encountered in reviving the village economy are the inevitable products of an administrative system and a structure of laws hopelessly out of tune with the rapidly changing times. The village plan will soon run into rough weather when it will be realised that, natural resources which traditionally belonged to the village community and played a significant role

in sustaining the village economy have either been frittered away or have been placed beyond the reach of the villagers.

The stake-holders will not take this lying down. Fortified with the constitutional mandate they will prevail upon the administration to make amends. This will be administrative reform brought about by the people. And that is how it should be. After all, the word "administration" itself means ministering to the needs of the people. A silent revolution will thus have been ushered in; pre-empting any need for any armed confrontation.

Planning will then become power to the people. People currently at the bottom of the heap, tribals included, will have become arbiters of their destiny, within the framework of the existing constraints. Resource constraint is not one of them. On the contrary, budgetary allocations go a-begging until the March frenzy sweeps every thing aside.

This is now a recurring theme causing anxiety all around. Even municipal budgets have started overflowing their coffers. This had never happened before. Resource crunch put an end to many ambitious projects. Time lag caused cost overruns. Incomplete projects claimed priority in allotment of funds denying of the schemes their legitimate share. Such distortions had a deleterious effect on the planning process.

It is not as though the pendulum has moved to the other extreme but resource crunch is not what it used to be. And now therefore we have different kinds of distortion. The stakes are much higher, there is scarcely any accountability because of the overall decline in standards of public morality and rules can always be bent, almost with impunity. In other words, no matter how meticulously a plan is prepared, its execution now is affected by extraneous factors.

This is precisely the moment when people must step in, assert their authority, articulate their aspirations and be responsible for implementation of schemes. All this must happen within the framework of the 73rd amendment. This base will eventually decide the contours of the super-structure. The District Planning Committee (DPC), as provided for in the Constitution is an ideal mix of democratic representation and experts input to enable drawing a practicable and intellectually sound plan for the district. Two thirds of the members of DPC are elected by the members of PRIs and urban local bodies and one third consists of experts in planning public finance and officials at the district level. The DPC is expected to function in collaboration and co-ordination with the local bodies. DPCs, as provided for in the Constitution, have started functioning in Maharashtra very recently. Sufficient time will have to be given to them before their role is evaluated. The deliberations of the District Planning Committee will be focused on creating a mosaic from the pulls and pressures from all directions. The concept of participatory planning will thus have acquired flesh and blood. A certain degree of transparency will need to be ensured almost as a concomitant in its implementation.

The real task is to initiate people into the mechanics of planning. They will take to it as duck takes to water. For, now it is their life, it is their village, it is their plan.

The Statutory Development Boards sadly enough became an exercise in tilting the windmills; clamouring for a larger slice of the cake and completely overshadowed the very people in whose name the banner was being raised. Social audit is still confined to the text books on public administration. How much money has been spent has become more important than how well it has been spent. A paradigm shift is imperative.

Planning as a tool of administration reform may sound quixotic but it will reveal its awesome potential once it follows the constitutional prescription. This is both a challenge and an opportunity. The Human Development Index is not something esoteric for the people; they know what ails them.

If the Statutory Development Boards have not produced the results that they were expected to produce, alternative route will have to be discovered. Planning in terms of the Constitutional mandate is that route.

CHHATTISGARH: DILEMMAS OF DEVELOPMENT

Anupama Saxena

Arrival of a New State

Chhattisgarh is a newly emerged state of India. It was carved out from Madhya Pradesh in 2000. As a new state, Chhattisgarh was a quiet arrival. Chhattisgarh had an uncomplicated birth. By making the electoral promise to carve out a separate State, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won six seats in the region in the 1996 elections, seven in 1998 and eight in the 1999 elections. Analysts conclude that the BJP's decision to go ahead with the Separate State Bill (The Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act 2000) stemmed more from compulsions of electoral politics rather than any genuine desire to fulfil the aspirations of the local people.

The Abundance of Natural Resources and the Industrialisation Based Development

The State has four favourable factors for industrial growth: land, labour, power and water. Apart from this, as the Indian Bureau of Mines, in its Indian Minerals Yearbook-2005, notes, Chhattisgarh has 28 different types of minerals, with coal and iron ore being the most abundant. The Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), in its comprehensive book *Rich Lands, Poor People: Is 'Sustainable' Mining Possible?*, says that around 16 per cent of India's coal reserves, 10 per cent of its iron-ore reserves, 5 per cent of its limestone deposits, 5 per cent of its bauxite, and 88 per cent of its tin reserves lie in Chhattisgarh. One-third of the country's diamond deposits, too, are in the State. But even with one of the richest mineral resources bases, at the time of its birth the state was one of the most socially and economically challenged states of India. Rampant poverty, unemployment and injustice were the severe problems prevailing in the resource rich state. 80 per cent of the State's

population was dependent on agriculture for livelihood. More than 44 per cent of the State's geographical area was under forest cover.

To exploit the natural resource wealth the State came up with a New Industrial Policy in 2009, which was rated as one of the most attractive and investor friendly Industrial Policy for a state in the country. As a consequence of the policies of the State government and because of its rich resource base, Chhattisgarh could bag first position in terms of actual investment inflows among all Indian States in the first seven months of January to July 2006. Within two years, 50 industrial houses inked Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Government of Chhattisgarh to invest Rs 51,000 crore in the State. Similarly, during 2003-04, Chhattisgarh maintained top ranking in terms of fiscal discipline, third position in India in terms of industrial exports, and the first position in actual investment inflows among all Indian States. With an actual investment inflow of more than Rs. 7,700 crore, Chhattisgarh cornered approximately 11 per cent of the industrial investment inflow in the country in 2003-04. Due to this exponential industrial growth the result has been very impressive. Chhattisgarh has achieved a growth rate of 7.35 per cent from 2004-05 to 2008-09, grown faster than the standard miracle benchmark of 7 per cent. As Swaminathan ...Aaiyar puts it "All three states [Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand] belong to what was historically called the BIMARU zone, a slough of despond where humans and economies stagnated. Out of this stagnant pool have now emerged highly dynamic states. Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh were the most backward parts of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, which in turn were among the most backward states of India. After becoming separate states, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh have emerged as

industrial dynamos." (Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar: The economic case for creating small states, <http://swaminomics.org/?p=42>.)

Compared to other states like Jharkhand and Uttaranchal and its parent state Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh is way ahead in terms of overall growth rate and on other indicators of the extent of economic growth of a state like, the number of passengers per outbound flight movement, Telephone connectivity, electrification etc. (In Jharkhand Development Report, prepared by Indicus Analytics Pvt Ltd, these are considered as indicators for economic development. The Report is available at <http://www.indicus.net/media/index.php/feature-d-work/1525-jharkhand-development-report-2010>).

In terms of Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) Chhattisgarh has emerged as a vibrant economy in the country registering highest growth during 2009-10. With 11.49 per cent growth during the year, the state ranked numbered one in the country as Gujarat was the second at 10.53 per cent, followed by Uttarakhand (9.41), Maharashtra (8.59), Orissa (8.35) and Bihar (4.72) (<http://simcwire.simc.edu/?q=no-de/1458>).

The Other Side of Development

It was expected that formation of a separate state would help in fulfilling the aspirations of the people. But so far the results have been far from being satisfactory. About 40.5 per cent of the people are still below the poverty line (Speech by Mr Aman Singh, CEO CHIPS) for UN Award ceremony at New York on 20th June 2007 available at <http://chips.gov.in/newyork.htm>).

According to World Bank also about 43% of the people in Chhattisgarh live below the poverty line (BPL); among these, the tribal and scheduled caste populations are the worst off, together

amounting to 57% of the BPL population (<http://www.worldbank.org.in/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDIAEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20787025~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:295584,00.html>).

It was further expected that the separate state would ensure the development of the dominating tribal population of the state, the poorest section of the state that constitutes 37 per cent of the total population. But the current data for some of the tribal regions is indicative that situations still is not satisfactory. The Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), an environmental organisation based in Delhi, through the presentation of a 365-page report recently claimed that Chhattisgarh performed disappointingly in terms of human development indicators and that almost all its districts come in the category of 150 backward districts of India. The report states that the iron producing districts of Bastar and Dantewada in Chhattisgarh are amongst the 10 most backward ones in India. Although in data provided by Poorest Areas Civil Society (PACS) Programme, out of Total 1922 inhabited villages Safe drinking water is available in 1,867 villages (<http://www.pacsindia.org/Bastar>), the reports collected by various people groups presents a different picture. According to them many of the villages in these districts have no safe drinking water facility. [Investigation report of hunger deaths in Dantewada and Bastar districts by PUCL <http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Industries-environment-resettlement/2004/starvation-bastar.htm>] The report underscored that it was evident that the wealth generated from the iron ore was not reaching the residents of these districts. Of the 200 backward districts, according to Planning Commission, (2003) ["Riders for NREGA: Challenges of backward districts" http://nrega.nic.in/Planning_Commission.pdf] where the NREGA is being implemented, Bastar, Dantewada and Kanker are ranked at 6th, 7th and

8th positions and Jashpur, Korba and Raigarh are ranked at 33rd, 34th and 35th. All these are tribal dominated districts.

Chhattisgarh became the first state in India to privatise the river water. The three rivers were sold to industrial houses in this new state at the cost of restricting common people's access to water for their daily needs. The Sheonath river in Durg - Raipur district was sold to Radius Waters Company in 2000, the Jindal Steel and Power Limited Raigarh was allowed to build and own a dam on the Kurkut River in Raigarh District in 2005 for their power plant that supplies power to Jindal Steel Plant in Raigarh, Jindal Steel Company was allowed to take water from Kelo river in Raigarh District since 1998. (for details please read articles of Alok Putal at <http://www.cseindia.org/userfiles/Privatisation%20unlimited--%20Rivers%20for%20sale%20in%20Chhattisgarh,%20infochange.pdf>)

During the last ten years the historical displacement of people especially in the tribal regions has taken place due to large scale land acquisitions by Industrial houses. According to map provided by Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Chhattisgarh has been among one of the states that has been most affected by displacement.

Naxalites commenced their activities in the Bastar region when it was part of Madhya Pradesh in the 1980s. A combination of political, economic, and social factors in this region, including economic exploitation of tribal communities, poor relations with the police, and absence of government facilities and state institutions, contributed to the popular support and growth of Naxalism. At the time of its birth, out of Chhattisgarh's 16 districts, seven were considered hotbeds of Naxalite activity. After the formation of state, the naxalism has only taken worse shape. From the carving out of Chhattisgarh in 2000 till date, a total of 1416 people including

security men, naxalites and people have been killed in naxal related incidents and on the current count of casualties, Chhattisgarh is the worst naxal-affected State in the country. (<http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/A+year+of+Naxal+violence+in+Chhattisgarh/1/24060.html>)

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described their insurgency as India's biggest internal security challenge. Over 50% of the incidents and killings in the Naxalite conflict have been consistently reported from Chhattisgarh. Chhattisgarh is known globally for the violation of human rights by both: Maoists and the security forces. All parties to the Chhattisgarh conflict have used children in armed operations.

It is obvious that the formation of a separate state has boosted the economic development of Chhattisgarh state but it is also evident that the paradigm of development has not been acceptable to all sections of the society. During the last ten years, Chhattisgarh has witnessed the most aggressive people's movements against the state over its policies of exploitation of natural resources. The benefits of economic development have not been distributed judiciously. A mechanism needs to be developed where the benefits of development should reach to all sections of the population. The tribals who are the historically disadvantaged sections of the state still find themselves on the wrong side of development, facing an egg-chicken like situation as the human rights groups insist that the lack of development is the source of Naxalism and the government is equally certain that there can be no development without peace. Tribals of Chhattisgarh are the historically disadvantaged sections. Their own unawareness, lack of strong political leadership among them, negligence of tribal areas of Chhattisgarh by the then government of Madhya Pradesh, absence of civil society groups in these areas are some of the factors which have been restricting the tribals to have access to fruits of

development. A participatory approach to the process of development and a development agenda that is in accordance with the needs, expectations and local context of the tribal people can be helpful in initiating the process of empowerment of tribal communities.

As Chandi Prasad Bhatt, leader of Chipko Andolan, once said, "when you break a stone, all you get is more stones," the unholy nexus between politicians, bureaucrats and business interests, a legacy of the earlier state, is still to be contended with. The leadership of the newly formed state has been unable to use the opportunity to abandon the older development model and adopt a new strategy. That can have the following ingredients:

1. Rights based approach for development where rights are not merely the subset of the whole process of development but the process of development should be framed within the framework of rights- based approach.

2. The policy making process of issues related to natural resources should be transparent and participatory.

3. An impact assessment by the competent person/persons should be done before the start of

any new development project and accordingly policy and programmes for compensation and rehabilitation should be formulated and implemented. It should involve taking into account the opinion of affected people.

Like their predecessors, the new leadership made every effort to use natural resources to generate more revenue, degrading the environment further, according to the paper [Bhabesh C. et al, 2009] titled "Assessing impact of industrialisation in terms of land use/land cover (LULC) in a dry tropical region (Chhattisgarh), India using remote sensing data and GIS over a period of 30 years", over the three decades, 22.22 per cent of forests have been completely cleared and converted to industrial setup. Another 25 per cent is completely cleared and 10% is degraded. Around 4 per cent of agricultural area is totally affected due to industrial activity."

Exploitation of natural resources for economic development is not a bad idea but this process of development should take into account the opinion of the affected people and the fruits of development should reach to all sections of the society, especially including the affected people. In nutshell, the development process should be inclusive.

DOCUMENTATION

The purpose of this section is to make available to the readers official documents such as reports of committees, commissions, working groups, task forces, etc., appointed by various ministries, departments, agencies of central and state governments and international organisations, which are not readily accessible either because they are old, or because of the usual problems of acquiring governmental publications, or because they were printed but not published, or because they were not printed and remained in mimeographed form. We also present in this section, official documents compiled from scattered electronic and/or other sources for ready reference of the readers. It will be difficult and probably not worthwhile to publish the documents entirely. We shall publish only such parts of them as we think will interest our readers. The readers are requested to send their suggestions regarding official documents or parts thereof for inclusion in this section.

We are also keen to publish Papers, Notes or Comments based on the material included in this section. We invite the readers to contribute the same to our journal, which we shall consider for publication in subsequent issues of the journal, after the usual refereeing process.

In the present section, we publish:

1. *Report of The States Reorganisation Commission*, Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs, No. 53/69/53-Public, dated 29th December, 1953
2. Ambedkar, B.R., *Thoughts on Linguistic States*, Anand Sahitya Sadan, Siddhartha Marg, Chhawani - 20, Aligarh - 202001. (First Published 1955)*

*We are thankful to Shri Prakash Ambedkar for kindly permitting us to reproduce here the original paper in its entirety.

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REPORT OF THE STATES REORGANISATION COMMISSION

1955

INTRODUCTION

On 22nd December, 1953, the Prime Minister made a statement in Parliament to the effect that a Commission would be appointed to examine "objectively and dispassionately" the question of the Reorganization of the States of the Indian Union "so that the welfare of the people of each constituent unit as well as the nation as a whole is promoted". This was followed by the appointment of this Commission under the Resolution of the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs, No. 53/69/53-Public, dated 29th December, 1953 (Appendix A).

2. The task before the Commission has been set out in paragraph 7 of this Resolution in the following terms:

"The Commission will investigate the conditions of the problem, the historical background, the existing situation and the bearing of all important and relevant factors thereon. They will be free to consider any proposal relating to such reorganisation. The Government expect that the Commission would, in the first instance, not go into the details, but make recommendations in regard to the broad principles which should govern the solution of this problem and, if they so choose, the broad lines on which particular States should be reorganised, and submit interim reports for the consideration of Government."

3. Under this Resolution the Commission were required to make recommendations to the Government of India not later than 30th June, 1955. This period was subsequently extended to 30th September, 1955.

4. According to their terms of reference, the Commission were at liberty to devise their own procedure for collecting information and for ascertaining public opinion. After giving careful thought to the procedure to be followed, the

Commission issued a Press Note on 23rd February, 1954 (Appendix B), inviting written memoranda from members of the public as well as public associations interested in the problem of the reorganisation of States. The relevant portion of this Press Note is given below:

"The States Reorganisation Commission, after giving due consideration to the procedure that would be most suitable for the expeditious execution of the task entrusted to them, have decided to dispense with a questionnaire. They invite members of the public as well as public associations interested in the problem of the reorganisation of States to put their views and suggestions before the Commission by submitting written memoranda on matters on which they feel they can assist them. The Commission expect that wherever any concrete suggestions are made they will be supported by historical and statistical data and, if any proposal regarding the formation of any new State or States is made, it will, if possible, be accompanied by one or more maps, as the case may be."

5. It was announced in this Press Note that all memoranda should reach the Commission by 24th April, 1954. However, on account of the keen interest evinced by public organisations as well as the people in general in various aspects of reorganisation, and the nature of our enquiries, we did not adhere to this time limit, and communications ranging from simple telegrams indicating the wishes of particular localities to well-considered memoranda dealing with the problem as a whole continued to come almost to the very end of our appointed task. The total number of such documents received by us reached the figure of 1,52,250. The bulk of these communications is accounted for by simple telegrams, printed resolutions etc., denoting the wishes of particular localities to be included within one or the other unit. The number of well-considered memoranda does not exceed about 2,000.

6. Side by side with the study of these memoranda, we commenced interviewing people from all walks of life. These interviews were held in private to enable the persons interviewed to express their views freely and frankly. The interviews started in New Delhi from 1st March, 1954, and were continued till about the end of July, 1955. We started on 8th April, 1954, on our all-India tour-during the course of which we covered virtually the entire country-and visited 104 places which involved traveling over thirty eight thousand miles. We have interviewed over nine thousand persons.

7. We made every effort to get a complete cross-section of public opinion. Care was taken to see that all those who represent public-opinion were heard unless they were themselves averse to expressing any views. The people interviewed included members of political parties, public associations, social workers, journalists, municipal and district board representatives and other people representing cultural, educational, linguistic and local interests. The purpose of the all-India tour was not only to ascertain public opinion but also to make on-the-spot studies at different places and to understand the background of the problem and the popular sentiment on various aspects of reorganisation.

8. Under our terms of reference, it was open to us to submit an interim report, but at a fairly early stage we came to the conclusion that the submission of any interim report would not be feasible. The problems in peninsular India and some parts of the country outside it are interconnected and we, therefore, did not consider it desirable to formulate our views on any question in isolation. We accordingly decided to study the various problems over the entire country before coming to any final conclusions about any particular region. This excluded the possibility of our submitting an interim report.

9. In our examination of the various proposals for reorganisation we have mainly relied on statistical figures as given in the Censuses of various years. The Census figures for 1951 have been compiled according to what are known as "Census tracts". It has, therefore, been difficult to estimate the mother-tongue figures on a taluk or tehsil-wise basis. We were given to understand that it might be possible to make estimates of taluk or tehsil-wise figures on the basis of certain statistical assumptions. Having regard, however, to the controversies which surround such assumptions, we took into consideration only the figures as printed in different Census reports in reaching our conclusions.

10. We have been cautious also with our financial estimates. We have studied in some detail the possible financial position and the economic potentialities of each of the proposed units. We have been reluctant, however, to lay undue emphasis on these estimates as figures of revenue and expenditure depend, to some extent, on imponderable factors. It may be theoretically possible to raise revenue in a particular unit according to a phased taxation programme, but whether such taxation will be imposed depends, at least to some extent, on political considerations. Control of expenditure in the broadest sense is also influenced by non-economic considerations. We did not consider it safe, therefore, to project present figures of revenue and expenditure into the future.

11. On the other hand, these financial estimates have some validity, because no unit will really start from scratch. It will have a certain financial heritage and a pattern of revenue and expenditure to begin with, and the picture of its financial position, at least in the near future, is not likely to be strikingly different from the present pattern. We have given some weight, moreover, to a study of the potentialities of economic development in

the proposed units. Our financial estimates, therefore, represent only broad judgments of what is probable.

12. Our report is divided into four Parts. Part I deals with the conditions of the problem of reorganisation of States and its historical background. Part II deals with the factors bearing on reorganisation. Part III contains our proposals for the reorganisation of the existing units. In Part IV we have discussed briefly the administrative and other implications of reorganisation and measures which might be adopted to minimise the stress of transition.

13. Before we conclude this introductory Chapter we wish to place on record our deep appreciation of the invaluable assistance we have received from the Secretariat of the Commission and all members of the staff. Had it not been for their ungrudging help and devoted work, cheerfully and efficiently rendered, it would not have been possible for us to complete our difficult task within the period at our disposal. We should also like to express our thanks to members of the public and representatives of political organisations and public associations who responded to our Press Note by submitting written memoranda containing much useful information and statistical and other material.

PART I

THE CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM CHAPTER I STATES OF THE INDIAN UNION

14. The existing structure of the States of the Indian Union is partly the result of accident and the circumstances attending the growth of the British power in India and partly a by-product of the historic process of the integration of former Indian States. The division of India during the British period into British provinces and Indian States was itself fortuitous and had no basis in Indian history. It was a mere accident that, as a result of the abandonment, after the upheaval of

1857, of the objective of extending the British dominion by absorbing princely territories, the surviving States escaped annexation. The map of the territories annexed and directly administered by the British was also not shaped by any rational or scientific planning but "by the military, political or administrative exigencies or conveniences of the moment".¹

15. The provincial organisation of British India was meant to serve a two-fold purpose: to uphold the direct authority of the supreme power in areas of vital economic and strategic importance and to fill the political vacuum arising from the destruction or collapse of the former principalities. Of these two, the first was obviously the primary objective, and it required the suppression of the traditional regional and dynastic loyalties. This was sought to be achieved by erasing old frontiers and by creating new provinces which ignored natural affinities and common economic interests. The administrative organisation of these provinces was intended to secure their subordination to the Central Government, which was the agent and instrument of imperial control exercised from London. This process inevitably led to the formation of units with no natural affinity.

16. During the early phase of the rise of the British power in India, moreover, the accretion of territories was gradual and the need for the rationalisation of administrative units was not seriously felt. British dominion in India started with small settlements in the coastal regions established at different times during the seventeenth century. From the middle of the eighteenth century they provided the bases from which British authority expanded inwards by the acquisition of further territories which were attached to one or the other of the three presidencies.

1. Constitutional Reforms, 1918, para. 39.

17. The Presidencies of Madras and Bombay had practically acquired their final shape by 1801 and 1827 respectively. Accretion of fresh territories to the Bengal Presidency, however, continued up to the year 1865.

18. The Charter Act of 1833 had provided for the creation of a fourth presidency out of the overgrown Presidency of Bengal, to be called the Agra Presidency. It was, however, considered expedient later to set up a less expensive form of government for the new province, and accordingly the North-West Provinces were set up under a Lt.-Governor in 1836 by detaching from Bengal all British territories west of Bihar. The Punjab, annexed in 1849, was the next province to be formed. It extended at that time up to the then north-west frontier of India. Placed first under a Board of Administration and later, in 1853, under a Chief Commissioner, the Punjab was made a Lt.-Governor's province on the transfer of Delhi to it in 1859.

19. Oudh, annexed in 1856, constituted a Chief Commissionership until it was joined to the North-West Provinces in 1877. The Central Provinces were formed in 1861 by taking the Saugor and Nerbada districts out of the North-West Provinces and joining them with the territories of the Raja of Nagpur that had been acquired in 1854. Assam, attached to the Bengal Presidency on its acquisition in 1826, was made a separate Chief Commissioner's province in 1874. In 1901 the strategically important north-west frontier regions were detached from the Punjab and constituted into a separate Chief Commissioner's province. This also resulted in the North-West Provinces and Oudh being renamed the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

20. Thus far the formation of provinces had been mainly governed by considerations of administrative convenience and economy and by reasons of military strategy and security. To the extent, therefore, there was a conscious or

deliberate design behind the demarcation of the territories of administrative units, it was grounded in imperial interests or the exigencies of a foreign government and not in the actual needs, wishes or affinities of the people. Administrative convenience itself required compact units with some measure of homogeneity. In some cases, therefore, various factors conducive to the growth of natural units operated in the background. They were, however, subordinate to the prime considerations of administrative and military exigencies.

21. With the emergence of nationalism as a new factor in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the policy of balance and counterpoise began to override purely administrative considerations in making territorial changes, though on such occasions arguments based on administrative needs and other principles were also put forward. Thus, Bengal, undoubtedly unwieldy as it included at that time also Bihar and Orissa, was divided with a view at least as much to dispersing revolutionary elements as to securing more manageable administrative units.

22. In 1905 Bengal was divided to form, along with Assam, the provinces of (a) East Bengal and Assam and (b) Bengal, which included the western part of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Chota Nagpur. The change in the outlook regarding provincial boundaries was reflected in the famous Resolution of Lord Curzon, dated 19th July, 1905, which, while providing for the partition of Bengal, also commented on the proposed territorial realignment of areas between Madras, the Central Provinces and Bengal. Thus, "reasons of administrative expediency, arising out of the peculiar linguistic and racial conditions and the geographical conformation of Ganjam and the Agency tracts of Vizagapatam" were cited against the transfer of these areas from the Government of Madras. "Commercial considerations" were relied upon for the continued retention of the

districts of Chota Nagpur under the Bengal Government. The linguistic principle was mentioned in support of the transfer of certain Oriya-speaking tracts from the Central Provinces to Bengal; and the principle of close contact between the governors and the governed was put forward to justify the concentration of the "typical Muhammadan population" of Bengal in a separate province .of East Bengal and Assam.

23. Six years later the partition of Bengal was annulled, though it was considered impossible both on "political and on administrative grounds" to revert to the *status quo ante*. In 1912 Assam was reconstituted into a Chief Commissioner's province and the eastern and western parts of Bengal were rejoined to form the province of Bengal. At the same time, Bihar, with Orissa and Chota Nagpur, was constituted into a separate province of Bihar and Orissa.

24. These changes were made in order to provide convenient administrative units and to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people of Bengal. At the same time, they sought to give the Muslims "a position of approximate numerical equality with or-possibly of small superiority over the Hindus" in the new Bengal, formed after the detachment of Bihar and Orissa, which province was intended to give the Hindi-speaking population "a fair opportunity for development". The settlement was supposed to be "so clearly based upon broad grounds of political and administrative expediency as to negative any presumption that it has been exacted by clamour or agitation".

25. The shape of the provinces and the principles underlying their formation, before and after 1905, continued, however, to be very far from satisfactory. As late as 1930 British statesmen

themselves admitted that there were in India "only a number of administrative areas" which had "grown up almost haphazard as the result of conquest, super session of former rulers or administrative convenience".² The desirability of a reorganisation of provinces on a rational, basis was pointed out earlier by the authors of the Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918, who had observed: "We are impressed with the artificial, and often inconvenient character of existing administrative units".³ The Indian Statutory Commission, 1930, endorsed this view and observed: "Although we are well aware of the difficulties encountered in all attempts to alter boundaries and of the administrative and financial complications that arise, we are-making a definite recommendation for reviewing, and if possible resettling, the provincial boundaries of India at as early a date as possible".⁴ The Commission recommended the examination of the question by a Boundaries Commission under a neutral chairman.⁵

26. The Commission made a special mention of Orissa. "An urgent case for consideration and treatment", it observed, "is that of the Oriya-speaking peoples, most, but not all, of whom are now-included in Orissa, because we consider that so close a union as now-exists between Orissa and Bihar is a glaring example of the artificial connection of areas which are not naturally related".⁶

27. The province of Orissa was created in 1936 by joining together the Oriya-speaking areas of the provinces of Bihar and Orissa, the Central Provinces and Madras.

2. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. II para. 25

3. Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918, para. 246.

4. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. II, para. 25.

5. Ibid, para. 38.

6. Ibid.

Integration of the Indian States

28. The administrative units of British India have remained virtually intact after the achievement of Indian Independence. The only changes which have been made so far as these units are concerned are the formation of a separate Andhra State and the merger in these units of some of the territories of the former Indian States.

29. So far, however, as the former Indian States are concerned the period immediately following the transfer of power to India saw a revolutionary change come over them with dramatic speed. Of about six hundred units known as Indian or princely States,

- (a) 216 States having a population of a little over 19 millions were merged in the provinces;
- (b) 61 States having a population of about 7 millions were constituted into new Centrally-administered units; and
- (c) 275 States with a population of about 35 millions were integrated to create new administrative units, namely, Rajasthan, Madhya Bharat, Travancore-Cochin, Saurashtra and PEPSU.⁷

Only three States, namely, Hyderabad, Mysore and Jammu & Kashmir, survived these processes of integration, but the internal structure of these States as also their relationship with the Centre were cast into a new mould so as to fit them into the constitutional structure of India.

30. While factors such as linguistic and ethnic homogeneity or historical tradition were taken into consideration to the extent practicable in the process of integrating these diverse units with adjoining provinces or constituting them into separate administrative units, the compulsion of the dynamic urges of the time necessitated prompt

decisions. A number of settlements, therefore, made in respect of these States had to be in the nature of transitional expedients.

31. The princely States, as they existed at the time of the transfer of power, were themselves in varying phases of development. Their integration into the new democratic Constitution of India involved many problems, both administrative and political. So far as the political structure was concerned, in most States it was a form of direct personal rule; and even in the States which had introduced some of the forms of democratic government, the personal authority of the Ruler was hardly affected. So far as administration was concerned, while some of the larger States had developed a fairly efficient machinery, in most cases it was of a rudimentary character.

32. It was, therefore, inevitable that some of the features of the old order should be found in the Indian Constitution and leave an impress on the administrative and political structure of the units comprising territories of the erstwhile princely States.

Disparate Status of the Constituent Units

33. A peculiar feature of the Indian Constitution is the disparate status of the constituent units of the Union. The Constitution recognises three categories of States and gives each category a pattern and status of its own. The status of the first two categories of States, i.e., those specified in Parts A and B of Schedule I of the Constitution, is based on the concept of federalism. Apart from the institution of Rajpramukh, the main feature that distinguishes Part B States from Part A States is the provision contained in Article 371, which vests in the central executive supervisory authority over the governments of these States for a specified period. This provision is no doubt, un-federal in character, but it does not alter the basic relationship between these States and the

7. White Paper on Indian States, 1950, para. 147.

Centre, which essentially rests on the principle of a clear division of powers between the Centre and the States. Part C States which rank lowest in the hierarchy, are, however, administered by the Centre on a unitary basis. The devolution of powers to the legislatures and governments of some of these States under the Government of Part C States Act, 1951, does not detract from the legislative authority of Parliament over these States or from the responsibility of the Union Government to Parliament for their administration.

34. Apart from the States of the Union, there are also territories specified in Part D of Schedule I, which form part of India. In respect of such territories as also of any territory comprised within the territory of India but not specified in this Schedule, the Central Government has not only full executive authority but also regulation-making power.⁸

Historical Background of the Classification of States

35. If the present alignment of the boundaries of States has been largely determined by the vicissitudes of British rule in India and the integration of the former Indian States, the same holds true also of their existing constitutional classification into different categories.

36. Even before the Act of 1935 introduced, to a limited extent, the federal principle in the governance of this country, the relative status of administrative units *vis-a-vis* the Central Government had varied from one category to another. This was to a certain extent due to the historical reason that different parts of the country were acquired and their administration organised by the British at different times, so that they could not be patterned as units of an administrative structure constituted on a systematic and rational

basis. Considerations of economy and administrative expediency also led the British rulers to give to newly-organised and smaller provinces less expensive and simpler government than that of the older, more settled, and developed provinces.

37. By the close of the nineteenth century, there were in existence three different forms of provincial governments, namely, those under a Governor and Executive Council, those administered by a Lieutenant Governor and those administered by a Chief Commissioner. Many of the British Indian provinces, such as Assam, Bihar and Orissa, the Central Provinces, the North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab and the United Provinces, passed through one or both of the earlier stages before acquiring the Governor-and-Council form of government.

38. The difference in the form of government of a province carried with it a difference in status. It is, no doubt, true in a sense that, after 1833, all the provincial governments became agents of the Central Government. Still the different categories were clearly distinguishable in their status. A broad distinction was made between territories which were under the immediate authority and management of the Central Government and those which were not. To the former category belonged all territories not included in Governorships or Lt.-Governorships, i.e., the provinces administered through Chief Commissioners.

39. A distinction was also made between "major provinces" and "minor administrations". In the first category were included the Governors' provinces, Lt.-governors' provinces and the two largest Chief Commissionerships, i.e., Assam and the Central Provinces, whose Chief Commissioners were, in practice, entrusted with powers merely as wide as those of a Lt.-Governor. All the other Chief Commissionerships were called "minor administrations" and were administered

8. Constitution of India, Article 243.

under the direct control of the Central Government acting, except in the case of Ajmer-Merwara, British Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province, mainly through the Home Department. The North-West Frontier Province and British Baluchistan constituted a special class because of their strategic importance and special political problems. Central control over these, as well as over Ajmer-Merwara, was exercised through the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India.⁹ It was these "minor administrations" which, on account of their geographical position and other special characteristics, continued to be centrally-administered, while the territories which were initially placed under a Chief Commissioner mainly because of administrative expediency, acquired more advanced forms of government in course of time.

40. The Government of India Act, 1935, recognised, in the circumstances in which it was formulated, three categories of component units, namely, Governors' provinces, federating Indian States and Chief Commissioners' provinces. This classification is reflected in the grouping of the States of the Indian Union as Parts A, B and C States, except that not all the former Indian States are now represented by Part B States, a number of them having been merged in the provinces or consolidated into centrally-administered areas. A departure, however, from the old classification is the recognition under the Constitution of two categories of centrally-administered areas, namely, Part C States and Part D territories, as against only one such category recognised under the Act of 1935.

States not Pre-Existing Sovereign Units

41. Another important feature of the States of the Indian Union is that none of them represents

a pre-existing sovereign unit. The units corresponding to the Part A States, namely, Governors' provinces, were administered until 1937 on a unitary basis, although from 1919 there was a certain measure of devolution of powers to the provinces. With the enforcement of the provincial part of the federal scheme embodied in the Act of 1935, certain subjects were assigned to the provinces on a federal basis, but the federal principle was heavily circumscribed by the special powers of the Governors, in the exercise of which they were answerable to the Governor-General. The Chief Commissioners' provinces, although recognised as constituent units of the federation, continued to be administered on a unitary basis. It was only in the case of the former Indian States that the right of accession on a negotiated basis was conceded. Rulers of these States, no doubt, claimed a measure of sovereignty, but this sovereignty was severely overborne by the paramountcy of the British Crown, not only in the field of external affairs but also in respect of internal administration. Whatever the content of the sovereignty of the rulers, it was surrendered by them to the national Government of India before the commencement of the Constitution.

42. Thus, none of the constituent units of India was sovereign and independent in the sense the American colonies or the Swiss Cantons were before they decided to pool their sovereignty to form federal unions. Accordingly, the Constituent Assembly of India, denying its power from the sovereign people, was entirely unfettered by any previous commitment in evolving a constitutional pattern suitable to the genius and requirements of the Indian people as a whole. Consequently, unlike most other federal legislatures, Parliament, representing the people of India as a whole, has been vested with the exclusive power of admitting or establishing new

9. Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, paras, 43 and 44.

States, increasing or diminishing the area of an existing State or altering its boundaries, the legislature or legislatures of the States concerned having only the right to an expression of views on the proposals.¹⁰ It is significant that for making such territorial adjustments it is not necessary even to invoke the provisions governing constitutional amendments. "Unlike the United States of America, therefore, the Indian Union is not an "indestructible Union composed of the indestructible States" in that the Union alone is indestructible but the individual States are not."¹¹

Changes since the Adoption of the Constitution

43. At the time of the commencement of the Constitution, there were nine Part A States, eight Part B States and ten Part C States. Since then, Parliament has, by law, established a new Part A State, namely, Andhra, and merged one Part C State, namely, Bilaspur, in another such State - Himachal Pradesh.

CHAPTER II RATIONALE OF REORGANISATION

44. The demand for the reorganisation of States is often equated with the demand for the formation of linguistic provinces. This is because the movement for redistribution of British Indian provinces was, in a large measure, a direct outcome of the phenomenal development of regional languages in the nineteenth century which led to, an emotional integration of different language groups and the development amongst them of a consciousness of being distinct cultural units. When progressive public opinion in India, therefore, crystallised in favour of rationalisation of administrative units, the objective was conceived and sought in terms of linguistically homogeneous units.

45. Recent years have, however, seen some shift in emphasis on the linguistic principle and a growing realisation of the need to balance it with other factors relevant to the reshaping of the political geography of India, such as national unity and administrative, economic and other considerations. In the paragraphs which follow, we shall trace the evolution of thought on the rationale and objectives of the reorganisation of States with particular reference to the concept of linguistic States.

The British approach

46. As we have observed earlier, during the British period, territorial changes were governed mainly by imperial interests. However, as an ostensible factor the linguistic principle figured, for the first time, in a letter from Sir Herbert Risley, Home Secretary, Government of India, to the Government of Bengal, dated 3rd. December, 1903, in which the proposal for the partition of Bengal was first mooted. Later, in the partition Resolution of 1905, and in the dispatch of Lord Hardinge's government to the Secretary of State, dated 25th August, 1911, proposing the annulment of partition, language was again prominently mentioned. The linguistic principle was, however, pressed into service on these occasions only as a measure of administrative convenience, and to the extent it fitted into a general pattern which was determined by political exigencies. In actual effect, the partition of Bengal involved a flagrant violation of linguistic affinities. The settlement of 1912 also showed little respect for the linguistic principle, in that it drew a clear line of distinction between the Bengali Muslims and Bengali Hindus. Both these partitions thus ran counter to the assumption that different linguistic groups constituted distinct units of social feeling with common, political and economic interests.

10. Constitution of India, Articles 2, 3 and 4.

11. Munro: *The Government of the United States*, 5th edition, p. 591

47. The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 1918, not burdened with the task of finding a posteriori, reasoning for decisions taken on political grounds, approached the problem with greater objectivity. They examined the suggestion for the formation, within the existing provinces, of sub-provinces on a linguistic and racial basis, with a view mainly to providing suitable units for experiment in responsible government. Although they rejected the idea as impracticable, they commended the objective of smaller and more homogeneous units. "We cannot doubt", they observed, "that the-business of government would be simplified if administrative units were both smaller and more homogeneous; and when we bear in mind the prospect of the immense burdens of government in India being transferred to comparatively inexperienced hands, such considerations acquire additional weight. It is also a strong argument in favour of linguistic or racial units of government that by making it possible to conduct the business of legislation in the vernacular, they would contribute to draw into the arena of public affairs men who were not acquainted with English".¹²

48. Twelve years later, the question of redistribution of provinces was considered by the Indian Statutory Commission, who recognised that the provincial boundaries, as they then existed, embraced, in more than one case, areas and population of no natural affinity and separated those who might under a different scheme be more naturally united. Speaking of the factors which should govern redistribution, the Commission stated:

"If those who speak the same language form a compact and self-contained area, so situated and endowed as to be able to support its existence as a separate province, there is no doubt that the use of a common speech is a

strong and natural basis for provincial individuality. But it is not the-only test-race, religion, economic interest, geographical contiguity, a due balance between country and town and, between coast line and interior, may all be relevant factors. Most important of all perhaps, for practical purposes, is the largest possible measure of general agreement on the changes proposed, both on the side of the area that is gaining, and on the side of the area that is losing, territory"¹³

The Commission thus gave only qualified support to the linguistic principle. It attached great importance to agreement amongst the people affected by the changes.

49. The Indian Statutory Commission's view that the question could not be settled by any single test received support from the O'Donnell Committee, which was appointed in September, 1931, to examine and report on the administrative, financial and other consequences of setting up a separate administration for "the Oriya-speaking peoples" and to make recommendations regarding its boundaries. In the event of separation. In framing their proposals, the Committee took into account all relevant factors, such as language, race, and the attitude of the people, geographical position, economic interests and administrative convenience. But more than all these factors, the Committee claimed to attach "great, indeed, primary importance" to the wishes of the inhabitants where they can be clearly ascertained."¹⁴

50. Sind came into existence, along with Orissa, in April, 1936, but the demand for this province was conceded mainly to placate Muslim opinion. The Indian Statutory Commission, while expressing sympathy with the claim for the separation of Sind, had taken the view that there were

12. Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918, para. 246.

13. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. II, para. 38.

14. Report of the Orissa Committee (O'Donnell Committee), Vol. I, para. 6.

grave administrative objections to isolating Sind and depriving it of the powerful backing of Bombay before the future of the Sukkur Barrage was assured and the major adjustments which it would entail had been effected.¹⁵ However, the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1933-34, took note of the fact that separation of Sind had been pressed not merely by the Sindhi Muslims but also by Muhammadan leaders elsewhere in India and recommended it on the ground that "apart from other considerations, the communal difficulties that would arise from attempting to administer Sind from Bombay would be no less great than those which may face a separate Sind administration".¹⁶

The approach of the Indian National Congress

51. The Indian National Congress lent indirect support to the linguistic principle as early as 1905 when it backed the demand for annulling the partition of Bengal which had resulted in the division of the Bengali-speaking people into two units. Yet another concession to the linguistic principle was the formation of a separate Congress province of Bihar in 1908,¹⁷ and of the Congress provinces of Sind and Andhra in 1917. This involved a deliberate departure from the normal organisational pattern which had so far followed the boundaries of the existing administrative provinces. However, at this stage, Congress opinion had not clearly crystallised in favour of linguistic provinces and at the session of 1917 the principle was strongly opposed by the group led by Dr. Annie Besant.

52. It was only some thirty-five years ago that the Indian National Congress was converted officially to the view that linguistic provinces were desirable. It was at its 1920 session at

Nagpur that the Congress accepted the linguistic redistribution of provinces as a clear political objective and in the following year the principle was adopted for the purposes of its own organisation.

53. In 1927, following the appointment of the Indian Statutory Commission, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing the opinion that "the time has come for the redistribution of provinces on a linguistic basis" and that a beginning could be made by constituting Andhra, Utkal, Sind and Karnataka into separate provinces. Those supporting the resolution spoke of the right of self-determination of the people speaking the same language and following the same tradition and culture.

54. The question of redistribution of provinces was also examined by the Nehru Committee of the All Parties Conference, 1928. The Committee lent its powerful support to the linguistic principle in the following terms:

"If a province has to educate itself and do its daily work through the medium of its own language, it must necessarily be a linguistic area. If it happens to be a polyglot area difficulties will continually arise and the media of instruction and work will be two or even more languages. Hence it becomes most desirable for provinces to be regrouped on a linguistic basis. Language as a rule corresponds with a special variety of culture, of traditions and literature. In a linguistic area all these factors will help in the general-progress of the province".¹⁸

55. The Nehru Committee recommended that the redistribution of provinces should take place on the basis of the wishes of the population, language and geographical, economic and financial principles. Of all these factors, however, in the opinion of the Committee, "the main

15. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. para. 38.

16. Report of the Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms, Vol. I, para. 57.

17. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya-History of the Indian National Congress, Vol. I., P. 147.

18. Report of the Nehru Committee, All Parties Conference, 1928, p. 62.

considerations must necessarily be the wishes of the people and the linguistic unity of the area concerned".¹⁹ It will be of interest, however, to note that the Committee, while recognising that the argument for the separation of Sind was very strong on the grounds that it was a definite linguistic area and that the great majority of the people demanded separation, regretted that they could not take the declaration of the Sind National League to "cut their coat according to their cloth", as a final solution of the financial problem.²⁰

56. Between the years 1928 and 1947, the Congress reaffirmed its adherence to the linguistic principle on three occasions:

- (i) at its Calcutta session held in October, 1937, it reiterated its policy regarding linguistic provinces and recommended the formation of the Andhra and Karnataka provinces;
- (ii) by a resolution passed at Wardha in July, 1938, the Working Committee gave an assurance to the deputations from Andhra, Karnataka and Kerala that linguistic redistribution of the provinces would be undertaken as soon as the Congress had the power to do so; and
- (iii) in its election manifesto of 1945-46, it repeated the view that administrative units should be constituted as far as possible on a linguistic and cultural basis.

57. The Congress election manifesto of 1945-46, which assured the people that provinces would be constituted on a linguistic and cultural basis, not in every case but as far as it was possible in the circumstances of each case, would appear to be the first attempt to qualify the linguistic principle. There was a perceptible change, however, in the outlook of the Congress leaders on the subject with the Partition and the achievement of Independence. These brought in their wake

unthought-of problems, giving rise to serious doubts as to whether the old pledges could be redeemed in the new conditions.

58. Speaking before the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on 27th November, 1947, soon after Partition, the Prime Minister, while conceding the linguistic principle, remarked: "First things must come first and the first thing is the security and stability of India". This was, followed by the appointment, on the recommendation of the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly, of a Linguistic Provinces Commission, known as the Dar Commission, for the purpose of enquiring into and reporting on the desirability or otherwise of the creation of any of the proposed provinces of Andhra, Karnataka, Kerala, and Maharashtra and fixing their boundaries and assessing the financial, economic, administrative and other consequences in those provinces and the adjoining territories of India. It follows from the terms of reference of this Commission that reconstitution of provinces solely on a linguistic basis was no longer taken for granted.

59. The Dar Commission reported to the Constituent Assembly in December, 1948. It not only expressed itself strongly against any reorganisation being undertaken in the prevailing circumstances but also held that the formation of provinces exclusively or even mainly on linguistic considerations would be inadvisable. The Commission felt that in forming provinces the emphasis should be primarily on administrative convenience. The homogeneity of language should enter into consideration only as a matter of administrative convenience.²¹ The Commission emphasised that everything which helped the growth of nationalism had to go forward and everything which impeded it had to be rejected or should stand over.²² Among many other factors

19. Report of the Nehru Committee, All Parties Conference, 1928, p. 61.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.

21. Report of the Linguistic Provinces Commission, para. 131.

22. *Ibid.*, para. 147.

which should be given due weight the Commission mentioned history, geography, economy and culture.²³

60. In the opinion of the Commission, if new States, formed after taking into consideration all these factors, possessed linguistic homogeneity also, that would be an additional advantage.²⁴

61. The Dar Commission listed certain "generally recognised" tests which a linguistic area must satisfy before it could be formed into a province. These were:

- (i) geographical contiguity and absence of pockets and corridors;
- (ii) financial self-sufficiency;
- (iii) administrative convenience;
- (iv) capacity for future development; and
- (v) a large measure of agreement within its borders and amongst the people speaking the same language in regard to its formation, care being taken that the new province should not be forced by a majority upon a substantial minority of people speaking the same language.²⁵

62. Soon after the Dar Commission had submitted its report, the Indian National Congress appointed at its Jaipur Session in December, 1948, a Committee to consider the question of linguistic provinces and to review the position in the light of the report of the Dar Commission and the new problems that had arisen since Independence. The Committee, known as the J.V.P. Committee, which consisted of Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, was the first Congress body to sound a note of warning against the linguistic principle. It stated that:

- (a) when the Congress had given the seal of its approval to, the general principle of linguistic provinces it was not faced with the practical application of the principle and hence it had not considered all the implications and consequences that arose from this practical application;²⁶
- (b) the primary, consideration must be the security, unity and economic prosperity of India and every separatist and disruptive tendency should be rigorously discouraged;²⁷
- (c) language was not only a binding force but also a separating one;²⁸ and
- (d) the old Congress policy of having linguistic provinces could only be applied after careful thought had been given to each separate case and without creating serious administrative dislocation or mutual conflicts which would jeopardise the political and economic stability of the country.²⁹

The Committee admitted that if public sentiment was insistent and overwhelming the practicability of satisfying public demand with its implications and consequences must be examined. However, it imposed two limitations on the possible satisfaction of such a demand:

- (i) that, at least in the beginning, the principle might be applied only to well-defined areas about which there was mutual agreement; and (ii) that all the proposals which had merit behind them could not be implemented simultaneously.

The report stated that a beginning could be made with the creation of Andhra.³⁰

23. *Ibid.*, para. 131.

24. *Ibid.*, paras. 151 and 152(4).

25. Report of the Linguistic Provinces Commission, para 10.

26. Report of the Linguistic Provinces Committee, Congress. p. 2.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 5 and 15.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

30. Report of the Linguistic Provinces Committee, Congress, pp. 15-16.

63. The J.V.P. Committee's report was adopted by the Congress Working Committee in April, 1949. Since then, the Congress has broadly adhered to the views expressed in this report. This would be clear from the election manifesto issued by the Congress in 1951 and the resolutions passed by it since 1949.

64. The manifesto declared that the decision about the reorganization of States would ultimately depend on the wishes of the people concerned but expressed the opinion that, while linguistic reasons were important, there were other factors also, such as economic, administrative and financial considerations, which had to be taken into account. As a practical example, the Congress agreed to the formation of the Andhra State because the Andhra Provincial Congress, the Tamilnad Congress and the Madras Government had agreed to it, but withheld support to the proposal for the formation of a Karnataka State for want of agreement of the great majority of the people including the people of Mysore State.

65. A question which has become important since 1951 is the Implementation of the five-year plan. This found a specific mention in the All-India Congress Committee resolution adopted at Hyderabad in January, 1953.

66. The latest Congress stand on the subject as announced at the Hyderabad Session in January, 1953, and reiterated in the Working Committee resolution adopted in May, 1953, and further reaffirmed at Kalyani in January, 1954, is that in considering the reorganisation of States all relevant factors should be borne in mind, such as the unity of India, national security and defense, cultural and linguistic affinities, administrative convenience, financial considerations and economic progress both of the States and of the nation as a whole. It may be noted that there was emphasis both at Hyderabad and at Kalyani on

the unity of India and national security which, as the Kalyani resolution says, "must be given first priority".

Views of other Parties

67. The linguistic redistribution of States also figured prominently in the election manifestos of other political parties. The Socialist Party expressed itself in favour of the redistribution of States on a linguistic basis consistently with geographical contiguity and economic viability. The Communist Party stood for national States enjoying wide powers including the right of self-determination. The Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party advocated the appointment of a high-power committee to go into the whole question of the redistribution of States including the question of bilingual border areas. The Hindu Maha Sabha believed in the policy of formation of provinces on a linguistic basis but was of the opinion that due regard should be paid to the problem of defence and to other factors like area and economic stability.

The creation of Andhra

68. The post-1947 period also witnessed the formation of the-Andhra State. The J.V.P. Committee had suggested that a beginning could be made with Andhra. The Committee had, however, suggested in its report certain general principles, one of which required that disputed areas should not be included in the new provinces. Accordingly, Madras city, which was a disputed area, was not to form part of Andhra. The Prime Minister made it clear in his statements in Parliament in December, 1952, that Government could proceed with the formation of the Andhra State only according to the principles of the J.V.P. Committee. After the death of Shri Potti Sriramulu, the Government of India announced their decision to establish the State of Andhra "consisting of the Telugu-speaking areas of the

present Madras State but not including the City of Madras". Shri Justice Wanchoo was appointed to report on the financial and other implications of the decision.

69. In his report submitted in February, 1953, Shri Justice Wanchoo recommended the transfer of the Bellary district to Andhra with the provision that, if and when a Karnataka State was formed, the Kannada-speaking areas of the district should go to that State. However, the Government of India decided to include in Andhra only the three taluks of the district which had a Telugu majority, and to transfer the other taluks, excepting Bellary, to Mysore State. The decision of the Government of India in respect of Bellary taluk was deferred because it was felt that "in view of its very mixed population not only its linguistic composition but certain other matters would also need examination before a final decision is reached".³¹

70. Following this decision, Shri Justice Misra was asked to examine and report on the future of the Bellary taluk after taking into consideration all relevant factors which were to include "linguistic composition and cultural affinity, administrative convenience and economic well-being". On the basis of the recommendations made in Shri Justice Misra's report, the Government of India decided to transfer the whole of Bellary taluk to the State of Mysore.

71. On August 10, 1953, a Bill was introduced in the House of the People "to provide for the formation of the Andhra State". The State of Andhra, which, according to the statement made by the Deputy Home Minister in Parliament on 17th August, 1953, was a province which approximated as much as possible to a linguistic province, came into existence on 1st October, 1953.

CHAPTER III TIME FOR REORGANISATION

72. As we have stated earlier, the desirability of the redistribution of provincial territories was recognised from time to time even by British statesmen. As early as May, 1903, Lord Curzon, the then Governor-General, considered the time to be appropriate for such an undertaking, because of

- (i) absence of political passions on the subject;
- (ii) preparedness of educated public opinion for redistribution; and
- (iii) availability of experienced administrators with special knowledge of the areas involved.

However, the only result of Lord Curzon's initiative in the matter was the first partition of Bengal.

73. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 1918, recognised the need of a general redistribution, but did not consider the time opportune for such changes, because they considered it unwise to undertake simultaneously the revision of the Constitution and of the political geography of the country. It expressed the view that redistribution "ought in any case to follow, and neither to precede nor accompany, constitutional reform and suggested "that it should be recognised as one of the earliest duties incumbent upon all the reformed provincial Governments to test provincial opinion upon schemes directed to this end".³²

74. The Indian Statutory Commission also recommended a readjustment of provincial boundaries, particularly in view of the change in the status of provinces consequent on a substantial decentralisation of powers, and the ultimate

31. Shri Justice Misra's Report, para. 2, p. 2.

32. Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918, para 246.

establishment of a federation of which the provinces would form units. The Commission was conscious of the very great difficulties in the way of redistribution, but urged that the main cases in which provincial readjustment seemed called for, be investigated by a Boundaries Commission to be set up by the Government of India.³³ No such Commission was, however, set up, the only changes introduced following this recommendation being those relating to the creation in April, 1936, of Sind and Orissa as separate provinces.

75. During the period between 1936 and 1947, major political and constitutional issues and the prosecution of the war engaged the attention of the government and nothing further was heard about the reorganisation of provinces.

76. After the transfer of power to India, the question was examined by the Linguistic Provinces Commission of the Constituent Assembly in July-December 1948, and the J.V.P. Committee, appointed by the Congress, which reported in April, 1949. Both these bodies were concerned with the limited question of the formation of certain linguistic provinces. However, they suggested the postponement of the formation of new provinces on grounds which could be applied to a large extent to the general question of the reorganisation of States.

77. The Dar Commission recommended that no new provinces should be formed for the time being and that the question could be taken up when India had been physically and emotionally integrated, the Indian States problem solved, the national sentiment strengthened and other conditions were favourable,³⁴ on the grounds that

- (i) India was burdened with problems more urgent than the problem of the redistribution of provinces, such as those, of defense, food, refugees, inflation and production;
- (ii) it could not afford to add to its anxieties the heat, controversy and bitterness which the demarcation of boundaries and the allotment of capital cities of Bombay and Madras would involve;
- (iii) the economic consequences of splitting up of existing provinces into several new provinces required a great deal of study, preparation and planning; and
- (iv) the administrative personnel available at the time were inadequate to bear the additional burden of running new governments.³⁵

78. The J.V.P. Committee generally concurred in this view and did not consider the time opportune for reorganisation, because it was likely to

- (i) divert attention from more vital matters;
- (ii) retard the process of consolidation of the nation's gains;
- (iii) dislocate the administrative, economic and financial structure of the country and seriously interfere with the "progressive solution of our economic and political difficulties"; and
- (iv) let loose, while we were still in the formative stage, forces of disruption and disintegration.³⁶

79. The Committee, however, admitted that if public sentiment was "insistent and overwhelming" they would have to submit to it, subject to certain limitations in regard to the "good of India as a whole" and other conditions specified by them.³⁷

33. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. II, para. 38. p. 26.

34. Report of the Linguistic Provinces Commission, paras. 138 and 152(3)

35. *Ibid.* para. 132

36. Report of the Linguistic Provinces Committee, Congress, p. 9.

37. *Ibid.* pp. 15-16.

80. A similar view was taken by the Prime Minister when he spoke on 7th July, 1952, in the House of the People on the resolution for the reorganisation of States on a linguistic basis. He emphasised that "we must give the topmost priority to developing a sense of unity in India and anything that might come in the way of that unity might perhaps be delayed a little", and added that at a time when the world was hanging on the verge of a crisis it was extraordinarily unwise to unsettle and uproot the whole of India for a theoretical approach or a linguistic division.

81. With the appointment of this Commission, the problem is now again before the country, with opinion divided on the appropriateness of the time for undertaking large-scale changes in the existing set-up.

82. Those opposed to reorganisation argue that:

- (a) there has been no marked change in the situation, internally or externally, which would justify the view that factors which made the consideration of any proposal for the reorganisation of States inadvisable in 1948 and 1952 have now disappeared;
- (b) problems created by the Partition, including the complicated problem of Kashmir, have still to be settled;
- (c) the international situation and developments across the borders do not admit of any dissipation of national energies and resources;
- (d) the economic development of the country continues to demand the highest priority; and
- (e) any large-scale changes in the existing set-up are bound to generate provincial feelings and impair national solidarity.

83. The opponents of reorganisation have accordingly suggested the postponement of the whole issue for a period of at least twenty or twenty-five years to allow for the creation of a

proper atmosphere in the country so that we might concentrate during this period on other matters of vital national importance.

84. These arguments are not without substance. While internally as well as externally the situation is, no doubt, easier than it was immediately after the attainment of Independence, neither the international scene nor the economic and other problems facing the country would justify a complacent attitude. It is also true that any large scale reorganisation of States is likely to involve a heavy financial and administrative burden on the resources of the country. But this logic must yield now to the realities of the situation which render further postponement of the question impracticable.

85. The problem of reorganisation has become emergent, because. India, with her programme of large, scale planning, has to think in terms of enduring political units. A direct and regrettable outcome of the present state of uncertainty is that there has been a general reluctance to invest funds in the disputed areas.

86. One of the main impediments in the way of reorganisation was that a certain measure of territorial inviolability was enjoyed by the former Indian States, both under the British rule and during the period immediately following the transfer of power. The integration of these states has, however, removed this impediment and has paved the way for a rational approach to the problem.

87. It may be recalled in this connection that the Indian Statutory Commission had considered it extremely important "that the adjustment of provincial boundaries and the creation of proper provincial areas should take place before the new process has gone too far. Once the mould has set, any maldistribution will be still more difficult to

correct".³⁸ This applies in a greater measure to the ill-assorted units representing territories of some of the former Indian States whose future should be considered, before vested interests get too strongly entrenched and reasonable settlement becomes difficult. 88. The appointment of this Commission itself has given rise to expectations and prepared the country psychologically for the readjustment of state territories. The Commission has had the benefit of the views of prominent leaders of public opinion and has received valuable material on the various aspects of reorganisation. Unless a constructive approach is now recommended, it will cause a sense of frustration with all its attendant evils.

89. A good deal of reasoning against the reorganisation of States has also been coloured by the presumption that reorganisation must lead to a linguistic redistribution of States. But for this tendency to equate reorganisation with the formation of linguistic States, there would be a fair measure of agreement on the desirability of rationalising the existing units. Thus, for instance, informed public opinion is agreed on the point that the present classification of States into three categories can no longer be defended, and that of the two alternatives of equalising the status of the existing small units with that of Part A States or their merger in adjoining larger milts, the latter is more practicable.

90. It would, perhaps, have been possible to defer the process for some time, but the decision to create the State of Andhra and the events leading to it have precipitated matters. Even without this decision, so long as the political parties stand committed to the policy of reorganisation, further deferment of a general reorganisation might lead to more dissatisfaction.

91. The task of redrawing the political map of India must, therefore, be now undertaken and accomplished without avoidable delay, in the hope that the changes which are brought about will give satisfaction to a substantial majority of the Indian people.

PART II

FACTORS BEARING ON REORGANISATION

CHAPTER I. COST OF CHANGE

92. Although the Resolution appointing this Commission vests in this body full discretion to consider any proposal or principle bearing on reorganisation, the Government of India have indicated some broad principles which should govern the consideration of the problem. The relevant portion of this Resolution is quoted below:

"The language and culture of an area have an undoubted importance as they represent a pattern of living which is common in that area. In considering a reorganisation of. States, however, there are other important factors which have also to be borne in mind. The first essential consideration is the preservation and strengthening of the unity and security of India. Financial, economic and administrative considerations are almost equally important, not only from the point of view of each State, but for the whole nation. India has embarked upon a great ordered plan for her economic, cultural and moral progress. Changes which interfere with the successful prosecution of such a national plan would be harmful to the national interest".

93. The principles that emerge may be enumerated as follows:

- (i) preservation and strengthening of the unity and security of India;
- (ii) linguistic and cultural homogeneity;
- (iii) financial, economic and administrative considerations; and

38. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. II, 'pare. 38.

(iv) successful working of the national plan.

94. Before we go into these and other principles relevant to the task with which we are charged, it would be well to take note of the unsettling consequences of reorganisation. The pace of change in recent years has been such and the changes themselves have been so far-reaching that there has been a general tendency to assume that the administrative and financial consequences of reorganisation cannot be serious. This is an unrealistic view. Changes in the existing set-up resulting in the breaking up of old ties and the creation of new associations must involve, at least during the transitory phase, a large scale dislocation of the administrative machinery, no less than of the life of the people. As the J.V.P. Committee has pointed out, whatever the origin of the existing units, and however artificial they might have been, a century or so of political, administrative and, to some extent, economic unity in each of the existing State areas, has produced a certain stability and a certain tradition. Any change would naturally have an upsetting effect.

95. To begin with, parliamentary legislation in terms of Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution, in order to give effect to any scheme of reorganisation, must itself entail a great deal of effort and time. If one were to judge by existing tensions, the proceedings in State Assemblies, preceding parliamentary legislation, may be protracted and may give rise to strong feelings. Reorganisation of States on a rational basis may also necessitate a number of constitutional amendments which will add considerably to the burden of piloting legislation concerning reorganisation proposals.

96. The problems of transition will, by no means, be over with the passage of enabling legislation. In the first instance, there is the difficult question of the unification of the laws in force in the areas which might be grouped together. The laws extant in the existing administrative units, including those governing such

vital matters as land tenure, agrarian reforms and prohibition, are not the same even in the geographically contiguous States. There has been no uniform attempt in the recent past, when mergers have taken place, to apply straightaway the laws and regulations of one predominant area to the whole State. Some States have had to depart from this principle because of the prevalence of social and economic conditions in those areas justifying disparity in laws. In some States old laws are still operative because of the delay in completing the process of unification of laws.

97. The initial phase of transition during which two or more sets of laws are applicable in one State cannot, however, last for any length of time. Apart from *prima facie* objections on general grounds and the administrative inconvenience which it will involve, lack of uniformity in the application of tax laws will make budgeting difficult, and the lack of uniformity, in so far as it involves discrimination without justification, may even prove to be bad in law. For these reasons every reorganised State will have to undertake, in the initial years, a laborious and exhaustive review of its existing legislation.

98. The process of disintegration and reintegration of the existing administrative units must also entail serious dislocation of the administration. It involves a difficult process of integrating the service personnel belonging to one State with the personnel of another State; retrenchment of surplus and unsuitable personnel, if necessary; introduction of unified pay scales; re-fixation of cadres; re-determination of relative seniority in the different services, etc. It may also be necessary in consequence of reorganisation to devote attention in the initial years to the basic structure of the administration in some of the States, that is to say, the system of district administration, the number of districts and other administrative units and sub-units.

99. In the case of the Part B and Part C States this administrative integration has proved to be a complex problem. In spite of the fact that the utmost importance was attached at the highest level to the early completion of this process, there are some States where it is still to be completed. In the light of this experience it cannot be anticipated that the transition will be easy.

100. In the case of Andhra it was possible, to some extent, to hasten separation. But for various reasons (such as that *inter se* seniority was not disturbed, that surplus staff was retained by the residuary State, and that no great changes in the number or the constitution of the districts were involved), Andhra cannot be regarded as a good precedent. Moreover, the Andhra administration has itself had to face such difficulties as the dispersal of its offices, absence of duplicate records, and lack of experienced staff. It cannot, on the whole, be anticipated that reorganised administrative machinery will start functioning smoothly in the new States within a short period.

101. This must be regarded as the indirect cost of change; to the extent that revision of salaries after reorganisation becomes inevitable (and such a revision, it must be remembered, can only be upwards), there will also be a direct recurring cost. It is not possible or necessary to attempt a forecast of this cost except to indicate broadly the magnitude of the problem. One estimate which has been made on certain assumptions is that the lump sum provisions which will be needed in order to introduce uniform scales of pay may run into ten or eleven crores per annum. Without necessarily accepting this estimate, it may be assumed that one of the consequences of reorganisation will be the intensification of the existing demands for salary revision to such an extent as to render an increase in State Governments' expenditure unavoidable.

102. Whether there is or there is not a case for salary revision is not a question on which it is necessary for this Commission to express an opinion. In the event of a revision being ultimately decided upon, the State Governments may be able to meet the extra cost involved in the introduction of uniform scales of pay by retrenchment and administrative rationalisation to some extent, but, too much reliance cannot be placed on these possibilities in the initial years after reorganisation. In the light of the experience of the working of some of the Part B States, a reduction in the number of districts and other administrative units or large-scale, retrenchment, even if justified on administrative grounds, would appear to be a remote possibility. Retrenchment and rationalisation will have to be spread, in all probability, over a number of years; the extra cost of salary revisions will, therefore, be fairly heavy.

103. One other major consequence of reorganisation will probably be the upsetting of the work of the Delimitation Commission. Much of the work of the delimitation of constituencies will have to be done all over again, and major amendments will clearly be needed in the Representation of the People Act, 1950.

104. This discussion is not, and cannot be, exhaustive. It does not take into account, for example, what may be called the human factor, which should be a relevant consideration in breaking up old associations and alignments, or the fact that the service personnel allotted to a State may be inadequately equipped to deal with the needs of that State. There will also be many other minor difficulties with which the new States may be faced. The division of assets and liabilities has never proved to be easy. What are known as unique institutions, that is to say, institutions which serve the needs of the State as a whole, may not be equitably divided on partition; arrangements may have to be made to duplicate them or to ensure that they serve the separated units. Separation of records would involve a

process of sifting, collating and large-scale copying. Some changes in the judicial organisation of the States, will also be necessary, and considerable volume of accounts work will be created at a time when the Comptroller and Auditor-General is planning an experiment in the separation of accounts and audit, which will itself add greatly to the responsibility of State Governments.

105. The Integration of princely States involved administrative Changes in an area of about 360,000 square miles inhabited by about 59 million people - not counting the major and minor units the boundaries of which were not changed. Impressive as the scale and swiftness of these changes were, it can now be seen in retrospect that the process of rationalising the administrative system in these areas has been spread over seven or eight years and, as has been stated already, it is still not complete. If the reorganisation of States at the present time is to be on a comparable scale, the effects of the change are bound to be considerable.

106. A preliminary but essential consideration to bear in mind, therefore, is that no change should be made unless it is a distinct improvement in the existing position and unless the advantages which result from it, in terms of the promotion of "the welfare of the people of each constituent unit, as well as the nation as a whole" - the objectives set before the Commission by the Government of India-are such as to compensate for the heavy burden on the administrative and financial resources of the country which reorganisation of the existing units must entail. The reorganisation of States has to be regarded as a means to an end and not an end in itself; that being the case, it is quite legitimate to consider whether there is on the whole a balance of advantage in any change.

CHAPTER II. UNITY AND SECURITY OF INDIA

107. The first essential objective of any

scheme of reorganisation must be the unity and security of India. Any movement which may tend to impair the unity of the country must 'ultimately affect the welfare of all sections of the Indian people. Any measure of reorganisation which is likely to create tensions and disharmony must weaken the sense of unity among the people of India and should not, therefore, be countenanced.

108. While it is generally agreed that the unity of India must be regarded as the prime factor in readjusting territories, there has been considerable difference of opinion as to how this objective is to be realised. Basically, the difference of approach arises from the measure of emphasis put on the relative suitability, in the conditions prevailing in the country of federal and unitary concepts, not merely as the basic postulates underlying the constitutional structure of India, but as embracing concepts covering the political as well as the social and cultural life of the people. The problem is essentially one of determining how far the free play of provincial sentiment deriving from a consciousness of cultural and linguistic distinctiveness is a factor making for unity or disunity.

109. One view is that:

- (a) it will be unrealistic to disregard the patent fact that there are in India distinct cultural units; the unity of the country, therefore, should not be sought in terms of an imposed external unity but a fundamental unity recognising diversity of language, culture and tradition of the Indian people;
- (b) the strength of the Indian Union must be the strength . which it derives from its constituent units; and
- (c) since the unity and strength within the constituent units is a condition precedent to a healthy feeling of unity at the national level, any attempt to eliminate tensions and contradictions and to make units more homogeneous and internally cohesive is bound to strengthen the unity of the whole nation.

110. The other view is that:

- (a) in the past India did not achieve a real measure of political unification or develop into a living body, social or political, constituting an integrated whole; if, therefore, we have to create a united India, it must be based on a new concept of unity which cannot be achieved by reaffirmation or re-enunciation of old values such as religion, community, culture and language, which operate more to separate than to unite;
 - (b) regional consciousness never contributed to India's oneness in the past. In fact, it is inherent in narrower loyalties, whether based on communal, provincial or linguistic considerations, that they ally themselves with centrifugal forces and become instruments of inter-state discord and other disruptive trends. The idea of sub-nations or nationalities, which must foment resistance to the growth of national unity, is implicit in the demand for a reorganisation of States or a rectification of their boundaries, on the basis of exclusivist factors such as linguistic and cultural homogeneity; and
 - (c) if, therefore, the unity of India has to develop into a dynamic concept capable of welding the nation together, it must transcend community and language and recognise the entire nation as one integrated unit.
- (ii) in a vast country like ours, governed by a federal Constitution, centrifugal forces are not an unnatural phenomenon, but what is important is not that they should be eliminated, but that such forces must not be allowed to impede the achievement of our national, unity; and
 - (iii) the strength of the nation is undoubtedly the sum total of the combined strength of the people of the component States. But while the building of contented units, strong enough to bear their share of the burden, is an important objective, it is no less necessary that the links between the units and the nation should be equally strong so that under the stress of regional loyalties, the Union does not fall apart.

112. It follows that, while internal adjustments at State level are to be desired, it is imperative to ensure that these do not lead to maladjustments at the inter-state and national level. From the point of view of national unity, therefore, reorganisation has to aim at a two-fold objective:

- (a) firm discouragement of disruptive sentiments such as provincialism or linguistic fanaticism; and
- (b) consistent with national solidarity, provision of full scope for the unhampered growth of the genius of each group of people.

111. In the Chapter dealing with the implications of the linguistic principle we have examined at some length the question of finding an equilibrium between the regional sentiment and the national spirit. Here we shall briefly indicate the basic considerations which should govern our approach to the problem:

- (i) an essential feature of our social fabric is undoubtedly a wide variation in our life within the framework of a broadly united culture. This, however, does not mean that diversity is a pre-requisite of unity or that overemphasis on diversity will not hamper the growth of the national sentiment;

This requires that we must build the administrative and political structure of the country on the basic concept of the primacy of the nation, conceding to lesser units an autonomous existence and an intrinsic life and purpose of their own, but only within the harmoniously integrated organism of Indian nationhood.

National Security

113. A fundamental pre-requisite of national security is the unity of the country. What promotes unity, therefore, also strengthens security.

Other considerations which we have to keep in mind from the point of view of national security are:

- (i) it is of great importance that the composition of administrative units, should not assume a form which might foster regional, communal or other narrower loyalties in, any section of the armed forces of India and thereby undermine their undivided allegiance to the Union of India;
- (ii) in strategic areas where effective or direct central control is necessary, the administrative structure as also the measure of autonomy given to the people, should be governed by considerations of national security; and
- (iii) another factor relevant from the point of view of national security is the size and resources of the border States. While the primary responsibility for defence arrangements must be that of the Central Government, a considerable burden relating to security arrangements must be borne by the State. It is, therefore, important that a border State should be a well-administered, stable and resourceful unit, capable of meeting the emergent problems arising out of military exigencies. This means that normally it would be safer to have on our borders relatively larger and resourceful States rather than small and less resilient units.

114. It may be desirable to elaborate the last-mentioned point a little further. It has been argued in some important memoranda that the formation of the separate North-West Frontier Province in 1901 involved the recognition of the principle that, for defence purposes, a small province on the border is preferable to a large one. This view is based on an incorrect appreciation of the reasons for the detachment of the frontier districts from the Punjab to form a separate Chief Commissioner's province.

115. The main consideration underlying the detachment of the frontier region in 1901 was the establishment of direct central control over it in preference to control through the medium of "a Local Government of the first class". In fact, when the proposal to establish the North-West Frontier Province was approved, the Secretary of State for India recounted the advantages of a strong administration on the frontier and pointed out that the existing arrangements had been found unsatisfactory and that the assumption of direct central control over the frontier areas had become essential. He said:

"In remarking that the need of a strong administration equipped with all the resources of Government would be felt on the frontier, I did not refer to the political administration. I referred to the advantages that must accrue to the frontier districts of British India from the application to them of the ways and means at the command of a first-class administrative unit. The construction of roads, bridges, rest houses, and hospitals, and generally the assignment of provincial resources to a particular district, may be of the utmost value, and are best secured if the district is an integral part of a large province. In times of disturbance or threatened danger a larger province can draft in additional police, procure transport, change local officers, and do much to Prepare for troubles before they arise or assume the form of Military operations".

116. This puts succinctly the case for larger States on the frontier. It seems clear to Us that, When a border area is not under the direct Control of the Centre, small units and multiplicity of jurisdictions would be an obvious handicap froth the Point of view of national security.

CHAPTER III. LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

117. The question that has caused the greatest controversy is the position to be accorded to language in the reorganisation of the States of the Indian Union. One of the major facts of India's political evolution during the last hundred years has been the growth of our regional languages. They have during this period developed into rich and powerful vehicles of expression creating a sense of unity among the peoples speaking them. In view of the fact that these languages are spoken in well-defined areas, often with a historic background, the demand for the unification of such areas to form separate States has gathered momentum and has, in some cases, assumed the form of an immediate political programme. The Resolution appointing this Commission makes a specific reference to the importance of language. A careful examination of the pros and cons of this problem is, therefore, necessary as an essential preliminary to the consideration of the question of the reorganisation of States.

The case for Linguistic States

118. The advocates of a rigid and uniform application of the linguistic principle in determining the boundaries of States advance important arguments- in support of their claim which may be briefly stated and examined here.

119. A federal union, such as ours, presupposes that the units are something more than mere creatures of administrative convenience. The constituent States in a federal republic must each possess a minimum degree of homogeneity to ensure the emotional response which is necessary for the working of democratic institutions. The States of the Indian Union can achieve this internal cohesiveness only if they are constituted on a unilingual basis, because language being the vehicle for the communion of thought and feeling provides the most effective single bond for uniting the people. Linguistic homogeneity, therefore, provides the only rational basis for

reconstructing the States, for it reflects the social and cultural pattern of living obtaining in well-defined regions of the country.

120. In a democracy such as we have in India, based on universal adult franchise, the political and administrative work of a State has of necessity to be conducted in the regional language. A multiplicity of such languages would lead to weakness and inefficiency in administration and rivalry and jealousy in politics. It is pointed out that already in some of the States a large percentage of members in the legislature know only one language and this trend is likely to become more and more emphasised. In some States even ministers know only one regional language. Discussions in legislatures would become difficult, if a considerable number of members are unable to follow the proceedings.

121. Under an alien rule the basic need of unity of outlook between the people and those governing them could be subordinated to imperial and other considerations. But under a democratic form of government based on adult franchise, it is imperative that there should be a real consciousness of identity of interests between the people and the government, and that both should work in an atmosphere of co-ordination and mutual understanding. The success of a welfare state depends essentially on broad-based popular support, which cannot be secured if the processes of government are not brought home to the people. If the Legislature of a State is not to develop into a babel of tongues, it must conduct its work in one language, the language of the people. The various devices adopted in multi-lingual States to meet the communicational needs of the people have led only to a dissipation of energy and national resources.

122. Educational activity can be stimulated only by giving the regional languages their due place. If the educated few are not to be isolated